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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the challenges of ethnic conflict in Nigeria and Malaysian plural 
societies, in view of the demands their diverse ethnic groups impose on nation-building. 
This tension is largely exacerbated by factors that favour group dominance particularly on 
the right to resources which mostly fractures effort at achieving national cohesion. This 
study is important given the persistent problem of instability which has affected the 
development and well-being in both countries. The ethnic problem in Nigeria is centered on 
two polar extremes - the Government position that “Nigeria’s unity is not negotiable and 
must not be discussed” in its lopsided nation-building posture, and some ethnic groups that 
see themselves as viable nations entrapped in an invented nation-state. This thesis discusses 
reoccurring problems that have bedeviled Nigeria as a nation since its independence in 
1960 as observed in continuing ethnic conflicts, which are less mitigated due to its fledging 
federalism which ought to have enhanced interethnic harmony within its multi-ethnic 
society. The thesis highlights ethnic demands resulting in militancy over “Resource 
Control”, “Religious Intolerance” as well as “Secessionist Movements” in the face of 
persistent inequality and unfairness to some ethnic groups in Nigeria. This may explain 
disunity in Nigeria. These are some of the contested issues that have fractured efforts at 
achieving smooth nation-building and national development. This is the focus of the thesis, 
which provides a lens to view Malaysia’s achievement in its interethnic harmony, political 
stability and social development. However, investigation reveals how leadership role and 
policy implementation over decades in Malaysia have led to good wealth distribution 
although with inherent institutionalised preferential policies in favour of its Malay ethnic 
majority as a solace against tension. It explains Malaysia’s ethnicised federal practice 
which is uncommon that largely constitutes huge ethnic tensions beneath the surface in the 
country as observed in its grumbling minority groups while the system has remained 
considerably and progressively stable. Hence this work reconciles the problem in Nigeria 
within the embrace of progress made by Malaysia whose similar society has lived a 
relatively peaceful life for over half a century.  Inequality, denial and social exclusion, inept 
leadership as well as institutional inadequacy are found to have exacerbated ethnic conflicts 
in Nigeria hence the state totters in the face of tension. This study is a mirror to view 
construction and reconstruction in Nigeria’s sociopolitical space which defines its 
continuity and discontinuity, while it aligns Nigeria to Malaysia’s success in interethnic 
balance. Given this insight, the thesis argues that no multiethnic nation-state makes 
substantial social progress or survives outside the axis of its interethnic balance. This is 
Nigeria’s challenge in nation-building. Significantly, the study relies on empirical evidence 
as well as secondary data while providing logic for comparison. Relatively, theory of 
federalism is adopted in this study as conflict mitigating mechanism in plural societies to 
clarify different issues in both countries while the thesis concludes with relevant 
recommendations.  
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ABSTRAK 
Kajian ini meneliti cabaran-cabaran dalam konflik etnik dalam masyarakat plural di Nigeria 
dan Malaysia yang masing-masing mempunyai pelbagai tuntutan ke atas pembinaan 
negara. Ketegangan ini sebahagian besarnya diburukkan lagi oleh faktor-faktor yang 
memihak kepada dominasi kumpulan terutamanya tentang hak untuk mendapat sumber-
sumber utama negara dan dominasi ini kebanyakannya boleh merosakkan perpaduan. 
Kajian ini penting memandangkan masalah ketidakstabilan berterusan dan membantutkan 
pembangunan serta kesejahteraan di kedua-dua negara. Masalah etnik di Nigeria berpusat 
pada dua ekstrem - kedudukan Kerajaan bahawa "perpaduan Nigeria tidak boleh dirunding 
dan tidak perlu dibincangkan" dan kedudukan sesetengah kumpulan etnik yang melihat diri 
mereka sebagai negara berdaya maju tetapi terperangkap dalam negara-bangsa yang 
direkakan. Tesis ini membincangkan masalah yang sering muncul yang mencengkam 
Negara Nigeria sejak kemerdekaan pada tahun 1960, sepertimana yang berlaku dalam 
meneruskan konflik etnik yang disebabkan oleh persekutuan untuk mempertingkatkan 
keharmonian masyarakat yang berbilang etnik. Tesis ini menonjolkan tuntutan-tuntutan 
etnik yang menyebabkan wujudnya tindakan militan terhadap beberapa isu penting iaitu 
"Kawalan Sumber Utama", "Intoleransi Agama" serta "Gerakan Pemisah" dalam keadaan 
tiadanya  ketidaksamaan dan ketidakadilan bagi semua kumpulan di Nigeria. Demikian 
antara isu-isu yang didebatkan yang menghambat usaha-usaha dalam pembinaan dan 
pembangunan negara.Walaubagaimanapun kajian menunjukkan bahawa peranan 
kepimpinan dan perlaksanaan polisi di Malaysia semenjak beberapa dekad yang lalu telah 
menyumbang kepada pengagihan kekayaan yang saksama, sungguuhpun wujudnya  polisi 
polisi yang memihak kepada ethnik kaum Melayu untuk mengurangkan ketegangan di 
kalangan kaum tersebut. Ini menunjukkan bahawa polisi ethnik yang diamalkan oleh 
Kerajaan Malaysia, dimana amalan tersebut jarang dipratikkan oleh negera lain, telah 
menyumbang kepada ketegangan dan ketidakpuasan hati di kalangan kaum minority 
walaupun polisi tersebut kekal stabil dan utuh. Dengan itu kajian di Malaysia ini memberi 
pengajaran kepada Nigeria untuk melihat kemajuan Malaysia yang ciri masyarakatnya 
adalah sama tetapi secara relatifnya hidup dalam keadaan  aman selama lebih setengah 
abad. Ketidaksamaan, penafian dan penyisihan sosial, kepimpinan tidak cekap serta 
kelemahan institusi didapati memburukkan lagi konflik etnik di Nigeria. Kajian ini 
merupakan cermin untuk melihat dan menilai ruang sosiopolitik Nigeria yang mentakrifkan 
kesinambungan dan ketakselanjaran, dan pada masa yang sama ia menjajarkan Nigeria 
dengan Malaysia. Berdasarkan wawasan tersebut, tesis ini menghujahkan bahawa tidak ada 
negara pelbagai etnik yang dapat mencapai kemajuan sosial yang besar di luar paksi 
keseimbangan antara etnik itu. Inilah cabaran Nigeria dalam pembinaan negara. Secara 
signifikan, kajian ini bergantung kepada bukti empirikal serta data sekunder di samping 
menyediakan hujahan logik bagi tujuan perbandingan. Secara relatifnya, teori persekutuan 
yang digunakan dalam kajian ini sebagai mekanisme pengurangan konflik dalam 
masyarakat majmuk untuk menjelaskan isu-isu yang berbeza di kedua-dua negara  dan tesis 
ini diakhiri dengan cadangan yang sesuai. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
             This study examines the challenges of ethnic conflict in the context of pluralistic 
societies of Nigeria and Malaysia. Ethnic conflict among ethnic groups can be defined as 
a struggle for equality, recognition or autonomy within the framework of an existing 
territorial state, and sometimes a struggle for independence from such a state. It can also 
be called an identity conflict - a phenomenon, subsequent to the decolonisation process 
that occurred in the 1960s. As a new development, it resulted quickly in many former 
colonial territories becoming independent nations in Africa and Asia.  
             This study aims to address continuing ethnic tensions in Nigeria and Malaysia 
through a comparative analysis of the two countries through the lens of federalism as a 
mechanism that helps to mitigate conflict in plural societies. However, the idea is 
predicated on the fact that the structure and composition of societies define their form of 
governance and administration. Hence the formation of Nigeria and Malaysia as multi-
national states directly derives from heterogeneity in culture, descent and origin. 
Significantly, the choice of this comparative study is premised on shared features by the 
two countries, such as the degree of ethnic conflict and harmony, as well as factors that 
have contributed to each country’s level of tension. For example, both countries operate 
a federal system of government which accommodates their respective multi-ethnic, 
religious and cultural diversities. Malaysia and Nigeria share a common colonial history 
as former British colonies that won their independence in 1957 and 1960 respectively 
which began their nation-building efforts as independent federal states. Given their 
multiethnic and racial diversities, this thesis focuses on three main ethnic groups in 
contention in both countries. These are the Igbo, the Hausa/Fulani and the Yoruba ethnic 
groups in Nigeria, whereas in Malaysia three main ethnic groups, the Malays, the 
Chinese and the Indians are studied. Coser defines ethnic conflict as “a struggle over 
values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the 
 2 
opponents are to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their rivals.”1 For example, in Nigeria, 
the aforementioned problems were largely aggravated by the policy adopted by the 
British colonial rule in which both the northern and southern regions of Nigeria were 
merged together in 1914, but were administered separately through the indirect rule 
policy of the British colonialists. Even when federalism became effective in 1954 by the 
creation of three regions which operated independently, the North had isolated the South 
which received its self-governing status in 1957. The North claimed that they were not 
mature for self-rule but, later became self-governing in 1959.
2
 Independence was won in 
1960 amid ethnic divisions and hatred, among the main ethnic groups in the new nation.  
            Notably, these main ethnic groups in Nigeria are distinct given their cultural 
differences and wide geographical separations. The territories of three major ethnic 
groups, namely the Igbo from the east, the Yoruba from the west, and the Hausa /Fulani 
from the north were merged to form Nigeria. As a nation with over 250 diverse ethnic 
groups, the first decade of independence was characterised by violence and ethnic 
conflicts exacerbated by sectional cleavages, disagreement and suspicion among the 
ruling elites of Nigeria which unfortunately made the country seemingly ungovernable. 
              This thesis takes into account Nigeria’s early electoral and census crises of 1962 
-1964, and persistent tensions leading to the military coup and counter coup of 1966, 
which climaxed into civil war from 1967-1970 as the country became seemingly 
ungovernable. For example, severe ethnic divisions within Nigeria’s unbalanced federal 
structure had a negative outcome in the unity, political process, as well as the 
consolidation of democracy in the country. It strongly speaks of a North South divide, 
exacerbated by immediate post-civil war power control by a sectional (ethnic) army that 
controlled power in Nigeria for almost three decades of the country’s forty years of 
independence to the chagrin of other sections of the country.    
                                                 
1
 L. A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, Glencoe III, New York: The Free Press, 1956, p. 8. 
2
 April A. Gordon, Nigeria’s Diverse Peoples: A Reference Source Book, California: OBC-CLIO, Inc, 
2003, p. 97. 
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            The military distorted the original federal structure of Nigeria without the 
consent of the many ethnic groups. A series of patrimonial and clientelist tendencies by 
the ethnic military toward the people led to deep feelings of marginalisation, alienation, 
exclusion and even the denial of basic rights. For example, the dimensions of the conflict 
were in part exacerbated by the slashing of the revenue derivation in the country from its 
original 50 percent to 1.5 percent by the various military regimes. This led to serious 
tensions immediately after the military disengaged in 1999. Second, given this divisive 
ethnic posture, various military regimes in Nigeria engaged in new state creation, which 
started in 1970 by Gowon’s administration. It was meant to neutralize ethnic dominion 
within the federation as observed in the Biafran war, and to protect the minority groups.  
           This exercise later gave rise to boundary disputes among ethnic communities 
across the country. No true federal arrangements were provided in most of the decisions 
affecting various ethnic groups under the military.
3
 Ethnic divisions, suspicion and 
hatred which could not be mitigated by its federal structure quickly led to more brutal 
conflicts and impairment which Nigeria has been exposed to since the last fifty years of 
existence. Economic stagnation, mass poverty, endemic corruption, political instability, 
inept leadership, weak institutions, and ethno-religious conflicts are found elsewhere, 
but the Nigerian situation is considered to be especially serious for the country is 
regarded an unstable federation. This study stresses that the prevalent atmosphere was 
exacerbated by the inability of the central governing authority to equitably cater for its 
citizens, and was worsened by military interventions in politics that created a “coup 
culture” in the country. Military involvement in politics led to the militarisation of 
                                                 
3
 Donald Horowitz is correct in his theoretical insight that after independence among decolonized states 
“the context and the issues changed. No longer was the struggle against external powers paramount. No 
longer was colonial domination the issue. Self-determination had been implemented only to the level of 
preexisting colonial boundaries. Within these boundaries, the question was to whom the new states 
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explains the crux of the Biafran Civil War in Nigeria discussed in chapter 3.  Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic 
Groups in conflict, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, p. 4. 
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politics as well as politicisation of the military in Nigeria. By 1999, Nigeria had to 
contend with the military assumed role of corrective agents of national unity as 
expressed in Pita Agbese’s “Nigeria and Military Disengagement theory.”4 Military rule 
being an aberration, national oil wealth was mismanaged through corruption and a 
patronage system which prevailed under the logic of maintaining national unity of 
impoverished masses who were suffocating under the yoke of poverty.  Efforts by some 
past leaders at various National Conferences to resolve ethnic conflicts and separatist 
tendencies in Nigeria were not truly successful, though Nigeria still exists as one nation. 
             The most problematic is the government’s position that “Nigeria’s unity is not 
negotiable and must not be discussed” amid Nigeria’s flawed administration in spite of 
its federalism as a conflict mitigating mechanism. Hence some ethnic groups in Nigeria 
see themselves as viable nations territorially entrapped in an invented nation-state of 
colonial construction. Ethnic conflicts in Nigeria and Malaysia led Horowitz to 
incorporate both countries among others in the analysis of his theory on ethnic conflict. 
For Horowitz, “Ethnicity is at the center of politics in country after country, a potent 
source of challenges to the cohesion of states and of international tension.”5 
           However, Malaysia as a multiethnic nation-state which also operates a federal 
system of government is compared with Nigeria to understand its level of ethnic 
cohesion to ascertain whether positive values found can be applied to Nigeria. Given the 
aforementioned features, it is certain that Malaysia as a nation has experienced conflicts 
in the past, yet has been able to manage such contestations and cleavages to date. Similar 
to the Nigerian civil war, Malaysia’s early beginning was disrupted by the 13th May 
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5
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1969 race riots which claimed many lives. This was casused by the economic disparity 
that existed between the indigenous mainly poor Malay majority and the largely 
wealthier Chinese ethnic group that dominated the economy at the time. The government 
rose to tackle the problem through the National Economic Policy (NEP) - an affirmative 
action plan put in place to rectify the economic and social imbalances that existed among 
various communities and to enhance the well-being of all citizens in the country.  
            However, given its successful affirmative action policies, Malaysia’s ethnicised 
federal structure has over the years used preferential policies in favour of its Malay 
majority to avoid tensions while non-Malay ethnic groups continue to grumble resulting 
in some ethnic tension brewing below the surface, despite an appearance of normalcy. In 
spite of this, Malaysia has, from 1970s onwards, achieved rapid progress in many fields, 
such as education, affordable healthcare, communication, a large manufacturing base, 
and a reduction in the poverty to 5 per cent. Malaysia has achieved considerable political 
stability while it hopes to join the league of developed countries by year 2020.    
            Malaysian macroeconomic management has remained a balancing act, with 
prioritised goals in achieving redistribution of income and also allowing for economic 
stabilization in the system.
6
 The thesis compares and contrasts ethnic conflicts in both 
countries through the framework of federalism as a benchmark to determine how the 
levels of ethnic conflict affect national stability, development and wellbeing of their 
peoples. This is the focus of the thesis, which traces historical and contemporary factors 
in line with Car’s view that, “To learn about the present in the light of the past means 
also to learn about the past in the light of the present. The function of history is to 
promote a profounder understanding of both past and present through the interrelation 
between them”.7   
  
                                                 
6See, Jayant Menon, “Macroeconomic Management amid Ethnic Diversity: Fifty Years of Malaysia 
Experience,”  Journal of Asian Economics, Volume 20, Issue 1 (2009): 25-33, here p. 25. 
7
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Statement of the Problem 
 
       This study stresses that Nigeria is a complex society with over 250 ethnic groups, 
mostly described by scholars as a deeply divided society.
8
 Its ethnic tensions stem from 
its federal structure which has not been able to mitigate overarching ethnic cleavages and 
misrule as the root of continued ethno-religious and political tensions since its birth as a 
nation in 1960. The earlier mentioned major ethnic groups in Nigeria which maintain 
different cultures and traditions were brought together as a nation in 1914. Given the 
ethnic disunity that characterised the colonial era, there was little or no compromise 
among the ruling elites who took over power from the colonialists. This internal strife 
caused a stalemate in the business of governance which subsequently led to the first 
military coup, counter coups and civil war in Nigeria which lasted for nearly three years. 
           The prolonged misrule of the military distorted ethnic cohesion and aggravated 
grievances among ethnic groups and communities over perceived neglect of some 
sections of the society as national resources were mismanaged to the detriment of the 
nation’s development. Due to the discovery of oil, the military in 1970s unilaterally 
reduced the derivation meant to be paid to oil producing regions unlike the pre-civil war 
derivation on agriculture to the three main regions. The military hardly consulted the 
federating units in their unilateral policy decisions. The twelve year old (since 1999) 
Niger Delta crisis is a reaction to the long suppression by the military, and what they call 
denial of their rightful share from oil located in their region. The ongoing destruction of 
oil pipelines as well as the Nigerian armed forces regular skirmishes with armed ethnic 
militia in the oil-rich region has constrained effort at peaceful nation-building. 
                                                 
8
 Nigeria is complex in terms of its ethnic composition.This has been commented by Diamond in an effort 
to showcase its averse to unity and not amenable to cohere for social progress. Larry Diamond describes 
Nigeria as “struggling with massive problem of governance and could swing either toward democracy or 
dictatorship in the coming years”. According to him, “no country in the world has had a more turbulent and 
tragic democratic experience than Nigeria.” See, Larry Diamond, “Foreword” in Rotimi T. Suberu, 
Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria, Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace, 2001, pp. xi- 
xii. 
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         The creation of new states and re-creation of states by the military to accommodate 
the demands of certain ethnic groups still caused other groups to demand their own 
states within the Nigeran Federation. This caused many teething problems, such as 
unequal revenue allocation, boundary disputes, communal clashes, political tussle for 
official posts, disputes over the location of new state capitals and local government 
headquarters. These tensions have seriously affected interethnic relationship and the 
smooth governance of Nigeria, which Agbese describes as “one of the most pernicious 
legacies of the military rule is the culture of violence that it has created in the country.”9 
          Political instability is also largely induced by certain sections of the country that 
tend to disallow power shift to other areas in the Nigerian federal structure. This is 
resisted through electoral fraud, assassination, arson etc when compromise is lacking. 
For instance, the Igbo have been marginalized since the civil war ended in 1970 and it 
brought about the reemergence of the “Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign 
State of Biafra” (MASSOB) which is Igbo separatist group in the East. Similarly, it is 
important to note that the “Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta” (MEND) 
is another separatist group in the South-south region fighting for self-autonomy. 
        The idea to institutionalise Sharia Law in Northern Nigeria since early 2000 has 
been resisted by the Nigerian Government based on the country’s secular status. Apart 
from years of religious conflict especially in the North, the ongoing killings by the Boko 
Haram tend to worsen religious tension in Nigeria. This ethno-religious bloodbath took a 
new dimension between 1999 and 2007. For example, over 11,000 Nigerians died 
through politically motivated violence and ethno-religious conflicts between 1999 - the 
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beginning of Obasanjo’s democratic dispensation and the end of 2007.10 However, more 
than 3 million people in Nigeria were displaced by strife which has been ongoing.
11
  
          While ethnic and religious tensions undermine the stability and growth of Nigeria, 
the nation is also steeped in corruption having lost over US$380 billion since its 
independence in 1960. These have led to retarded growth and progress in which many 
Nigerians suffer extreme poverty. This misguided rule has contributed to economic 
frustration among groups which are engaged in ethno-religious blood baths, communal 
clashes, exclusion and marginalization. Years of neglect of economic development, 
unfocused policy directions and marginalisation by the Nigerian state has intensified 
calls for self-determination by ethnic groups who increasingly view themselves as 
trapped in a country seen as an unworkable legacy left behind by the British.  
        Many ethnic nationalities were arbitrarily lumped together into a territorial unit that 
formed the geographical entity called the state of Nigeria. To many, of these “new” 
states, there was no identification among sub-national groups/communities with the state 
as a symbol of collective identity, and no political community.
12
 These problems have 
led in the past to calls for a National Conferences to discuss Nigeria’s future, but to no 
avail. For example, the agenda at the recent conference under Obasanjo included fiscal 
policies, revenue allocation, federalism, and ‘no-go-area’ for discussion was on the unity 
of Nigeria’s ethnic groups, which the government says ‘unity’ is not negotiable. 
         Similarly, one of the ex-military officers in the Nigerian army, General Alani 
Akinrinade (rtd) cautioned the government that “No-go-areas do not exist in democracy. 
True democracy is a process that operates in an open system”.13 Rhetorically, Osaghae 
also asked, “What is really the trouble with Nigeria? It is arguably one of the most 
complex countries in the world and belongs to the genre of the most troubled complex 
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societies called deeply divided societies”.14He also argues that, “Nigeria is a crippled 
state. It was crippled from the beginning by the nature of its colonial creation and 
integration into the global economy, and has remained crippled by corrupt and 
authoritarian regimes, the inability to overcome its divisions, and the inability to 
determine its manifest destiny in the face of a hegemonic world order.”15  
           Indeed, resource control, militancy and secession, ethno-religious tension, 
electoral fraud, arson and assassination, legitimacy crisis are largely centered on ethnic 
cleavages that overwhelm the Nigerian government and hence the state totters to 
systemic failure. This study emphasises that the Nigerian polity is unstable due to fierce 
ethnic competition and a lack of compromise among sectional leaders in most of their 
national engagements. This thesis stresses that years of misrule outside Nigeria’s federal 
institutional framework has aggravated tension along ethnic and regional lines. It has 
constrained development, which is usually empowered by institutional competence. This 
has negatively affected the social and welfare needs that enhance interethnic well-being 
and harmony, which is the hallmark of federalism as conflict regulatory mechanism. 
Given these contrasting scenarios in Nigeria’s federal structure, this thesis opines that no 
multiethnic nation-state makes substantial social progress or survives outside the axis of 
its interethnic balance. This is Nigeria’s challenge in nation-building.  
        Comparatively, Malaysia is considered as maintaining considerable political 
stability due largely to its level of ethnic harmony. However, no conclusions can be 
made yet, because within its federal setting and constitutional arrangement, various 
governments in the country have for decades used certain constitutional acts and 
limitless preferential policies to favour a particular group. This is part of a Malay-ethnic 
dominance expressed in UMNO’s seemingly authoritarian rule since 1957. Malaysia’s 
known religious moderation is fast drifting towards a uni-polar primacy of Islam - in the 
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making of an Islamic state, while its original secular constitution is contested by other 
stakeholders.
16
This is not helpful because religion is almost drawn along ethnic lines too.              
           Given the aforementioned issues and many more, this thesis points out to reasons 
advanced by Shamsul – a top Malaysian scholar that “Malaysia had since been in a state 
of stable tension, which means that we have been living in a society dominated by many 
contradictions but we have managed to solve most of them through a continuous process 
of consensus-seeking negotiations, sometimes the process itself became a solution”.17 
The study investigates these and more, and the level of ethnic cohesion in Malaysia 
being compared with Nigeria. This is especially to find ways Malaysia’s considerable 
ethnic harmony could provide insights into efforts in mitigating ethnic conflict within 
Nigeria’s federal structure. In view of the foregoing, the study argues that post-colonial 
plural societies require the right social architecture to manage cultural diversity. Without 
a push for interethnic balance, social progress and the well-being of citizens will always 
elude plural societies of recently decolonized countries in Asia and Africa. 
The Objectives of the study 
1. To explore the challenges of ethnic conflict in Nigeria and Malaysia. 
2. To demonstrate federalism as an institutional mechanism for accommodating 
plural society. 
3. To provide a comparative overview of contested issues in Nigeria and Malaysia 
with federalism as a mechanism in dealing with ethnic conflict. 
 
Research Questions  
 
a) What are the challenges to ethnic conflict in Nigeria and Malaysia? 
b) How does the federal system contribute to resolving ethnic conflict in both 
countries? 
c) What are the obstacles to overcoming ethnic conflicts in Nigeria and Malaysia’s 
federal systems? 
d) Why is the federalism in Malaysia more successful in dealing with ethnic conflict 
compared to Nigeria? 
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office, March 23
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, 2012. 
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Literature Review               
 
 
        Ethnic conflicts in Malaysia and Nigerian plural societies are rooted in historical 
and contemporary events shaping years of stable tensions and brutal conflicts in the two 
countries respectively. For a clearer understanding of the phenomenon, the literature 
review is arranged thematically and observed at a glance as demonstrated in figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Explanatory Diagram  
                           THEMATIC  ARRANGEMENT  OF  LITERATUR  REVIEW 
                                     
 
          
Institutional Impact Ethno-religious conflict Ethno-political 
factors 
Socio-economic 
disparity 
Cultural contests Federalism as 
conflict-mitigating 
mechanism 
 
The practice of federalism in managing ethnic conflicts in plural societies is a complex 
challenge that confronts most decolonised and developing countries in Africa and Asia. 
Although ethnic conflict is common, the practice of federalism in mitigating such 
conflicts varies among countries. As earlier highlighted, this literature review is arranged 
thematically under seven perspectives that provide insight into ethnic challenges and 
notably ways Malaysia has recorded more success than Nigeria in the overall context.  
         The thesis starts by providing theoretical explanations of ethnic conflict as a 
phenomenon. It discusses institutional impact in the second part and thirdly followed by 
hints on religious issues. The fourth part looks at the practice of identity politics which 
increases the odds of political violence in Nigeria and Malaysia but Malay-led UMNO 
dominance has been effective in reducing tension in Malaysia. Fifthly, the thesis 
discusses socio-economic challenges in both countries and how early resolution of socio-
economic disparities among groups in Malaysia paid off through affirmative action. The 
  Theoretical explanation of ethnic conflict 
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sixth part of the review is on ethno-cultural cleavages whereas the seventh part discusses 
the extent federalism has helped mitigate conflict in both Nigeria and Malaysia. 
             First, the theory of federalism is primarily adopted in this study as a mechanism 
that regulates conflicts in plural societies mainly in countries under a federal 
arrangement as seen in Nigeria and Malaysia.
18
 Donald Horowitz theory of Ethnic 
Groups in Conflict is also significant in this study. He argues that “ethnic conflict arises 
from the common evaluative significance accorded by the groups to the acknowledged 
group differences and then played out in rituals of affirmation and contradiction”.19 
Horowitz theory provides insight into ethnic affinity, and intergroup relations which is 
alert to any threat of dominion. As a work of detailed insight, it is seen as “an original 
and powerfully argued comparative analysis of one of the most important forces in the 
contemporary world”. He incorporates Nigeria and Malaysian plural societies in his 
analysis of conflict-ridden societies which significantly clarifies issues in this study.
20
 
            Similarly, Gurr’s Theories of Communal Conflict is significantly important in 
this field in view of its explanatory insights into the theories of political violence as well 
as rebellion in developing countries. He suggests that “the conflicts that develop around 
communal loyalties pose a different set of problems than revolutionary conflict”.21 The 
problem of managing plural societies is rooted in earlier studies by Furnivall, and 
Durkheim. In Furnivall’s view, numerous people with crises of governing their diverse 
groups are earlier multiethnic dependencies.
22
 For Durkheim, these ethnic communities 
meet at a market place that lacks the characteristics and the “concept of organic 
solidarity. It lacks the shared values which organic solidarity requires and involves brutal 
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conflict and exploitation”.23  According to Stavenhagen, ethnicity is perceived as the 
unavoidable result of “modernization, economic development and political development, 
especially in Africa”. Ethnic group maintains its membership by people with shared 
interest and fate, who advocate ethnic symbolism that expresses their oneness.
24
  
           Second, it is apt to demonstrate that ethnic conflict is also exacerbated by 
institutional inadequacy, or managed by institutional architecture. Institutional 
inadequacy contributes directly or indirectly to ethnic conflict. Many studies reveal that 
it accounts for pervasive ethnic disunity and conflict during Nigeria’s formative years. 
These studies are historically as old as the nation itself whereas new researches continue 
to emerge. Some writers dwell on institutional inadequacy as the unmitigated problem of 
the nation’s unity whose ethnic groups needed a more competent and focused 
administrative rule in its formative years. For example, Isaac Albert stresses on the early 
divisiveness that characterised the society throughout imperial rule in Nigeria. He 
discusses the role of the Southern Nigerian elites, and their inclination to abuses 
especially through the mass media in their control and its impact in the North and South 
relation during the colonial era. This feeling of hurt is contained in an editorial piece 
written in february 11, 1950 by Alhaji Na-Alhaji, editor of  “Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo”  (the 
truth is worth more than a penny), a Northern Nigerian newspaper based in Kano. He 
explains that
 “the thing which surprised me the most is that all the newspapers which are 
owned by the southerners say the same thing. They contain nothing but abuse for the 
northern representatives…What cannot but done peacefully cannot be done by 
abuse…”25   
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       According Caroline Ifeka, Nigeria is a complex society and its centre-periphery 
conflict, has impacted on the country since its birth as a nation. She discusses about the 
people, oppression, marginalisation, insecurity and poverty as the country’s 
contradictions.
26
 Problems tend to fracture national cohesion with the kind of 
government in place, with roles played by the political leadership and state institutions 
that give the notion that Nigeria manifests features of a typical predatory state.
27
 
             The foregoing collaborates with Falola’s view that the challenge before Nigeria 
is the need to construct governmental systems that will accommodate and satisfy the 
desire of the constituent Nigeria’s fragmented ethnic groups to exercise authority and 
control over their own affairs and wellbeing while also meeting the desire for national 
cohesion. However, a crucial question of what should be done to make ethnic 
nationalities in Nigeria live together in harmony is of great concern to Falola.
28
 Suberu 
observes certain social issues in Nigeria and the need to see the psyche of Nigerians real 
distrust for government. His concern is that there seems to be a lost dream of a 
responsive and popular government in Nigeria that can act for the public good.29  
          On the other hand, certain social conditions have helped considerably in the 
management of ethnic conflict in Malaysia. While Horowitz emphasizes that no single 
factor accounts for ethnic conflict, so also this study stresses that effort at achieving 
interethnic harmony is also attributed to a number of factors which a society is required 
to pursue. This study takes a look at institutional architecture as the beacon upon which 
Malaysia has managed to achieve a considerable feat in ethnic relations. In contrast to 
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earlier views on Nigeria, institutional architecture against conflict plays a significant role 
in the management of ethnic conflict in a plural society. According to Montesino, 
institutional architecture is the beacon upon which Malaysia has managed to achieve a 
considerable feat in ethnic relations. Malaysia accomodates over 60 ethnic groups and 
requires social architecture to manage the affairs of its racial diversity. He discusses 
Malaysia’s socioeconomic disparities as well as the 1969 racial riots, initiating and 
implementing policies to disallow or lessen ethnic conflicts and providing support for 
the majority Bumiputras. Montesino stresses the earlier reluctance of the minority 
immigrant communities to accept such policies, which however describes the change in 
Malaysia’s pre-independence ethnic disparities. He identifies various cross-cultural 
conflicts that confront Malaysia after forty years of affirmative action. These include 
segregation in Malaysia’s educational system without much prospect for intercultural 
interactions, hidden interethnic tension beneath the surface, complaints of cultural and 
economic hegemony among the Malays and Chinese respectively, alleged discrimination 
and marginalization, in political and religious issues but it is important to not that the 
state has addressed most of the problems by promoting national unity.
30
 
          In concert with Montesino, Haque’s study also demonstrates that the Malaysian 
government plays a positive role in managing ethnic conflicts as well as reconciling 
different ethnic interests by adopting appropriate policies and programmes in meeting 
such demands. In other words, “Malaysia is a classic case where there is a coexistence of 
some major ethnic groups with distinct identities and where the state has used wide-
ranging preferential policies to manage ethnic problems.” Hence Malaysia can be 
described as founded on “ethnocratic state” or “ethnic democracy.”31 However, Voon 
Keong is one of such scholars whose studies capture the underlying peaceful co-
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existence within the plural Malaysian society. He discusses Malaysia’s plural society 
while emphasising that the main focus of the nation centres on fostering shared values 
that promote national unity. He looks at the cooperation and understanding exhibited by 
the three main ethnic groups in their joint negotiations for independence from Britain as 
a symbol of hope for “multi-ethnic co-operation and compromise.” Their joint effort in 
pursuit of a common aspiration of larger benefit for all is significantly historic.
32
 
            Significantly, Ebong collaborates with the views of Montesino, Haque and 
Keong on social architecture that surrounds Malaysian development and social progress. 
His discussion centres on the institutional apparatuses that form the government that 
governs the society. The state is ruled by  the elite in power which claims to be acting in 
the interest of the society, although may often be unfair to certain groups in the society. 
The state is an arena where state elite divisions contest and how their interests often 
collide.
33
 The state functions through development ideology in view of its effort to 
develop the society as a benchmark for its legitimacy. He discusses the framework that 
serves as the standard for analysing the developmentalist state in Malaysia while 
emphasising that Malaysia’s experience within East Asian countries provides a detailed 
history of how its economy was transformed under the Tun Razak-led affirmative action 
with NEP. As a social architecture under which Malaysian economy is founded, it 
covers growth and distribution and Razak’s emphasis on NEP. He he insisted, “The Plan 
must succeed as it is vital to our survival as a progressive, happy and united nation”.34 
            However, the third factor in this literature survey looks at ethno-religious tension 
in both Nigeria and Malaysia. Undoubtedly, certain ethnic groups and religions seem to 
be intertwined thus exacerbating rivalries in both the Nigerian and Malaysian societies. 
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For instance, the complex ethno-religious nature and rivalries in Nigeria is partly shown 
in Falola’s study. He sheds light on power transfer from the military to civilians and the 
writing of a new constitution which provides opportunity for groups to settle old scores 
and create hegemonies for their ethnic and religious groups. Falola stresses on the 
adoption of the constitution in 1978, the generated tension in the 1978 election and 
political campaign and the manipulation of religious symbols and values by politicians. 
He discusses the1980 Maitatsine religious crisis in the North and its impacts. His study 
provides documented cases and insight into complex religious issues in Nigeria.
35
           
           Similarly, Agbaje seems to be concerned with the need for national cohesion 
while pointing at religion as the explanatory variable given the religious composition, 
characteristics and the challenges of Nigeria and the legitimacy of government. Given 
the precarious nature of religious issues in 1999, he suggests the need for the civilian 
administration to maintain stability with astuteness as well as justice by political leaders 
to manage scarcity, as inter-groups as well as intra-groups struggle for public good 
through state institutions.
36
 Some other scholars see religion and its challenges to the 
state from different perspectives. For example, Edmund Ezegbobelu stresses the need to 
close the gap that exists in interethnic relations in Nigeria, the mistrust between the two 
main religious groups in the country and the challenge of true dialogue. He argues that 
interreligious dialogue cannot be analyzed in isolation of other societal variables as some 
scholars have done in the past. He contends that religion and theological studies must be 
rooted in interdisciplinary approach while paying attention to contexts. He presents these 
contexts as societal variables including geo-historical, cultural, religious, local, national, 
artistic and global factors which play an indispensable role and provide the background 
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for understanding, interpreting and evaluating human religious expressions.
37
 Most 
problem generating issues vary overtime because things ethnic groups contest for are 
material objects such as “money, employment” and many more, whereas others are 
“non-material” issues in which “culture, religion and language” are contested too.38  
           Lately, religious issues in Nigeria have tended to challenge the country’s secular 
status especially from Muslim scholars. Felix Agbara notes that “In Nigeria, the 
secularist question has endured, affecting inter-ethnic and inter-religious relationships. In 
many instances it has threatened the unity of the nation”.39Agbara also reflects on Sanusi 
Lamido Sanusi’s view, a popular Islamic scholar who supports the full implementation 
of Sharia law, which he believes is consistent with the Nigerian constitutional 
arrangement, and non-secular but retains a multi-religious character.
40
 However, despite 
all the challenges in Nigeria, the nation has been steadfast with its commitment to 
secularism as enshrined in the constitution. For example, it is found that Nigeria’s 
secular state status was meant for building a liberal state that disallows bias by 
government officials towards religion or ethnicity to maintain peace and unity in the 
country. Nigeria’s numerous religious challenges are also discussed by April Gordon 
who persuasively explains that “Since independence, the Nigerian state has managed 
religious diversity through the constitutional stipulation that Nigeria is a secular state 
that guarantees freedom of religion and equality of all citizens.”41 
             Conversely, religious issues profoundly shape the state apparatuses in Malaysia, 
as well as the people’s perceptions. Writing on what they describe as sacred tensions, 
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Lee and Ackermann discuss religious differences which exist among the Malays, the 
Chinese and the Indians. There are obvious tensions but such do not escalate into major 
conflict in the country. They noted that the Malaysian Consultative Council of 
Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism and Sikhism formed by the Chinese and Indians in 
1983 was meant to maintain dialogue on religious matters. The Institute of Islamic 
Understanding was formed by the government in 1990 to promote religious tolerance in 
the country. All these bodies help to maintain religious harmony in Malaysia.
42
  
           Schottmann’s study demonstrates the import of religion into governance in 
Malaysia. His study examines the management of religious, cultural and ethnic diversity 
in Southeast Asia with his focus on “intra-communal debate about the proper 
relationship between the state and its official religion among Malaysian Muslims.” He 
stresses on Mahathir government’s (1981-2003) projection of Islam in the public sphere 
and describes the role the state plays as crucial but hitherto under-recognised enabler of 
what has been described elsewhere as “post-Islam or parallels with Europe’s post-war 
Christian Democrats intended, as Muslim Democracy”.43 Schottmann looks at the 
influence of former PM. Mahathir Mohamad and argues that Islam can rise to the level 
of being a cultural pillar for democracy in Malaysia which can lay hold to the notions of 
rule of law, good governance and social justice in what he calls ‘Muslim majority 
country’. He applauded the premier’s role in making this possible as he notes, “even if 
this outcome was in part the unintended consequence of his government’s 
individualising and individually empowering religious discourse or the result of having 
forced PAS to scuttle its call for the authoritarian theocracy…” Schottmann believes in 
the primacy of Islam in Malaysia given his view on Mahathir’s personal move to have 
the influence of Islam on Malaysian state, and the more privileged position Islam 
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receives from the government as the official religion. Yet, he seems to contradict issues 
and fails to reconcile ‘Islamisation’ and ‘equal citizenship’ in the same Malaysia. His 
sentiment seems to address two polar extremes, may be unknowingly. For example, he 
posits, “Islamization, whether at the personal level, where it is manifested through 
growing public displays of piety, or at the level of state and the market, does not in and 
of itself undermine calls for equal citizenship and inclusive notions of national 
identity…” There appears a seemingly confusing situation in Schottmann trying to 
discuss inclusiveness of all cultural diverse Malaysian ethnic groups – a notion of 
national identity under a state-focused Islamisation in Malaysia which he affirms to. 
This sounds incongruous. Yet, he denounces the growing tension, especially “the recent 
spate of arson and attacks on churches and desecrations of Hindu temples and bitter 
controversies over the competencies of civil and syariah courts, readily demonstrate, that 
there are some very uncivil sides to Islam in Malaysia.”44 One wonders if this immediate 
comment against Islam which his earlier comments seem to promote now seeks to 
resolve the current problem under the secular status of the Malaysian state rather than 
the state Islamisation process. He seems to fit-in two opposing issues into one.     
          In a collaborative manner, Hoffstaedter also looks at the prevailing religious 
controversies in Malaysia. He discusses historical trends and the efforts of the 
government to reinvent the state continually, while stressing on the government-led 
modernization, industrialization and what he describes as ‘Islamisation’ process and 
their mark on the nation of Malaysia. He discusses elites and politics as well as power 
sharing among racially based parties under Barsan Nasional (National front) as well as 
impediments to true inter-religious dialogues. He stresses that the backlash against 
interfaith organisations in 2006 and the attacks on places of worship since 2008 provide 
a conflicting scene. The Internal Security Act (ISA) which provides for detention 
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without trial is regularly used by the government to address extremism in race and 
religion to maintain order in the country. Hoffstaedter advocates for open debate which 
he says is necessary to test the nation’s opinions on religious matters and the need for 
regular dialogue on new developments on the ongoing controversy about the word 
‘Allah’ as a stable tension that has attracted two different court decisions on the matter. 
The current episode is a continuation of contestation over public image of Islam in 
Malaysia as a moderate form of Islam. The Government of Malaysia continues to 
‘protect Islam and the sanctity of Islam’ with hopes that UMNO can shore up support in 
the Malay electorate. The government knows that religious issues give Islam a bad name 
as dominating and exclusivist.
45
 
           Fourth, ethno-political challenges could be seen as another dimension of ethnic 
conflict in both countries. Many scholars affirm to the fact that ethno-political conflict is 
one of the challenges confronting many severely divided societies. The study carried out 
by Dauda Abubakar discusses identity politics and the ruling elites in post-independence 
Nigeria whom he describes as ethnic minded in democracy. He emphasises the need for 
social cohesion and integration in nation-building.
46
 Abubakar’s view collaborates with 
Jega’s study on various ethnic affiliations in which he suggests that shared identities as 
rallying points for collective action in post-colonial severely divided states in Africa.
47
   
         Similarly, Mwakikagile in his recent study stresses on ethnic conflict and political 
stability in Nigeria and other African states. He discusses historical north-south divide 
and the Nigerian Nationalists regional interests and what seems to be explosive politics 
at the centre. He captures the assertion made by one of the early nationalists Chief 
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Anthony Enahoro who noted that “Nigeria was plagued with a deep-seated imbalance in 
its political structure, stemming from the inequality of its component units which placed 
one of the regions (the North) in a dominant position in the Federation…”48 New 
researches in this area of study especially Imobighe’s recent work attempts to develop 
new strategies to manage ethnic conflicts in Nigeria for democratic consolidation. He 
discusses the socio-economic and political dynamics that fuel ethnic conflicts; highlights 
the limitations to their management; and civil society approaches.
49
                   
            Bah’s study on Breakdown and Reconstitution makes captivating reading of 
political issues in Nigeria while dealing with the synergy of democratisation, nation-
building and ethnicity in the country. His study covers the role of ethnicity in the 
breakdown and reconstitution of democracy, the Nigerian nation-state and its leadership 
problem as well as the challenges of institutional design in such a multiethnic nation. It 
gives emphasis on the circle of breakdown and reconstruction in the political life of 
Nigeria.
50
 In his Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, Nnoli demonstrates a bold attempt to analyze 
Nigeria’s perennial problems. The result is a broad study as well as a distinguished 
contribution tailored to adding to the literature of the politics of development, political 
sociology and national integration in addressing nation-building efforts. While credit is 
given for his theoretical insight, Nnoli discusses the social dynamics which are related to 
ethnicity in Nigeria and its pervasive mode as a phenomenon. He explains plainly the 
difference that separates ethnic conflict from class type, but stresses that Africa 
demonstrates in some cases where ‘ethnic and class conflict coincide.’ 51 He offers 
recommendations for solving ethnic challenges in Nigeria, but suggests that it requires a 
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revolution to change the status quo in the country especially the ‘comprador bourgeois’ 
who manipulate ethnic sentiment for their political mileage.
52
 
           Ethnic politics provides a lens to view how the selection of responsible and more 
reliable national leadership is undermined, given such persistent politicisation of 
ethnicity in the country. The election of national leaders is largely based on ethnicity, 
religious and regional considerations. A leader’s experience, character, leadership ability 
and knowledge are usually not considered as vital assets when selecting candidate to 
lead the country and this negatively affects national transformation. Ethnicity has 
engendered episodic outbursts of hostility among diverse ethnic groups in Nigeria. 
Analysis shows how census enumeration for the nation’s economic planning as well as 
electoral representation generate tension and internal strife in Nigeria’s ethnic politics. 
This is because each ethnic group as well as regions put up a defense of their inflated 
population figures for the purposes of securing bigger government financial support, in 
addition to having more representatives at the federal level. Ethnic politics largely serve 
as a determinant factor in the location of industries and development project, which tend 
to disregard genuine feasibility studies which consider how viable the area should be. 
The above is an example of how ethnic politics negatively affects the cohesiveness as 
well as socio-economic good of Nigeria.
53
 
            Observably ethnic and political activities shape rivalries and competition in 
Malaysian plural society too. Malaysia is relatively peaceful with unity as a factor 
underlying its existence since it gained independence. It is a historical development 
which partly describes its early good race relations, given the British emphasis on unity 
as a prerequisite for independence. Hence Malaysia is commended for being a successful 
country among newly independent nations in managing ethnic relations. However, 
Bumiputras invoking indigenous or native rights is currently discriminatory, thus 
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providing a sense of deprivation, favoritism as well as resentment felt among non-
Bumiputras in the country. “The lack of interethnic violence in Malaysia is engendering 
inaccurate perception of success with regard to ethnic relations”.54 
           Politics and political maneuverings in Malaysia seem to be in constant shifts. For 
Anuar, Malaysia’s cultural diversity demonstrates ample evidence of the nation’s 
cultural richness which its diverse people celebrate. But Anuar rejects this notion 
partially, and argues that the same diversity remains a cause for social tension and 
conflict in a number of issues in the country. The worst is that Malaysia’s cultural 
differences are exploited for political mileage. Politics of ethnicity is at the centre stage 
of its politics, it permeates various levels of the society. Malaysia operates racially based 
political parties, which is complicated by ethnicity and religion. Given article 160 of the 
Federal Constitution which defines Malays as Muslim, any form of criticism against the 
Malays is quickly regarded as affront against Islam too. “Worse, ideological assault can 
also be read by some Malays as contesting the very notion of Ketuanan Malay, or 
‘Malay Supremacy’ in Malaysian society and politics, that is promoted by certain 
quarters in UMNO and elsewhere in Malaysia’s political landscape”.55 ISA was used to 
check excessive behavioural practices and tension exhibited by public protests and party 
rivalries. The ruling group deliberately attempts to preserve as well as promote its 
ideology through religious institutions and mass media in its quest to maintain a 
hegemonic position.
56
 His work and those of other scholars provide insights into conflict 
provoking factors in which various ethnic perceptions and motivations are appraised. 
          Fifth, there is a form of growing pervasiveness of socioeconomic imbalances that 
induce ethnic conflict. Cleavages over the appropriation and exploitation of economic 
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wealth within nations especially in decolonized countries in Africa and Asia contribute 
largely to national crises. For instance, Ikpeze discusses decades of military misrule and 
neglect of the oil producing areas in Nigeria amid huge oil revenue return to Nigeria. It 
prompted ethnic insurrection and insistence on the control of mineral resources in their 
region. As will be fully explored in subsequent chapters ahead, the struggle for 
‘resources control’ in Nigeria is anchored on both the Philipson “Commission report 
(1946) and the Dina Committee Report (1968)” which provided Nigeria with “the 
principle of derivation” and was generally accepted for revenue allocation in Nigeria. It 
then benefited the North and West through their agricultural produce. The Nigerian 
military changed the rules immediately after oil was discovered in Eastern Nigeria- 
largely in the Niger Delta. The derivation principle was amended by Decree 3 of 1970 
which gave recognition to equal weighted principles, population and equality of states.
57
 
This is the root of the crisis witnessed in the oil-rich region of Niger Delta in Nigeria. 
          To substantiate the above claim on Niger Delta crisis, Ogbodo looks at resource 
control in the Niger Delta region, the intensification of other crises as the legitimacy of 
the Nigerian state is challenged. He discusses the intense ethnic identity politics in the 
area referred to as the Nigeria Delta, the discovery and exploitation of oil and gas 
resources from the area. He also addresses the prolonged military rule and its 
“implications for identity formation and transformations of groups that inhabit this oil-
laden region”. A revisit of military economic mismanagement in Nigeria in the late 20th 
century and its consequences to the reconfiguration of the Niger Delta identity and 
intense conflict are discussed in his work.
58
    
          More insight is provided through Najibo and Umukoro’s study which covers a 
wide range of issues, from corruption to Niger Delta ethnic militia, youth 
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unemployment, the denial and deprivation and the ready support from local and state 
officials to paramilitary groups they believe have the strength to enforce their regional 
agenda in Nigeria.
59
 Similarly, other scholars also discuss economic issues side by side 
with communal cleavages in Nigeria. For example, Naanem and Nyiaana stress on what 
they describe as abysmal development in the midst of plenty, and the struggle for control 
of the resources. This is their estimation of the issues that define social constraint of the 
Niger Delta since the 1990s. They provide historical data that covers decades of 
mismanagement, marginalisation and intense confrontation that describe the event.
60
 
          Undeniably, full dependence on oil has seemingly turned the nation into a rentier 
state which has made the nation vulnerable to crisis.
61
  Nigeria’s Petroleum industry has 
transformed the nation since 1970 from an agrarian economy to an oil-based economy. It 
rose in economic performance from 12 per cent in 1970, 33 per cent in 1974 and to 98 
per cent by 1997.
62
 Ironically, Nigeria’s oil wealth has barely benefitted the people of 
Nigeria in terms of development or improved their welfair. Many scholars describe the 
oil wealth as the “oil curse” to Nigeria.63 Given the fact that economic issues exacerbate 
major forms of cleavages, Sam Moyo stresses the fact that many African states that 
manage and allocate mineral resources and other rents as well as services, maintain 
strategies they use in mobilising socio-economic and political dominance which shows a 
key source of ethno-regional wealth differentials and struggles over resource control. 
African countries affected in this ethnic struggle include: Nigeria, Cameroon, Angola, 
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Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone and South Africa. 
Economic issues and quest for survival intensify illegal exploitation and such inclination 
for control exacerbates wider conflicts involving many actors in what is known as zone 
of conflict. Major discourse revolves around socio-economic dominance arising from a 
wider economic process whereby ethnicity is co-opted or institutionalized.
64
 
        In the case of Malaysia, apart from political rivalries in a plural Malaysian society, 
pervasive socio-economic imbalances induce ethnic conflict in which wealth distribution 
is a factor that cannot be isolated from the analysis of ethnic conflict and management in 
the country. In Malay Dilemma, former PM. Mahathir Mohamad discusses the Malays, 
their condition and racial harmony in Malaysia. First published in 1970, the book 
explains factors that led to the 13 May 1969 racial riots in Kuala Lumpur. Mahathir 
emphasises that independence ushered into the new nation economic disparities of a 
structural imbalance that existed between the majority indigenous Malays and other 
groups. The National Economic Policy (NEP) was introduced as an affirmative action 
plan to redress the situation. He observes “Malays seem to be teetering between the 
desire to assert their rights and arrogate to themselves what they consider to be theirs 
and the overwhelming desire to be polite, courteous and thoughtful of the rights and 
demands of others…that slowly but surely they are becoming the dispossessed in their 
own land. This is the Malay dilemma”. 65 His book gives insight into ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
about Malays special rights, which explains considerable calmness in Malaysia today. 
          However, Hadi Soesastro’s study focuses on the relationship between the state and 
the federal government of Malaysia on revenue sharing and their cordial relationship. 
The challenge only centres on oil producing areas, oil revenue and the management of 
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oil revenue between the federal government and the states where oil is produced. But 
while Malaysia tackles challenges to woo foreign investments into the country, 
“Malaysia faces recurring problems of federal/state disputes over the division of revenue 
and who will pay for development projects.” He discusses the federalisation of oil since 
the formation of PETRONAS and 5per cent received by the states as revenue.
66
 
Malaysia gradually adopted changes that would be more equitable to the government as 
well as the oil producing areas. For example, legislation covering the management of the 
petroleum industry in Malaysia has witnessed changes more than three times. First, a 
concessionary system operated in Sabah and Sarawak in East Malaysia, and states of the 
peninsular up to 1965. The second was petroleum mining Rules of 1966 which changed 
the concessionary system to one of equal profit sharing between companies and the 
government. This was followed by government control over petroleum with the 
replacement of the profit-sharing system by a producing sharing system of 1974 under 
the Petroleum Development Act that also established PETRONAS.
67
Unlike conflict in 
Nigeria, the management of crude oil resources in Malaysia has generated little tension. 
         Sixth, ethnic groups in Nigeria maintain their cultures and traditional values 
uncontested. Apart from certain religious and cultural practices which occasionally spark 
tension, Nigeria maintains colourful cultural diversity. However, ethnic challenges in 
Malaysia could be analysed under ethno-cultural context. In Malaysia’s ethnic and 
cultural context, Gomes sheds light on Malaysia’s relative peace and harmony despite its 
fractious cultural diversity, and inter-ethnic and inter-religious differences. There could 
be occasional sparks of political and social tensions but these have not affected the 
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nation’s unity and harmony. He stresses on the trend of events in Malaysia within the 
past 40 years as characterized by communal tension and relative peace.
68
 
          In collaborating with Gomes view, Yeoh presents his 21
st
 Century Malaysia: 
Challenges and Strategies, and Malaysia’s good image and international perception of 
its plural society and practices as unique. The post-colonial state since 1957 
independence has shown commitment in nation-building which measures greatly within 
the global community. However, Malaysia is not excluded from challenges that confront 
many countries, rather it has transformed from its early uncertainty to a fast 
“industrializing nation that thrives on national unity, racial harmony, economic 
aspirations, political maturity, and social prosperity.” Malaysia maintains social progress 
and projects a good image in international perception in the 21
st
 century world.
69
  
            Similarly, Stigitz discusses the reputable position Malaysia occupies among its 
peers in the developing countries, the current perception of the advanced countries 
especially the U.S as practicing ‘moderate Islam’ in contrast to violence as well as 
extremism in the Middle Eastern countries. In addition to its religious moderation, 
Malaysia is generally hailed for its ‘successful story’ of modernisation when compared 
to many countries of the South that are underdeveloped. Its breakthrough describes its 
success in combining economic growth and political stability. It played a major role in 
refocusing the 57-member Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), i.e. shifting its 
focus “from a highly political to a more socio-economic body”. 70  
      Seventh, in early 21
st
 century, federalism was seen as an important system of 
government. For instance, Rothchild argues that even if a good number of federated 
states failed in their early years, the role of federalism in balancing the competing 
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struggles for autonomy as well as unity in countries such as India, Malaysia and Nigeria 
have never been in doubt.
71
 Federalism emerged as a unique mechanism of nation/state 
building after European colonial empires collapsed in the post Second World War era.
72
 
         In effect, the Nigerian federation was created in 1954 with unbalanced regions of 
internal boundaries constructed in a manner that favoured the North’s hegemony over 
the principal ethnic groups, while denying the minority their own constituent, served not 
to moderate but to escalate ethnic and regional conflict.
73
 Young, in his study looks at 
Nigeria and conflicts, and what he describes as an historical necessity compelling 
citizens of Nigeria to accept a single nationhood.
74
 Nigeria’s diversity has necessitated 
the adoption of federalism for its ethnic pluralism for the country’s diverse groups to be 
accommodated peacefully.
75
 But Nwolise discusses the Nigerian state, the challenges 
that seem to overwhelm its system as seen in a series of violence which occurred during 
the exit of the military from power in 1999. This is a federation he describes as unstable 
and may become a failed state.
76
  Ironically, Nigeria is known to be consistent in its 
federal polity,
77
 yet, the same Nigerian federal system has been described in many ways 
as ‘peculiar’, ‘bizarre’, ‘Irregular, ‘misleading’, ‘purely distributive’ or ‘failed’, and as 
representing a ‘hollow federation’ or ‘a unitary state in federal guise.’78 
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         Howver, Federalism was accorded a pleace in Malaysian history in 1895 in order 
to achieve smooth governance while realising economic goals. The British brought the 
federal system which led to the amalgamation of four Malay States in the Malaya 
Peninsular.
79
 The amalgamated states which was called the Federated Malay States for 
the purpose of smooth administration involving legal and financial needs. British attempt 
to introduce a unitary form of government in Malaya after the Second World War was 
opposed. A federation was then established, thus preserving the nine Malay Rulers.
80
  
          Simandjuntak one of the earliest scholars who studied the Malayan federation also 
gives a deeper insight on the political structure in Malaya before independence. He 
observes that “The 1948 Federation of Malaya Agreement established a federation with 
a strong centripetal bias. “He stresses on the division of the country, and observes that 
power was constitutionally subjective in favour of the Federal government. The new 
framework retained the High Commissioner as well as the British Advisers, while the 
Rulers were to follow their advice. “But in practice the attitude of the British Advisers 
continued to be coloured by a romantic-chivalrous determination to preserve the time-
honoured Malay feudal privileges and institutions.”81    
         Finally, the literature review has touched on numerous conflict-generating factors 
in Nigeria and Malaysia. Two other scholars have also carried out studies on Nigeria and 
Malaysia. For example, Joseph Russell Rudolph, Jr’s Ph.D thesis (1971) compares 
federalism in India, Pakistan, Malaysia and Nigeria. Rudolph focuses on state formation 
under federalism and discusses how federalism was partly manipulated to fit into these 
decolonised plural societies.
82
 Similarly, Samuel Inua Zalanga’s doctoral thesis on “The 
Post-colonial State and Development Agenda …” a comparative study of Nigeria and 
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Malaysia focuses on the role of the ruling elites in development policy formulation in 
Nigeria and Malaysia. He highlights elite role and their ethnic inclination.
83
 None of the 
two theses focused on federalism and ethnicity in Nigeria and Malaysia. No other study 
or studies have dealt with federalism and ethnic conflict in Nigeria and Malaysia as 
comprehensively, comparatively and in greater depth and scope than this research. This 
is the gap this current study fills in the literature of ethnic conflict in plural societies. 
Remarkably, amplification of Islamic law or Islamisation is another research area of 
fresh tensions in both countries. 
 
Theoretical Framework of the Study 
 
        In an effort to regulate the problem of ethnic conflict in both countries, federalism 
is primarily adopted as the framework of this study. Effective comparative and in-depth 
study of ethnic conflicts in both countries are explored through the lens of federalism 
for interpretative and explanatory goal on federal practices is explored in chapter one, 
and afterwards applied in the analysis of the study. The structure and composition of 
societies largely define their governance as well as administration. Hence multi-national 
states are mainly formed on the basis of heterogeneity in culture, descent and origin as 
seen in older countries in Europe and America where federalism has flourished.  
         While ‘federalism’ serves as the framework of this study, Ethnic Groups in 
Conflict as rendered by Donald Horowitz compliments federalism in order to unpack 
some conceptual underpinnings in ethnic conflict in this study. This is important given 
the fact that Horowitz incorporated ethnic conflicts in both Nigerian and Malaysian 
plural societies in this theory, hence it contributes enormously to the current need for 
synthesis.  
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Method of Data Collection 
         This study is enriched with primary and secondary data collected from both 
countries. They consist of documents on their constitutions and other archival materials 
that cover areas of analysis. The instruments used during the fieldwork were valid and 
reliable which include research questions, interview, and observation and email. The 
primary data collected during the field study focused on 25 selected respondents largely 
drawn from the three main ethnic groups in each country i.e the Hausa/Fulani, the 
Yoruba and Igbo in Nigeria and the Malays, the Chinese and the Indian ethnic 
communities in Malaysia. The 50 respondents were considered appropriate to shed light 
on contested issues in both countries. It is reasoned that unlike in quantitative method 
that relies on numbers or numerical data, this study is focused on qualitative data 
collection or qualities that cannot be measured. Hence 25 respondents from each country 
are deemed enough to give useful information on the subject being studied while room is 
also provided for the analysis of their contributions in the entire context. 
        Respondents’ age variations of 45 to 80, their ethnic group and location were 
considered important to cover historical and contemporary facts about contentious 
issues being explored. Simialarly, respondents’ educational attainments, and their 
official positions in government as well as civil society matters were considered 
essential, among variables the researcher considered in the interview process in line 
with what Charles Stangor describes as important variables in this context.
84
 Eight elite 
were selected from each of the three main ethnic groups in Nigeria and Malaysia while 
one was selected from the minority group in each country. While it ensures equal 
balance, the basis of the choice of the number interviewed across ethnic and 
regional/state boundaries as territorial units of each federation, was also taken into 
account to accommodate different views and perceptions on ethnic, religious and 
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political cleavages in both countries.   Appendix K. Table 6.1 and Appendix L. Table 
6.2 contain lists of personalities interviewed in Nigeria and Malaysia respectively. The 
research was conducted in Nigeria between 7th of June to 1st of August 2010. Similarly, 
in Malaysia it was conducted between 1st September and 15th of October 2010. These 
field studies in both countries were concluded between January and May 2012. This was 
made possible through official request letters sent to all the personalities. The sample 
letter is found in Appendix P. 
         The adopted approach in this study is social and anthropological. While this study 
investigates complex societal problems involving people’s beliefs and actions, such a 
method that combines experiences of a targeted audience takes cognizance of their 
language, their reasoning as well as their broad perceptions as major areas of focus. 
Hence during the interviews, the researcher was engaged in participant observation with 
key information generated from open-ended questions in line with Granato’s work.85 In-
depth one on one interviews were combined with participant observation in order to 
counter the latter’s disadvantages regarding the subjectivity, ethical considerations and 
the fact that observations are not data.
86
    
       Sometimes during the interview process, it was observed that certain explanations 
attracted shouting, gesticulations and bad facial expressions at one interview or the other 
in both countries. The in-depth interviews were designed to gain informed knowledge of 
issues being studied. The method chosen is consistent with qualitative fieldwork studies 
demonstrated in the works of Glazer and Strauss. The choice of this method is premised 
on the fact that it is free to combine a variety of data gathering methods that also allow 
for the generalization of analysis grounded in recorded data concerning the development 
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of crisis.
87
 The research questions were meant to examine their thoughts as to why, how, 
and to what extent ethnic conflicts affected them and whether the mechanism of 
federalism can mitigate conflicts in both federations. Two separate fieldwork interviews 
for Nigeria and Malaysia were carried out.These involved pre-interview communication-
processes involving telephone calls and email enquiries as well as interview 
appointments. It truly exposed the author to a number of issues during the fieldwork 
work.
88
 Second, this study is also enriched with secondary data from books and journals. 
Others were Nigerian newspapers such as Daily Times; The Guardian; Vanguard; 
Punch etc. and Malaysian newspapers such as New Straits Times, and The Star. 
 
Significance of the Study 
 
         The study serves as a mirror to view ethnic conflict in both Nigeria and Malaysia 
and how Malaysia has achieved considerable ethnic harmony. The significance of the 
study lies in its effort to resolve ethnic conflict in Nigeria as seen in Malaysia. In other 
words, the study offers Nigeria a significant insight into measures taken by Malaysia to 
manage its ethnic relations amid other socio-political and developmental challenges. It 
offers a road map towards unresolved talks at various National Conferences by past 
regimes in Nigeria. It shows how misrule of a nation can degenerate into tension, 
secession and retarded national growth and development. 
                                                 
87
 See, B. Glaser and A. Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategic for Qualitative Research, 
Chicago: Aldine press, 1967. 
88
 I tried to socialise with many people through conversation with my keen interest to have discussion 
about socio-political issues that bear on ethnic politics, ethno-religious tensions and what the 
governments at states and federal levels were doing to address the problems. I had such engaging 
observations with some elites in Southern Nigeria more specifically in Ehime-Mbano Local Government 
Area, Owerri, Anambra, Enugu and Abia, Delta, and Rivers States, and in the west –Lagos. I was at the 
same time booking interview appointments with selected personalities both within and outside these 
states. Similarly, I had similar relaxed interactions in Kaduna in Northern Nigeria, Jos in the Midle-belt 
and Abuja which is Nigeria’s capital city. The idea of engaging in participant observation at this time was 
to gain firsthand information and to evaluate their emotions in order to gain understanding of their current 
mood about events raised about the subject. I visited some of the key personalities I had contacted to 
inform them that I was already in the country ahead of June scheduled interviews. The same experience 
was repeated in Ipoh, Malaca, and other areas covered during the interview process in Malaysia. 
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         With Malaysia, the study offers a break from Nigeria’s social circle of disharmony 
and unrest and advocates for true federalism for accommodation, social change and 
development in Nigeria. Issues resolved on Nigeria and Malaysia, especially those learnt 
about Malaysia could be relevant to other troubled societies and can generate enquiries 
for further studies on ethnic conflict. There is “system failure” in core findings arising 
from ineffective federalism in managing ethnic conflict in Nigeria 
          This study is deemed unique because it differs significantly from previous works 
as this is the only comprehensive and comparative study on ethnic conflict between 
Nigeria and Malaysian plural societies that covers five decades of their nationhood. In its 
contribution to academic knowledge, the study fills knowledge-gaps covering studies on 
multi-ethnic countries across Africa and Asia. It opines that no multiethnic nation-state 
can make substantial social progress or survive outside the axis of its interethnic balance. 
 
Scope of the Study and Areas of Analysis  
          The scope of the study covers a period of 51 and 47 years of nationhood in 
Malaysia and Nigeria respectively. This study touches on Malaysia and Nigeria’s core 
historical origins in terms of their pre-colonial and colonial rule periods as a benchmark 
to determine their being as political entities. Their political independence in 1957 and 
1960 for Malaysia and Nigeria respectively provide starting points of analysing their 
respective post-colonial nation building and ethnic conflict. The researcher limits the 
period of this study to 2009 when Prime Minister Ahmad A. Badawi was in power 
Malaysia on one hand, and 2007 of President Olusegun Obasanjo’s regime in Nigeria.  
 
  Limitations of the Study 
          Research of this type demands adequate financial resources, and poor finance can 
be a setback to the project, but the researcher utilized prioritised funds at targeted result 
areas without much constraints.  Secondly, effort was made to reach out to a wider 
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spectrum of the Nigerian and Malaysian societies which posed some difficulties. In other 
words, problems associated with getting linked up with targeted personalities for 
interviews, were largely overcome through some personalities who were interviewed 
earlier in the interview process. They kindly provided some links to other top 
personalities in government and retirees for further interviews.  For example, in 
Malaysia, Dato M. A. Jaafar who is former Malaysian Ambassador/High Commissioner 
to many countries and Dr Benjamin Gorge rendered tremendous help to the researcher. 
In Nigeria, similar help was gratefully received from A. H. Yusuf (Deputy D.G) 
Ministry of Justice Abuja and Sir Julus Onuoha (Catholic Knight).  
            Similarly, it was difficult to get to certain areas in Northern Nigeria due to the 
ongoing Boko Haram insurgency, but it was a friend, Nuredden that linked me up and 
directed me to important areas I covered and email links. Access to certain information 
on both countries posed a challenge in view of government‘s Official Secret Act (OSA) 
limiting the release of certain information. As such this report relies heavily on 
information that was rendered by benevolent informants and information made available 
at the public domain.  
 
Definitions of Concepts used in the Study 
   Plural Society 
          J.S. Furnivall was the first scholar to coin the concept of plural societies which is 
appears in his 1910 Journal publication as well as his book “Colonial Policy and 
Practices: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India,” of 1948. He stresses 
on the unrestricted economic forces in tropical countries under colonial subjugation, 
which had led to diverse cultures and traditions being trampled for economic reasons in 
the Dutch and British colonies of South-East Asia. He saw plural societies as being 
composed of groups who were different in their social and cultural settings, but were 
integrated largely for economic reasons or joint interdependence induced by colonial 
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powers with scant regard for their different languages, religions and customs. They met 
only at market place, in a society held together by imperial powers.
 89
 
        Another early scholar in this field was M.G. Smith, a social anthropologist of very 
considerable repute who was born in Jamaica in 1921. He was convinced from the onset 
that the central sociological theory which emphasised harmony as well as shared values 
was not the case with the “former slave societies of the Caribbean”. He claimed that 
these societies were severely divided. He also discarded the Marxist study attributing 
this division as generated by class consciousness as well as the ensuing class conflict. 
Smith stressed that plural societies were divided along ethnic and cultural lines, thus 
making the society largely unstable due to continual conflict.
90
 The concept ‘plural 
society’ as used in this study is a taxonomy that attempts to map different cultural 
groups of a nation, its people and their origins which explains the complexity of ethnic 
identities that emerged at the end of 20
th
 century colonial rule. 
 
Ethnic groups    
       Conflicts largely define ethnic lines or differentiated groups in most societies. The 
term “ethnic groups” may be tempting to be regarded as fixed and enduring. Ethnicity 
may be described as a process that combines two mutually reinforcing forms of 
identification. First, an ethnic group refers to a given population of a group of people 
who are bound by common origins, shared experience and culture, a distinct language 
and religious practice. Second, the notion of self-identification takes cognisance of some 
other groups with whom the ethnic population shares area or interacts. The place for 
ethnic interaction is “a society, an orbit of patterned social relations typically framed by 
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the political boundaries of kingdoms, nation-states, or empire.”91  This study stresses 
that ethnic groups such as the Igbo and Yoruba in Nigeria or Malay and Chinese in 
Malaysia, can be seen in the context of primordial ties, which accentuates strong 
identities within the territory of the group. Ethnic conflict defines ethnic boundary 
maintenance which eventually defines ethnic groups.  
 
The Structure of the Thesis 
       This study is structured under seven chapters. While the ‘Introduction’ provides a 
general overview and the focus of the thesis, chapter one covers the theoretical 
framework underpinning the study. However, chapter two examines the origins of the 
ethnic groups in Nigeria and Malaysia which provides the background of the ethnic 
groups being studied. Chapter three explores the role of federal design in managing 
pluralism. Chapter four investigates ethnic conflict and federalism by assessing elite 
behaviour and policy roles, whereas chapter five examines the effectiveness of 
federalism in both countries. Chapter six covers a comparative overview of the domains 
of conflict at which point the study concludes with recommendations. Next is the 
theoretical framework. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
            Federalism: Concepts and Theories, and Ethnic Conflict 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
         The introductory section provided the background of the study especially the 
statement of the problem as well as the focus of the thesis. As a comparative study of 
ethnic conflict in two federal states, federalism is adopted as the framework. This 
chapter demonstrates the workings of federalism especially how the concept helps to 
regulate plural societies while it serves as the analytical framework of this study.  The 
chapter gives insights into federalism and explains other related concepts and theories. 
          First, it provides the definition and explanation of federalism as a concept. 
Second, this chapter gives insight into the origin of federalism while it reflects on 
Nigeria and Malaysian federal formations. The fourth section touches on theories, and 
goes further in section five and six to discuss Riker’s political theory of federal 
formation and socioeconomic theory respectively. The seventh section covers the 
fundamental principles of federalism; ethnicity and ethnic conflict are also explored in 
the eighth section while the chapter concludes. 
 
1.2 Federalism and Federation: Conceptualisations 
        Federalism is such a fascinating concept that attracts the attention of numerous 
scholars. It implies the existence of a primary centre in a political system while there are 
units which are clearly subordinated to this centre. Thus this primary centre which is the 
central government alone possesses inherent authority, but it devolves some powers on 
the units as a means of facilitating the administration of the country.
92
 The study extends 
this definition to an earlier one rendered by Elazar which says “the mode of political 
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organisation that unites separate polities within an overarching political system by 
distributing power among general and constituent governments in a manner designed to 
protect the existence and authority of both.”93 Federalism essentially represents a 
political system which calls for putting in-place institutional arrangements designed at 
displaying and affording an appreciable degree of integration amongst the units, states or 
regions which constitute the system.
94
 Federalism is not just power sharing between 
governments, rather it is a process structured within certain institutional distribution and 
redistribution of authority. Its origin could be traced back to the Latin word ‘Foedus’, or 
covenant.  According to Rodden, it makes no sense if the central government can get 
whatever it wants from the sub-units by applying administrative fiat, rather federalism 
provides for the consent of the subordinate units in certain central decisions.
95
 
        Similarly, as Moten explains, “The Federal system of government is particularly 
well suited to states embracing wide geographic areas, and to states with diversities that 
result from unequal socioeconomic conditions and culture cleavage.”96 In line with 
Moten’s view, federalism is also conceptualised and articulated in “federal principles 
which is the method of dividing powers so that the general and regional governments are 
each, within a sphere, coordinate and independent.”97 Formal institutional requirements 
such as constitutional delimitation of powers, bi-cameral legislature, independent 
electoral system for both levels of government, multi-party - preferably a two-party 
system, and a supreme court are vital. It is important to underline the fact that federalism 
is “a political agreement that explicitly admits the existence of conflicting interests 
among the component territorial communities and commits them to seek accommodation 
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without outvoting the minority and without the use of force. Federalism is not fixed; it is 
a process that is in perpetual negotiation: some issues are not currently recognised, some 
are soluble, and some are currently insoluble”.98 It is the mode of political alliance as 
well as association that joins separate polities within a larger political system in a 
manner that allows each unit to exercise its own basic political integrity.
99
  
           Rodden has also advised that in federalism are the institutions that underlie its 
contracts, providing for both the definition and the workings of the system which are 
embedded in the historical conditions that led to the original contracts.
100
 Federalism had 
its origin in a bargain aimed at providing a common military defense against a perceived 
enemy.
101
  Broadly speaking, federalism connotes two main ideas. One is the notion of 
unity in diversity and the second idea is a decentralised constitutional system of 
government. As Michael Burgess observes, federation can be understood as a 
constitutional arrangement that showcases a sovereign state based on federalism.
102
    
            Conversely, a federation explains “an institutional arrangement, taking the form 
of a sovereign state, and distinguished from other states (e.g. unitary states) solely by the 
fact that its central government incorporates regional units into its decision making 
procedure on some constitutionally entrenched basis”.103 McGarry and O’Leary assert 
that “In a genuine democratic federation there is a compound sovereign state, in which at 
least two government units, the federal and the regional, enjoy constitutionally separate 
competencies-although they may also have concurrent powers.” However, given their 
mutual responsibilities, both central and provincial governments are empowered to take 
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care of their citizens and to produce elected leaders from both components. Also, federal 
government, as a rule cannot independently change the horizontal division of powers: 
amendment of the constitution which affects component units requires the agreement of 
both levels of government. To this end, federation by design implies codified as well as 
written constitution, usually linked at the federal level with a supreme court put in place 
for checks and balances among the different tiers of government while maintaining a 
bicameral legislature in view of federal and regional representations.
104
 Significantly, 
“more than one nationality may be explicitly recognised as co-founders and co-owners 
of the federation”. The first is shown in that of Switzerland which was established in 
1848 while the second is shown in the case of Canada also established in 1867. The 
Indian subcontinent was later divided into two in its post-colonial period to establish two 
multi-ethnic federations of India and Pakistan. However, Nigeria and Ethiopia are 
federations in Africa. According to McGarry and O’Leary, federations are differentiated 
by levels of democracy whereby Canada, the US and Belgium are considered maturely 
democratic, whereas Nigeria and Malaysia as partially democratic.
105
 The origin of 
federalism is explored in the next segment to deepen its understanding and utility. 
 
 1.3 The Origin of Federalism  
        The history of federalism is important to scholars especially in the application of 
the concept in the governance of modern states as shown in this study. Although modern 
federation traces its origin to1787 in the United State of America which is often seen as 
the first federal system, but federalism is rooted in ancient history.  The first documented 
federal system was that of ancient Israelite tribes which emerged in 13
th
 century prior to 
the Common Era or over 3200 years ago. It is unclear if it was a federation or 
confederation but it is described in the Bible as having common constitution(the Torah 
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of Moses) binding many tribes with governing powers. It lasted nearly seven hundred 
years with kingship and the division of the kingdom into polities.
106
      
         The next stage was the medieval federal arrangement which occurred in medieval 
Europe, and was associated with democratic republicanism. The correlation this had with 
the Israelite Federalism is that self-governing cities emerged in northern Italy or 
Germany as loosed confederations. Rural areas in the continent consisting of mountains 
and on the European periphery, small republics confined to a particular mountain valley 
or a coastal swamp which came together first in confederation and transformed into 
federal arrangements. The Helvetic Confederation (Coniuratio) of 1291was transformed 
to become the present Swiss federation in1848 which celebrated the 700
th
 anniversary of 
its founding in 1991, and continues to remain as a federal system.
107
      
          However, this was followed by the sixteenth century political federalism 
reformation which secured the survival of Helvetic Confederation that ushered in the 
current Switzerland and the formation of the Netherlands confederation. This brought 
about the first burst of explicitly federal theory, although the Bible provided the 
elements of federal theory in view of its moral education, and not political teaching. It is 
of interest to add in this study that to the Greek political philosophers theoretical models 
were not federal, instead they were preoccupied with “the principles of organic society 
resting on the centre-periphery model and rather rejected federalism, which to them was 
a deformity”. However, there were early developments of federal theory in connection 
with the medieval experimentation which became prominent in the Catholic Church and 
not too long ago in the European Union. It is observed that the political thought of 
Reformed Protestantism was based on the principles of covenant that were found in the 
Bible which animated the federalism of ancient Israel. While building covenant ideas, 
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Reformed Protestantism developed a federal theology which explains the relationship 
between God and man in this context in which Elazar succinctly put it thus,  
      Their theologians and political philosophers applied that theology to the relationship between 
humans and rulers and the ruled, to denounce tyranny as a violation of God’s ordinances, and to 
authorise the people under their legitimate leaders to take decicive action to remove tyrants. In 
the process of doing both, the Reformed theologians had to begin to articulate a political theory 
of federalism which was developed in full-blown fashion by Johannes Althusius in his Politica 
Methodice Digest.
108
 
 
      In a nutshell, this study also looks at the fourth stage in the evolution of federalism in 
which the world shifted away from federalism toward modern statism. The 17
th
 century 
saw federal theories replaced by German theorists for a restored modernized Holy 
Roman Empire and English theorists who desired to develop interstate comity in the area 
of international relations. The most significant development at this time was also the 
founding of the British settlements in North America, particularly in New England, 
which was largely based of federal arrangements in its growth out of Reformed 
Protestantism. These were the first successful models of modern federalism.
109
   
            As Elazar observes, the federalist’s theory of federalism emerged as the fifth 
phase in the development of federalism. This period covers works on federal theory and 
that of confederation by Montestquieu and Rousseau that led to the modern 
confederation and federation by the founders of the United States of America. This 
explains the principal work of The Federalist, a collection of essays that expound on the 
adoption of the Constitution of 1787.
110
 The sixth stage in the development of federalism 
ushered in modern European theory in the 19
th
 century.
111
The foregoing leads the thesis 
to examine the origins and adoption of federalism in Nigeria and Malaysian plural 
societies. 
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1.4 The Origin of Federalism in Nigeria and Malaysia 
           The evolution of federalism in Nigeria and Malaysia should be seen within the 
context of their political and socio-economic foundations. It is important to note that 
among other things, factors responsible for the development of federalism in the world 
have varied between nations and time. Nigeria and Malaysia demonstrate those factors 
which are important in explaining federalism and distinguishing these federations from 
older federal forbearers. The point being made is that pre-colonial Nigeria harboured 
tribal identities and was highly fragmented.
112
  
               The evolution of federalism in Nigeria can be traced to European conquest, and 
colonialism, which perhaps gave rise to comments in the scholarly circles that Nigeria is 
an artificial creation, an entity established without regard to boundaries. African partition 
into artificial states intensified following the Berlin West Africa conference of 1885. 
This was done by the European nations without the consent of various ethnic groups as 
to whether they agreed to an independent state being established.
113
  In the beginning, 
there was no Nigeria. There were Ijaws, Igbos, Urhobos, Itsekiris, Yorubas, Hausa, 
Fulanis, Nupes, Kanuris, Ogonis, Gwaris, Katafs, Jukars, Edos, Ibibios, Efiks, Idomas, 
Tivs, Jukuns, Biroms, Agnas, Ogijas and so on. In like manner, there were Kingdoms 
such as Oyo, Lagos, Calabar, Brass, Itsekiri, Benin, Borno, Sokoto Caliphate etc. These 
were independent nations and kingdoms prior to the British conquest.
114
 Historically, the 
structure of the Nigerian federalism is traced back to 1914 when both Northern and 
Southern Protectorates were amalgamated to form one administration of a unitary type. 
The recognition of the two autonomous parts of Northern and Southern provinces for a 
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better administrative system of Nigeria was placed under the charge of a lieutenant-
governor in Kano and Lagos while reporting to the Governor-General.
115
  
         In 1939 the East and West were separated due to differences that existed among 
them. The transformation of Nigeria into a full federation and various constitutional 
changes which included the recognition of regional assemblies under the provinces, later 
called regions, was established under Arthur Rischard in 1946. The Constitution of 1951 
assigned huge power to the central government while the regions were given a limited 
range of powers over matters contained in the constitution.
116
 Briefly, as Nwabueze 
observes, “The federal system in 1954 was built on the pre-existing division of the 
country into three regions –North, West and East –which, as earlier indicated, goes back 
to 1914 (with regard to the division of the South into East and West)1939.”117 
           The thesis argues that varied assortments of politically, economically, socially 
and linguistically diverse groups within this area named Nigeria had never been put 
under a single authority or power prior to British pacification and consolidation of the 
region.  At the close of the Second World War, the country later called Nigeria could not 
be described as a nation rather a collection of self-contained, influential communities.
118
 
There are at least 40 principal tribes and hundreds of minor ones,
119
 and 200 in the 
northern region of Nigeria.
120
 The tribal Hausa and Hausa-speaking Fulani accounted for 
about 8.5 million of the Northern Region population of 16,832,582 people as at 1951.
121
 
In the same manner, the South is divided naturally and as at 1939 this division was made 
clearly possible by the Niger River separating the East and the West. These three regions 
are shown in Appendix A. Map 1.1. At this time the Ibo tribe of the Eastern Region 
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constituted about 70 percent of the population with 7,215,251 people while the Yoruba 
tribe of the West accounted for two-thirds of the area’s population as listed in 1951 
showing a population figure of 6,085,065,61. Nigeria suffers tension and cleavages 
emanating from these three key tribes of the country.
122
  Nigeria’s early population, 
principal tribes and religion as at 1953 are shown in Appendix B. Table 1.1 with an area 
size of 373,250 square miles. All these features reinforced the need for Nigeria’s diverse 
peoples and ethnic groups to be accommodated under a federal system.   
            Similar to diverse groups discussed in Nigeria, it is significant to note also that 
several indigenous tribes were living in large parts of the Malay Archipelago before the 
colonial era. Their numbers have dwindled over the years and they are not a source of 
tension in present day Malaysia compared to tribes in Nigeria where dissatisfaction with 
the government is great. However, Malaysia’s pre-independence and earliest form of 
federalism was credited to the Negeri Sembilan’s loose arrangements of nine different 
localities under the Yamtuan Besar. While the office of the Yamtuan served as a 
unifying symbol, it was an arrangement that did not merit being called a federal system 
when compared to the contemporary definition of federalism.  As a matter of fact, it 
could be said that the federation of Malaysia began unofficially with the traditional 
federation of Negri Sembilan.
123
 However, the British introduced the system in 1895 
under the Federated Malay States (FMS), which united Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan 
and Pahang and discarded the resident system.
124
 It was also not a federation in the true 
sense; rather it served as a device which enabled the British to implement their policy in 
the states through the state councils chaired by the respective sultans.
125
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          Federal system at this time focused on a strong central government with sovereign 
authority over neighboring units. It was this reason that discouraged the Unfederated 
Malay States (UFMS) from joining this federation.
126
 While the Malayan Union (MU) 
came into being in 1946, it did not employ the idea of federalism within its influence in 
running the system in Malaysia.
127
 MU was an attempt by the British to introduce the 
unitary system.
128
 This time is described by B. Simandjuntak as post-war federalism in 
Malaya after the Japanese conquest of Malaya failed in disgrace. The fatally wounded 
British came back to Malaya with the idea of a centetralised administration. The idea 
was opposed by the Malay Rulers as well as the majority of the Malay community.
129
  
However, some features in the current federation are rooted in MU format. It includes 
the provision which allows the federal government control over the states which shows 
that most of the power lies with the central government. 
130
 
        The rejection of UM led the British to introduce a new political setup which was 
called the Federation of Malaya in 1948 under the Federation of Malaya Agreement. It 
was a pre-self-rule federation designed to create a strong central government and to 
accommodate states mainly with regard to the sovereignty of the Malay rulers.
131
 The 
federation is seen as a major achievement that led to independence in 1957, with powers 
shared between the central and state governments.
132
 This earlier federation was intact 
until 1963 when it assumed a dominant position of a larger Malaysian political entity 
with the inclusion of Saba, Sarawak and Singapore. The central government has 
strongly opposed threat to the territorial integrity of the federation. Under the Federal 
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Constitution 1963, Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore were given more autonomy than was 
allowed states in the Peninsular in 1957.
133
  The indigenous peoples of these areas were 
united by a common race, culture, religion and language and unification that were 
effected in 1963 to form Malaysia. The various racial groups and their population 
figures that formed the federation of Malaysia are shown in Appendix 1table 2.2. Given 
the history of its federal formation, Malaysia truly has a pre-colonial pattern of social 
pluralism which is prevalent in similar countries like Nigeria, Pakistan and India.
134
 
  
1.5 Theoretical Framework of Federalism  
         This study values federalism as an analytic structure which is designed to explain a 
set of observations in a given situation. It is important to note that a theory functions by 
explaining issues being scientifically investigated, e.g., a particular event and its case 
study, the account of a specific organization, and further describing a certain nation, a 
particular rule and its evaluation. It has become “imperative for the development of 
political science that it be provided with testable and tested generalisation, even if their 
meaning is not the most exciting revelation about nature”.135 While this study unveils 
ethnic challenges in Nigeria and Malaysian plural societies, it goes beyond the 
conveyance of this exploration to reflect Elazar’s own words that “federalism offers a 
way to approach political phenomena in its own rights and is not to be subsumed within 
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other models of political inquiry”.136 In view of the factors highlighted earlier in this 
chapter that led to the evolution of federalism in Nigeria and Malaysia, the factors vary, 
yet the two federations share certain aspects in their federal formations. Hicks observes 
that the historic origin of federations influences “their Constitutions and the working 
thereof.”137 However, there is no uniform analysis of theory of federalism in view of 
varied perceptions of the subject. Michael Burgess observes that federalism is 
extensively fraught with complexities that reflect in its theory and practice. He believes 
that the term ‘federalism’ has both an empirical and a theoretical resonance. He notes, 
        I shall argue that while such a thing as federal theory does exists, there is, as yet, no fully 
fledged theory of federalism. At best there is a partial theory based upon rigorous conceptual 
analysis and the pursuit of terminological precision. At worst, there is crass empiricism rooted 
in the failure to develop concepts and define the key terms. Without this fundamental 
preparation it is not possible to engage in genuine comparative analysis that has theoretical 
implications.
138
 
 
         Given the foregoing insight, the focus of this theoretical analysis is to shed light on 
the differences and implications of federal practices in the two countries. In the same 
manner Stepan has advised that clear distinction should be made between federations 
whose intention is to “come together” and those whose idea only seeks to “hold 
together”.139 This is the dividing line as observed in scholarly arguments that surround 
both the centripetal and centrifugal forces that lead to federal formations. Elaigwu has 
rhetorically asked: What is federalism? Why did Nigeria adopt federalism as a technique 
of managing conflicts? To what extent does governance (especially democratic 
governance) provide for the achievement of the goals of the state? What are the basic 
challenges of governance? If we isolate the issue of security from other challenges of 
governance, to what extent is the security a major challenge of state-building in 
Nigeria?
140
 He provided the following as answers to the questions:  
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1. Internal and external factors goaded Nigeria  to the adoption of federalism as a technique for 
managing inter-ethnic conflicts; 
2. Federalism is, and shall remain for a long time, a relevant and conducive grid for managing 
conflicts among Nigerians; 
3. The challenges of democratic governance are enormous, and the federal grid provides a 
conducive medium for dealing with these; 
4. Security, as a prime objective of any state, is important in the establishment of peace for 
democratic governance.
141
 
 
The aforementioned issues raised by Elaigwu will no doubt help to stimulate discussion 
on political theory and socio-economic theory of federal formation by Riker. 
 
1.5.1 Riker’s Political Theory of Federal Formations 
      William Riker’s political theory of federal formations is derived from his ground 
breaking study on the origin of federations, and the operations and significance of 
federalism. It was geared toward developing a new political science that is capable of 
providing “testable and tested generalisations”. His theory particularly addresses factors 
behind federal formation in Malaysia and other countries but with more emphasis on the 
federal formation in Nigeria. Given this focus, he defined federalism as “a bargain 
between prospective national leaders and officials of constituent governments for the 
purpose of aggregating territory, the better to pay taxes and raise armies”.142 Riker also 
raised certain issues in his prefatory remarks on his federalism theory: 
          The politicians who offer the bargain desire to expand their territorial control, usually either to 
meet an external military or diplomatic threat or prepare for military or diplomatic aggression 
and aggrandisement. The politicians, who accept the bargain, giving up some independence 
for the sake of union, are willing to do so because of some external military-diplomatic threat 
or opportunity. Either they desire protection from external threat or they desire to participate 
in the potential aggression of the federation.
143
 
 
          Issues in Nigeria and Malaysia are captured in Riker’s theory which is based on 
the supposition that federalism is institutionalised through political bargaining among 
rational politicians, supported by a two-fold hypothesis: the expansion condition, and the 
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military condition which are essential for the formation of a federation. While Riker’s 
intention or attention was to analyse a common trend in the formation of federations, he 
felt he could justify the validity of his data and to demonstrate his theory as scientific 
given his examination of federalism which has lasted since 1786 in the United States. He 
concluded that both the military as well as expansion factors are essential to the 
formation or occurrence of federalism.
144
   
          Riker’s analysis shows that military-diplomatic and security concerns led 
founding fathers of some countries to decide on federation.
145
 Riker was authoritatively 
of the view that the formation of the Malaysian federation conforms to his hypothesis. 
He argued that military condition was present as shown in “the existence of communist 
guerrillas, supported from China” and that the expansion condition was present amid 
uniting earlier federated states.
146
 Riker insisted that, “the clearly discernible motive for 
this federalism was, therefore, a fear of Indonesian imperialism and reluctance on the 
part of Singapore, Borneo, and others to accept Malayan domination”.147  
                Similarly, Cheah Boon Kheng asserts that several reasons account for the 
formation of Malaysia, but the most important reason given by Tunku’s administration 
was the ethnic factor. The earlier assertion on domination by Riker, as this thesis 
evaluates events, is validated by Kheng who also observed Tunku’s apprehension. The 
reason was that the racial balance as at 1957 Malaya was almost “equal between the 
Malays and “non-Malays”, but in the enlarged fedaration of Malaysia, the Malays and 
“natives” of Malaya, Sarawak and Sabah would outnumber the Chinese, Indians and 
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other “non-natives” and “non-Malays”.148 Obviously, Kheng’s study on Malaysia: The 
Making of a Nation clarifies Riker’s hypothesis on the role of politicians in Malaya. 
            Riker’s claim about the role of politicians in the formation of a federation is 
substantiated, as could be seen in the actions of Tunku and his team, as this thesis 
unveils, in their protectionist struggle for the emergence of a federation that favoured the 
‘Malays’ and indigenous groups. For instance, Tunku expressed negative perception 
when he observed that in Malaya-Singapore Merger, the Malays “might without the 
protection of the Constitution, find themselves at a total loss in the only homeland they 
had. This might eventually mean trouble as an outcome. And who wanted 
that?…Singapore vis-à-vis  Malaya was not as simple as idealists might think”.149 This 
thesis asserts that the internal fear about the political condition of the Malays and the 
indigenous people in Malaya in view of the populations of the Chinese and Indians was 
worrying Malay politicians as shown in Riker’s theory. External threats and the need to 
control the emerging federation were profound on the side of Malaysia which eventually 
discouraged Brunei from joining the federation. However, the expulsion of Singapore 
truly explains the push for Malay dominance.         
          Riker’s position on Nigeria was that external threat led to the formation of the 
country due to the expansionist ambition of Ghana. Some scholars have criticized Riker 
on the issue of Ghana, and external threat as the main underlying factor in federal 
formation but such threat has always constituted the need for a federation.
150
 Akin to 
Riker’s view is King’s postulation that every state tends to be exposed to the risk of 
external attack and domestic rebellion, the source of danger is three-fold: threat to a 
particular state from within the state; threat to one state from another state; and threat to 
                                                 
148
 Cheah Boon Kheng, Malaysia: The Making of a Nation, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2002, p. 93. 
149
 Tunku Abudul Rahman Putra, Looking Back, p. 79; Kheng, Malaysia: The Making of a Nation, p. 94. 
150
 R. D. Dikshit, “Military Interpretation of Federal Constitutions: A Critique”, The Journal of Politics, 
33(1971): 180-189; S.R. Davis , The Federal Principle: A Journey Through Time in Quest of Meaning, 
Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1978, p. 133. 
 55 
allied states from one another state. Internal threat may compel a state to form a union, 
and threat to one state against another may lead to the formation of a federation as seen 
in the federations of the United States, Switzerland and Nigeria because fear must 
provide grounds for a federal union. For the sake of clarity, both Nigeria and Malaysia 
expressed internal fear. Earlier analysis has shown the way Malaysian leaders tried to 
protect the Malay/indigenous people’s interest. King has also emphasised that the 
possible threat among Nigeria’s three main regions was that two could combine against 
it.
151
 For Elaigwu, regular fear and suspicions of domination among Nigeria’s ethnic 
groups reinforced the colonial authority’s idea to adopt federalism in Nigeria.152 
         Security issues are profound in most federal formations, and scholars especially 
Stephen who decided to examine modes of federal creation instead of the factors leading 
to federations is shown in his three main typologies of federal formations: coming 
together; holding together; and putting together. However, the American, Swiss and 
Australian federations are categorised as “coming together” federations that show how 
formerly sovereign units decided to unite with their sovereignties while retaining their 
respective identities. Also, a “holding together” federation is observed when a unitary 
state, in its “historical and political logic” chose to federalise. A “putting together 
federation describes the use of force to bring together earlier independent states. 
153
 
         Remarkably, Stepan’s typology shows that Nigeria and India typify holding 
together federations because their constituent units that amalgamated to form both 
federations were not sovereign in comparison with American states. However, the 
former Soviet Union exemplifies a putting together federation. Obviously, Malaysia falls 
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within this group since Sabah, Sarawak and all the previously existing Malay Sultanates 
(states) retained their autonomy in an enlarged federation of Malaysia. 
 
1.5.2 The Socio-economic Theory: Formation of Nigeria and Malaysian Federations     
           
        The earlier discussion in this segment demonstrated that, to federalise is to bring 
together or unify constituent parts while retaining their identities and a certain degree of 
autonomy of each of the composing units. It is of interest to add that socio-economic 
theory of federalism may find expression within the context of building a healthy society 
that enriches lives. The “socio-economic” context of federalism may allow individuals 
or observers to perceive fundamental benefits of a union, its sustenance and continuity.      
       The thoughts of socio-economic theory or such related ideas such as virtue inherent 
in federalism could directly or indirectly call to mind Michael Burgress words that, 
“Federalism deals with fundamental moral questions as well as with amoral matter-of-
fact issues”.  He extends his thesis by suggesting that “the moral basis of federalism 
derives from certain inherent virtues, such as respect, tolerance, dignity, and mutual 
recognition which lead to a particular form of human association, namely the federal 
state and federation”.154 This may give meaning to federal formations in Nigeria and 
Malaysia as based on socio-economic benefits and advantages favourable to the unions.  
          Deutsch, cited by Riker, explains that social as well as economic conditions lead 
to federation which he articulated in nine points, namely: “(1) Mutual compatibility of 
main value; (2) a distinctive way of life; (3) expectations of stronger economic ties or 
gains; (4) marked increase in political and administrative capabilities of at least some 
participating units; (5) superior economic growth on the part of at least some 
participating units; (6) unbroken links of social communication, both geographically 
between territories and sociologically between different social strata; (7) a broadening of 
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the political elite; (8) mobility of persons at least among the politically relevant strata; 
and (9 )a multiplicity of ranges of communications and transactions”. 155 
         In the same reasoning, Birch has confirmed that four out of nine conditions 
postulated by Deutsch were considerations for the creation of Nigeria’s federal system, 
namely: expectations of stronger economic ties or gains; marked increase in political and 
administrative capabilities of at least some participating units; superior economic growth 
on the part of at least some participating units; and a multiplicity of range of 
communications and transactions”.156 Malaysia’s early fragmentation also explains these 
conditions for its federal formation given the fact that both countries share similar 
problems; and the same Colonial Authority in Nigeria was also at work in Malaysia at 
the same time.  Kheng describes Malaysia as a fragmented nation-state. “Not only is it 
fragmented geographically, but the multi-ethnic diversity of its population has presented 
problems of economic, social and political integration for the Federal government”.157 
           In all contexts, Kheng’s assertion on economic, social and political need for the 
integration of ethnic groups in Malaysia also draws from Wheare’s argument that some 
political, social and economic factors jointly contribute to the formation of federations 
such as the United States, Switzerland, Canada and Australia. Others among these 
political and socio-economic factors for federal formation include: (1)A sense of military 
insecurity and of the consequent need for common defence; (2) A desire to be 
independent of foreign powers, and a realisation that only through union could 
independence be secured; (3) A hope of economic advantage from union; (4) Some 
political association of the communities concerned prior to their federal union either in a 
loose confederation,…or as parts of the same Empire,…(5) Geographical 
neighbourhood; and (6) similarity of political institutions.
158
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               Wheare has warned that “it is not possible to pick on any one of them or any 
one a combination of them and say that unless this or these are present, the desire for 
federal union will not arise; that desire may be produced by any one of them”.159 This 
study looks at the foregonging factors as a panacea or conditions that favour larger 
federated units, yet, Nigeria and Malaysia are implicated in numerous ethnic cleavages 
and demands within their federal politics and at times abuse of constitutional order. The 
implication and inability to address political and socio-economic needs of society is 
adequately explained by Ifidon. He laments that while recognising the legitimised 
constitutional provisions, the ruling elite have entrenched discriminatory practices that 
negatively affect the economic and political governance of Nigeria, whereby the central 
government limited capacity to meet the people’s need. This has led to increased 
withdrawal into primordial/primary levels of identity. “The level at which citizenship is 
truly realised is not the mega state but the home or primary group level, where the 
Nigerian is a subject. Beyond this a Nigerian is an alien in another state, enduring self-
imposed social passivity as strategy of survival. While a Nigerian nationality is non-
existent, properly speaking citizenship is operative at the homeland.”160  
            Similarly, the literature review and chapter three of this study demonstrated how 
ethnicised federal structure in Malaysia maintains Malay preeminence. Watts, a top 
scholar of federalism observes that ideas for a federal union in new federations are more 
complex than what was witnessed in the past. Given the current complexity in 
federations, he offers a broad list of socio-economic conditions that led to the formation 
of “new Federations”. Countries among his list of ‘new federations’ are India, Pakistan, 
Malaysia, Nigeria, Rhodesia and the West Indies, whereas the “old Federations” are the 
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United States, Switzerland, Canada, and Australia.
161
 In addition to Riker’s political and 
socio-economic theories of the formation of federalism in Nigeria and Malaysia, other 
fundamental principles of federalism are now discussed for more insight on its workings. 
 
1.6 Fundamental Principles of Federalism  
 
      Discussion on federalism, practice and emerging events continue to shape federalism 
in its complex posture. Attention is paid to the underlying basic principles of federalism 
to harmonise earlier insights into its definition and operations.  
 
1.6.1 Federal Democracy 
      Federalism has a strong disposition toward democracy with the general belief that to 
be truly federal a system must be democratic which invariably involves public and 
constitutional choice in all aspects. Democracy in this respect is built on different set of 
premises rather than other two models of the polity. Westminster democracy describes 
how the parliament is supreme with support given to government in exercise of power 
by a majority in the parliament.Consociational democracy is another form of democratic 
government that requires to be understood in the way it is practiced. “In those other two 
models, democracy stands in tension with political reality while in the federal model, 
while it can be perverted, it stands in basic harmony with the model itsel”.162 
 
1.6.2 Checks and Balances 
A federal system is generally democratic, which requires the polity to maintain 
appropriate checks and balances, “so that every institution is checked and balanced by 
other institutions which are constitutionally authoritative and practically sufficiently 
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autonomous to sustain themselves politically and socially; in the words of Federalist 
51,”ambition must be made to counteract ambition.” 163 
 
1.6.3 Open Bargaining 
         Open bargaining is one of the fundamental principles of federalism. It is required 
to take place among institutions and their representatives, but this has to be done in the 
open to comform with the legitimacy of the federal political process. While bargaining is 
witnessed in more centralized systems, Elazar observes that “Federalism, however, is the 
only system, subject only to the requirement that it be generally open and accessible.” 164 
 
1.6.4 Unity in Diversity 
       A federation which derives its system from the framework of federalism is usually 
established by the association of a number of independent states.
165
 If there is no need 
for the associating states to retain their separate existence and identity, then a unitary 
state is envisaged.
166
 One of the major aims of federalism is to achieve unity as well as 
safeguard the uniqueness of the constituents of the members that form the federation. In 
federalism, unity and diversity feature in the federal principle because federalism 
provides as well as channels two different or conflicting social forces such as the forces 
for unification (centripetal forces) and the forces for preserving differences (centrifugal 
forces). Unity is the underlying principle of federalism. According to Livingston, 
federalism ‘embraces diversities that are territorially grouped by recognising that rights 
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of the territorial units to exist as components of the federal system’.167   William also 
describes federalism as a political as well as constitutional arrangement of diverse 
groups into a single polity so that the autonomy of components parts is preserved while 
maintaining each as separate political unit.
168
 The theory of federalism is premised on 
thoughts about the nature of conflict that characterise society, consensus as well as 
resources of federalism. In order to realize unity in diversity, as well as to enhance 
checks and balances against sectional domination, and interference into the affairs of 
other federating units, each level of government is implicitly distinct, independent or 
autonomous in matters of resources, claims or control of institutions. The main thrust of 
the theory is shown in governments with defined authorities, nevertheless coordinated as 
well as lawful prominence, autonomous mechanisms of government, economic 
independence, a balance delimitation of actions without overlap.
169
  
       According to F. G. Carnell, federalism expresses a constitutional government of 
imperfect unity or multinationalism. Federalism ‘is the result of a balance between two 
competing forces, namely nationalism and sub-nationalism.” Nationalism describes the 
force focused on building large political structures whereas sub-nationalism represents a 
counter force that encourages political balkanization.
170
 According to K. W. Robinson 
“federation does not create unity out of diversity; rather, it enables the two to coexist.”171        
For Dicey, federalism is ‘a political contrivance intended to reconcile national unity and 
power with the maintenance of “state rights.”172 
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1.6.5 Decentralised Constitutional System of Government 
        Another underlying principle of federalism is decentralization which describes a 
constitutional framework whereby the power of the federation is decentralised and 
distributed among a number of power-centers or governments. The sharing of power 
which is stipulated in the federal constitution is premised on the territorial basis between 
the central (federal) government and the state governments. The distribution of power in 
this respect guarantees federal and state governments’ independence within their 
jurisdictions. This study demonstrates that federalism is an institutional arrangement 
which provides room for division of powers among the central government and the 
constituents. It is basically a constitutional separation of power between two levels of 
government whereby each level acts independently within its assigned powers.  
             Given this scenario, citizens perform dual political responsibilities to the 
constituents and the federal centre.
173
 While the centre is saddled with defense and 
foreign policy roles, the federating units engage in international roles, as well as taking 
part in central decision-making in the polity. Thus, federalism makes room for stability 
as well as creates trust among all citizens in the federation.
174
  Given the goal of the 
thesis, a theory is a system of ideas designed to explain something, mainly that which is 
based on general principles and solely independent of the thing it tends to explain.
175
 It 
extends to Wheare’s emphasis on the separation of powers between the centre and the 
federating units, each acting within its jurisdiction which shows how a federal system 
works.
176
 A federal system comes into being through a certain amount of union and no 
more.  Federalism in this sense is secure so far the federal tie remains the same and 
nothing tighter or looser is attached to those states. It shows federalism as an 
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intermediate between two extremes, balkanization and a large singe state.
177
  William 
Maddox describes it is a perfect balance or compromise between two extremes.
178
 
 
 1.6.6 Institutions of a Federal System 
       It is imperative to note that no one in the world can find two identical constitutions; 
rather federal arrangements in countries that are described as federations vary 
profoundly. On the other hand, there are certain institutions and features that are 
common to almost all federations in the world. In his scholarly insight, Rashid Moten 
provides vivid descriptive features of a federal state which he says “It implies an alliance 
of various units and people of a state. A federal state is one in which there exists at least 
two sets of governments, and there is a division of governmental powers between the 
national government and constituent units (states, provinces, republics, regions, or 
cantons).”179 Moten summarises four features of federalism as shown in figure 1.1. 
Figure 1.1 Features of Federalism  
 
      
 
 
  
 
   
 
 
Source: This is fully discussed by Wheare, see Kenneth C. Wheare, Federal Government, London: Oxford 
University Press, 1963, pp. 53-74; See also Abdul Rashid Moten, Introduction to Political Science, 
Second Edition, Singapore: Gengage Learning Asia Pte ltd., 2009, p.100. 
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 Four   
Features of 
Federalism 
1. “Two sets of governments, one is called 
central or national government, the other 
is provincial, regional or unit government. 
Each government is independent of the 
other within their own jurisdiction”. 
 
 
3. “The Constitution is the supreme law of the 
land and any legislation not in conformity 
with the provision of the Constitution is 
deemed  invalid. It, therefore, follows that the 
Constitution must almost necessarily be a 
written and rigid Constitution”. 
  
 
 
4. “The Court has the power of Judicial Review. 
The courts should have the authority to interpret 
the constitution. In this respect, the courts will 
decide disputes of jurisdiction arising between 
the central government and regional 
governments or among regional governments 
and will keep different governments within their 
limits so that none may encroach upon the 
jurisdiction of the other” 
 
2. “There is a division of power 
between the central and regional 
government. This division of power is 
clearly spelled out in the Constitution”. 
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Any country that has the listed institutions can claim to be a federation. However, there 
may be other forms of institutions in a federal system or distinctive federal institutions. 
In other words, distinctive federal institution adopted by a country to demonstrate its 
unique qualities. This is premised on the proposition that federalism recognises different 
qualities of each community which derive from social, political, legal or any other 
factors, but they have significant role in each federal system.
180
 
 
1.6.6.1 The Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy and Constitutionalism 
         The constitutional division of power between the federal and state governments is 
largely premised on a written constitution. The necessity of a written constitution is 
meant to express the division of power in clear terms. This demonstrates that a federal 
constitution must be the supreme law of the land, and its provisions must be observed by 
any legislative, executive and judicial body and by any organ of the federal and state 
governments. In other words, the doctrine of constitutional supremacy is entrenched in 
federalism; hence what is supreme in a federation is the federal constitution.
181
 It is the 
federal constitution that establishes organs of government and delegates power to them. 
The federating units or states derive their existence from the federal constitution which 
makes powers exercised by the executive, legislative or judiciary at national or state 
level subordinate to the constitution.
182
 All levels of government in a federal system are 
required to observe restraint and their limits as set by the federal constitution. The 
distribution of power to all levels of government is established with mechanisms that 
prevent possible violation of the rights of any of the levels of government.
183
  Federal 
arrangements allow the federal and state governments to co-ordinate and remain 
independent within their respective spheres. The federal constitution is seen as a ‘living’ 
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document which is ideally able to accommodate changing needs, social forces as well as 
aspirations of its constituents. As partners, any processing leading to the amendment of 
the constitution must receive their consent. 
184
 The Federal constitution is a legal 
framework for Pluralism. The preamble of 1999 Nigerian Constitution reads:  
We the people of the Federal Republic of Nigeria: Having firmly and solemnly resolved: To 
live in unity and harmony as one indivisible and indissoluble Sovereign Nation under God 
dedicated to promotion of inter-African solidarity, world peace, international co-operation and 
understanding: And to provide for a Constitution for the purpose of promoting the good 
government and welfare of all in our country on the principles of freedom, Equity and Justice, 
and for the purpose of consolidating the Unity of our people: Do hereby make, enact and give 
to ourselves the Constitution:
185
 
 
 
         Similarly, the constitution of Malaysia has the title: Laws of Malaysia, Federal 
Constitution whereby Part 1 “The State, Religion and Law of the Federations” states the 
following: “Article (1), Name, State and Territories of the Federation, (2), Admission of 
New territories into the Federation, (3), Religion of the Federation, (4), Supreme Law of 
the Federation”. The Federal Constitutions of Nigeria and Malaysia were founded on the 
strength of federalism. This is well explored in chapter 3 of this thesis. 
 
1.6.6.2 The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and an Independent Supreme Court 
 
     In federalism, the power of judicial review is a very crucial characteristic of the 
doctrine of separation of powers which is also enshrined in a federal constitution. The 
doctrine ensures that organs of government operate within the limits set by the 
constitution which helps to sustain democratic rule. The doctrine of separation of power 
is important in democracy in which the federal constitution protects human rights and 
those of states and the government at the centre.  Federalism is about the sharing of “the 
force of the state” among component units each level operating within a system that is 
regulated by its constitution.
186
 However, powers allotted to the states and the federal 
authorities require an independent body to exercise judicial power against arbitrary use 
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of power by any of the levels. In this regard, the court or tribunal plays an important role 
by interpreting the constitution and by ensuring that disputes are settled between the 
centre and the constituents not by force but rather by due process of law.  
 
1.6.6.3 Principle of Equality 
      The principle of equality in a federal system explains the equal status of all 
governments in a federation. Each level of government is endowed with powers within 
its jurisdiction. The federal constitution grants the state, powers to establish their own 
legislative body to make laws, its executive engages in policy formulation while the state 
judiciary settles disputes that fall within its jurisdiction. They should have their 
administrative bodies for policy implementation.
187
 While each of the two governments 
has its legislative and executive organs with their authority exercised independently, any 
action or law executed outside its sphere of authority will be declared by the independent 
supreme court of the federation as ultra vires. The two levels of government should be 
financially capable to run their affairs. According to Wheare, threat and political 
coercion’ are not allowed in a federal system.188 The worst threat and coercion a federal 
government can carry out is the expulsion of a member state, whereas the worst threat by 
a member state is secession. But Wheare also argues that the “unilateral right to secede 
or to expel makes for bad federal government”.189 
 
1.7 Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict    
        Major struggles and challenges in politics among contemporary multiethnic 
countries are discourses on ethnicity and ethnic conflicts which describe deep divisions 
in the polity. To understand ‘ethnicity’ is to view what Hutchison and Smith regard as a 
recent analytical construction with certain elements like culture, language and kinship as 
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old concepts.
190
 Ethnicity can be interpreted as ‘the essence of an ethnic group’ or ‘the 
quality of belonging to an ethnic community or group’.191Largely many scholars have 
found ways to differentiate one ethnic group from another. Ethnic community is defined 
by A.D. Smith as “a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared 
historical memories, one or more elements of a common culture, a link with a homeland 
and a sense of solidarity among at least some of its members”.192 
        On the other hand, ethnic tensions generated through intense competition and 
cleavages over power and, or economic resources in a given polity where the interests 
of ethnic groups collide can lead to armed conflict. Numerous but stable ethnic tensions 
in Malaysia include its early May 1969 racial riots as a typical case. The case of ethnic 
conflict in Nigeria in 1966 developed into a full blown civil war that only ended in 
1970. In his recent work on federal countries, a renowned federalism scholar John 
Kincaid discusses federalism in Africa and describes federalism in Nigeria as 
challenged by civil war, corruption and military incursion into power. But Nigeria has 
started to realise democratic governance. He also describes Malaysia as one of the few 
federations to expel a member (i.e, Singapore in 1965), but remains highly centralised 
as well as troubled by ethnic conflict.
193
  
            For a clearer understanding, ethnic conflicts in Nigeria and Malaysia are 
illustrated in the theory of Ethnic Groups in Conflict by Donald Horowitz. He is a 
political scientist of great stature as well as a lawyer whose book on the role of judicial 
interpretation and intervention in shaping American social policy in recent years was 
well received in the United States of America.
194
 Many studies have been carried out 
with reference to psychological, political as well as economic factors, and their linkages 
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especially among ethnic, class and religious identities. Such studies also unveil the role 
of the state, the significance of elites, and the need and possibility of reducing conflicts 
which overwhelm nations. Horowitz theoretical explanation gives detailed insights into 
motives and effects of ethnic conflict. His fresh insight into this field of study not only 
reflects on other studies but delves into interethnic relations and conflict in more 
profound ways. By calculation, over 10 million people have been killed through ethnic 
conflict since World War II.
195
 The spread of ethnic conflict shows that “Ethnicity is at 
the centre of politics in country after country, a potent source of challenges to the 
cohesion of states and of international tension. Connections among Biafra, Bangladesh, 
Burundi, Beirut, Brussels, and Belfast were at first hesitantly made –isn’t one “tribal”, 
one “linguistic,” another “religious”? –but that is true no longer. Ethnicity has fought 
and bled and burned its way into public and scholarly consciousness.”196  
             In an effort to bring to the fore the potency of ethnic conflict in contemporary 
societies, Horowitz captures earlier theoretical insight rendered by Karl W. Deutsch 
who had advanced a proposition that really aroused political consciousness, which 
could help to consolidate unity of  states with homogeneous population and “strain or 
destroy” the cohesion of state with diverse population.197  
             It has become clearly evident that only a number of states are homogeneous 
while numerous states are deeply divided, which provides a strong argument to view 
ethnic conflict as a global phenomenon. The dimensions of ethnic conflict are quite 
profound as evidenced in the regular hostilities in countries such as Northern Ireland, 
Chad, and Lebanon; secessionist warfare in Burma, Bangladesh, the Sudan, Nigeria, 
Iraq, and the Philippines; the Somali invasion of Ethiopia and Turkish invasion of 
Cyprus; the army killings in Uganda … and many more on ethnic riot in India, Sri 
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Lanka, Malaysia, Zaire, and a score of other countries. These consist of simply a major 
brutal proof of ethnic antagonism.
198
 Ethnic conflict is a recurring event in view of its 
shifting context in a situation where the complexities of international relations and 
changing environments contribute to its emergence as well as remission. The first and 
second World Wars taught no less a lesson than the revival of ethnic sentiments which 
has often been supported by the common doctrine of “national self-determination.”199 
After World War II, the colonial rule in Africa and Asia ended. Decolonisation was 
followed by a chain reaction despite the fact that ethnic differences were seen to be 
muted until they achieved independence. He further observes: 
         Following independence, however, the context and the issues changed. No longer was the 
struggle against external powers paramount. No longer was colonial domination the issue. 
Self-determination had been implemented only to the level of preexisting colonial boundaries. 
Within these boundaries, the question was to whom the new states belonged. As some groups 
moved to succeed the power of the former colonialists, others were heard to claim that self-
determination was still incomplete, for they had not achieved their own independence.
200
  
 
 
Ethnic conflict is a recurring incident in view of its shifting context in a situation the 
international environment contributes to its emergence as well as remission. The first 
and second World Wars taught no less a lesson than the revival of ethnic sentiments 
which has often been supported by the common doctrine of “national self-
determination.”201 While the independence of Asia and Africa echoed in both Europe 
and America, such sovereignty granted to Belgian territories in Africa such as Zaire, 
Rwanda, and Burundi helped to stimulate and intensify the desire for similar autonomy 
by the Flemings in the same Belgium. They argued, “if, they said, tiny Burundi can 
have an autonomous political life, why should the more numerous Flemish population 
be deprived of the same privilege”?202  
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              To be sure, Horowitz insists that certain worldwide ideological and institutional 
current developments have led to the growth of ethnic conflict. The spread of 
knowledge on such things as norms of equity in a society tend to make ethnic groups 
around the world more conscious of their rights and compare their status and wellbeing 
against that of other groups nearby. This idea may be of merit or unwarranted in the 
case of some groups.  He argues that “the state system that first grew out of European 
feudalism and now in the post-colonial period covers virtually the entire earth provides 
the framework in which ethnic conflict occurs.” For instance, Horowitz further posits, 
“Control of state, control of a state, and exemption from control by others are among 
the main goals of ethnic conflict.” 203 
             Economic interest plays a role in ethnic conflict, and it is within the context of 
economic underpinning of ethnic hostility that is persistently captured in contemporary 
ethnic conflict literature.
204
 This problem is orchestrated by the elites who manipulate as 
well as divert the interest of the working class. First, “Ethnic conflict amounts to 
“challenging nonexistent or barely dangerous enemies” and avoiding “the real issue” and 
the real enemies, namely, “the ruling class.” However, a second notion of materialist 
theory emphasises, not irrational mass submission to elite manipulation, but rational 
working class competition. There could be manipulation and competitive interests too.  
Also, a third economically based ethnic conflict relates to tensions between “middleman 
minorities” and “host societies”.205 Horowitz posits “The business rivalries envisioned 
by theories that predicate ethnic conflict on economic completion among members of 
opposing ethnic groups are fewer than imagined.” When occupation is divided along 
ethnic lines, it makes it “natural” for established trade, but “unnatural” when its breaks 
into entirely a new one. In ethnic conflict, ethnic division of labour serves as a shield 
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against conflict.
206
 Given the ethnically differentiation, the Northern Nigerian traders, 
merchants, and contractors between 1950 and 1960 gave their support for the regional 
government’s policy of “Northernisation”. The programme was intended to free the 
North from depending on the Southern Nigerian civil servant and business by giving 
preferences in employment, contract, scholarships, land, and loans to Northerners. This 
was as a result of apprehensions in Nigeria against the Southern domination of the 
Northern life.
207
 In Malaysia, the Malay envy of the Chinese. Peter J. Wilson writes: 
  … the Malays of  Jendram Hilir readily admit the superiority of Chinese in economic affairs 
and, on the whole, they do not begrudge or envy the Chinese his paramount position. That 
many Chinese are wealthy whereas most Malays are poor is indeed a topic of concern and 
self-pity for Malays, but the skill of Chinese businessmen and their ability to meet all the 
demands placed on them is often the subject of admiration on the part of village Malays. In 
the same way, the evident ability of the Chinese to work harder than the Malays is admitted 
and admired.
208
 
 
          Furthermore, ethnic conflict is sometimes linked to ancient enmities between 
groups, and often times it has been dismissed as artificial or ephemeral in places where 
such long standing antagonism could be seen.
209
 There are such wars in Africa and Asia 
that are linked to longstanding enmity between Sinhalese and Tamil kingdoms fought 
recurrently in ancient Sri Lanka (Ceylon), Menda and Temne in pre-colonial Sierra 
Leone and Maronites and Druze in the present Lebanon etc.
210
 Such long-existing hatred 
is shown in the case of the Achioli and Lang that fought regularly in pre-colonial 
Uganda
211
 whereas the Assamese king, Chakradhvaj Singha, “fought for independence 
with the war cry, ‘Better death than submit to the Bengalis.”212 
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1.8 Conclusion 
        This chapter conveys ideas and specific factors and concepts that are considered 
important in this study. The theory of federalism explains reasons and workings of a 
federal system, especially as to why certain things occur, reasons behind such 
occurrence as well as a predictable future. In other words, federalism and all it stands 
for, underpins politics and governance of federal states with a written constitution which 
divides power between the central government and the regional or states governments.  
           The origin of federalism in the world explored, and its adoption in both Nigeria 
and Malaysia provide a rich content of its importance in modern human society as a 
unique concept to manage and mitigate conflicts in plural societies. It provides focus and 
analytical tool to view ethnic hostilities in the two countries more broadly. One obvious 
fact in this framework is that both countries share similar interests in adopting a federal 
system of government. But the intensity of fear for ethnic groups to surrender or unite 
under a federal system controlled by them or other ethnic group/s was highly contested. 
This was due to their multicultural nature in which the colonising powers arbitrarily 
changed the legal status of their possessions without their consent and established plans 
for self-rule under federalism. This explains Riker’s emphasis on ‘bargain, military 
contests and all forms of intensification of ethnic self-interest that featured in both 
federal formations and in Horowitz’s analysis. Socio-economic conditions have helped 
to shape their formations although ethnic conflict is rooted in primordial affinities. This 
links to concepts of personal attachment, moral obligation, pride and ambition within a 
particular ethnic group bringing such into a larger civil collectivity such as a nation-state 
for which federalism is required to address. The next chapter explores the backgrounds 
of Nigeria and Malaysia involving their respective ethnic groups and how both 
federations came into being in the wake of their colonial encounter. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Background History of Nigeria and Malaysia 
2.1 Introduction  
       The previous chapter explored the concept of federalism which is a mechanism that 
helps in managing diversity. As a legal framework in governance, its features define how 
a plural society is organised and administered as this study demonstrates. However, this 
current chapter provides a clear insight of the origins and the development process of 
diverse ethnic groups that now occupy both Nigeria and Malaysia.  It is significant to 
note that this chapter is in two sections. First, this section traces the pre-colonial origins 
of the main ethnic groups in Nigeria and how European contact brought about 
immediate dismantling and pulling diverse ethnic groups together for the establishment 
of the entity called Nigeria accommodating ethnic diversity. Second, the thesis shows 
similar trends on how Malaysia came into being. This background study provides a 
better understanding of the origins of the main ethnic groups in both countries. 
           The thesis demonstrates that prior to the incursion of the British explorers and 
merchants, the geographical area now known as Nigeria was inhabited by various ethnic 
nationalities of remote origins and different cultures and beliefs. These diverse groups 
interacted among themselves especially in commerce. Given their diversity and different 
orientations, they were organized as well as governed through the rule of kingship, 
family, as well as age grade, from where some of these early societies developed in other 
directions. While few ethnic groups were developing through democratic communal 
patterns, others incidentally resulted in being kingdoms, emirates and empires.
213
 For 
example, among the traditional institutions of governance at this time were the kingdoms 
of Opopos; the Jukuns; the Sokoto caliphate which comprised of some emirates as well 
as empires of Kanem Bonu, Oyo, Benin, and Kwara. The Igbo in the Eastern section of 
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the territory had their main political authority rested with the age grade in the society or 
family.
214
 A brief historical background is provided in this study to enhance readers 
understanding of their remote origins, cohesiveness and their level of civilization prior to 
British incursion and subsequent subjugation and integrating these diverse groups 
together as a nation called Nigeria. This underlines the utility of federalism as an ideal 
system of managing plural societies as this thesis demonstrates. This is seen in Elazar’s 
definition as the “mode of political organization that unites separate polities within an 
overarching political system by distributing power among general and constituent 
governments in a manner designed to protect the existence and authority of both.”215 
 
2.2 Salient Features of Nigeria’s Early Societies  
       The focus of the thesis in this section is to highlight relevant issues that touch on 
Nigeria’s early features and a concise overview of its general characteristics. This is in 
terms of the number of its segregated ethnic groups, geography, the size and population 
of Nigeria. This helps to enhance understanding of the diversity and complexity of the 
new nation that required a federal structure that accommodates pluralism. For example, 
the people who inhabited the region now known as Nigeria had always lived in separate 
and often contentious societies. The frontiers of these societies were constantly shifting, 
but they all range across outside those enclosed by the British in Nigeria.
216
  
         Some of the aforementioned features could be seen in the light of Geographers that 
distinguish three principal zones of vegetation namely: the swamp forests of the coast-
belt, the high forests of the humid south and the savannas of the sub humid Middle Belt 
and north.
217
 Nigeria accommodates over 250 ethnic groups. The three main groups in 
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respect of size are the Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo. The political division of the 
country until independence into Northern, Western, and Eastern regions corresponded 
roughly to the areas occupied mainly by these three ethnic groups. It was the interaction 
of the politics of these three regions and their peoples, and their combined effort to drive 
out their British rulers that constitute the story of Nigerian politics in the colonial era.
218
  
          Nigeria is situated at the eastern end of the Gulf of Guinea between the 4
th
 and 14
th
 
parallels (North). Its total area is approximately 356,000 square miles slightly more than 
the combined area of France and both East and West Germany. Its name is derived from 
its inland waterway, the River Niger, which flows from some 2,600 miles from the hills 
of Sierra Leone into the enormous fluvial complex of the Niger Delta.
219
 The population 
of Nigeria was estimated to be about 35 million in 1959, (140 Million -2009), exceeding 
the combined population of states in the West African sub-region, South of Sahara.
220
  
            This study emphasises that the degree of ethnic heterogeneity in Southern 
Nigeria can be ascertained from the census figure for 1911(See, Appendix C: Table 2.1). 
The population of the early ethnic nationalities indicate that the Igbo were three million, 
while Yorubas recorded two million as they formed the major ethnic groups out of seven 
and three quarter million inhabitants in Southern Nigeria.
221
 The present entity called 
Nigeria had been in existence prior to British incursion, but harbouring unfriendly 
national states differentiated by languages and other cultural traits until 1900. Sir Hugh 
Clifford “the Governor General of Nigeria between 1920 -1931”, described Nigeria as “a 
collection of independent native states, separated from one another by great distances, by 
differences of history and traditions and by ethnological, racial, tribal, political, social 
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and religious barriers.”222 Hugh Clifford captured major cultural and traditional factors, 
as discussed in this study, which show underlying differences among the early and the 
contemporary warring ethnic groups in Nigeria. Given the foregoing insight, this study 
provides a brief history of the three main ethnic groups in Nigeria.  This is intended to 
shape readers understanding of historical evolution and patterns of convergence of ethnic 
groups in Nigeria as well as Malaysia as discussed in further chapters in the thesis. 
 
2.2.1 Peoples of the Northern Region  
         In this section, this study will provide historical facts to show that Hausa/Fulani 
ethnic groups in Nigeria are distinctively separate from other ethnic groups in Nigeria. 
The study will show that cultural distinctiveness, population and civilisation makes a 
federal structure necessary to accommodate this group with others. In view of the 
foregoing, this thesis demonstrates that the areas now comprising Nigeria is broadly 
divided between north and south. Most northern societies developed in the Savannah, 
with diffused ruling families and comparatively individualised commerce. The origins of 
the Hausa people, like those of their neighbours, remain obscure. Legend has it that their 
ancestors came from the Middle East. These records from both Kano and Katsina date 
back to early twelfth century.
223
  Given the wide spread of the entity called Nigeria, the 
Hausa inhabit the north-west and north-central parts to the edges of the Sahara desert. 
The origin of the Hausa states is a matter of controversy as the legend of their origin 
relates to an unspecified date in the remote times.
224
 
        One Bayajidda fled from Baghdad to Kanem-Bornu which was already an 
important state in the Chad basin. The early history of the Hausaland is covered by 
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scholars.
225
 The Habe states appear to have been established in the territory of modern 
Hausaland about the tenth century. From the twelfth to thirteenth centuries, they were 
partially within the sphere of influence of the Islamic kingdom of Kanem-Bornu, 
unquestionably the dominant state in central Sudan.
226
 
       For more understanding of Northern Nigeria in tribal groupings, this study provides 
an estimated figure of more than two-thirds of the seventeen million Northern people in 
1953 that belonged to the six largest nationality groups, as follows: 5.6 million Hausa, 
3.1 million Fulani, 1.3 million Kanuri, 800,000 TV, 500,000 Yoruba, and 350,000 Nupe. 
The remaining five million people include about 220 linguistic groups, most of whom 
inhabit the southern half of the Northern Region where Hausa culture does not 
predominate.
227
The Hausa nationality includes a number of tribes that are related by the 
Hausa language, the Islamic faith and roughly similar physiognomic traits. Smith defines 
Hausa to mean “the entire settled Moslem, Hausa-speaking population.”228  
           Given the vastness of the entity called Nigeria, the Hausa inhabit the north-west 
and north-central parts to the edges of the Sahara desert. The origin of the Hausa states is 
a matter of controversy as the legend of their origin relates to an unspecified date in the 
remote times.
229
 This thesis demonstrates that two principal subdivisions need to be 
distinguished: the indigenous Habe and the “settled” Fulani, who have intermarried 
extensively with the Habe, assimilating their language and customs. Apart from the 
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“settled” Fulani, there are two other Fulani groups: pastoral nomads, called Bush or 
Cattle Fulani, and an intermediate group that is semi-pastoral and semi-agricultural.
230
      
           Each of the remaining nationality groups of the Northern Region is identified 
with a particular territorial subdivision, thus the Kanuri of Bornu province, the Nupe of 
southern Niger and eastern Ilorin, the Tiv of Benue Province and the Yoruba of southern 
Ilorin and western Kabba.
231
  The Habe states appear to have been established in the 
territory of modern Hausaland about the tenth century. From twelfth to thirteenth 
centuries, they were partially within the sphere of influence of the Islamicised kingdom 
of Kanem-Bornu, unquestionably the dominant state in central Sudan.
232
 
        In 1804, a learned Fulani clan head, Shehu (Sheikh) Usuman dan Fodio rebelled 
against the persecution of Muslims by his pagan overlord, the king of Gobir. While each 
of the leading emirates in Hausa land and its periphery developed its own distinctive 
political system, certain principles of emirate rule are general. First, emirate rule is 
theocratic, involving the fusion of political and religious authority.  Secondly, it is 
dynastic; normally, emirates are chosen by traditional electors subject to conditions that 
are peculiar to states, e.g., the presumptive heir of a single royal dynasty (Kano), from a 
number of royal dynasties in rotation (Bida), from alternative dynasties subject to the 
approval of an overlord (Zaria).  Thirdly, emirs rule through aristocracies of birth and 
rank. Smith observes that “status is conferred by birth and is a prerequisite of eligibility 
for rank, but rank and office, as the Hausa say, is the gift of Allah.
233
 During the colonial 
period, many new offices, were created for the conduct of administrative functions, e.g., 
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education, agriculture, forestry, etc.”234 Relatively, the modern Hausa has developed 
from the context of traditional power and value.
235
 
 
2.2.2 Peoples of the Western Region 
          This study also attempts to show as earlier demonstrated on Hausa/Fulani 
historical development that the Yoruba ethnic group is distinctively a different culture 
and geographically separated from other ethnic groups in Nigeria. For example, Yoruba 
are located in Western Nigeria. According to Yoruba legends, they originally came from 
the East. Sometimes, these folklores seem to affirm the similarities between the region, 
arts and burial customs of the Yoruba and the people of the Nile. The legends vary–the 
ancestors came from Egypt, Kush or Arabia and that the Yoruba migrated southward 
into the verges of the forest around A. D. 1000. They certainly found many people 
already inhabiting the land as the forest lands were populated long before the birth of 
Christ.
236
 Further reflection on the background of Nigeria’s history shows that over 70 
percent of the 6.1 million people of the Western Region (1953) belong to the Yoruba 
nationality. Nine tribal or territorial sections have been distinguished, eight in the 
Western Region and the Federal Territory of Lagos, the ninth in neighbouring areas of 
the Northern Regions.
237
 Non-Yoruba peoples inhabit the two south-eastern provinces of 
the Region, termed the Mid-West. The greater numbers are the Edo-speaking people; 
these include the Edo of Benin Province and the Urhobo of Delta Province. The Igbo-
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speaking peoples inhabit easterly areas bordering on the Niger River; the Ijaw and the 
Itsekeri live mainly in the creek areas of the Delta Province.
238
  
         This thesis emphasises that the Yoruba have a unique origin. The Yoruba are 
believed to have migrated from northern Africa into their present homeland about a 
thousand years ago. Ill-lfe is the “cradle of Yoruba culture; but political pre-eminence 
was acquired by the city-state of Oyo which, by the late fifteenth century, had become 
the capital of a Yoruba empire. To the south, Oyo power was checked by the extensive 
but centralised kingdom of Benin.
239
 However, tribal fable attributes the origin of the 
Yoruba to a deity, Oduduwa, who legend claimed to have reigned at Ife where he created 
the earth as well as its people that inhabit it.
240
 The important royal dynasties of the main 
tribal parts are purported to have been established by the deified grandsons of Oduduwa. 
Minor royal lineages are ramified from Oduduwan branches and there are numerous 
kings, great and petty, in Yorubaland. The pre-eminent spiritual Oba
241
 is the Oni of Ife.  
              This study looks at the fast-evolving civilisation of the Yoruba. It is indicative 
of the vigor of tradition in the modern western region that in 1960 the incumbent Oni 
was designated as the first African constitutional Governor. Certain features of political 
organisation are typical of the traditional Yoruba states. The basic element of the Yoruba 
political system is the patrilineage, an exogamous descent group whose members 
venerate a founding ancestor.
242
  The classic illustration of Yoruba government is the 
kingdom of Oyo.
243
 All decisions of the Alafin (king) of Oyo required the approval of 
his council of chiefs. Remarkably, in former times, a gift of parrot’s eggs from the leader 
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of the council was a sign to the Alafin that his death was desired by the chiefs and the 
people. The Alafin complied by taking poison, so that threat of a dreaded gift was a 
safeguard against tyrannical rule. The proscription of this custom by the British 
“dislocated the checks and balances of the old constitution.”244   
           However, in theory and in practice, the powers of the Yoruba kings were 
regulated by customs and limited institutionally by countervailing organs of the state.
245
  
In 1953, 37 per cent of the population in the Western Region professed Christianity, 33 
per cent espoused Islam, and 30 per cent followed indigenous animistic creeds. Over 96 
per cent of the Muslims and 84 per cent of the Christians were located in Yoruba where 
the two faiths coexisted in amicable rivalry.  Such interfaith tension as exists is largely a 
consequence of the superior educational and political opportunities which have been 
enjoyed by Christian elements in the past.
246
 
 
2.2.3 Peoples of the Eastern Region 
          The Igbos showcase historical origin and cultural developments as a distinct group 
in Nigeria. For scholars, very little is known about the origin and the early history of the 
Igbo. In the first place, the Igbo like the Yoruba and the Bini were a non- literate people 
with no written record of their own. It is argued that the theory of Igbo origin is not all-
embracing, is evident from the existence of groups with traditions of independent 
origin.
247
 They had neither states nor empires, never developed centralised government 
but used totally different institutions.
248
 Among the 7.2 million people of the Eastern 
Region in 1953, about five million or 61 per cent belonged to the Ibo nationality which 
comprises some 30 territorial sections. Non-Ibo peoples inhabit the southern and eastern 
sectors of the region. The largest groups are the Ibibio and the Annang who jointly total 
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some 15 per cent of the regional population.  The 75, 000 Efik people of Calabar in the 
Cross River Estuary have given their name to the language of the Ibibio-Annang who are 
classed with peoples of the Cross River Basin as Efik-speaking.
249
 
              Ijaw people, numbering about 265,000, inhabit the coastal creeks of the Niger 
Delta while the easterly Ogoja Province presents a linguistic medley which is yet 
undocumented in its entirety. Most of the region is thickly forested and densely 
populated – 269 persons per square mile is the average density as compared with 148 in 
the West and 67 in the North. In the Igbo heartland, population densities average 450 to 
the square mile. Population pressures led to many of them migrating to urban cities. The 
Igbo are unique in their administration. As Skilar observes, as a rule, traditional systems 
of authority and land tenure among the Igbo are patrilineal kin group.
250
  The Igbo 
village chief is the head of a specified lineage; the chief of a senior village in a group 
may “preside” at meetings of the village-group. Sometimes village-group heads enjoy 
great prestige, but their authority never extends beyond the village-group.  Chieftaincy is 
virtually unknown in some parts of Igboland and “tribal government is the collective 
rule of the senior age grade.
251
 The dispersed power system of the Igbo is characterised 
by a high level of public democratic opinion expressed in decisions.
252
  
           In the context of cultural values, Igbo culture magnifies the value of individual 
achievement; yet the Igbo are known for their cooperative propensities as well, 
exemplified both by their enthusiasm for community development and by the multitude 
of voluntary improvement associations, e.g., town unions, clan unions, divisional unions 
etc that provide loans to businessmen, scholarships to youths, electoral support to 
politicians and other forms of communal development.
253
 Ottenberg’s account in this 
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historical narrative indicates that the Igbo are famous for their exceptional “receptivity to 
change”.254 This study deems it vital that there are two marginal Igbo groups that merit 
special mention in this account for the extraordinary influence on recent Igbo history.  
           First the Onitsha indigenes, numbering about 10,000 people are those who live 
mainly in the traditional sector of that great River Niger metropolis. The Onitshas are 
thought to have migrated from Benin in the 17
th
 century; their traditional ruler, the Obi 
of Onitsha, is the sacred chief whose traditional political status in the eyes of his people 
is probably unmatched in Igboland. Indeed, twentieth century Onitsha which was the 
leading market on the Niger flourished in business. Diocesan headquarters were 
established by both the Anglican and the Roman Catholic missions; schools flourished, 
and education became order of the day.
255
 Another group, the Aros are thought to have 
migrated from the North to their homeland in Enyong Division adjacent to the Igbo and 
Ibibio. Some Aro people affirm to their Igbo nationality while others deny it.  Aro 
power emerged during the period of the slave trade which they dominated by 
establishing colonies along trade routes and procuring hapless Igbo people for sale as 
slaves to the chiefs at the coastal city-states, who sold them in turn to the European 
traders.
256
 The Aro was an organised society system based on an oracle known as Aro 
Chukwu (God of the Aros) that was feared and respected throughout Igboland.
257
 
Basically, the foregoing facts underline the assertion that the three main ethnic groups in 
Nigeria are distinct. They were ruled by the British simultaneously with ethnic groups in 
Malaysia while the colonial rule lasted. This is the starting point of analyzing Nigerian 
plural society and numerous ethnic contestations which this study addresses.      
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2.3   Assessing British Incursion, Colonial Rule and Nigerian Independence    
              The focus of the study in this section is to establish the core origin of Nigeria as 
a nation, given the fact that its indigenous ethnic groups have earlier been identified. 
This is intended to provide information that enriches the historical development of 
country as an entity to enable the reader grasp salient features that surround its evolution 
and being. The important issues this study intends to uncover here are dates, the level of 
civilisation of the indigenous people, the activities of European firms as well as the 
amalgamation of northern and southern protectorates to form Nigeria with independence 
gained in 1960. While keeping the aforementioned goals of this section in mind, this 
study emphasises that the coming as well as the European activities in 1800 in West 
Africa transformed into the establishment of colonial rule in Nigeria which started with 
European annexation of Lagos in 1861. Similarly, such commercial intent, domination 
and colonial rule by the British in Malaysia will be discussed to establish the fact that 
both societies had similar experience in their early beginnings as former British colonies. 
        This study tends to show that the most significant single factor which influenced 
the economic history of Nigeria was the political and economic rivalry among the 
European nations in Europe as well as in Africa which led to British influence in Nigeria 
and subsequent domination. The British Government’s influence in Nigeria started in 
1851 when the British attacked Lagos in an attempt to force King Kosoko of Lagos to 
abandon slave trade. Lagos was taken over by the British powers in 1861 due to 
Kosoko’s refusal to stop slave trade, and British administration was established.258 
          This study points out that as late as 1860 the great expanse of West Africa watered 
by the Niger River along its twenty-six hundred mile course was still largely terra 
incognita to most Europeans. It is learnt that between 1788 and 1830 a number of 
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intrepid travelers including Mongo Park, Hugh Clapperton and the Lander brothers had 
explored a scattered portion of Western Sudan. In 1851, the epic journey of Heinrich 
Barth had aroused considerable interest in the Muslim empire of Sokoto and Fulani 
Emirates of which it was composed.
259
 The publication of Barth’s five volumes on the 
history, manners and traditions of the Sudanese in the interior of Africa caught the 
attention of many. The Sokoto Emirate, despite the flurry of interest occasioned by 
Barth’s journey remained largely unknown to Europeans. The Europeans eventually 
made their way to Borgu south of Sokoto, and in 1861 British mercantile interests within 
the Niger Delta had become strong enough to warrant annexation of the port of Lagos. 
They were aided by the proximity of the Royal Navy patrolling the offshore waters for 
slavers, but willing to dispatch a gunboat or two to the oil Rivers should the need arise as 
they were watchful of  events taking place along the coast.
260
  
             Almost all trading and other activities until 1879 were carried out solely by 
European firms. This eventually brought about all sorts of rivalries between France, 
Germany and Britain. There were serious disagreements between France and Britain 
concerning the right to trade in the rich vast area of what is now Nigeria.  Britain 
claimed dominion in the north by virtue of the Thomson treaties and subsequent 
agreements negotiated with Fulani rulers in 1890 and 1894. The rights conferred by the 
treaty were thus to bolster the British claims. The Berlin Conference had specifically 
forbidden the establishment of ‘paper’ protectorates and its General Act had established 
the criterion of effective occupation.
261
 The Berlin conference had to deal with 
pacification so that each nation’s interest was protected.262  
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            Relatively, the exact date of the beginning of British colonial rule in Nigeria is 
not clear. However, it is argued that the British colonial rule in Nigeria started in 1914, 
because it was the year the “protectorate of Northern Nigeria and the colony and 
protectorate of Southern Nigeria were amalgamated into a single administrative unit 
styled the colony and protectorate of Nigeria”.263 This contention is supported by the fact 
that there was no such entity as Nigeria before 1900. British adventure in Nigeria started 
in 1861 when Lagos was proclaimed a crown colony. This assertion supports the fact 
that Lagos, which later became the capital of Nigeria, had been a significant part of the 
territories known today as Nigeria.
264
  
          In 1900, protectorates were proclaimed for Northern and Southern Nigeria, and in 
1906 the Colony of Lagos was joined to the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. From 
1900 to 1906, Sir Frederick Lugard, a former army officer and agent of the British Royal 
Niger Company was “High Commissioner of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria”.265 It 
is important to note that up to 1906 and indeed from 1900 to the time of amalgamation 
in 1914, both the Northern and Southern Nigeria were under separate administrations 
controlled by a British High Commissioner and a British Governor respectively.
266
 
         Nigeria became an entity in 1914 following amalgamation of the protectorates of 
northern and southern Nigeria by Sir Fredrick Lugard. As Kirk-Greene observes “sixteen 
years earlier, Flora Shaw, who later married Lugard, first suggested in an article in the 
Times that the British Protectorates on the Niger be known collectively as Nigeria”.267 
However, before 1914 when the amalgamation took place, no geographical place was 
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defined as the present Nigeria. The various societies were conterminous with the 
existing ethnic boundaries. All these were altered during the colonial rule.
268
    
       There he established the practice of administration through emirs and chiefs that 
became known as the indirect rule or Native Authority System.
269
 In 1939, Southern 
Nigeria was reorganised for administrative purposes into two groups of provinces – the 
Eastern and the Western.
270
 The Second World War ushered in a new era of nationalists’ 
movement for racial equality as well as for freedom. This led to agitation for political 
reform by the nationalists and three constitutions were ratified in the eight-year span of 
1946-1954.
271
 As earlier highlighted, Appendix B. table 1.1 shows the Nigerian 
population and area as at 1953. The foregoing demonstrates the active role of ethnic 
groups in Nigeria represented by their nationalists in the struggle for independence then.       
           This thesis demonstrates this, for example, the Constitution of 1946 was 
promulgated by the Colonial Government without consultation and was deeply resented 
by nationalists. The Colonial Government converted the Northern, Eastern and Western 
Provinces into governmental regions and provided for the creation of three non-elective 
regional legislatures. It was the first time an all-Nigerian Legislative Council was 
formed comprising a majority of unofficial members chosen mainly by regional 
legislatures. The nationalists who did not accept this constitution instead demanded for 
the introduction of a democratically elected responsible government. In 1947, the 
‘National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons’ (N.C.N.C) sent a protest delegation to 
London under the leadership of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe which was followed by a review of 
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the constitution that led to it being replaced in 1951. This new constitution provided for 
the appointment of African ministers in both regional and central governments.
272
  
           It is important to point out that in spite of opposition to British arrangement by 
the ethnic groups, it did not take long when such an artificial and unworkable union 
started to show problems even before independence in 1960.
273
 In view of the argument 
being advanced in this thesis, it is fair to admit that the pioneering elites in Nigeria owe 
greatly to the countries infirmities given their often distanced posture on Nigeria as a 
collective project. The negative perception of one of the Founding Fathers of the nation 
demonstrates this when he noted: 
                                    “God did not create Nigeria, the British did.” 
- Sir Ahmadu Bello, (The late Saduana of Sokoto).274 
 
 
Bello’s utterance signifies the artificiality of the entity which is not bound to endure. It 
coincides with Chief Awolowo’s assertion below that Nigeria is an artificial creation and 
a mere geographical expression. This marks the starting point of assessing the 
abandonment of Nigeria as a collective project by the pioneering elites of the nation. 
  
2.3.1      Emergence of Ethnic Political Parties 
           This section deals with political parties which is intended to demonstrate the 
ethnic divisions that brought about political parties which were formed along ethnic and 
regional lines. However, it is important to point out two features common to both 
countries at this point: (a), Political parties formed along ethnic lines at this time was not 
associated with Nigeria alone, rather such was also the case with Malaysia. (b) The 
British rulers introduced unitary system of government in both countries from the onset.   
          For example, the system of government itself remained essentially unitary until 
1954, when a new constitution (framed by two all-party conferences) provided for a 
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genuinely federal form of government. Consequently, the leaders of the three political 
parties became the premiers of the regions. Alhaji Ahmadu (later Alhaji Sir, Ahmadu 
Bello) the Sarduana of Sokoto,
275
 became the leader of the Northern People’s Congress 
(NPC) Premier of the North. Chief Obafemi Awolowo of the Action Group (AG), 
became the Premier of the West; Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, leader of the National Council of 
Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), became the Premier of the East. Simultaneously, 
the United Nations Trust Territory of the Southern Cameroons, which had been 
administered as part of Eastern Region was granted a separate government as 
Cameroons demanded, and constituted as a quasi-federal territory.
276
 These political 
parties fought at realizing the independence of Nigeria.  
 
2.3.2   Independence 
          While focus is on independence and ethnic unity, this study stresses that the same 
electoral process that produced pioneering leaders in Malaysia was also the case with 
Nigeria. For instance, and as this study will also discuss Malaysia later, the office of the 
Prime Minister in Nigeria was created, and in September 1957 Alhaji Sir Abubakar 
Tafawa Balewa, Vice President of the Northern People’s Congress and the leader of his 
party in the Federal House of Representatives was designated Prime Minister. He 
formed a national government, including all major parties, which lasted until the federal 
election of December 1959. At a Resumed Constitutional Conference in 1958, the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies announced that if the next Federal Parliament passed 
a resolution for independence, the British Government “would introduce a Bill in 
Parliament to enable Nigeria to become a fully independent country on the 1
st
 of 
October, 1960”. In the federal election of 1959 the Northern People’s Congress and 
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independent candidates supporting that party obtained 142 of the 312 seats in the House 
of Representatives, followed by the NCNC with 89 and the Action Group with 73. The 
NPC-NCNC coalition government was formed by Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa 
Balewa. Dr. Azikiwe assumed the office of the President of the Nigeria Federal Senate. 
Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sarduana of Sokoto, remained as the Premier of the North, 
and Chief Obafemi Awolowo became the Leader of the Opposition in the Federal House 
of Representatives. At Nigeria’s independence, the Cameroons Trust Territory was 
separated from it pending the outcome of a plebiscite under United Nations supervision. 
In 1961 the Northern Cameroons voted to rejoin the Northern Region of Nigeria, while 
the Southern Cameroons chose to be part of the Cameroon Republic.
277
  
          The thesis will also show similar scenarios in Malaysia in the case of Sabah and 
Sarawak that joined Malaysia in 1963 while Singapore was expelled from the federation 
in 1965. As earlier highlighted, the formation of the Nigerian nation-state led to the 
creation of its three main regions as shown in (Apendix A. Map 1.1). This has transformed 
into thirty-six states with the main ethnic groups shown in (Appendix D. Map 2.1).  
 
   2.3.3 Ethnic Mindset at Independence and Views of Nigeria’s Founding Fathers 
         Negative views about Nigeria by its pioneering leaders impacted on the country’s 
future generations. In effect, while the thesis addresses continuing ethnic conflict in 
Nigeria, the story remains real in both the past and present with continual calls for the 
unity of the country. For example, as gathered from Lord Hailey Report on Nigeria, 
between 1940 and 1941, Lord Hailey made an official visit to Nigeria and concluded in 
his remarks that Nigeria’s future ‘must be in political unity.”278 The Governor of Nigeria 
at this time, Benard Bourdillion (1935-43), agreed with Hailey by maintaining that no 
encouragement should be given to the manifestation of separatist tendencies in any part 
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of the territory.
279
 Sir Arthur Richards, at the time the Governor-General of Nigeria who 
after his political bloomers in Nigeria became Lord Milverton, in 1948 informed the 
Royal Empire Society in London that, “It is only the accident of British suzerainty, 
which has made Nigeria one country. It is still far from being one country or one nation 
socially or even economically ... Socially and politically there are deep differences 
between the major tribal groups. They do not speak the same language and they have 
divergent customs and ways of life and they represent different stages of culture”.280  
      Since 1954, the three principal leaders of Nigeria, Azikiwe, Awolowo and Bello had 
combined certain common with no less important desire to be separate and autonomous 
in other matters in the Nigerian constitution. They pressed to obtain regional structure 
which conferred immense power on the political leaders of each region while leaving the 
centre weak. In 1960, each of the three major party leaders opted to remain in his region 
and each became a premier of his region while recommending no premiership at the 
centre until 1957. Certain reasons were advanced for this, thus it would lead to each 
region producing strong political leadership and create a vibrant middle class to help free 
the country from foreign control. This is evident in Azikiwe’s establishment of the 
African Continental Bank- the official bank for the Eastern regional government, 
whereas the National Bank which was founded by Action Group members became the 
official bank for the Western Region. Ethnic intransigence led to the crisis of 1953 that 
ended the 1951 constitution which had provided for a strong centre and weak regions.
281
  
             In 1953-54, the constitution reversed the power of the regional governments and 
weakened the central government thereby complicating the task of central leadership.   
The regions had already affected governance in the regions that reflected a distinct 
national outlook. It is important to poit out that the major constitutional changes that 
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took place from post-World War II to the present have all had the effect of whittling 
down the powers of the central administration in favour of the regions.
282
   
          Given the foregoing political and ethnic forces in Nigeria’s early fledging 
federalism, it is crucial for this thesis to point out that ethnic mindset of the nation’s 
leaders distorted and fragmented the entire Nigerian society to being opposed to each 
other. The idea of allowing powerful regions paid off given numerous achievements that 
were recorded while each region moved at its own pace. In other words, there was a 
healthy competition among the three regions in Nigeria at this time. Ironically, before 
the effect of a weak centre was fully understood, the regions had become three extreme 
polar centres of power controlled by the three main ethnic groups in Nigeria. However, 
there was a considerable consistency in Malaysia’s constitutional development. Later 
changes made to the Nigerian Constitution allowing for a strong center did not erase the 
ethnic mindset and the earlier cherished regional autonomy. This should be kept in mind 
by the reader in view of post-independence struggle for power and the devolution of the 
regions into twelve states discussed ahead.  
           All the negative perceptions by some of the pioneering leaders confirm such 
ethnic mindset that never projected the Nigerian nation in good light. For example, it is 
imperative to call to mind the position maintained by Awolowo who argued that 
“Nigeria is not a nation it is a mere geographical expression. The word ‘Nigeria’ is an 
administrative appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria 
from those who do not.”283 It has been observed that since Awolowo wrote his view 
about the nation-state of Nigeria as an artificial creation, events in the country have 
vindicated him as Nigeria has shown through its leaders that they are not a nation but a 
multi-national state.
284
  While such negative views were not common with Malaysia’s 
pioneering leaders, this thesis argues that there was real or imagined doubts on the 
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genuineness of the entity called Nigeria in the mind of its leaders. Abubakar Tafawa 
Balewa who later became the Prime Minister of Nigeria noted thus “Since 1914 the 
British government has been trying to make Nigeria into one country, but the Nigerian 
people themselves are historically different in their backgrounds, in their religious 
beliefs and customs and do not show themselves any sign of to unite … Nigerian unity is 
only a British intention for the country”.285 
         Oftentimes, problems generate grumbling about inequality and uneven playing 
fields lead to conclusions and opinions which negate the base of emergent polity indicate 
dissatisfaction. Similar views were expressed in 1947 by Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, later 
the first prime minister of Nigeria who told the Nigeria Legislative Council that “Since 
the amalgamation of Southern and Northern provinces in 1914, Nigeria has existed as 
one country on paper; it is still far from being united, Nigerian unity is only a British 
intention for the country.”286 Given these negative views of the pioneering elites of the 
nation, this study stresses that it was the same problem of unity that led to the adoption 
of unitary system which was rejected later. For instance, Richard's constitution which 
did not aim at dividing the country, tried to heal the disunity by establishing a 
Constitution (Unitary) which was meant to provide unity in diversity.
287
  
        It is understood that Sir Arthur Richards as a practical administrator, took into 
consideration the disunity in the country in drafting his constitution. He had earlier noted 
that, “I do not think that Nigeria is after a sufficiently coherent whole, whether in the 
political, social or economic sphere to be capable of immediate and full self-
government.”288 The new constitution is designed to bring the sense of unified interest 
beyond the realm of tribal jealousies, and to provide the training for ever swift advance 
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towards self-government.  It is essential to understand the diversities in Nigerian- state in 
order to comprehend the history of Nigeria’s complex governmental structure and her 
existing and frequently chaotic political past.
289
  
          However, it is of interest to reflect on the study carried out by A. V. Dicey, who 
argues that federalism connotes a constitutional arrangement that shares the power of the 
state among various component units each having its sphere of control as given by the 
constitution. In a multinational and multilingual state such as Nigeria, the federal system 
tends to be preferred. It has certain virtues such as decentralisation of activities, checks 
and balances and better representation. To lay the foundation of constitutional root of 
Nigeria, a large country in a unitary set up is unconceivable.
290
 For Awolowo “Since the 
amalgamation (of Northern and Southern Protectorates of Nigeria) all the efforts of the 
British Government have been devoted to developing the country into a unitary State. 
This is patently impossible; and it is astonishing that a nation with wide political 
experience like Great Britain fell into such a palpable error.”291 
             Awolowo who was inspired by Indian leaders’ pronouncement relating to revision 
of provincial boundaries along linguistic lines also argued that Nigerian political 
boundaries were arbitrarily drawn. He queried, “Why should there be Yorubas and other 
non-Hausas in the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria? Why were Ibos and other non-
Yorubas grouped together with the Yorubas in the protectorate of Southern Nigeria? I 
know the answers. At the Berlin Conference in 1885, the imperialist powers had paid no 
regard to linguistic or ethnic affinities nor to geographical features or boundaries in their 
final share-out of the territories of Africa.”292  If the idea of a federal constitution is 
accepted and if it is sincerely desired by the British government to create a platform in 
which all the ethnic groups in Nigeria could progress unhindered at various pace towards 
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national integration and unity while retaining their peculiar ways of life, the existing 
administrative boundaries within the country must be redrawn, because three regions 
were constituted without regard to ethnological factors.
293 
 Crowder noted,         
Any country is, in a sense, an artificial creation. In the case of Nigeria, however, the union was 
so sudden, and included such widely differing groups of peoples that not only the British, who 
created it, but the inhabitants themselves have often doubted whether it could survive as a 
political entity. On 1
st
 October 1960, despite many difficulties, focusing mainly on the 
differences among its various component groups, Nigeria became a sovereign federation.
294
  
The quest for a solution became desirable as Nigeria’s credo was expressed in the 
words of its African Governor General Azikiwe at the time of independence,  “Let us 
bind our nation’s wounds and let us heal the breaches of the past so that in forging our 
nation there shall emerge on this continent a hate-free, fear-free and greed-free people 
who shall be in the vanguard of a world task for whose assignment is not only to revive 
the stature of man in Africa but to restore the dignity of man in the world”.295  
       The foregoing analogy shows that Nigeria’s ethnic challenges, fledging federal 
formation and the overall foundational problem could be summed up in a historical 
context. This is because the British left weak institutional structures that could not 
provide the needed ethnic cohesion. “The British slowly but surely ceded power to a 
variety of indigenous forces that were divided along ethnic and tribal lines.” This 
however led to what is commonly seen as north and south geographical divisions with 
less attention to national project and economic development.
296
 The thesis also argues 
that the negative perceptions about the new nation by its founding fathers simply 
signaled danger ahead. There was disunity and hatred orchestrated by what Horowitz 
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describes as severely divided society.
297
 Similarly, this study explores Malaysia’s early 
beginning that provides certain similarities and contrasts to events observed in Nigeria. 
 
2.4    Malaysia: Introduction 
 
           In this section, attempt is made to highlight in a precise manner the core origin of 
the main ethnic groups in Malaysia. The study approaches the genesis of the entity 
called Malaysia through recorded events by taking cognisance of critical issues in order 
to bring to the fore the differences and similarities in its early beginnings as observed on 
Nigeria in view of their acquired nationhood under the colonial tutelage. In this section, 
the main focus is on Malaysia’s early features and a brief overview of its general 
characteristics. These relate to the country’s diversity in terms of its segregated ethnic 
composition and environment. While Malaysia is viewed from its early history the study 
intends to describe the essential characteristics of its component parts and the 
experiences which have produced its present geographical shape and location. 
          
 2.4.1   Salient Facts about the Origin of Malaysian Plural Society 
 
            The focus of this section of the study is to trace the origin of Malaya through a 
brief historical but relevant dates as well as events that shaped its plural formation 
leading to the emergence of Malaysia as a modern nation in its current federal setting. It 
is important to note that until the beginning of 15
th
 Century AD, it was difficult to 
reconstruct Malaysia’s past with certainty. Lack of information prompted some 
historians to view the popular entreport of Melaka as the identifiable period to anchor 
the beginning of the past history of Malaysia.
298
 Malaysia as a federation was fashioned 
without rebellion and, its territory which is partly bordered by the South China Sea and 
organised under its present 13 states and its federal territories has endured and has been 
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intact as one nation till today. It has also overcome the economic disruptions of the late 
20
th
 century better than a number of its neighbours.  Achievement was made in the 
creation of a national history developed by consecutive governments to impart in 
Malaysia citizens and others of the development of the modern nation state.
299
 These 
facts about Malaysia are consistent with events in Nigeria prior to British incursion. 
 
2.4.2   Colonialism and the Genesis of a Plural Society 
            The point this study intends to highlight in this section is to underline certain 
events and recorded dates in connection with the incursion of the British and their 
commercial activities that changed the landscape of Malaya into becoming a multiracial 
society instigated by migration patterns. For example, Malaysia as a nation traces its 
origin back to the spread of British control in the incremental consolidation of territories 
starting from the founding of Penang in 1786 to the merger between Malaya and the 
British Borneo territories in 1963.
300
 Over this period of 177 years, a series of political 
developments took place that propelled these territories into a single polity. Politically, 
the overarching factor that imprinted a large degree of commonality on the territories 
was the legacy of British laws and administration.
301
  
      British control began in the coastal enclaves of Penang, Singapore and Melaka but it 
took 80 years before they were consolidated, initially as a Presidency of British India 
and later as a single Crown colony. Similarly, political events that unfolded in the Malay 
States and Borneo territories in the nineteenth century witnessed the centripetal 
encroachment of British influence. The Residency system introduced in 1874 initiated 
the formative phase of modern political development and amalgamation of Perak, 
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Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Pahang into the Federated Malay States (FMS) in 1895.
 
This was an event that marked “the beginning of a political revolution” which brought 
about a major change in the government and function of the state.
302
 
           Subsequent British expansion led to the embrace of the northern States and 
Johore into the arms of its empire. In Borneo, British adventurers and commercial 
interests extended into an area that was larger than the Malay Peninsula. It was a 
unifying imperial hegemony over the separate territories that had justified their merger 
into the modern state of Malaysia.
303
 From 1877 to 1895 and under the Residential 
system, the State Council was the instrument of government of the FMS and provided 
the constitutional basis of government of the individual protected state.
304
  
          Briefly, the thesis stresses that the influence of European and oriental empires in 
its heyday are too many to mention, however trade was the main cause of British interest 
in Malaya before the outbreak of the Napoleonic wars. For this reason the Island of 
Penang was rented on perpetual lease in 1786, after a long off-and-on series of overtures 
from the sultan of Kedah.
305
  In a nutshell, Malaya has a multi-racial population which 
includes Malays
306
, Chinese, Indians, Eurasians, Sinhalese, Arabs, Thais, and aborigines. 
The first three communities formed the dominant groups, about 97 per cent of the total 
population.307 The population is essentially alien in character; it is composed 
predominantly of Malay, Chinese and Indian immigrants of descendants of such 
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immigrants in Malaya before its opening up during the last century. The Malays have 
been settled in the country since before the beginning of the Christian era, but the 
majority of the present Malay population of the country descended from immigrants 
entering the country during the medieval and modern times.
308
 They have been 
habitually, constitutionally and politically regarded as the “natives of the country and 
owners of the soil”, in spite of being immigrants of longer standing than the Indians or 
the Chinese. Nicholas has pointed out that before 1960, the Orang Asli as an ethnic 
category did not exist. The numerous aboriginal communities in Peninsular Malaysia 
never saw “themselves as a homogenous group, nor did they consciously adopt common 
ethnic markers for self-identity”.309  
        The greatest influx of the Malay people came in the 20
th
 century from the Islands in 
what is known as the Malay Archipelago, the present republic of Indonesia.
310
 The 
movement of population from Indonesia to mainland Malaya prior to 1874, was minimal 
showed poor figures, but it was obvious that Menangkabau, Batak, Rawa, Korinchi and 
Kandiling people from Sumatra, and Bugis from the Celebes settled in Negri Sembilan 
and Selangor.
 311
 In 1911, a total of 117,800 Indonesians were enumerated in the Straits 
Settlements, federated and unfederated Malay States.
312
 The census of 1957 showed a 
total population of 342600 from Indonesia who were enumerated in Malaya and 
Singapore.
313
 The Indians who migrated to Malaya at the close of 15
th
 Century as well as 
the first four decades of the 20
th
 Century were, like the Chinese, mainly illiterate 
labourers from South India. Out of a total of 2,725,917 Indian arrivals in Malaysia up to 
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1941, about forty-four per cent were recruited under the kankany system.
314
 The early 
populations of ethnic groups in Malaysia are shown in Appendix E. Table 2.2. Appendix 
F. Map 2.2 and G. Map 2.3 show states in West and East Malaysia respectively. 
            This study stresses that in Malaya which later became Malaysia, the British 
adventure and its colonial rule influenced the indigenous Malays. The presence of the 
British rulers and their economic and commercial exploitation intensified the need to 
absorb many Chinese and Indian migrants into Malaya. However, earlier immigrants 
from Indonesia sharing common culture, i.e. language, as well as religion practiced by 
the indigenous Malays assimilated easily and boosted the Malay population. It was a 
different case with the Indians the British were bringing into Malaya between 1900 and 
1929, from Tamil-speaking areas of south India. Similarly as at 1405 the Chinese had 
started minimal migration to Malaya although in small numbers until the period of 
colonial rule that opened up economic opportunities.
315
  
          As earlier observed on Nigeria, the British were responsible for creating this 
community of foreigners who had little in common with the Malays. They exhibit 
differences in languages, race, religious practices and philosophy which define their 
cultural life separating the Malays, Chinese and Indians from one another.
316
 Similarly, 
this is the starting point of analysing Malaysia’s diverse ethnic groups in this study. 
 
2.5 Assessing Interethnic Co-operation towards Malaysian Independence     
 
       The focus of the thesis in this section is first to assess measures that encouraged 
interethnic collaboration that transcended independence and victory by the nationalists. 
Significantly, the three main ethnic groups in Malaysia were seen as a community of 
strangers, but the unity and process that yielded their political stability and far-reaching 
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success is of interest to this study. This will give the reader some understanding on how 
independence was won under a federal structure and strengthened by consociationalism. 
However, in Malaysian plural society, the rise of nationalism among one segment 
activated a reactive nationalism among other-ethnic categories.
317
  
         It could be said that both Chinese and Indian nationalistic feelings gradually paved 
the way for the emerging Malay nationalism with the “domestication” of the various 
movements by the postwar colonial constitutional reforms with the institution of the 
Federation of Malaya agreement in 1948.
318
 To understand this collective action, this 
study revisits Isabella’s own words about the Malays thus, “The Malays undoubtedly 
must be remembered among civilized people…They have possessed for centuries 
systems of government and code of land and maritime law, which in theory at least show 
a considerable degree of enlightenment”.319 British dominance was rudely ended by the 
Japanese conquest in early 1942 that inflicted hardship on all the communities and many 
Chinese were massacred.
320
 This study establishes the fact that Japanese aggression 
galvanized the Chinese into vigorous defense of the country. Many humble Chinese 
folks braved the perils, and suffered torture and death, to volunteer assistance to British 
soldiers, prisoners of war and civilian internees.
321
              
         One of the most “nationalistic” reactions among the people was the general unity 
for the purpose of resistance against foreign invasion. It raised people’s awareness of the 
notion of the “state” and fostered a real sense of patriotism. The anti-Japanese resistance 
brought home to the people the importance of defending the land where they had settled 
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down and “to make a commitment to Malaya to lay down their lives in defense of their 
families, properties and rights, something they had not been asked to do before the 
war.”322  Pre-war Malaya was a conglomeration of states with little overriding interest to 
unite for political freedom.
323
 The return of the British in the immediate post-war years 
saw a contest in the plan for a future Malayan nation. In 1946, the Colonial 
Administration proposed a union of the Malay States, Penang and Melaka under a 
central government but in which sovereignty of the Sultans would be transferred to the 
British Crown and equal citizenship rights granted to Malays and non-Malays. This 
British plan for Malayan Union was quickly and forcefully rejected by the Malays.
324
  
         The proposed union was replaced by a federation of Malaya Agreement 1948 
which was a “formal federal constitution” for Malay States and the Settlements of 
Penang and Melaka.
325
 Malaya also emerged from years of colonial rule and the brief 
Japanese occupation into a world divided by a bitter ideological Cold War.
326
 Given the 
complex multi-ethnic situation of colonial Malaya, the construction of the independent 
nation saw a bargain for rights and protection among the ethnic groups. Post-war 
realities reinforced the already changing Chinese attitudes on matters of domicile. 
According to Lim, “As the nation-building process could begin only with the possession 
of sovereignty by the people, the struggle for this status took the combined efforts of the 
Malays, Chinese and Indians …Merdeka in 1957. The three ethnic groups successfully 
forged a united front in the form of a political alliance to seek independence from 
Britain. A show of such unity was also a condition for the transfer of sovereignty”.327 
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2.5.1 Constitutional Foundation under a Federal System 
 
          For the emerging Malaya nation, “a constitutional conference” took place in 
London in 1956 remarkably involving the British and the newly-formed Alliance 
government of, “United Malay National Organisation (UMNO), Malayan Chinese 
Association (MCA) and Malayan Indian Congress (MIC)”, and the rulers agreed on 
independence for Malaya by August 1957.
328
 A Commission headed by Lord Reid was 
appointed to draft a constitution.
329
 However, a federal form of constitution of self-
governing within the commonwealth under a parliamentary democracy with a bicameral 
legislature were terms of reference to Lord Reid Commission, which also include, 
 (i) the establishment of a strong central government with the states and settlement enjoying a 
measure of autonomy and with machinery for consultation between the central Government 
and the states and settlements on certain financial matters to be specified in the Constitution, 
(ii) the safeguarding of the position and prestige of Their Highnesses as constitutional Rulers 
of their respective States, (iii), a constitutional head (Yang di-pertuan Agong) for the 
Federation to be chosen among their Highnesses the Rulers, (iv), a common nationality for the 
whole federation, (v), the safeguard of the special position of the Malays and the legitimate 
interests of the communities.
330 
 
 
         The Reid Commission report was studied by a working party which resulted in a 
White paper entitled Constitutional proposal for the federation of Malaya (Colonial 
Office 1957). Among the difficult tasks of winning independence were tough inter-ethnic 
negotiations in what is now known as the Merdeka Compact or “Bargain of 1957” to 
agree to the demands and sensitivities of each community.
331
 The alliance accepted a 
constitution that would specify, among other things, the special position of the Malays 
and the sultans and constitutional monarchs, Malay as the national language, and Islam 
as “the religion of the Federation.” On the sensitive issue of citizenship, it was provided 
                                                 
328
 Keong, Malaysian Chinese and Nation-Building, p. 17. 
329
  Bari Aziz Abdul, Malaysian Constitution: A Critical Introduction, Kuala Lumpur: The Other Press, 
2003, pp. 26-27. 
330
 Abdul, Malaysian Constitution, p. 26-27. 
331
 Donald R. Snograss, Inequality and Economic Development in Malaysia: A Study Sponsored by the 
Harvard Institute for International Development, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford university press, 1980; Pek Koon 
Heng, Chinese Politics in Malaysia: A History of the Malaysian Chinese Association, Kuala Lumpur: 
Oxford University press, 1988; Keong, Malaysian Constitution, p. 17. 
 104 
that “every person born within the Federation on and after Merdeka day” shall be 
citizens by operation of law (Constitution of the Federation of Malaya, article 14 (1)(b)).  
          This principle of jus soli was applied by the Federation for the first time.
332
  The 
bargain was made in the context for the Malays to hold political power to balance 
Chinese economic power. The Constitution adopted thus has an indigenous character in 
possessing elements that are unique to Malaysia, namely “the sultanates, the position of 
Islam, the position of the Malay language and the special privileges of the Malays”.333 
While the British colonial rule was coming to an end, the British officials made it 
mandatory that the three main ethnic groups must unite and work together in order to 
achieve ethnic harmony in Malaya. This called for a formula for enhanced inter-racial 
cooperation. The three main ethnic groups negotiated between 1955 and 1956 and 
achieved a ‘Social Contract’ along the process which metamorphosed into UMNO-
MCA-MIC Coalition that won the first general election in 1955. Two years later, after 
independence talks had been concluded, the British Government handed over power to 
the UMNO-MCA-MIC coalition government.
334
 Given the mutual constitutional 
development in Malaysia, this thesis argues that the spirit of joint effort in providing a 
lasting constitution in Malaysia by its ethnic groups deferred markedly from such 
contested constitutional arrangement in Nigeria. For example, as observed above, the 
constitution of 1946 was promulgated in Nigeria by the Colonial Government without 
consultation and was deeply resented by her nationalists. This prompted the 1947 
protest to London. No doubt this may have led to the premonition by one of the 
Nigerian elites that “God did not create Nigeria, the British did,” and such other 
derogatory remarks on Nigeria as an artificial creation. All these and more account for 
                                                 
332
 Visu Sinnadurai, “The citizens Laws of Malaysia”, in Tun Mohamed Suffian, P. Lee and F. A. Trindade 
(eds), The constitution of  Malaysia, Its development: 1957-1977, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University press, 
1978, 69-100, here p. 76. 
333
   Abdul, Malaysian Constitution, p. 43. 
334
 Kheng, Malaysia: The Making of a Nation, pp. 2-3. 
 105 
variations in the early formation of Nigeria and Malaysia which fit into the analysis of 
how their past histories have helped to shape their respective contemporary situations. 
  
2.5.2 Extending Citizenship Terms to Non-Malays for Interethnic Harmony 
      This section of the thesis provides insight into how the British genuinely made sure 
that Malaysia was truly united. It also provides a contrast to view Nigeria where all its 
main ethnic groups are not- migrants. However, the perception in Malaysia is seen in the 
light of ‘natives’ and ‘foreigners’ and the British desire to lift Malaya above ethnic and 
racial collision. For instance, in 1952, given the good work of the communities Liaison 
Committee, and Onn’s strong support, the British authorities in Malaya succeeded in 
convincing the Malay Rulers to give their assent to the modified citizenship provisions 
for non-Malays in the federal constitution. A new Federal citizenship ordinance and nine 
State nationality Enactments were introduced in 1952.
335
  
           Under these laws, if a Chinese was born in a Malay state he becomes 
automatically a subject of a sultan and was qualified to become a Federal citizen; 
similarly, if one of his parents had been born anywhere in the Federation, he was also 
qualified to be a citizen. It brought in large numbers of second-generation Chinese.
336
 It 
also enabled several categories of citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies to 
become Federal Citizens. However, an alien who became a citizen by naturalization or 
registration was required to renounce his foreign nationality. The MCA, however, 
demanded that citizenship should be based on jus soli, but this was not acceded to. As 
Mills observes, “The only answer which could be made was that the law of 1952 was as 
                                                 
335
 K. J. Ratnam, Communism and the Political Process in Malaya, Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya 
Press, 1965, p. 86; Kheng, Malaysia: The Making of a Nation, p. 29. 
336
  Lennox A. Mills, Malaya: A Political and Economic Appraisal, Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 
1973, pp. 81-82.  
 106 
much as the Malays could be persuaded to concede after two and half years of 
negotiation, and that Britain was not prepared to compel them to go further”.337  
            This study discovers that by May 1952, about 346,935 aliens had been 
naturalized, of whom about 300,000 were Chinese. Expressed in total number, Malaya’s 
citizens were distributed as follows: about 2,650,000 Malays and Malaysians, 1,100,000 
Chinese and 180,000 Indians. The British authorities agreed in December 1952 that non-
Malay Federal citizens would be admitted to the service in the ratio of one to every four 
Malays appointed, but “this was as large a concession as the British officials could 
persuade the Malays”.338 Malay special rights’ being discriminatory in nature is not 
observed in Nigeria, as hatred and suspicion among ethnic groups tend to create serious 
divisions in Nigeria. All such compromises in Malaysia which helped to unify its ethnic 
groups were almost lacking in Nigeria in what can be described as a zero sum game. 
  
2.5.3 Unified Interest: Alliance won Independence 
        This study intends to underline the fact that political parties in Malaysia were 
formed along ethnic lines as seen in Nigeria. However, the only marked difference was 
the sustained alliance between UMNO and MCA in their faith and focus on Malaysia’s 
future unlike the NPC and NCNC in Nigeria that did not last because there was lack of 
compromise. This thesis substantiates this assertion, for instance, in 1952, Tunku Abdul 
Rahman, with the support of UMNO, demanded that Malaya be given independence 
within three years in response to the IMP’s demand within seven years. In March 1953 
the leaders of UMNO and MCA announced they had reached agreement on the principle 
of general elections for the federal legislative council. Attempts were made to reconcile 
differences between Datuk Onn and Tunku Abdul Rahman, but their meeting proved 
unsuccessful. According to one source, the former insisted that “the Tunku would have 
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to dissolve the Alliance and join his IMP”339 Soon after this, the UMNO-MCA Alliance 
demanded the establishment of an Independent Constitution Commission to inquire into 
constitutional reforms, aimed apparently at reviewing the 1948 Agreement. Its members 
were to be composed of eminent jurists from outside Malaya. In February 1954, Onn 
launched his Party Negara. After the various political parties had aired their proposals at 
the general elections, the new High Commissioner, General Templer, announced, with 
the consent of the sultans, that the new Federal Legislative Council would consist of 52 
elected and 46 nominated members. Elections would be held in early 1955. The UMNO-
MCA Alliance was dissatisfied with an elected majority of only six, and threatened to 
boycott the elections. It withdrew the threat after the next High Commissioner 
MacGillivray assured Tunku Abdul Rahman of meeting with the majority elected party 
to appoint some of five or seven nominated members”340 The Alliance under the 
Tunku’s leadership swept into a landslide victory in Malaya first-ever general elections 
on 17 July 1955, winning 51 of the 52 seats. The way Tunku had changed from an 
exclusionary Malay nationalist, was how he had persuaded his UMNO party to make 
compromises and accept the Alliance’s concept of inter-racial unity. 341 It was agreed 
that the country’s independence should be in August 31st, 1957.342 
         Finally, constitutional developments towards independence status in Nigeria and 
Malaysia which were former British colonies show three similarities: First is that the 
British adopted a federal constitution to lay democratic foundations in both federations. 
Second, coalition between ethnic political parties was encouraged to unify the ethnic 
groups as observed in NPC-NCNC and UMNO-MCA coalitions in Nigeria and Malaysia 
respectively. Third, the continuing misgivings in Nigeria at independence prompted 
Azikiwe to caution: “Let us bind our nation’s wounds and let us heal the breaches of the 
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past …” as quoted above. Similarly, Tunku had persuaded his UMNO party to make 
compromise and accept the Alliance’s concept of inter-racial unity. Two different 
scenarios emerged: Alliance co-operation was sustained while independence was won in 
Malaysia whereas divisions among ethno-political parties in Nigeria as Azikiwe had 
warned led to early electoral and census debacle in Nigeria as shown in chapter six of 
this study. This explains the social environment and ethnic conflict in both federal states. 
 
2.6 Logic of Case Selection, and the Assessment of Ethnic Groups’ Environment 
 
2.6.1 Introduction 
 
         In this last section of the chapter, the thesis first sheds light on the logic of 
comparing the two countries. Second, it gives insight into the environment that harbours 
the ethnic groups in the two countries. It explains the location of the ethnic groups given 
their patterns of either geographical locations, or clustering. This is explored to shape 
readers understanding about ethnic behaviours, cohesion, or propensity towards conflict.   
 
 
2.6.2 Logic of Case Selection in Comparing Nigeria and Malaysia 
 
 
        This study employs McMichael’s incorporated method of comparative study on a 
world scale.
343
 The logic of this comparison is premised on the following shared factors: 
First, both Nigeria and Malaysia belong to the world history of post-colonial state 
formation which began immediately after the World War II involving countries in Asia 
and Africa. Second, both countries are former British colonies. Third, both are multi-
ethnic countries with politically dominant ethnic groups that were economically weak at 
the threshold of their independence and the economically dominant ethnic groups that 
were politically less powerful. This describes the Igbo and the Yoruba in the South, who 
were dominant economically, educationally and professionally while the North-based 
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Hausa/Fulani dominated the political arena.
344
  In Malaysia the Chinese are powerfully 
dominant in the economic arenas, educationally and professionally whereas the Malays 
are more powerful politically.
345
 Fourth, the two are multi-religious countries. Fifth, 
Nigeria’s 1967-1970 Civil War, and Malaysia’s racial riots of May 13, 1969 define early 
contestations and brutal conflicts in both countries. Sixth, both countries are among 
plural societies included in Horowitz Theory of Ethnic Groups in Conflict which makes 
ethnic conflicts in both countries uniquely explored and interpreted in this study.
346
 
 
2.6.3 Living in Clusters and Geo-ethnicity Exhibiting Levels of Conflict 
      In spite of certain shared factors, it is crystal clear that the nature of the ethnic groups 
in both countries varies considerably in some other ways.  Their environment is vital in 
the analysis of their cleavages and conflicts. While ethnic groups in Malaysia are known 
for living side by side, it simply describes the accident of history for numerous Chinese 
and Indians to live in clusters with the indigenous Malays they met on their arrival into 
Malaya. However, this pattern of living side by side without intermingling is emphasized 
by Nordin Razak who posits that the uniqueness of Malaysia is the characteristic of its 
society where ethnic groups live together, yet they preserve and maintain their various 
(a) identities, ((b) cultural languages (c) codes of dress, customs, culture; behavioural 
patterns, architectural background and tradition thus living side by side while 
maintaining separate cutures.
347
 In spite of ethnic groups in Malaysia being divided by 
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race, language, religion, custom and places of abode, they still intermingle in opposing 
sides on virtually every politically relevant issue.
348
  
       Conversely, Nigeria’s Igbo, Hausa/Fulani and Yoruba main ethnic groups are all 
natives, although some may have migrated into their present location centuries ago. 
These ethnic groups in Nigeria are located at different concentrations and different 
geographical locations which sometimes show differences in climate as well as 
activities, of the different ethnic groups which settled in different locations. The 
differences in climate among some of the ethnic groups, lead to differences in the ways 
they carry out the business of their lives especially in agriculture.
 
Salami also observes 
that “Nigeria is no doubt a conglomeration of different ethnic nationalities. This has 
serious impacts on national identity. It is possible to argue that national identity is a 
myth within the structure of the Nigerian nation-state.”349 For Okehie-Offoha, the 
definitions of ethnic group vary because of assumptions peculiar to time and location. 
Specific to Nigeria, “I define ethnic group as a collection of people who share a similar 
language, live in a given geographical location, and are conscious of their common 
bond.” 350 All these explain the geographical locations of ethnic groups in Nigeria which 
collaborates with Cobbah’s view on Africa’s geoethnicity which is reinforced by what 
he calls its ‘standing place’: 
          In Africa, this ethnic identity is above all other things a territorial identity. Nothing defines 
the ethnic group better than its ‘standing place’. The term geoethnicity has been used to 
describe African ethnic phenomenon. Geoethnicity as opposed to non-territorial ethnic 
identification involves the historic identification of an ethnic group with a given territory, 
an attachment to a particular place, a sense of place as a symbol of being and identity.
351
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         Given Cobbach’s point of view on African setting, this study stresses that ethnic 
groups in Nigeria have their ethnic homelands or their ‘standing place’ as observed in 
their geographical separations. For example, the Igbo ethnic group and others often 
withdraw in their large numbers to their homelands whenever and wherever serious 
violence threatens their lives in other parts of Nigeria. Such happened during the 1966 
military coup and subsequent massacre of the Igbo in Northern Nigeria prompting their 
exodus to Eastern Nigeria. In fact, the returnees are often given heralded welcome by 
their kin as survivors. This is explained in Colin Legun’s analogy that “…the scene in 
the Eastern Region continues to be reminiscent of the in-gathering of the exiles into 
Israel after end of the last war.”352 For Nnamdi Ijeaku, “The return to East was a home-
coming, the place of last resort, the line of last defence!! Biafra was all the above to the 
returnee Easterners during the period!!!
353
 Apart from sporadic occurrences, such partial 
withdrawals were witnessed during Babangida and Abacha years of intense ethno-
political upheavals in Nigeria in the 1990s. Iloegbunam remarks: “The Igbo man in the 
country is always on the run –“Ogba Oso” due to their past bitter experience in 
Nigeria.
354
 Worst still, certain killings of the Igbos or Yoruba in the North raises reprisal 
attacks on northerners residing in the Southeast and Southwest and triggers mass exodus 
of Hausa/Fulani back to the North. This is in part the hostility in Nigeria’s geoethnicity 
in contrast to Malaysia’s ethnic groups living in clusters. As a force, they are sensitive to 
threats against their members, and undeterred in their retaliatory posture hence such 
separate geographical locations makes them think they are truly different nations as seen 
in Igbo secession bid. Given this scenario, this study argues that it is partly a 
combination of other factors in the Igbo undying commitment to secede from Nigeria. 
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While this is left for debate, there are similar ethnic groups elsewhere in the world that 
have endured with a host of other groups. But the problem of ethnic divisions, cleavages 
and geoethnic patterns in Nigeria is unarguably reinforced by what Horowitz calls 
cultural differences. He opines that when cultures differ, it creates dichotomy. Cultural 
differences divide ethnic groups and such divergence obstructs smooth interethnic 
relations hence it fosters ethnic conflict.
 355
 
 
2.7   Conclusion 
       This chapter has explored historical facts of the past that clarify most of the events 
that shape the present.  A grasp of the early stages of these societies is meant to shape 
readers understanding as to how the European incursion disrupted natural evolution of 
these societies that later became Nigeria and Malaysia. The study has traced the 
historical origins, locations and of the evolutionary stages of the main ethnic groups in 
Nigeria and Malaysia before the British incursion. No thorough work on these plural 
societies could be well grasped without knowing their roots. It serves as a benchmark to 
evaluate their current sense of primordial affiliations for proper assessment of such 
inclinations to identity the cause of conflict in both countries. This chapter has 
established a number of facts under which some events in later chapters are rooted.  
           First, the study has shown through this chapter that ethnic groups in Nigeria are 
diverse and distinct in their origins. Second, the event of the1914 Amalgamation owes a 
lot to the existing dichotomy between the Northern and the Southern Nigeria. Third, the 
thesis traced Nigerian ruling elites as early champions of nationalist movements in 
Africa, but hatred and uncompromising attitudes shaped their interactions while the 
colonial rule lasted. In a nutshell, the negative views of Nigeria’s ‘Founding Fathers’ 
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reconfirm exacerbated shift of interests to their respective regions at the expense of the 
centre which became weak and has remained weak to its current troubles.  
          In other words, this fact had considerable significance for the way in which the 
colonial empires were run and for the successor states. This study argues that the 
diversity of these societies meant that a colony did not have a single united 
consciousness, at least until one was created, often only momentarily, in the course of 
the struggle for independence. Until then the imperial power could deal with localities 
rather than a country. It shows how it ruled by division without having to divide. 
Conversely, after the end of empire this diversity meant that, when the new states were 
given back their ‘mind’ they were, in most cases, given something they never had before 
in that form and which they found it very difficult to use. That is, they had never before 
had, or been able to think collectively as a single nation or state. This was the situation 
in Nigeria at its independence and immediate post-independence period. This explains 
Horowitz’s emphasis on hostilities and other negative ideas that intensified in the early 
years of many decolonised societies which he featured Nigeria due to interethnic 
juxtaposition which strictly does not allow political leaders to transcend other ideas.
356
 
          Similarly, the study has demonstrated how Britain came in contact with three 
racial groups in Malaysia that were migrants from China and India joining the Malays 
(largely natives, with earlier migrants from Indonesia) who had already settled in 
Malaya. There was much struggle, competition and hatred among the Malays, Chinese 
and Indians who were the main racial groups in Malaya. The study has shown that ethnic 
groups in Malaysia had their differences during the colonial rule, but they united to gain 
independence. A number of issues are uniquely vital in shaping our views on Malaysia.  
            First, this chapter has shown that ethnic groups in Malaysia are truly of distinct 
origins. Second, Malaysia had racial problems during its British colonial rule as seen in 
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Nigeria. Third, the study has demonstrated how maturity, co-operation and 
accommodation within the Malaysian elites stimulated ethnic unity leading to their 
independence. The fact is that from the onset both countries had ethnic problems but 
Malaysian elites were able to achieve considerable compromise. However, Nigerian 
elites could not transcend above ethnic and regional differences which provoked a 
diminished sense about Nigeria as a collective choice.  This conflict is more explored in 
chapter four ahead. Federal designs in both Nigeria and Malaysia which are explored 
next truly explain their constitutional arrangements to manage their ethnic diversities. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Federal Design in Accommodating Pluralism in Nigeria and Malaysia 
3.1 Introduction 
       The preceding chapter of this thesis provided insights into the origins and the early 
history of Nigeria and Malaysia. Ethnic conflict as a social phenomenon largely occurs 
between ethnic groups observed in disputes, cleavages and sometimes clashes across 
ethnic regions.The functions of the federal government and its federating units are 
enshrined in the Federal Constitution with their defined boundaries. This chapter fulfills 
two main goals in the entire discourse on ethnic pluralism, conflict and comparative 
analysis of Nigeria and Malaysia. (i)  It serves as a lens to view in brief the constitutional 
design of Nigeria and Malaysia as a social architecture to manage ethnic diversity. (ii) 
This chapter is also designed to serve as a lens to view ethnic compositions, wealth gap 
and conflicts in both countries about which federalism was desired to mitigate. 
 
3.2 The Federal Constitution of Nigeria and Malaysia Compared 
        Nigeria and Malaysia are two multiethnic and cultural diverse countries. The 
formation of the two countries as captured in the earlier chapter was a product of the 
British adventure in Africa and Asia. In other words, both countries were constructed by 
foreign conquest given the fact that colonial form of authoritarianism underlying 
“indirect rule” did not create a legitimate social contract especially among constituent 
groups in Nigeria. As this study argues, the idea of pulling diverse peoples together to 
form a federal polity and effort at sustaining their social co-existence are two extreme 
poles in the analysis of fragile and often conflict-ridden plural societies. Given the fact 
that ethnicity is self-seeking for group maintenance and benefits, this study explains that 
scarcity of resources and often absence of mediating agent or ameliorating conditions 
makes ethnic conflict more severe in most recently decolonised and divided societies.       
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        Given this focus, this study contends that creating a federal state is not an end in 
itself, because plural societies of the developing world are confronted by a dual 
challenge of achieving sustainable economic development amid the task of managing 
volatile inter-ethnic relations.
357
 Hence federal constitution as a social architecture that 
deals with problems in multicultural societies is vital. Yet, differences exist between the 
federal constitution of Nigeria and that of Malaysia. For example, in Nigeria, the 
constitution does not mention ethnicity in the framers calculations as seen in the case of 
Malaysia, rather the constitution stipulates states and regions for obvious ethnic 
problem. For instance, Part 1 under Chapter 1 of General Provisions states, 
 1.-(1) This Constitution is supreme and its provisions shall have binding force on all 
authorities and persons throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria. (2) The Federal Republic 
of Nigeria shall not be governed, nor shall any person or group of persons take control of the 
Government of Nigeria or any part thereof, except in accordance with the provisions of this 
Constitution. (3) If any other law is inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution, this 
Constitution shall prevail, and that other law shall to the extent of the inconsistency be void. 
2-(1) Nigeria is one indivisible and indissoluble Sovereign State to be known by the name of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria. (2) Nigeria shall be a Federation consisting of States and a 
Federal Capital Territory. 3-(1) There shall be thirty-six States in Nigeria.
358
 
 
 
        The Nigerian Constitution provides for a bicameral legislature at its National 
Assembly, for instance “4-(1) The legislative powers of the federal Republic of Nigeria 
shall be vested in the National Assembly for the Federation which shall consist of a 
Senate and a House of Representatives; 4-(6) The legislative powers of the State of the 
Federation shall be vested in the House of Assembly of the State; 6-(1) The judicial 
powers of the Federation shall be vested in the courts to which this section relates, being 
courts established for the Federation”. For all intents and purposes, the constitution of 
Nigeria is purely federal in its outlook and is a written constitution that shows in its 
distinctiveness the separation of powers between the federal government and the 
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federating units.
359
 Nigeria runs a bicameral legislature as seen in its Upper and Lower 
Houses of Assembly- Senate and House of Representatives which make laws that are 
rigid to amendments. Nigeria’s rigid constitution is a strong feature in the covenant that 
holds a federation together.
360
 The guiding principle for a fair federal practice in Nigeria 
is enshrined in the Federal Character Commission Act (FCC) 1979. Section 14, Sub-
section 3, of the 1979 Constitution stated, “The composition of the Government of the 
Federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in 
such manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote 
national unity, and also to command national loyalty thereby ensuring that there shall be 
no predominance of persons from a few States or from a few ethnic or other sectional 
groups in that government or in any of its agencies.
361
In federal terms, this shows that 
the Nigerian Constitution adequately fulfills a true federal constitutional arrangement. It 
demonstrates the principle of equity which significantly enhances federal democracy. 
             On the other hand, Malaysian constitution is highly traditional, and culturally 
influenced by its institution of monarchy, ethnic preference and religion. For instance, in 
the beginning, federalism was not seen as a necessary issue to tackle ethnic challenges in 
dealing with the accommodation of diverse and geographically separated ethnic regions 
which has always been a major criterion for federalism in plural societies. Ethnicity was 
profound in the overall consideration for the establishment of both 1957 and 1963 
federations in Malaysia. In this context, ethnicity was entrenched in both federal 
designs-in the former and, by protecting symbols of Malay supremacy and legitimacy as 
well as in the latter, by making sure that Malay or indigenous demographic 
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dominance.
362
 This thesis provides supporting facts to show that the Federation of 
Malayasia was wholly founded on Malay ethnic consideration, in spite of other 
immigrants. For example, the difficulty to accommodate Singapure in one federation 
was expressed by Tunku who observed that “the majority of people in the Federation 
had accepted the kingship and the sultanate as the embodiment of their loyalty, Malay 
language, and Islam as the official religion of the nation”. But Singapure is seventy per-
cent Chinese who profess different religions instead of Islam, and these are foreign 
concepts. Tunku felt that the merger of these two territories of different views would 
clash violently and may result to problems that might be quite difficult to resolve.
363
  
       There is no doubt that these factors and more formed the core foundation and 
articulation of Malaysia’s ethnicised federal constitution. According to “Article 1(1), 
The Federation shall be known, in Malay and in English, by the name Malaysia, (2) The 
States of the Federation…”364 The Constitution also provides that “Article 3(1) Islam is 
the religion of the Federation; but other religions may be practiced in peace and 
harmony in any part of the federation”. The Constitution further states, 
  Article 3 (2) In every state other than states not having a Ruler the position of the Ruler as the 
Head of the religion of Islam in his State in the manner and to the extent acknowledged and 
declared by the Constitution of that State, and, subject to that Constitution, all rights, 
privileges, prerogatives and powers enjoyed by him as Head of that religion, are unaffected 
and unimpaired; but in any acts, observances of ceremonies with respect to which the 
Conference of Rulers has agreed that they should extend to the Federation as a whole each of 
the other Rulers shall in his capacity of Head of the religion of Islam authorize the Yang di-
pertuan Agong to represent him.
365
 
 
 
         While the Federal Constitution of Malaysia is explored, it is important to see these 
constitutional provisions or the contextual analysis of Malaysia’s Federal Constitution, 
and arguments against it as truly federal. In other words, the basis of argument for or 
                                                 
362
 B. H. Shafruddin, “Malaysia centre-state relations by design and process,” B. H. Shafruddin & Iftikhar 
AMZ Fadzli (eds.), Between Centre and State: Federalism in Perspective, Kualal Lumpur: Institue of 
Strategic and International Studies, 1998, p. 7; Nurhafilah Musa, Federalism, Constitutionalism and 
Democratic Soceity in Multicultural Societies –A Case Study of Malaysia, Paper Week 2, IFF Summer 
University 2008, p. 1. 
363
 Simandjuntak, Malay afederalism, p. 104. 
364
 Federating states in Malaysia are listed, Laws of Malaysia, Federal Constitution, Part 1. 
365
 Laws of Malaysia, Federal Constitution, Part 1 
 119 
against how anyone perceives Malaysia as a true federation or a quasi type revolves 
around its constitutional provisions and practice will be shown in chapter six. 
           The uniqueness of its federalism is reinforced by specific provisions in the 
constituion such as the “Supreme Head of the Federation and his Consort -Article 32. (1) 
There shall be a Supreme Head of the Federation, to be called the Yang di-pertuan 
Agong, who shall take precedence over all persons in the Federation and shall not be 
liable to any proceedings whatsoever in any court except in the Special Court 
established under Part XV. Chapter 4 –Federal Legislature -Article 45, Composition of 
Senate; Article 46, Composition of House of Representatives; Article 73, Extent of 
federal and state laws”.366 This section underlines differences with Nigeria’s federal 
system given the fact that the Constitution of Malaysia which follows a parliamentary 
system yet stipulates a wide range of special rights to both its rulers and the indigenous 
people. The Government, traditional and religious institutions are more focused to 
protecting and maintaining these special rights in nation-building process. This is the 
ethnicised structure of the constitution of Malaysia with less emphasis on the principle 
of equity in consideration of other ethnic groups in seemingly fused powers. Hence its 
federalism is largely seen in name rather than in practice.
367
       
            For a better understanding of federalism in Malaysia, its constituents operate as 
federal units but the overriding federal government powers make it more typical of a 
unitary system or what Wheare describes as a quasi-federation.
368
 The effort of 
Malaysian leaders manifested in the Alliance bargain on ethnic rights and compromise 
which ushered Malaysia into its consociational democracy. As earlier cited, Elazar 
describes consociational decmocracy as a kind of democratic government which needs 
to be well understood in the manner it operates.  However, internal diversity has varied 
between Malaysia and Nigeria and has shaped the two federal constitutions.  
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3.3Ethnic Composition, Inclination to Conflict in Pre-affirmative Action in Malaysia 
       In this section, effort is made to underline problem areas in Malaysia’s immediate 
post-independence era.  This study explores post-independence challenges in Malaysia 
arising from different ethnic groups and their pressure towards meeting the aspirations 
of their people and the resulting tensions. For instance, most of the posts in the service 
had been Malayanised (occupied) in 1960 by mostly non-Malays because they were 
filled initially by non-Malays.
369
 This study demonstrates the Malay sense of frustration 
at their disadvantaged position which posed a threat to unity, vis-à-vis the “non-Malays” 
in terms of equal employment opportunities in the government services.
370
  
             As at 1970 detailed comparative statistical study has shown, the Chinese, for 
instance, occupied superior positions in administrative, managerial, professional and 
technical areas in the country’s government services.371 Also, overall, the professional 
services were dominated by non-Malays – 90 per cent in medicine, 84 per cent in public 
works (engineering), 67 per cent in agriculture, 68 per cent in education etc.
372
 However, 
Chinese and Indians were over represented in labour, Income Tax and Immigration. In 
the private labour force, the Chinese dominated construction, commerce, mining and 
manufacturing sectors, including clerical grades of white collar employment, the 
Chinese and Indian were of a preponderant percentage with secondary education in 
English, a privilege which very few Malays enjoyed.
373
     
          According to Young, “Equity is a complex idea that resists simple formulations. It 
is strongly shaped by cultural values, by precedent, and by specific types of goods and 
burdens being distributed. To understand what equity means in a given situation we 
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must look at the contextual details.”374  Equity in this sense explains the fact that this 
could not go on indefinitely. The British realised this as early as in 1952 and had 
introduced a quota system for both Malays and the non-Malays. To correct the 
imbalance, the ratio of non-Malay Federal citizens who were employed in MCS was 
reduced to “one for every four Malay”.  The quota system was introduced to ensure that 
“the special position of the Malays” would be retained in the Civil Service.375This thesis 
argues that quota system at this time was meant to ensure equity as a federal principle. 
However, it began a new era when the Malaysian authorities started to marginalise other 
races through its post-independence preferential policies and segregation as commented 
by Montesino and Haque in the literature review of this study. 
            This is in contrast to Nigeria where ethnic ‘rights’ is not pursued. Given the need 
for adjustment, a concomitant of social mobilization has been the increase in Malay 
economic aspiration. Far from being contented with the British stereotype of them as 
hewers of wood and drawers of waters”, Malays have great expectations that political 
independence would bring economic benefits.
376
 The sense of economic deprivation has 
been sharpened by the widening disproportion in earnings between the Malays and non-
Malays. This study provides statistical figures to show income disparities among ethnic 
groups. One estimate was based on a very small national sample survey of West 
Malaysia from 1957 – 1958, showed that 64 per cent of the rural household earned less 
than M$125 (approximately US$40) per month while only 23 per cent urban households 
fell within this group. This comparison is without regard to ethnic group, but since 
Malays comprised the majority of the rural population the implication is clear. Based on 
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this survey, T. H. Silcock calculated, roughly, the ethnic distribution of income for 1957, 
(See Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1     West Malaysia: Income Distribution by Ethnic Group, 1957 
                                                      Malays           Chinese            Indian      Total       . 
Aggregate Individual              
Income (M$m)                                   1150                1950                 475        3,575  
Percentage of total                                 32                    55                   13           100 
Population (million)                           3.13                 2.33                0.71          6.28 
Average annual income per head (M$)                  367                  837                  669           585 
Source: Household Budget Survey Report of Inland Revenue Department 1958; Census of Malaya, 1957377 
         These were, of course, average ethnic incomes and did not reveal intracommunal 
differences. Still, the Malay income per head was nearly two times below the Indian 
figure and more than twice below that of the Chinese income (Table3.1). In 1970, it was 
found that in terms of the ownership of the national wealth, foreign interests owned the 
largest portion of the share capital - 60.7 per cent. The Chinese came next with 22.5per 
cent, and Malays and Indians had holding of 1.9 per cent and 1.0 per cent respectively.
378
  
Table 3.2 Malaysia: Personal Income Tax Statistics, 1964. 
                                                                                                                  Assessed income   Assessed tax  
Individual taxpayers by   
Residence and race             Number of taxpayers      Assessed income    Assessed tax     per head         per head 
                                  No.            %         $m          %           $m        %                &               &                                                                
Residents                    111,404      97.4     984.3     98.6      65.3      92.1      8,835.4       586.2 
Chinese                         67,574     59.1      575.2     57.6      36.6      51.6      8,512.1       541.6 
Malay                           19,188      16.8     132.2     13.2         4.5        6.4      6,889.7      234.5 
India & other                19,285     16.8      158.3     15.9         7.8      11.0      8,208.5      404.5 
Non-Asian                      5,357       4.7      118.6     11.9       16.4      23.1    22,139.3   3,061.4 
Non-Residents                2,980       2.6        14.0       1.4         5.6        7.9      4,698.0   1,879.2 
Total                           114,384   100.6     998.3     100.0      70.9     100.0     8,727.6      619.8 
Source: States of Malaya 1950-68: Abstract B, (cited) in Clive Thomas Edwards, Public Finance in 
Malaya and Singapore, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1970, p. 78. 
 
       This study’s findings are similar to the situation in Northern Nigeria, that 
imbalances in both the civil service and the private sector may be attributed to Malays’ 
low level of education. No useful comparison can be made of the two tables. Table 3.2 
does exhibit some interesting comparisons: 59 percent of taxpayers were Chinese, 
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responsible for 52 per cent  of assessed tax; 17 per cent were Malays, paying 6 per cent 
of total tax, and 17 per cent were Indians, other taxpayers delivered 11 per cent and 
average assessed income of Europeans was over M$22,000 per annum. In this inter-
ethnic comparison, this last category is seldom salient. When Malays talk of poverty, 
they are using the non-Malays, particularly the Chinese as a reference group.
379
 
          One basic fact this section addresses is that Malaysia is a fragmented multi-ethnic 
“nation-state”. Not only is it fragmented geographically, but the multi-ethnic diversity of 
its population has presented problems of economic, social and political integration for 
the Federal Government. There were several reasons as to why Malaysia was formed. 
The most significant from the viewpoint of the Tunku’s administration was the ethnic 
factor.
380
 The Malays in the Peninsula, where historical processes beyond their control 
had already created a plural society, had always greatly feared such an eventuality and 
therefore naturally dreaded the political inclusion of Singapore in their country.
381
  
                    Table 3.3: Racial Composition of Malaya and Singapore 
Malays and Other Indigenous Groups          Chinese               Indians             Others             Total___                                                                                                                             
Malaya                3,125,474                   2, 333,756            696,186         123, 342        6,278,758 
(1957 Census)      (49.8%)                         (37.1%)              (11.1%)           (2.0%) 
Singapore             197,060                      1,090,595           124,084            34,190        1, 445, 929 
(1957 Census)      (13.6%)                         (75.1%)              (8.6%)             (2.7%) 
Total                 3,322,534                     3,424,351            820, 270         157,532         7,724,687 
                             (43.0%)                         (44.3%)             (10.6%)            (2.1%)            (100%) __        
 
Sources: 1. Federation of Malaya, Official Year Book 1961, Kuala Lumpur, 1961, p. 36; G. P. Means,  
                    “Malaysia – A New Federation in Southeast Asia,” Pacific Affairs, 36 (2), 1963, p. 140. 
                    2. Colony of Singapore, Annual Report 1958, Singapore, 1959, pp. 27-8. 
 
The Tunku had dropped his earlier opposition to merge with predominantly Chinese-
Singapore and accepted it with Malaysia because the overall ethnic “indigenous” factor 
was now in the Malay’s favour. He said in his memoirs that, in the Malaya-Singapore 
merger, the Malays might, without the protection of the Constitution, find themselves at 
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a total loss in the only homeland they had. This might eventually mean trouble as simple 
as idealists might think.
382
 Table 3.3 demonstrates the problem posed by the racial 
composition. The figures clearly meant that in a direct Malaya-Singapore merger, the 
numerical superiority of the Malays in the Peninsula would be lost to the Chinese.
 383 
     Having given the racial composition of Malaysia from its formative years, this study 
notes that the full implementation of affirmative action was inevitably triggered by the 
May 13 1969 racial riots in Kuala Lumpur. It was a watershed in the history of Malaysia, 
whereby the implementation National Economic Policy (NEP) was put in place which 
helped to resolve much of Malaysia’s racial tension. It is vital to note that since 1970s 
the implementation of the affirmative action has been ongoing. This study discovers that 
the Malaysian democratic system less adopts open bagaining as a principle of federalism 
in view of its majority rule and major focus on Bumiputra interest over the years. This is 
shown in the next segment although the period is beyond the scope of this study, but 
arguably, it provides a useful insight on how Malaysia has maintained ethnic harmony. 
 
3.4 Bumiputra Interest: A Historical Necessity for Ethnic Harmony in Malaysia  
         The controversy surrounding wealth gap in Malaysia is embedded in the history of 
the country. Current Bumiputra policy calls to mind roles played by the country’s past 
and present leaders in addressing the plight of the Malays and other natives in Malaysia. 
This thesis situates the issue of “special rights” in Malaysia more accurately by 
reflecting on the rights of the Malays, as well elevated in governance from 1970s up till 
2015 of this study and probably beyond. For example, in line with earlier prime 
ministers views on the welfare of the Malays, Mahathir had argued that “Malaysia’s 
NEP was a form of affirmative action, a form which stressed the results. Here was an 
instance where the ends justify the means. Having admitted that the distribution of 
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wealth between the races in the country was unfair, we were willing to be unfair, in 
order to achieve fair results and the equitable distribution of wealth”.384 Currently, Prime 
Minister Najib Tun Razak’s administration has embarked on Bumiputra programmes, in 
line with the nation’s past history. In his Bumiputra economic empowerment 
programmes launched on 14
th
 September 2013, the premier noted, “Appreciating the 
interest and struggles of Bumiputras, I wish to quote seven wills by the Nine Malay 
Rulers when consenting to the independence agreement to set up a federation”. Truly: 
“We declare and we keep for you and we allow you to declare and keep for your 
children and grandchildren, other than the mountains, lakes and forest reserves, Malay 
Reserve land up to a ratio of 50%, the rest you, together with the other communities, 
may grab”.  Najib also noted, “This will is very clear. It has stated the equity and the 
ownership of the Malays and later expanded to Bumiputra, through the unification of 
Sabah and Sarawak when Malaysia was set up 50 years ago”. 385   
            All the Malay and Bumiputra plannings and economic policies by the 
Government had been enacted since independence based on the composition of the 
plural communities.  Naji explained that in principle, this had been adopted as a social 
contract since a long time ago by the people of Malaysia, as agreed to by the nation’s 
founding fathers of , protected and articulated in the Federal Constitution through Article 
153, Article 160 (2), Article 161A (6)(a). Also Article 161A (6)(b). He also noted: 
It is important that this must be thoroughly understood by all quarters that we must always 
be aware and be careful about the Bumiputra Agenda being the National Agenda. This is 
because if the majority Bumiputra group is not looked after or felt themselves threatened 
and sidelined, the country may not achieve peace, stability, and we may not achieve our 
dream of becoming a developed nation which is peaceful and prosperous as aspired in 
2020… the New Economic Policy, namely, NEP had been introduced in 1971 by the late 
Tun Abdul Razak, my father, to tackle the issue of inter-ethnic socio-economic imbalances 
and poverty eradication following the May 13, 1969 tragedy.
386
  
                                                 
384
 Mahathir Mohamad, The Way Forward, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1998, p. 85. 
385
 Najib Tun Razak Announced New Bumiputrera Economic Empowerment Programmes, Universiti 
Teknologi Mara, Saturday, September 14, 2013.  (See speech serialized no: 68 and 69).Available at 
http://www.thestar.com.my/News/Nation/2013/09/14/full-text-najib-bumi-speech.aspx  (accessed  
December 10, 2013).  
386
 Najib, Naji Annouced New Bumiputra, 
 126 
         While appealing to minority ethnic groups in Malaysia, Najib explained that the 
10th Malaysia Plan, starting from 2011 to 2015, is aimed at providing fair opportunities 
to all Malaysians, not considering ethnic groups or geographical position, to be together 
involved in all economic activities. This he said is based on the principle of friendly 
market, based on need, transparency and merit.  One significant thing the government 
has achieved is a stable economy with a gradual but incremental rate in the income of 
the Bumiputras and the rest of other communities in the country. 
          Najib emphasised that the standard of living of Bumiputras has gone up as 
planned. Currently, statistical figures show that Bumiputra monthly average household 
income had gone up from RM172 in the 1970s to RM4, 457 in 2012 or almost 2,500% 
in forty-two years. The Bumiputra poverty rate had been reduced significantly from 
64.8% in the 1970s to 2.2% in 2012. Similarly, the Bumiputra corporate company equity 
rate had reasonable growth from as little as 2.4% in the 1970s to 23.5% in 2011.  Apart 
from several specific employment sectors, the number of Bumiputra employed in the 
professional category, mainly those qualified as medical doctors, engineers and lawyers 
had approached the percentages of the racial composition. This had really shown that the 
New Economic Policy, as a preliminary measure had recorded success in tackling the 
gap between the communities in the effort to develop the socio-economy of the 
Bumiputra community. For the period of the last four decades, the Bumiputra 
community had entered the first phase of the transformation. 
387
  
         Najib also emphasised on how the government has been looking at the income 
disparity which still exist between the ethnic groups. For example, in 2011, the average 
monthly income of the Chinese was higher than Bumiputra by a ratio of 1:43. The 
government has been able to meet part of the interests of the Bumiputra, yet in the 
corporate company equity ownership, the target of at least 30% is yet to be achieved, 
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rather only 10 per cent has been achieved. The premier unequivocally appealed to other 
ethnic groups: “Nevertheless, on behalf of the Government and from the bottom of my 
heart, I would like to urge all quarters, not to misconstrue the Bumiputera economic 
empowerment measures. We will implement all these initiatives and strategies without 
trampling on the interests of other groups or deny their rights….”388   
           This study demonstrates that Malaysia maintains ethnic harmony with 
contradictions under its preferential policies. As H. Singh has argued that “Rather, the 
more pertinent question that arises at this juncture is: why did the Malaysian political 
system come to be structured on a differential, rather than on an equivalent, or even 
universalistic, mode of incorporation?” Equivalent incorporation is about social justice 
which is expressed in equal rights to citizens with regard to affiliation. His 
“universalistic incorporation” explains the need for equal political rights to all 
individuals in Malaysia.
389
 This thesis stresses that here is every reason to accede to the 
fact that these contradictions in Malaysia are perculiar to the country. What is observed 
as unity in Malaysia is rather regular compromise by the minority ethnic groups. It is not 
true unity federalism demands. Horowitz persuasively argues that, “in divided societies, 
ethnic affiliations are powerful, permeative, passionate, and pervasive”.390 
 
3.5 Ethnic Composition, Tendency towards Conflict and Affirmative Action in Nigeria 
          Naturally, groups pursue different interests and goals in the society which 
involves contests to capture available official positions. Politicians perceive fresh 
resources associated with earmarked development projects in the society, usually form 
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areas of conflict involving persons as well as groups who struggle to benefit from it.
391
 
In Nigeria, ethnic cleavages and contestations existed in its pre-independence era, 
whereas the post-colonial administration has witnessed frequent conflicts over resources 
accruing from the state. As observed on Malaysia’s NEP in 1970s, Nigerian Federal 
Character Commission which was established in 1979 was meant to redress socio-
economic inequalities. For example, the population of Nigeria is estimated at 140 
million.
392
 Approximately between 250 and 400 ethnic groups inhabit Nigeria. This 
study streses that the three main ethnic groups in Nigeria, namely, the Hausa-Fulani, the 
Yoruba and the Igbo represented 57 per cent of the national population in the 1963 
census.
393
 This census showed the population of the Hausa “excluding the Fulani at 
11,653,000 (20.9 per cent), the Yoruba at 11,321,000 (20.3 per cent) and the Igbo at 
9,246,000 (16.6 per cent)”.394 To understand the power of the majority ethnic groups in 
Nigeria, eleven among its staggering minority groups represented 27.9 per cent of the 
population in the early 1963 census conducted in the country.
395
      
         Undeniably, as observed in Malaysia, Nigeria’s tripodal ethnic structure shows 
how each of the main ethnic groups represents a pole in the competition for political and 
economic resources available in the country. To this end, minority ethnic groups are 
compelled to remain in alliances with each of the three principal ethnic groups. Given 
Nigeria’s situation, it has been argued that tripodal ethnic structures are intrinsically 
unstable as seen in the ethnically fragmented structure in Tanzania where no ethnic 
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group’s population exceeds 12 per cent.396 However, co-operation between the 
minorities and the main groups strategically located in ethnic politics in tripodal Nigeria 
is frequently conflictual. Each of these dominant ethnic groups is inclined to building 
support to ensure its predominance in government or to avoid being maginalised by 
other rival groups.
397
 It gives understanding of the interplay between the tripodal ethnic 
structures in Nigeria on the one hand, and administrative divisions and communal 
identities on the other hand leading to eight major cleavages in Nigerian politics.
398
   
          The most disturbing are cleavages and contests among the three majority ethnic 
groups and 350 minority ethnic groups; cleavage between the north and south; between 
the 36 states that make up the federation and the six zones whereby three are located in 
the north while another three are found in the south; and cleavages between religious 
affiliation in the country. But one obvious fact in this complex web of cleavages is that 
some of them overlap each other. For instance, the southeast zone overlaps with Igbo 
ethnic group who are predominantly Christians. Similarly, the north central overlaps 
with northern ethnic minorities. All these sectional cleavages of ethnic, regional and 
religious types have transformed into systemic problems with induced overlapping 
patterns of disparities in the Nigerian society. Hence many factors that range from 
Nigeria’s colonial past, history, geoethnic patterns, cultural differences, religious 
affiliation, different natural resource endowments and government policies have 
contributed to this complex web of social inequalities in the country.
399
 Mustapha also 
observes that “From the first coup in 1966, reform became an imperative within the 
Nigerian political system. The Federal Character Commission (FCC) is the final 
outcomes of one standard of these reforms; the introduction of a quota and the 
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subsequent constitutional entrenchment of affirmative action.”400 All these pressing 
issues on representation as well as power-sharing in Nigeria were backed by the 1979 
constitution under the Federal Character principle (FCP) enshrined in Section 14, Sub-
section 3 of the 1979 Constitution earlier highlighted in this chapter. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
       This chapter is significant in the general discussion of ethnic conflicts in Nigeria 
and Malaysia. The idea of a federal design which accommodates pluralism is carefully 
chosen to show differences in the constitutional features of federalism in both countries. 
Essentially, this gives insight into the practice of federalism as well as ethnic conflict in 
the two countries. Some salient facts which emerged from this chapter enrich the thesis: 
         First, the chapter has shown that the two countries run federal constitution with 
marked differences. While the federal constitution of Nigeria is state and regionally 
focused, Malaysia’s federal constitutional arrangement is designed to preserve symbols 
of Malay dominance and legitimacy. The position of Islam as the official religion of the 
state, Malay Rulers as well as the special rights for the Malays are features that make 
federal practice in Malaysia different from all known federations in the world. Second, 
this chapter also provided insight into the composition of ethnic groups in Nigeria and 
Malaysia, economic disparity among ethnic groups and their proclivity to tension.  
        The interests of the Bumiputras in Malaysia are strongly advocated by the current 
government of Najib. But, in spite of the Federal Character principles, ethnic tension in 
Nigeria remains obvious. Malays has shown its own inadequacies but managed without 
adhering to the federal principle of equity. The next chapter serves as a benchmark to 
evaluate ethnic conflict and federalism in the context of elite behaviour on policy role 
and the assessment of levels of political stability in both Nigeria and Malaysia. 
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                                                         CHAPTER 4 
 
 
Ethnic Conflict and Federalism: Assessing Leadership Behaviour and Policy Role 
                                       
4.1 Introduction 
 
      The previous chapter explored constitutional design in both federations to 
accommodate their ethnic diverse groups. This chapter examines the behaviour of 
political leaders in plural society and how their constitutional role limits or causes ethnic 
tension. Given this focus, three issues are also analysed in this chapter. (a) To assess the 
independent jurisdictions of two sets of governments namely, central or national 
government and the provincial, regional government, (b) To evaluate the division of 
power between the central and regional government as spelt out in the Constitution. 
First, the thesis discusses ‘a’ by assessing political leadership and behaviour, especially 
where their actions exceed their constitutional roles. As one would expect, this could 
cause disharmony among diverse interests in Nigeria and Malaysia respectively. 
         The second part of this chapter examines policy choice and implementation in 
Malaysia’s post 1969 racial riots, and Nigeria’s post-civil war policies. This is to 
demonstrate Nigeria’s missing link from Malaysia’s treaded path on affirmative action, 
to discuss ‘b’. Two arguments emerge:  (in the case of ‘b’, unlike in Malaysia, 
institutional framework of federalism was completely distorted by the military rule in 
Nigeria which convoluted in military suppression of the federating units. The 
constitution was also suspended by all the military regimes that ruled by decree in 
Nigeria. Violations of boundaries of jurisdictions under democracy will be discussed.         
The third part of the chapter shows the adoption of brute force on defenseless ethnic 
communities in Nigeria while dislodging ethnic tension under Obasanjo–led democratic 
rule. The thesis argues that Nigeria has not performed creditably in policy choice and 
 132 
implementation when compared to events that have spurred economic development as 
well as considerable ethnic harmony in Malaysia. 
 
4.2 Assessing Leadership Behaviour and Constitutional Role, and Conflicts in Nigeria and  
      Malaysia 
 
       Ethnic conflict defines major problems of plural societies. As this study explains, 
such conflict is largely resolved or even prevented within the balancing mechanism of 
federalism which unites federating units while retaining a level of their autonomy. 
Federalism has been described in various forms in chapter one of this thesis as a 
necessary system of government that helps in managing cultural diversity in a polity. Yet 
this thesis argues that federal constitutional framework is not an end to itself given the 
fact that its provisions need to be well adhered to strictly for federalism to have impact 
and give meaning in a given society. Given the desired role federalism plays in plural 
societies, the role of political leaders, and their behaviour are vital in their constitutional 
role for a federal framework to function and thrive. This study argues that Nigeria has 
failed to approximate to rational-legal mode of operation. As Imutinyanu Ugiagbe has 
argued, “One level in which this is obvious or evident is the formal constitution of the 
country, which should in principle, provides the ultimate legal framework through which 
the rational behaviour is defined. The charismatic illegal government of Abacha and 
Babangida breeds nothing but suffering and corrupt practices for the country, a legacy 
which is continuing today.”401  
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         This study has established that there exist independent jurisdictions of two sets of 
governments as provided in the federal constitutions of Nigeria and Malaysia as shown 
in chapter two of this thesis. But this study contends that there are some instances the 
jurisdictions of both the federal and regional governments are violated in the exercise of 
governmental function which does not promote good intergovernmental relationship. For 
the sake of clarity, at Malaysian independence, the Constitution retained the federal 
nature Tanah Melayu but there was no bargaining between the federal government and 
states with regard to sharing of powers as well as revenues because the communist’s 
insurgency had weakened the positions of the states at this time. This prompted the 
setting up of the Reid Commission which recommended that a strong central 
government be established with the states and settlements accorded their due autonomy 
while consultation of the two levels of governments should be maintained.
402
 
           In view of the foregoing, this study briefly demonstrates how post-independence 
Malaysian and Nigerian leaders either violated or acted within the confines of their 
constitutional role in governance. For example, although Tunku Abdul Rahman’s 
administration was adjudged as smooth, a lot of complaints came up from the states of 
Kelantan, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak for certain reasons due to the fact that almost 
all the states were under the party that was in power at the center. Cooperation between 
the State of Kelantan and the federal government failed after the 1959 General Elections. 
The federal government failed to release federal funds to states controlled by the 
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opposition. In like manner, the opposition states refused to cooperate with the federal 
government for fear of the political game plan of the government at the centre. Due to 
this crisis, the federal government failed to launch new land schemes in Kelantan even 
though the state was willing to bear the cost. This led the state to introduce its own land 
scheme known as Kelantan State Land Development Authority (KSLDA) in January 
1960. Similar crisis was witnessed in the construction of Sultan Yahya Petra Bridge.
403
     
        While the federal government of Malaysia failed to release federal fund meant for 
Kelantan as well as refused to launch the new land scheme, it shows anti-federal 
elements in governance. It shows disunity, no open bargaining to ensure equity and in a 
situation that seemingly lacks checks and balances as principles of federalism. 
         Similarly, such high-handedness has also been observed in Nigeria. Crises 
involving federal and state in Nigeria often lead the federal government to reinforce its 
intimidation by deploying the military and regular police forces to the state capitals and 
sealing off state government’s houses with armored tanks.404 Similarly, this study looks 
at the federal might against the opposition state of Kelantan. This was observed when 
the Kelantan government opposed the idea of Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore joining 
Malaysia in a lawsuit.
405
 While the ruling by the court favoured the federal government, 
the Kelantan Government argued that the Malaysia Agreement and the Malaysian Act 
enacted pursuant thereto were void. The said agreement abolished the Federation of 
Malaya. The Kelantan government had argued that the consent of all the constituent 
states and Kelantan ought to be sought in the process of new entities joining Malaysia. 
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But it was decided that the consent of the state was not required before the three states 
could join as part of Malaysia.
406
  
          This thesis argues that this action at this point in Malaysia is contrary to the 
principle of open bargaining in federalism because it is the federating units that 
established the federal government(at the centre) which requires isssues to be debated 
before adoption. This scenario in Malaysia can be related to similar federal power 
against some states in addition to earlier cited cases on Nigeria. For instance, concerned 
by the developments in the impeachment processes in the states, the Senate of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, while unwillingly backing President Obasanjo’s declaration 
of a state of emergency in Ekiti State on October 26, 2007, the Senate “bound him and 
other institutions of state to comply with the rule of law in the on-going crises in plateau 
and Anambra States.”407 There seems to be a common trend but a little variation on 
contested issues between the states and the federal governments of both countries. For 
example, similar threats of applying emergency rule in certain states by the Nigerian 
Federal Government can also be viewed in the light of the conflict between the Federal 
Government of Malaysia and the State of Kelantan which was resolved under Tun Abdul 
Razak when the Mentri Besar of Kelantan started to cooperate with the federal 
government. But it is also observed that another problem occurred when PAS opposed 
the appointment of Dato’ Mohamed Nasir as Kelantan’s new Mentri Besar.408 
          The same argument concerning the appointment of Nasir led Prime Minister Tun 
Hussein Onn’s administration to declare a state of emergency in Kelantan in 1977 after 
which PAS was removed from UMNO.
409
 The expiration of the emergency rule on 12 
February 1978 led to the dissolution of the Kelantan State Assembly whereby election 
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conducted on March 11, 1978 was won by UMNO. It restored good relationship 
between both levels of government and development projects such as Empangan 
Kemubu Project, FEDA and KESEDAR were brought back to the state.
410
  
          It is vital to point out in this study that by declaring a state of emergency, the 
ruling party is known to have used its big stick on the state of Kelantan. It could sound 
as a constitutional role, yet it could also be used to intimidate a state thereby exposing 
the federal government to abuse of power. This study argues that the action of the 
Malaysian Federal Government in the foregoing discussion can be seen on a neutral 
ground of its role but it could be targeted at the party in power in the State of Kelantan.  
While this is outside ethnic chauvinism, but rather on federal matters, a similar situation 
occurred in Nigeria when the conduct of the federal government in a number of issues 
was seen as unconstitutional especially in interfering in the affairs of Bayelsa State.  
While the editorial column of the Guardian newspaper described the federal 
government’s action as at variance with the principle of federalism, the paper further 
took a sweep at the deployment of the “Economic and Financial Crimes Commission” 
(EFCC) to facilitate the state governor’s impeachment. While the role played by the 
EFCC was outside the powers establishing it, the federal government was literally 
browbeating the Bayelsa state lawmakers into doing what they should have done well 
without external intervention.
411
 It shows a violation of the independent role of Bayelsa 
State Assembly on matters concerning the removal of its governor. Hence Nwabueze, a 
constitutional lawyer regretted the action of EFCC as a violation of federalism, and that 
the Federal Government being well informed of constitutional limits of powers is not 
expected to exercise them in a manner whereby its “practical effect, impedes, frustrates, 
stultifies or unduly interferes with state management of its affairs.”412 
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         This study also looks at post 1990 General Election under Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamed when UMNO lost all its seats in Kelantan to Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah 
(APU). It led the federal government to put Kelantan under pressure by preventing 
private firms from investing in the state. Given this wrangling, the federal government 
refused to invite Kelantan Menteri Besar and Chief Minister of Sabah to Menteri Besar 
and Chief Ministers meeting in November 1990 about Malaysian Development Plan.
413
   
In another incident, the hudud law passed by the Kelantan Government was rejected by 
the federal government because it violated Article 75 of the Federal Constitution.
414
 
Given the continuing faceoff PAS won the state of Terengganu which prompted the state 
to ask the federal government to review its oil royalty, but Prime Minister Mahathir 
refused on the ground that no state will be given more autonomy than others. Yet PAS’s 
move to set up Islamic State was rejected by the federal government as anti-federal and 
would weaken efforts made by the government to integrate Malaysians.
415
  
           This provides a ground to see violations on the part of a state against its stipulated 
boundary in the constitution. Yet, the character and behaviour of a leader counts in 
calming down or in the escalation of conflict. In some situations in Nigeria, it makes 
ethnic conflict more prolonged. For instance, the personal behaviour and actions of 
President Obasanjo in drafting the military against Odi town and to Benue state in 
Nigeria that almost annihilated the entire Odi and hundreds of people killed by soldiers 
in Benue were inconceivable in democracy. This study stresses that given the rule of 
law, equity and fairness as characteristics of a true federal state, must also balance forces 
that tend to create disharmony or to the extent of destroying the federating units or the 
ethnic minorities’ federalism was originally designed to protect and prosper.416 This 
thesis discovers that there is no unity in the country given the spate of killings and 
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destruction.  The whole scenario does not portray Nigeria as a true federal state under a 
federal democracy- a cardinal feature of federalism which does not exhibit coercion. 
         Further evaluation of the distribution of power between the central and regional 
governments as spelled out in the Constitution can be seen in the Constitution of Nigeria 
1999, which says in Part II, 4-(3) “The power of the National Assembly to make laws 
for the peace, order and good government of the Federation with respect to any matter 
included in the Exclusive Legislative List shall, save as otherwise provided in this 
Constitution, be to the exclusion of the Houses of Assembly of State.” But there are 
certain ethnic issues that frustrate the Federal Government of Nigeria on its role.  For 
example, the recent need for a constitutional reform in Nigeria led to institutionalising a 
National Political Reform Conference (NPRC) during President Olusegun Obasanjo’s 
tenure in office. The conference comprised of 400 nominees and 36 governors which 
converged at Nigeria’s capital city Abuja. The NPRC was to create a common 
understanding with regard to a fresh constitutional design to bring about national unity, 
social cohesion and the progress of the Nigerian federation.
417
      
         However the conference generated controversies between the northern and 
southern Nigeria in a fresh constitutional change in the country’s deeply divided society. 
This was observed in the increasing polarisation of the Conference along a broad geo-
political fault-line that shows supposed southern Nigerian constitutional reformers 
against more pragmatic northern conservatives.
418
The continuing regional disagreement 
often frustrates the effort of the Federal Government of Nigeria on unity and social 
progress which derives from ethnic sentiment that divides elites in their geoethnic and 
geopolitical settings in Nigeria.  
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         This thesis strongly demonstrates that political behaviours and utterances of 
Nigerian politicians and leaders often generate controversies in Nigeria. These have been 
a clog in the country’s quest to fully unify its federating ethnic communities. For 
instance, while attempting to justify Northern hegemony, Sani Kotangora – a northern 
politician reacted that the south was unsatisfied in monopolising economic power as well 
as control of federal civil service, but the region has been fighting to grab the “choicest 
slice” of Nigeria’s politics- the presidency.419  He maintained the same claim during an 
interview with Newslink Magazine tagged “Nigeria’s Presidency, Not for the South”, 
that democracy is a game of numbers. The South, he stressed could kill the people in the 
North to reduce their population to cling power. He envisioned political power to remain 
with the North forever.
420
 Many politicians in Nigeria have contributed to heating the 
polity with their sectional remarks which frustrate effort at unity and a federal balance.  
       According to Suberu, another Northerner has remarked that it will be “morally and 
politically unfair not to allow the majority to decide who shall be president when a grave 
North-South imbalance persists in education and bureaucracy.”421 To buttress the 
aforementioned facts, Northern hegemony is a deliberate ploy as seen in the words of 
another prominent Northern politician - Alhaji Maitama Sule who noted that: 
“...everyone has a gift from God. The Northerners are endowed by God with leadership 
qualities. The Yoruba man knows how to earn a living and has diplomatic qualities. The 
Igbo is gifted in commerce, trade and technological innovation. God so created us 
individually for a purpose and with different gifts.”422  
         This may have formed Horowitz’s view that politics in divided societies is 
characterised by ethnic conflict which makes national cohesion difficult. Horowitz 
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persuasively explains these divisive tendencies when he observes, “Ethnic conflict 
strains the bonds that sustain civility and is often at the root of violence that results in 
looting, death, homelessness, and the flight of large numbers of people. In divided 
societies, ethnic affiliations are powerful, permeative, passionate, and pervasive.”423  
        Although the East Malaysian States of Sabah and Sarawak are located at a far 
distance from West Malaysia similar to geographical separations in Nigeria, this has 
caused no tension to the Federal Government of Malaysia on policies of ethnic balance. 
 
4.3 Ethnic Conflict and Federalism: Assessing Policy Choice and Implementation in Nigeria      
      and Malaysia 
 
      This study contends that policy and institutional quality are largely endogenous. A 
grasp of this correlation is vital because “poor institutional quality” and “failure to 
implement better policies” are among causes of growth collapses, poverty, and civil 
conflict. “Such explanations are logically (and properly) followed by calls to improve 
institutions and policies, but an implicit assumption in such calls is that realizing them is 
simply a matter of choice, technocratic skill, and/or sheer political will.”424 The problem 
this study explains is premised on the fact that many conflicts that presently characterise 
many countries in the world largely have deep-rooted structural causes due to 
diminished or diminishing resources which instigate intergroup agitation or dominance 
largely sheltered under religion or ethnicity.
425
 This in part unveils reasons for various 
contestations treated in chapter five ahead. For Horowitz huge dissimilarity over time 
and space exists in what he describes as “bite-sized pieces into which ethnic conflict can 
be sliced.” In all, there is no ground to analyse it in one single term.426  
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          Hence, on policy choice, implementation and practice, this thesis demonstrates 
that both the May 13 1969 racial riot in Malaysia and the Biafran Civil War (1967-1970) 
in Nigeria marked specific watersheds in their respective political histories. The two 
countries began fresh moves in the 1970s with new policies to address their respective 
socioeconomic and political problems through new policy agendas. The two countries 
differed significantly in the debate that took place among policy makers in both 
countries. The nature of the debates helps to enhance understanding of the vision and 
developmental focus of their elites in power respectively, to deal with poverty and socio-
economic disparities as well as reduce or even eradicate ethnic conflict. 
           This study demonstrates the vision of the elites in Malaysia by organizing a 
debate on the way forward for the country after the May 13 1969 racial riots. For 
example, the ideas of the New Economic Policy (NEP) were first outlined in a paper, 
dated 18 March 1970, which was prepared by the Department of National Unity (DNU). 
It identified the economic priorities as follows: “(i) the promotion of national unity and 
integration; (ii) the creation of employment opportunities; and (iii) the promotion of 
overall economic growth”. Accelerated growth is desirable, but sometimes may be 
subordinated to a redistribution of income if extreme poverty threatens political stability 
or forestalls the mobilization of human resources.
427
  
             It is of interest to demonstrate in this comparative study that in Malaysia, the 
Economic Planning Unit (EPU) and DNU were asked to Debate on the choice of 
development strategy in post 1969 Malaysia. In the debate, EPU emphasised economic 
growth with less regard to other concerns in the national economy and society. EPU in 
its approach however maintained that attaining a higher standard of living in the country 
could only be possible with higher economic growth and GNP rates. They did not see 
anything wrong with earlier development strategy started right from 1960s. They 
                                                 
427
 Malcolm Gillis, et al, Economics of Development, New York: Norton & Company, 1996, p. 15. 
 142 
advocated for effective implementation of the existing development policy rather than a 
change in order to achieve a higher income growth rate for the country. EPU approach 
implied that redistribution would take care of itself through the price mechanism if 
growth was pursued. However, if by accident redistribution did not take place through 
the proposed price mechanism, then the government could specially supplement the poor 
who were predominantly Malays with some targeted budgetary spending. In its 
submission, DNU School emphasised that the May 13 1969 racial riots could not be 
ignored or swept under the carpet as a mere tragic accident in Malaysia in the 1960s as 
EPU may have desired it. This school of thought argued that the race riots of May 1969 
were manifestations of a distortion in the 1960s Malaysia’s development strategy.428      
           They accepted the truth that the Malaysia economy expanded as reflected in the 
growth rate statistics, but they also argued that the Malays did not commensurately share 
in the growth of the prosperity of the 1960s. They also argued that there was no grounds 
to believe that continued pursuit of economic growth in the country’s future without 
special policies put in place to redress the inequality and lopsided nature of the 
distribution would give immediate solution to the problem.  On the other hand, DNU 
desired to complement the EPU method instead of discarding it entirely. With a 
combined approach, they began to identify major institutional and social problems in the 
Malaysian economy and society and began to integrate the problem into the country’s 
development strategies and policies with the aim of addressing the problem directly 
rather than allowing them to be determined by anonymous market forces.
429
 In spite of 
EPU and DNU differences, they agreed on two fundamental issues involved in moving 
Malaysia forward after the dark spot of 1969 as premised on the following: 
(a) “Growth had to be an indispensable element in a policy of economic 
development”. 
(b) “The implementation machinery should be improved”. 
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       In many cases, development policies not qualified with social and political 
considerations have resulted in increased inequalities in wealth, income, and 
opportunities between social, ethnic and religious, or geographical groups. The 
inequalities then spiraled into social tensions, instability, riots and even civil wars. 
          This study emphasises that the Rukunegara (National Principles) not only 
expresses a bargain by Malaysia’s multiethnic groups but also has become a national 
covenant that holds the nation together. Rukunnegara was designed to instill among 
Malaysian citizens certain articulated fundamental values for common sharing. The 
National Operations Council (NOC) introduction of new constitutional reforms and the 
purpose of constitutional amendment were to restrict and discourage issues that could be 
discussed publicly or questioned by politicians in the country’s parliament. This helped 
to checkmate laissez-faire public attitude that existed before the May 13
th
 riot in 1969. 
The themes of the constitutional reforms are neatly summarised by Means thus: 
               The new constitutional amendments proposed in the White paper were to prohibit any public 
questioning or criticism of the Rukunegara and certain topics identified as ‘sensitive 
issues’, including: the power and status of Malay Rulers: citizenship rights of non-Malays; 
Malay special rights and privileges; the status of Islam as the official religion; and the status 
of Malay as the sole National language. The proposed amendments would also ‘enrich’ 
these matters in the Constitution by requiring the consent of the Conference of Rulers 
….By giving the Malay Rulers the powers to protect ‘entrenched’ constitutional provisions, 
they were thus to be made the perpetual guarantors of The Racial Bargain which had now 
been defined largely as a package of inalienable indigenous rights.
430
 
 
 
     The debate and joint approaches worked for Malaysia in two main ways: First, ethnic 
harmony was immediately achieved and has lasted for over four decades of peaceful 
coexistence. Second, Malaysia has witnessed economic growth and development and 
hopes to join the league of developed countries of the world by year 2020. By this policy 
choice and implementation, the Federal Government of Malaysia acted consistently with 
Part VI, chapter 5 National Development Plan in Article 92 (1) If, after a 
recommendation from an expert committee and after consultation with the National 
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Finance Council…”431 Conversely, in the light of the foregoing debates, Nigeria’s post- 
civil war Second National Development Plan (SNDP) of 1970-1975 can be compared to 
that of Malaysia (1970-1974) of post-1969 development. There were similarities 
between the two countries national policies. Nigeria’s Second National Development 
Plan directed at achieving the following: “(a) a united, strong and self-reliant nation; (b) 
a great and dynamic economy; (c) a just and egalitarian society; (d) a land of bright and 
full opportunities for all citizens; (e) a free and democratic society”.432 
        Similar to Malaysia, this study explains that the objective of planning in Nigeria is 
not limited to providing the needed accelerated rate of economic growth, and the idea of 
raising the level of the population; it also involves giving the country increased measure 
over the control of its destiny.
433
 This study stresses the fact that Nigeria’s post-civil war 
policy was rationally articulated to address “reconstruction of war damaged areas, 
eradication of corruption; establishment of more states; adoption of a new constitution; 
new formula for allocating revenue; completion of a national census; organization of 
national political parties; and elections” but its implementation is said to be a failure.434  
            The Nigerian development plan established an unambiguous connection between 
national unity and social integration of the country on the other hand, with distributive 
equality of the fruits of economic development. As observed in Malaysia’s National 
Plan, the plan document also stated that if a just and egalitarian society was going to be 
established in Nigeria, it then means that there must be a reduction of inequalities in 
interpersonal incomes as well as among various communities in different geographical 
areas in Nigeria. The planners had in mind that Nigerian institutions must be formally 
restructured articulated to function in a manner that no individual or group was 
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oppressed on the basis of class, ethnic group, state or social status.
435
 While evaluating 
the Nigerian economy in mid-1975, Professor Sam Aluko, a Nigerian economist noted, 
“the tendency is for the rich to grow richer and for the poor to grow poorer. The growing 
pattern of income and wealth distribution between the high and the low, between the 
urban and the rural areas, between the employed and the unemployed, between the 
military and the civilian population and even between the Federal Government and the 
State Governments is anything but just or egalitarian. The economically strong have 
been growing stronger and the economically weak growing weaker, buttressed by the 
increased abundance of the resources available to the governments”.436 
           The said failed Second National Policy was managed by the military’s rigid rules. 
For instance General Gowon ascended the throne as head of state of Nigeria after the 
second coup mid-1960s, and public policy became exclusively his, and some of his top 
civil servants and members of the Supreme Military Council (SMC).
437
  Given that 
military rule was not accountable to the general public, national policies were not 
debated rationally in the SMC, hence public policy issues became immune from public 
scrutiny.
438
 Similarly, it was also true under the regimes of Murtala Mohammed and 
General Obasanjo as the military maintains a command structure.
439
  
          The emphasis here is that in public scrutiny, public debates highlight the strength, 
lapses, corruption and loopholes in a public policy while mobilising public interest and 
support for the programme. Public scrutiny and debates are important because even if 
the technocrats who conceptualise and implement the programme are competent, 
without scrutiny they can fumble even with the best of intentions, without which they 
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may abuse their office.
440
 The foregoing discussion on Nigeria describes problems 
associated with policy implementation in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world 
which describes the challenges brought about by a widening gap between intensions and 
results in programme execution. A defective execution of a policy programme voids the 
expected results.
441
 Manyong et al reflect on poor policy implementation in Nigeria and 
observe that the formulation of policies is seen as ends in themselves instead of a road 
map to desired goals. Given this, less attention was paid to better execution of policies. 
Bureaucrats as well as those in charge of implementation of policies often lose sight of 
the basic objectives of policies; rather they continued to focus of superficial issues. A lot 
of illicit activities involving poor managerial skills, redtape, corruption as well as high 
rate of policy turnover often set hurdles to policy implementation.442  
           Given instances of failure by the Nigerian leaders in the post-civil war Nigeria, 
the thesis argues that Nigeria suffered economic strains under President Shagari due to 
poor management amid the initial oil boom. For example, under the democratic regimes 
in Nigeria, with their oversight function, the House of Representative and the Senate 
during Shagari regime was a house of the ruling elite–coalition characterised by 
predatory, destructive and corrupt practices and did not commit enough to shape public 
policy. The executive arm of the government used its power to crush any form of serious 
scrutiny thus making themselves unaccountable like the military regimes.
443
  
          It is important to note in this study that there is a need for strong ethical values 
that help to mould a society. Good moral behaviour is strongly emphasized in Nigerian 
and Malaysian Constitutions with the aim of raising ethical citizenry. For example, 
Buhari overthrew Shagari because he claimed that the economy had been ruined by 
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corruption and moral decadence. Major General Mohammadu Buhari’s Adminstration 
articulated an idea on War Against Indiscipline (WAI) to address moral decadence and 
impatience by Nigerians as a missing link in achieving orderly society. While Nigerians 
had started to respond to WAI rules, it was suddenly obstructed by Babangida’s coup, 
which eventually removed Buhari from office and later renamed the programme Mass 
Mobilisation for Self Reliance, Social Justice, and Economic Recovery (MAMSER) in 
his administration. For Ekwonwa “major social changes come slowly and depend on 
large scale of shift in attitude and belief”.444Yet, General Ibrahim Babangida could not 
handle such moral issues of the nation effectively with his MAMSER etc. His regime 
witnessed the emergence of high-profile fraud code-named ‘419’ and other antisocial 
activities. While Malaysians were largely influenced by their cultural values which the 
traditional and religious rulers strongly emphasized on, Nigeria was as well rich in 
maintaining ethical values. Sadly, decades of military coercion, brutality and 
commandist rule left many Nigerians including political leaders with a militarised 
psyche.  Ethnic violence is within this calculation as part of military legacy in the 
country. This is part of years of military failures in most initiated policies 
implementation difficulties in Nigeria’s continuity and discontinuity.445 It was part of 
what President Olusegun Obasanjo inherited. This is attested in his first inaugural 
address to the Joint National Assembly Session (JNAS) on June 4, 1999, when Obasanjo 
decried the spate of moral decadence in Nigerian society in his note: 
This is an issue that continued to recur in most observations about the way our society 
functions. Lack of discipline is a major factor behind many of our problems, such as attitude 
towards work, inefficiency, and low productivity in our economic life and social 
organizations. Indiscipline has even got a popular reference called the Nigerian Way of Life 
or the Nigerian Factor which, everyone knows, means how to get by without regard for, or 
behaving unreasonably and not abiding by the norms, rules and regulations. We owe it to 
ourselves to clean up this image of Nigeria and Nigerians.
446
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          The National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), a 
top policy programme of Obasanjo’s administration was put in place in 2003 as a 
medium term development goal to redress socio-economic disparities in Nigeria. It is 
akin to earlier NEP in Malaysia and was described as a huge failure in the nation’s bid to 
rise from its fledging past.
447
 “NEEDS” is a homegrown “poverty reduction strategy 
process” (PRSP). It builds on the government’s efforts and “progress made during the 
transitional phase of new democratic dispensation from 1999-2003”.448  ‘It is designed to 
prosper the nation as “a four-year medium term plan for the period 2003-2007”.449 For 
instance, “NEEDS wishes to significantly eradicate poverty in Nigeria. It aims to create a 
Nigeria that Nigerians can be proud of and have a sense of belonging and identity, a 
Nigeria that promotes self-reliance, entrepreneurship, innovation, rewards hard work, 
protects its people and their property, and offers its children better prospects than those 
may be tempted to seek in Europe or the United States”.450      
       However, NEEDS was established to resolve issues on people’s “welfare, their 
health, education, employment, poverty-reduction, empowerment, security and 
participation.”451 But this thesis looks at poor execution of programmes in Nigeria in 
which NEEDS was poised to make a difference. The coordination and implementation 
of NEEDS was headed by President Obasanjo for supervision as well as evaluation. 
Implementation was carried out in all the three tiers of government in Nigeria.
452
 Yet, 
NEEDS was not a success story for the country. Sadly, Nigeria lost decades of 
opportunities for its advancement because of “negative-to-slow growth and has been one 
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of the weakest growing economies in the world on a per capita basis especially for the 
period 1981-2000.”453 Yet, it took Malaysian leaders only a single strategy with focused 
deliberation to put things right in the post -1969 ethnic riots in Malaysia.   
          Finally, according to NEEDs report, Nigeria’s past policy failures are legacies of 
years of poor governance by various military regimes that ruled the country. Due to 
government assumed dominant role of being the producer and controller of the Nigerian 
economy, it brought about perverse incentives, inefficiency and waste. The control of oil 
revenue by the central government led to rent-seeking culture.  The government turned 
out to be an instrument for acquiring easy wealth which seemingly discouraged 
incentives and dedication to duty. While the government became a source of patronage 
and rent-seeking, there were also intense struggle for official positions. All these neither 
rewarded private enterprise, nor encouraged transparency and accountability. As 
articulated in ‘NEEDS’ “Frequent regime changes in governance and frequent changes 
in policy were defining features of the past”.454 
         Apart from these defining features of the past, the military despotism weakened 
institutions of governance. ‘NEEDS’ addresses, “Inappropriate development 
frameworks, poor and frequently changing policies and programmes, lack of clear 
development vision and commitment to the Nigerian project (as well as a population that 
acquiesced to the patronage culture) were the major causes of Nigeria’s failed past”.455  
Unfortunately, this was a missing link from success recorded under NEP in Malaysia, 
yet the wealth of Nigeria grew due to favourable price of oil at the world markets along 
with substantial debt relief which the Paris Club granted the country. No one could say if 
the average Nigerian actually benefitted from this huge accrued wealth to the country. 
The annual budget of Nigeria crossed the threshold of billions into trillions of Naira 
during NEEDS period 2003-2007 without making any difference in the per capita 
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income of Nigerians still living on one dollar per individual that characterizes Nigeria as 
one of the poorest countries in the world.
456
  Ethnic conflict is also poverty-induced. 
 
4.4 Assessing Leadership Role on Massacre in Odi and Benue Ethnic Communities, and       
       Bloody Conflict in Jos, Nigeria 
 
           This section of the study stresses on violence among ethnic groups in Nigeria, and 
the use of physical force by the Nigerian federal armed troops to destroy lives in the 
guise of calming down ethnic hostility. They unleashed destruction on a quiet Odu 
Community in Bayelsa State. Similar military force was drafted to contain some 
communal clashes in Benue State as well as ethnic conflict in Jos among the list of 
communal uprisings in the wake of the restoration of democracy in Nigeria in 1999. But 
tragic conflicts involving lives is uncommon in Malaysia. The alleged killing of some 
police officers in Odi and Benue was advanced as the reason the government felt 
compelled to re-engage already disengaged military forces on the erring communities. 
As. Carnell says, Federalism ‘is the result of a balance between two competing forces.457 
        But this study argues as to whether such reasons are acceptable to destroy Odi town 
while mass killings were recorded in Benue. Three issues are learned in this section. (a) 
There is abuse of power from the federal centre on the component units on some issues 
that required a peaciful approach, and not brutal force. (b) The spate of killings and 
abuse of human rights by the military rulers was not contained by the civilian regime 
that inherited power due to poor enforcement of law. (c) It is also found that the society 
is severely divided because conflict among ethnic groups is often brutal in its least form. 
         First, since 1999 the widespread of inter-communal conflicts across Nigeria have 
led to the displacement of more than 3 million people, as well as the death of over 
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14,000 of its citizens.
458
 On November 20, 1999, a military attack was launched against 
the main Ijaw town of Odi in Bayelsa State due to growing conflict in the Niger Delta 
over the right of the natives to oil resources in their land. The Nigerian army destroyed 
Odi town in Bayelsa State, allegedly in response to 12 police men killed by local youths. 
Reports gathered by many human rights groups support allegations that hundreds of 
civilians, most of them unarmed were killed in an organised attack by the Nigerian 
security forces.
459
  In contrast to relative ethnic harmony in Malaysian democratic rule, 
Nigeria was engulfed in ethnic conflict in 1999. Obasanjos’s victory in the 1999 election 
after forty years of mainly post-independence military rule, Nigeria was expected to 
show promises. He inherited an economy in shambles in a massively corrupt state 
apparatus of a federation that was characterised by years of ethnic hostility. His 
inauguration was greeted by militant ethnic groups expressing their desire in the 
“language of self-determination, local autonomy and resource control”.460 The Port 
Harcourt Environmental Rights action report in 2002 indicated that 2,483 people died in 
the Odi massacre.
461
 Such attacks by the military that destroyed many lives and caused 
massive property damage attracted a visit by Nigerian Senator Chuba Okadigbo, the then 
President of the Senate a week after the massacre, where he stated: “the facts speak for 
themselves…there is no need for speech because there is no body to speak to.”462  
       Obasanjo-authorised army nearly annihilated an entire village of Odi – an outrage 
that prompted the National Assembly to raise impeachment charges against the president 
who claimed that “The deployment of soldiers to Odi … was done within my 
constitutional powers and in absolute good faith with the aim of containing the 
worsening situation in the areas in the interest of security and to maintain law and order 
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and save lives and property.”463  The problem started in 1993 with the suppression of the 
“Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People” (MOSOP). In a single episode of the 
government’s order of military oppression, 20000 from the Ijaw ethnic minority were 
killed, with many more missing. Thousands were forced to flee and virtually no house 
was left standing in Odi”.464These show a lack of true federal democracy at work, a clear 
sign of disunity due largely to problem of inequity invoking ractions among groups.       
          Second, another related tragic incident occurred between 22 and 24 October 2001 
when hundreds of the Nigerian soldiers slaughtered over 200 unarmed civilians, 
demolished homes and properties covering over seven towns and villages in Benue 
state.
465
 This was in retaliation to an earlier attack by a group of civilians that led to the 
death of Nigerian soldiers. Obasanjo forcefully denounced the death of the nineteen 
soldiers killed and directed that no effort should be spared to fish out the perpetrators. 
Obasanjo’s response to the killing of unarmed civilians was surprisingly muted, and 
stated it was what one should expect from soldiers who may have acted in self-defense.    
       While considering the killings in Nigeria in contrast to considerable ethnic harmony 
in Malaysia, one is bound to question the behaviour and character of the president in 
light of such killings by his armed soldiers. These killings significantly demonstrate 
glaring instances of extrajudicial killings carried out by the Nigerian army which is 
contrary to Nigeria’s “obligations under international human rights law”. Sadly, the 
government did not take action or issue a strong condemnation on the spate of killings in 
Benue State.
466
 Benue tragedy was indeed reminiscent of reprisals by the military two 
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years earlier in Odi where perhaps as many as 2000 civilians were killed.
467
 Undeniably, 
the Benue episode shows severe divisions among ethnic communities in the Nigerian 
federal arrangement. The carnage in Nigeria is not recorded in Malaysia. Given the fact 
that both countries were at this time under democratic rule, such may have been 
attributed to the military had Nigeria still been under the military rule. This can raise a 
question as to why democratic rule in Nigeria has not been able to redress most of the 
past failings associated with military authoritarian rule in the country?
468
  
        Third, this thesis demonstrates how more shocking stories emanate from Jos. For 
example, Jos, in Plateau State, once known for harmonious living and home for over 40 
ethno-linguistic groups and 3.5 million people suddenly became a ground for recurring 
violence with the highest number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Nigeria since 
the restoration of the country’s democracy in 1999.469 Many lives were lost in this tragic 
incident that accured between 7 and 13 September 2001 in a conflict between Christians 
and Muslims who had coexisted for many years.
470
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        This study highlights numerous brutal ethno-religious conflicts that have 
characterised Jos for the past one and half decades and how the state and federal 
governments have more or less contributed to the crisis through their omission or 
commissions. It is correct to argue in the same line of reasoning that there is a great 
difference between often minor tensions in Malaysia with more deadly conflicts in 
Nigeria. For example, about one million people in Nigeria were displaced in the country 
due to ethno-religious strife between 1999 and 2004. Similar tension in Plateau State 
which occurred between February and May 2004 left 250,000 as IDPs. Some clashes 
started as “struggles for political control of LGAs, access to land and competition for 
other resources and are fueled by the entrenched bias of local and state officials who 
have crafted policies that favour indigenes and deny non-indigenes opportunities for 
educational advancement and civil service jobs. These officials also accept the exclusion 
of non-indigenes from the political life and continually demonstrate anti-settler bias in 
the provision of social welfare services.”471 Contestation over indigene and non-indigene 
status intensified mindless killings in Plateau State. The appointment of a politician from 
the Hausa Community to a state-wide post in a federal poverty eradication programme in 
2001 resulted in clashes that claimed more than 1000 lives involving local Christians 
and the non- indigenous Fulani as well as Jarawa who are mostly Muslims. The 
Christian community claimed that their member was entitled to the state appointment.472       
Obviously Nigeria faces challenges despite the fact that federalism fosters unity and 
mitigates conflicting social forces which seems to be absent in this scenario. 
         In another scenario, Jos which has been a safe haven between 2000 and 2001 for 
many people fleeing from clashes in Bauchi, Kaduna, Taraba, and Nasarawa states 
suddenly became a conflict ground. The case of indigenes or non-indigenes or the 
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settlers mostly Hausa in the north had been causing tension in the state.
473
There is no 
effective law on citizen’s rights: for instance a man and his wife, who migrated to 
another part of the country, will remain a no-native in his place of residence including 
their offspring who were born there, no matter the length of time of their stay in a 
particular state or territory. They are continually denied customary, native and political 
rights throughout all their generations based on a singular reason that they are non-native 
or are from a different tribe. This does not augur well for national unity.
474
 
        Given the need for security, the choice of using the armed forces as a bulwalk 
against aggression has put emphasis on its relevance. Despite the poor image of the 
military, their barrack is the first place of call for many Nigerians fleeing from ethnic 
and religious violence.
475
 According to Larr, “In keeping with previous patterns, soldiers 
were sent in not only to restore law and order in the face of obvious police 
incapacitation, but to demonstrate a show of force in a bid to dislodge impunity. Such 
ventures have translated into bloodshed against innocent and defenseless civilians”.476 
       The army had started “feeling a sense of professional idleness and political 
restiveness” an indication that an unused army is a possible threat to the stability of civil 
rule, as well as to individual liberties and freedom.477 In spite of these communal 
conflicts in Nigeria, its Federal Constitution provides a guide for interethnic harmony. 
For example, section 42-(1) of the Federal Constitution of Nigeria which states:  
A citizen of Nigeria of a particular community, ethnic group, place of origin, sex, religion 
or political opinion shall not, by reason only that he is such a person- (a) be subjected either 
expressly by, or in the practical application of any law in force in Nigeria or any executive 
or administrative action of government, to disabilities or restrictions to which citizens of 
Nigeria of other communities, ethnic groups, places of origin, sex, religion or political 
opinions are not made subject; or (b) be accorded either expressly by, or in the practical 
application of, any law in force in Nigeria or any such executive or administrative action, 
any privilege or advantage that is not accorded to citizens of Nigeria of other communities, 
ethnic groups, places of origin, sex, religions or political opinions.
478
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       According to the same section “42-(2): No citizen of Nigeria shall be subjected to 
any disability or deprivation merely by reason of the circumstances of birth”.479 Given 
these constitutional provisions, the federal government under President Obasanjo 
declared a state of emergency in Plateau State for six months following numerous tragic 
deaths. He accused and suspended the state Governor Joshua Dariye of incompetence 
and replaced him with retired General Chris Alli.
480
 This study argues as highlighted at 
the beginning of this section that the Federal Constitution of Nigeria is rich in 
inclusiveness, but weak enforcement of the law has in part given room for many deaths 
in the country. For instance, ICG has noted that given Nigeria’s diversity, a 
constitutionally-based tenet that seeks to foster inclusiveness is a commendable 
design.
481
 ICG also observed that the way the federal character principle is interpreted 
as well as implemented tends to legitimise a reasoning that instigates ethnic resentment 
as well as recurring carnage in places like Plateau State. It cautioned “There is 
compelling need to divorce citizenship and entitlement from indignity in order to stem 
the discrimination of communities perceived as settlers.”482 It means that Plateau State 
governor in trying to protect the indigenes of the state contravened the Federal 
Constitution. Paradoxically, it is similar to such seemingly (unfair) rights for the 
indigenous Malay majority but correctly entrenched in the Malaysian constitution 
which projects the political arrangement as authoritarian majority. In view of the 
continuing violence and killings in Jos and some parts of the country due to issues on 
indigeneity, ICG has suggested how the Federal Character Principle should be 
restructured to take care of emerging issues in the polity.483 
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          The suggested areas largely reflect on how issues in a plural society and in fact a 
federal state should be treated without bias. This is akin to such disparity that existed in 
Malaysia in early 1970s prior to the implementation of the country’s affirmative action. 
It must be pointed out in this study that the struggle for natives’ rights in Jos and a few 
other places in Nigeria has cost the nation many lives. Yet, in contrast to Nigeria being 
averse to indigenous rights, such rights to the Bumiputras in Malaysia have been 
elevated in governance policy in the country in more profound and enviable heights 
because of their constitutional backing. The larger Malay population receives the 
benefits and other ethnic groups, while not engaging in violent reactions, convey their 
reactions or perceived unfair treatment by mostly peaceful means. This is in contrast to 
continuing clashes and brutal confrontations that characterise the situation in Nigeria. 
While HRW reports condemned the role the Nigerian Government played with its 
military at various engagements as shocking. Wheare has cautioned that threat and 
political coercion are not allowed in a federal system.
484
 A detailed insight in this respect 
as Ronald Watts would say provides different insights and a rich content in the analysis 
of pluralism, diversity and operations of different federal states.
 485
 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
      This chapter has shown that apart from ethnic conflict in a federal system, a certain 
level of crisis can be observed happening between the federal authority and its federating 
units from time to time, which sometimes show how either the federal or state 
government acts in accordance or outside its jurisdiction. While the federal constitution 
delimits spheres of authority, it is meant to avoid conflict in the process of achieving 
effective governance in federalism. There can be levels of tension emanating from 
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excessive use of power or incidental encroachment into the sphere of authority of 
another. All these make federal practice both challenging as well as healthy competition 
between both levels of government. Both the mobilization of military force against some 
states in Nigeria and the federal government failure to release revenue or discourage 
investment in its federating units due to faceoff are not healthy for federalism to thrive. 
         It is observed in the chapter that maintaining ethnic harmony, political stability, 
growth and development requires good policy choices and implementation strategies to 
redress the tensions generated by the May 13
th
 racial riot of 1969. One of the significant 
factors that enhanced the success of Malaysia’s affirmative action was the nation’s pre-
NEP debate by both EPU and NDU. The National Operations Council (NOC) ushered in 
a new era of ethnocentric development. The promulgation of a Rukunegara (National 
Ideology) and the implementation of a national policy, known as the Dasar Ekonomi 
Baru (DEB) or the New Economic Policy (NEP) which propelled the Second National 
Plan from 1971 to 1975 and to run for twenty years. The Federal Government of 
Malaysia pursued an agenda that was meant to avoid a repeat of the 1969 incident.                
          Similar to Malaysia’s pos-1969 race riots, the rehabilitation, reconciliation and 
integration of diverse groups in Nigeria after the civil war in 1970, especially the Igbo 
were top agendas in the Second National Development Plan. The chapter raised the 
important point that Nigerian leaders failed in policy implementation and practice that 
contrasted with Malaysia’s approach in its post-1969 racial riot.  Tension associated with 
interethnic competition is intertwined with the struggle for economic resources accruing 
to the state in form of the national cake. The civil war was mainly on account of 
economic interests in Nigeria’s federal structure. Yet Nigerian authorities were unable to 
implement policies that could help resolve the economic factors that instigated the war. 
This is where Malaysia achieved a feat in its affirmative action in reducing income 
disparities among groups after its 1969 racial riot in which the national debate helped. 
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         Nigeria has been inconsistent in being guided by good policy options and 
direction. Right from its inception, inconsistencies, failed national plans, and policies, 
have characterised the country’s inability to overcome its socio-political and economic 
challenges. As a missing gap in national development ideology, this chapter has 
highlighted how the Obasanjo administration introduced NEEDS. Despite NEEDS 
intellectual approach as a tool for development and reduction of poverty and economic 
disparities among Nigerians, it was a failure. Some scholars see NEEDS as good on 
paper only, which could not convert the country’s huge oil wealth and the government’s 
trillion naira budgets, into lifting the mases out of their grinding poverty. This chapter 
has also demonstrated the level of ethnic and communal violence in Nigeria and the 
approach adopted by the government to deal with it. Surprisingly, the reasons given by 
the president in defense of his order that led to the slaughter of hundreds of civilians by 
federal troops is untenably wrong and invalid. Apart from May 13 1969 race riots in 
Malaysia, no other ethnic commotion has witnessed such tragic incidents as seen in 
Nigeria. This is a lack of unity as respondents point out in this study in what Ifeka 
describes in the literature review as a complex society with its centre-periphery conflict. 
        In fairness, the performance of Nigerian leaders has not been good enough to 
address numerous ethnic challenges in the country. The state has not effectively 
intervened with huge resources at its disposal to relieve the masses of their long standing 
poverty. Secondly, policy issues and programmesto disallow socioeconomic disparities 
as seen in Malaysia were not strictly followed and implemented in Nigeria. Although 
Malaysis exhibits its own mode of operation, Nigeria’s posture, in handling disputes 
under Obasanjo’s regime was contrary to the principle of a true federal democracy. The 
foregoing analysis that will aid in the understanding of the effectiveness of federalism in 
Nigeria and Malaysia is explored in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
Exploring the Effectiveness of Federalism in Managing Ethnic Conflicts in Nigeria 
and Malaysia 
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
      The preceding chapter assessed Nigeria and Malaysia on federalism as an inclusive 
mechanism for managing diversity with focus on leadership behaviour and policy issues. 
This current chapter examines further the role of federalism and how effective this 
institutional framework has worked in Nigeria and Malaysia in mitigating ethnic 
conflict. The focus is to provide analysis that vividly shows the country that 
demonstrates political stability and enduring social order within the context of ethnic 
rivalries and federalism as a conflict mitigating mechanism in both countries. 
          This evaluation also takes cognisance of two institutional prerequisites of federal 
features (a & b have been discussed earlier in chapter 4). This chapter will now discuss 
(c) The Constitution is the supreme law of the land and any legislation not in conformity 
with the provisions of the Constitution is deemed invalid. It, therefore, follows that the 
Constitution must almost necessarily be a written and rigid Constitution. (d)The Court 
has the power of Judicial Review. The courts should have the authority to interpret the 
constitution. In this respect, the court decides cases related to jurisdiction involving the 
federal and regional governments or among regional governments. It keeps various 
levels of government in check within their various spheres of influence.
486
  
       The thesis examines the effectiveness of federalism in dealing with ethnic conflict. 
In order to understand how the system works in enhancing political stability in Nigeria 
and Malaysia, the following areas are explored: first by assessing conflict over 
exploration and distribution of resources; second, it examines conflict induced by 
structural and political context; and third, it assesses the influence of tradition and 
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culture in politics. The idea is to show levels of political stability in both countries. Two 
facts emerge from this perspective: Nigeria is more unstable while Malaysia is much 
more stable. This assertion is shown in the patterns of regime change discussed in the 
chapter. The fourth section of this chapter examines the current challenges in Nigeria 
and Malaysia. It is important to note that ‘current challenges’ in both countries are 
beyond the scope of this study. However, the idea is to show briefly current issues in 
both countries as supporting facts to the ongoing discussion. To begin this chapter, the 
entire discussion is substantiated with the following arguments: 
        (1) Nigeria has been in turbulence for about fifty years of its existence with 
numerous challenges, namely, {i} numerous ethnic conflicts, exacerbated by rampant 
regime change by an ethnic army that distorted the country’s federalism and exposed the 
nation to the status of an unstable polity. {ii}the country’s written (rigid) constitution 
was suspended six times in thirty years of military rule by decree {iii} except  for a few 
years, the suspended constitution gave no room for judicial role. In effect, this study 
argues that federalism in Nigeria has not been effective.  
        (2) This thesis argues that the Malaysian federalism has been considerably effective 
and more stable for over fifty years. Three factors emerge from this perspective: (a) 
entrenched traditional and religious institutions and Malay rights are intertwined with 
federalism in Malaysia. (b) Power sharing and compromise arrangements by the 
Alliance at independence have led to consociational democracy in Malaysia. It describes 
uninterrupted one party seemingly majority-authoritarian democratic rule for fifty years. 
(c) Post-independence leaders were truly determined on affirmative action, and national 
development. This study examines (constitutional issues-‘c&d’).This chapter 
demonstrates that the role of federalism as a mechanism in managing ethnic conflict has 
been more effective in Malaysia than in Nigeria. 
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5.2 Ethnic and Regional Conflict over Exploration and Distribution of Resources in Nigeria 
        Ethnic and regional struggle for higher derivation from oil has exposed Nigeria to 
instability. Unlike Malaysia, ethnic and regional conflict over resource distribution is a 
peculiar problem to Nigeria. Malaysia will feature in this discussion where necessary. 
Obviously, federalism has helped to keep Nigeria’s diverse groups together for half a 
century. Malaysia has done well too but its federal constitution is ethnically focused. 
Fault lines exist in the practice of federalism in Nigeria that has made ethnic conflict 
and political instability inseparably convoluted and threatens its social existence.  
           This thesis looks at ethnic conflict and instability that have characterised Nigeria 
as a nation since the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria in 1914.  It is 
linked to such ancient hatred, and a union of people of different regions and cultures 
who often engaged in continual inter-ethnic wars as well as trade before they were 
joined together as one nation. The argument is seen on why this disunity was not 
overcome at independence, which helps the reader to understand how Malaysia’s level 
of stability has emerged from its historical past as the thesis demonstrates in the next 
section. Observably, tension among ethnic groups in Malaysia could be said to be far 
less than the North South tension today in Nigeria. The serious tensions are like a 
corrosive wound that is negatively affecting federal arrangements in the country which 
is reinforced by fresh conflicts.
487
  This thesis emphasises that ethnic conflict and 
political instability crisscross regional and ethno-communal boundaries in Nigeria. 
Given the ethnic conflict, this study presents both ‘fiscal’ and ‘political’ contexts that 
instigate most known rivalries and all forms of instability in the Nigerian federal 
system. Discussion on Nigeria requires a broad view. As Watts would say, federations 
are distinct political systems.
488
 Fiscal federalism explains constitutionally distinct 
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monetary transactions involving more than one level of governing authority within a 
nation-state (federation) with responsibility for both taxation and expenditure.
489
  
            Fiscal context as discussed in this study involves exploration as well as allocation 
of oil resources whereas the political context has to do with providing suitable 
arrangements that would enhance the well-being of all the components parts. But the 
function of federalism in both contexts should be designed with effort to avoid marked 
inequality among the federating units in power and resource matrix.
490
 Contrary to 
federal practice, this study looks at the centralisation of resources by the Nigerian 
governing authority as inconsistent with the law that guides federations, whereas it has 
been made clear that financial subordination of units or obvious disparity in wealth, 
population and landmass harbour factors that can destabilise federations and may mark 
an end to federalism.
491
 This study contends that conflicts exist among Nigeria’s 
federating units as was the case with Malaysia. For example, at the inception of 
federalism in Nigeria, the original three regions enjoyed devolution of powers whereby 
each region enjoyed significant autonomy over internal affairs such as maintaining a 
regional police force as well as civil service. The principle of derivation was obviously 
significant in the resource distribution arrangement as seen in the recommendations by 
Louis Chick Commission of 1953.
492
 
          It points to the fact that derivation was the central emphasis in federal revenue 
allocation between the period 1954 and 1966 when the military removed the then 
civilian government from power. The military saw the crucial need to curb the powers of 
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the regions which had weakened the central government because the federal structure 
was gradually disintegrating. To arrest the situation, the military changed the derivation 
principle in 1966 to make way for other arrangements. This was a period of rising in oil 
prices and a fall in the prices of cocoa as well as other export produce from various 
regions that were sold in the world market. It was unexpected windfall for the south 
eastern region with the oil boom eventually becoming the mainstay of the Nigerian 
economy, while the importance of groundnut and cocoa from northern and western 
regions respectively receded at this period.
493
 Other Revenue Commissions instituted by 
the military recommended some minor modifications which were effected.494 
            This study also looks at how both the North and West were seemingly silent over 
the new revenue distribution formula by the military in which the Eastern Region 
insisted on the existing derivation arrangements as the basis for revenue sharing in the 
country. The military regimes however tampered with the constitution and kept on 
reducing the derivation (See table 6.2, page 229 ahead), contrary to Nigeria’s fiscal 
practice, and no consensus has been reached on an acceptable formula in the country.
495
 
This shows how divided Nigeria has become, hence it begs the question as to whether 
the northern military ruled-government would have changed the derivation, had the oil 
deposits been found in the north. This question still remains unanswered. Yet, each time 
the military seized power the Nigerian Constitution was suspended and military decree 
was put in place. Contrary to democratic principles that operated simultaneously in 
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Malaysia at this time, there was no consultation with the federating units in Nigeria, 
rather they were being intimidated in most matters of earlier shared interests. This is also 
substantiated in the literature review of this study where Najibo and Umukoro stress on 
denial and deprivation and the ready support from local and state officials to paramilitary 
groups they believe have the strength to enforce their regional agenda in Nigeria. 
           First, it could be argued that military rule is non-constitutional in terms of matters 
this study seeks to address. Second, as highlighted in ‘c’ in the introductory section of 
this segment which looks at the constitution as the supreme law of the land and any 
legislation at variance with its provisions is deemed invalid, yet no court  as required in 
‘d’ above is allowed to challenge the military which largely operates outside the 
constitution. Largely, the courts seem to be constrained, for example, John Paden 
clarifies this assertion when he posits that “the judiciary continued to play a weak role 
partly as a result of long term military rule. Political interpretations of the constitution 
tended to rely on power politics rather than judicial precedent.”496   
           Third, subsequent military and civilian governments in Nigeria attached such 
earlier military decrees on revenue sharing into the 1999 Federal Constitution with less 
emphasis on what happened to the 1960s constitution that provided for 50 per cent 
derivation which the military dropped. The regions or ethnic communities affected by 
the slashed oil derivation were not consulted because it was an ethnic army that took 
over power and distorted the existing revenue arrangement. There was no participatory 
discussion on how the military decrees could override provision of the country’s earlier 
constitution. What the ethnic army did in terms of the provisions of the Constitution is 
deemed invalid in (a) above. But from all indications, no court revised what the military 
put in place. But it should be noted that the military’s inclination in meddling in politics 
and governance in Nigeria is not observed in Malaysia. For instance, Campaign for 
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Democracy (DC) in Nigeria has decried that military rule destroyed the basis of 
federalism in Nigeria. The 1999 constitution does not show any sensitivity to the 
existing problems. It scarcely gives consideration to the issue of autonomy or 
organisation of political power; rather it concentrates on power and definition of power 
in its lopsided posture in favour of the central government. The federating states are 
denied control of their oil resources. This exclusive preserve is shown in the 13 per cent 
to oil producing states which is not different from the illegality of the military that doled 
out meager portion to them under dubious fiscal arrangements.
497
  
            This study contends that this derivation instigated resource control struggle in 
Nigeria at the exit of the military in 1999 because, as highlighted in the introductory 
note of this section, the military as an aberration were coercive. Given the pressure, a 
suit was filed by the federal government demanding Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
the offshore oil revenue in 2001, and also stated that it was not compelled to pay 
revenue derived from offshore oil fields to coastal states. The ruling by the Supreme 
Court in favour of the federal government triggered further agitation due to a feeling by 
the oil-producing states of their derivation cut.
498
 With regard to (b) above, if the 
Supreme Court ruling was truly justified, how right is it to increase to 13 per cent 
derivation during the same period?  This then leads to the question as to why the same 
conflict has not ceased for fourteen years now, if both the court ruling and 13 per cent 
increase were justifiable. This has led to armed conflict between the Niger Delta ethnic 
communities and the Federal Government armed forces.  
         This problem is not witnessed in Malaysia. Although there are instances whereby 
oil-producing states ruled by the opposition party have asked the Federal Government of 
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Malaysia to increase their royalty, but without conflict.
499
  This owes more to the fact 
that the oil-producing regions in Nigeria have insisted on true federalism. The system is 
also riddled with huge theft of revenue from oil or large scale corruption that benefits 
the political class. The conflict in Nigeria as the thesis highlighted in chapter two is also 
exacerbated by Nigeria’s geoethnicity (most states are ethnic/tribal in nature) which 
makes their oil resources localised and arguments on resource control is highly 
contested, because they see it as one of the features of true federalism. Ethnic groups in 
Malaysia live in clusters, and are largely loyal to both traditional and religious rulers, 
which has made its system more synchronised. Both Sabah and Sarawak oil producing 
states which are geographically separated from West Malaysia have not acted violently 
on oil revenue matters. While other improved conditions may count, Raja Omar argues 
that the states in Malaysia are not constitutionally safeguarded since the Federal 
Constitution vests overwhelming power in the federal authorities.
500
 
         Notably, revenue sharing formula has been a major cause of most recorded 
conflicts in present-day Nigeria, but oil producing states receive 5 per cent in Malaysia 
with fewer worries, hence more attention is focused on Nigeria in this analysis.  
Research has shown that resource control has not posed a major issue in Malaysian 
fiscal policy.
501
  As noted earlier in the introductory section of this study, it is this story 
that has led to tragic ethno-regional conflict in the Niger Delta Region over revenue cut 
from 50 per cent down to 1.5 per cent and presently 13 per cent which is still being 
contested. Sadly, such are the politics of revenue sharing and frequent conflict in 
Nigeria which however describes the practice of federalism in Nigeria as ineffective. 
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5.3 Federalism: Ethnic tension Induced by Structural and Political Contexts in Nigeria 
          Another area of tension in Nigeria relates to the country’s structural and political 
context. The creation of the nation’s first three regions in 1954 has witnessed gradual 
but steady incremental state creations by different regimes in Nigeria bringing about 36 
states in 1996. Also the numerical strength of local councils in Nigeria grew from 301 in 
1976 to 774. The three tiers of government involving the federal, state and local 
governments are fashioned to cope with Nigeria’s diversities, but ceaseless structural 
divisions of the country have not provided satisfactory results.  This owes more to the 
military’s penchant for disregarding constitutional norms by quickly acceding to 
numerous calls for the creation of more states as well as local governments in Nigeria.
502
       
          Part of the emphasis in this segment of the thesis is that unlike Malaysia, rampant 
state and local government creations and recreation have not really relieved Nigeria of 
numerous destabilising conflicts. This is because as some scholars argue, the exercise of 
state creation in Nigeria has opened up room for development. It has also localised or 
shifted conflict away from the federal centre and such moves, has succeeded in breaking 
the earlier hegemony of the original three regions.
503
 But this study argues that the 
localised conflicts highlighted above have destroyed lives and property within the 
Nigerian federation. What goal is then achieved when the centre is firm and secure and 
its federating units destabilised by conflicts of varied proportions? Even if such 
development prospects could be envisaged, how real is development in Nigeria? How do 
the states and local councils account for huge oil revenue at their disposal which local 
government Chairmen and governors are largely accused of sharing among themselves 
and big men in politics with minimal development projects?
504
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         This study contends that to understand the game of politics in Nigeria is to observe 
the flow of oil money from the federal government to states and local governments 
which raises some sentiments among those who feel they are marginalized or left out. 
For instance, Nwosu has argued that creating new states from the existing ones 
invariably leads to the emergence of new minorities, as well as new majorities in newly 
created states which raises fresh claims of marginalization by those who felt they have 
become minorities. In other words, attempt to cut age old tribal affinities of brothers into 
separate states or local councils have caused clashes within the federation.
505
  
             This study argues that the issue of marginalisation prompted the federal 
government to divide the country into six geographical zones. For example, both 
Southeast Zone of core Igbo has Southsouth Zone of former minority groups now split 
into states to form a zone. This is similar with Southwest and those of Northeast, 
Northwest and North central. These zones are new centers of power and the number of 
states counts in politics. In order to give sound expression to its federalism, the Federal 
Government of Nigeria adopted Federal Character Principle which is enshrined in the 
1979 Nigerian Constitution as a directive principle of state policy in which section 14(3) 
of the Constitution says “The composition of the government of the Federation or any of 
its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such manner as to reflect 
the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity and command 
national loyalty thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a 
few states or from a few ethnic or sectional groups in that government or any of its 
agencies”.506 The uniqueness of the Federal Character Commission (FCC) is also seen in 
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its section 14(4), for instance, explains that the composition of the federation and 
conduct of affairs in a fair manner in recognition of Nigeria’s diversity.507  
            But this lofty Federal Character Principle (FCP) which targeted inclusive 
segments of the federation had no executive agency until 2002 when the FCC was 
launched. Its implementation earlier by different agencies of the government was 
disorderly leading to people’s loss of confidence even now in the federal character 
principle.
508
 While Malaysia is examined next, it is interesting to recognize certain good 
characteristics of the Nigerian federal character principle. This study has shown that 
Nigerian leaders have maintained clear insight on how the Nigerian federation should 
prosper through its federal character principle approach. Yet, one ponders over the scale 
of conflicts that have ravaged Nigeria over five decades amid its federal arrangements.         
        Nigeria, as this study argues, has been plagued by an avalanche of conflicts namely, 
the three year civil war of 1967 and 1970, ethno-regional instigated coups, namely 
January 1966 and July 1966.Others are Major Gidion Okar-led but failed coup of 1990, 
communal clashes between Ife and Modakeke in Osun State, Umuleri and Aguleri in 
Anambra, Ijaw and Ilaje communities in local war etc. This period also witnessed the 
resurgence of Movement for the Actualisation of Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), 
Odua People’s Congress (OPC), Egbesu Boys, Movement for the Emancipation of the 
Nigeria Delta (MEND), and other ethnic militia that rose in the wake of Sharia debacle, 
to defend their respective ethnic interests and to control oil resources within their region 
in what they feel is true federalism.
509
The literature section of this study provides views 
of scholars like Isaac Albert, Toyin Falola on ethnic hostility in Nigeria. Apendix I. 
Table 6.1 also provides a list of ethnic and religious clashes in Nigeria between 1754-
1817 and 1960-2002, and all these describe the Nigerian federation as volatile.  
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5.4 Federal order: Religion and Culture influence Political Behaviour in Malaysia 
 
 
       Malaysia and Nigeria are two different countries that have certain salient features 
that provide unique differences between them.  Unlike tensions caused by oil money and 
the rough politics of Nigeria, Malaysia exhibits far less tensions. Rather, while taking 
cognisance of Malaysia’s stable tensions, this section of the study shows how Malaysia’s 
socio-cultural heritage has reinforced on its federal character -a measure of cultural and 
religious loyalty that significantly influence public behaviour and political stability.    
      There is one peculiar fact that emerges in this discussion which directly or indirectly 
touches on some other aspects of life in Malaysia. It is deep-rooted culture that 
permeates the life of the people. The relationship between politics and social culture has 
been emphasised as “Among the most important principle which must be considered 
when analysing Malaysia politics.”510 It is observed in this study that culture has a great 
influence on Malaysia’s political stability. For instance, Malaysia remains a kingdom 
given the fact that the Sultan as the head of state remains in power, whereby the 
constitution has also given mandate to the people of Malaysia to choose their 
government through election. Hence the Executive Government remains in position 
under the “philosophy of the people, for the people and by the people.” The process of 
integration in the system has been ongoing since the general election in 1955 and 
independence in August 1957.
511
        
        In effect, this study explains the fact that early integration between ‘power and 
politics’ and the ‘balance of ethnicity and races’ had been experienced in Malaysia as a 
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dominant factor that saved Malaysia from falling into insurgency.
512
 This study also 
contends that Malaysia has transformed from ‘sultanate nationality’ to ‘nation-building 
phase which in this context largely defines Malays as primary subjects. To understand 
Malays and culture, prior to 1940s, they were divided into Malay groups and categorised 
themselves between state and kaum (ethnics).
513
 But the point of emphasis now is that 
Malays who are largely Muslims have all along been pressured and controlled by 
traditional loyalty to the Sultan and the King. The Sultan is the symbol of sovereignty by 
his or her own people. This historical fact has also shown with the exception of Malays 
living in Malacca, Penang and Singapore, that “Malays had to be citizens and loyal 
subjects to each state governed by the traditional aristocracies. This had a major 
influence on the process of nation-building in Malaysia.”514  
        It is of interest to point out in this study that, apart from the Sultan in Northern 
Nigeria whose influence is limited to religious issues within the north, Nigeria is aligned 
to secularity in its federal design. Unlike the more traditionally and religiously regulated 
Malaysian society, Nigeria’s secular state status was meant for building a liberal state, 
and as such government officials had to adopt a neutral position towards various 
religions because of its divisiveness and likelihood of causing conflict. It is the reason 
why Gordon rigntly observes that “Since independence, the Nigerian state has managed 
religious diversity through the constitutional stipulation that Nigeria is a secular state 
that guarantees freedom of religion and equality of all citizens”.515  
          It is this early culture that got infused into UMNO and Malayan union in 1946. 
For example, Dato Onn Jaafar, the Johor Malay leader, demonstrated his zeal to unite all 
Malays “in Malaya either from non-federated states or Strait States,” which stressed on 
the unity that gave birth to UMNO, as a dream realized on May 11, 1946. The proposal 
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and concept of Malayan Union by Sir Harold McMicheal was resisted because it was an 
idea of ‘nation building’ that sought to bring non-Malays to an ‘equal citizenship 
rights.”516 The proposed idea for Malayan Union was regarded as a move to overthrow 
the Sultan and kingship. However, the Sultan and the Raja are held in high esteem as the 
traditional as well as religious leaders of the Malays.
517
 This fact is profound; hence this 
thesis demonstrates that in the federation of Malaysia, the Monarchy is a highly revered 
institution whereby some levels of administration provide a balance between power and 
politics. While rulers are not allowed to be involved in politics, the authority and respect 
they command often helps calm down tension between politicians in the country 
especially Malay politicians.
518
 Conversely, Nigerians are more restrained by legal rules.   
        This study argues that the Malays in Malaysia who are largely Muslims as well as 
majority in the country have retained their old and cherished loyalty to their traditional 
and religious rulers as well as political leadership are not given to violence. This 
influence was evident in the administration of Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, 
1957-1970, Tun Abdul Razak, 1970-1976, Husein Onn 1976-1981, Mahathir Mohamad, 
1981-2003, and Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, 2003-2009.  Apart from racial riots of May 
13, 1969, Malaysia has recorded interethnic harmony within its federating units.       
         Nigeria has been able to keep all its federating units intact, even though it has 
witnessed more severe conflicts ranging from its Biafran Civil War to ethno-religious 
conflicts and other militia-related conflicts that expose its system to more volatility than 
Malaysia. As observed in Nigeria’s Federal Character Principle, NEP became the guide 
as affirmation policy in Malaysia that was strictly followed by all the governments that 
have ruled Malaysia since 1970. Fiscal policy in relation to revenue sharing has not 
posed many problems to Malaysia due to its affirmative action. There is no doubt that 
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contestations and certain level of exclusion have occurred in Malaysia as this study 
shows in chapter six, but such has not degenerated into major instability as seen in 
Nigeria. All these account for relative political stability in Malaysia as against more 
regular crises in Nigeria. Apart from earlier compromises within its ethnic leadership, 
Malaysia’s stable polity, as this study argues also owes more to its traditional monarchy, 
religious culture and its (ethnicity) Malay rights enshrined in its federal constitution that 
have influenced the state policy with the outcome of the state being considerably stable.   
 
5.5 Ethnic Conflict: Assessing Federalism and Regime Change in Nigeria and Malaysia 
 
5.5.1 Introduction   
        In this section, the thesis evaluates the effectiveness of federalism and its 
institutional workings by examining institutional structures and political stability 
especially in terms of smooth transfer of power in both countries. The idea at this point 
is to argue that federalism thrives in a democracy which makes room for social cohesion. 
On the contrary, “countries strongly divided along class and ethnic lines  will place 
severe constraints on the attempts of even the boldest, civic-minded, and well-informed 
politician (or interest groups) seeking to bring about policy reform.” 519 While Nigeria 
and Malaysia are discussed separately in this section, the thesis argues that Malaysia has 
been more politically stable than Nigeria due to traditional and religious influence on its 
society. It is apt to note that the structure of the Nigerian federation exhibits uncertainty 
and disruptions between civilian and military dictatorships.  In effect, attempt is made in 
this section to show how federalism has been distorted from working effectively in 
Nigeria due to turbulent and contradictory political trajectory that has characterised the 
nation since its independence in 1960.
520
 This thesis discusses item (b) above on 
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incessant regime change and different regimes in Nigeria while providing brief insights 
into other itemised problems. 
 
5.5.2 Ethnic army Induced Rampant Regime-Change and Faltering Federation of Nigeria  
  
        Nigeria, as this study emphasises is an interesting country to study given its 
challenges and the resilience to numerous internal tensions.  While the challenge is huge 
in view of diversity and sectional interests, federalism provides an enabling platform for 
diversities and multiethnic groups that exist in such federations whereby Nigeria is 
described as a country of extraordinary diversities and complexities.
521
 The argument in 
this section is premised on the fact that those decades of military rule in Nigeria 
negatively affected the smooth-running of the country’s federal arrangement towards a 
seeming unitary system in a strict sense of its true evaluation.  
          Strictly speaking, in 1960 the British came with their independent political 
arrangement that was skewed in favour of Northern Nigeria. Then came the military that 
was externally instigated to formulate various forms of constitutions and political 
arrangements for the country, all with the central intent to hold the country weak and 
backwards for the benefit of the military and civilian elites.
522
 This argument is also 
substantiated by the fact that most of the country’s politicians and bureaucrats, as well as 
other political actors are now engrossed in military dictatorial style of governance 
continually.
523
 Earlier in this chapter, this study raised and substantiated facts on how 
Nigeria has been more unstable than Malaysia. Similarly, it continues to characterise its 
faltering federation which is defined by different factors inherent in the system. 
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         First, Nigeria’s ethno-regional structure led to lack of compromise even within 
their conceived political coalitions. Disagreements and contests instigated numerous 
crises which provided room for the fatal military coup of January 1966 leading to the 
collapse of the parliamentary government of Nigeria’s First Republic. Second, to 
understand how federalism was distorted in Nigeria is to reflect on the fact that each 
time the military took over power; the Federal Constitution of the country was 
suspended and replaced with military decrees. A cursory glance at events in the 1970s-
1990s shows decades of aborted transitions to democracy and military coups which 
Okorie describes as “Khakistocracy, and illegitimate era of looting in Nigeria.” He 
provides insight into seven successful and two failed coups that negatively portrayed 
Nigeria as unstable.524 Horowitz describes military coups especially in Nigeria as 
“Where armed forces are ethnically fragmented, military coups ostensibly to quell 
disorder or to end corruption may be made to secure the power of some ethnic groups at 
the expense of others.”525The polarisation of the military and its intervention in 
governance constricts democratic space as seen in regular suspension of the Nigerian 
Federal Constitution which is the life wire of the federation. It is believed that the best 
way to succeed is to rise when one falls, but the situation in the past decades in Nigeria 
saw the military grab political power at the least mistake by the civilian regimes. 
          For further insight into power play, North’s hegemonic trait is put succinctly in 
Elaigwu’s own words, “there was a relatively delicate division of power between the 
North and the South. The North’s control of political power was counter balanced by the 
South’s monopoly of economic power in the country. We may go further to suggest that 
the January coup of 1966 tilted the delicate balance between the North and the South it 
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concentrated both political and economic power in the South, the North felt its sense of 
security threatened and reacted accordingly”.526  
          As a comparative study that clarifies issues common to both countries, such 
concessions allowing political power in the hands of the Malays and economic power 
controlled by the Chinese did occur in Nigeria. As observed in aforementioned 
Elaigwu’s view on Nigeria, there was no such alliance; rather such political and 
economic cleavages were reinforced by geopolitics over North and South regional 
interests. But such military disruptions in Nigeria did not occur in Malaysia. 
          Third, General Gowon was removed from office due to corruption amid 
mismanagement of the economy. General Murtala Mohammed and Obasonjo regimes 
1976-79 which was reform-centered governance inherited a fragile economy from 
Gowon. The buoyant economy, which defined General Gowon’s nine-year leadership, 
had begun to slide at the time Mohammed and Obsanjo took over the government 
through coup d'état.
527
 Yet, corrective military regimes are not saints if one can employ 
such an appellation in line with Dent’s view that “corrective Military Government is a 
distinct category. It comes under the genus of Military Trusteeship which contrasts with 
the corruption of military power-military usurpation or tyranny. A corrective 
Government occupies the middle position between Military Caretaker Government and 
Military Revolution.” 528 The inadequacy of the system includes the following: 
a) “Malfunctioning of the Federal System owing to lack of national unity. 
b) Lack of national dynamism owing to inert administration. 
c) Corruption throughout national life.  
d) Over-dependency on outsiders in foreign affairs and lack of indigenization in business. 
e) Failings in political process through deficiencies in the Federal Constitution and in the political 
class who operated it and excess elitism in many spheres”.529 
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         Another aspect of interest of this study is to show how the regime set up a panel to 
investigate the authenticity of the cost of government projects and the corrupt role of 
high-ranking civil servants in plundering the nation’s wealth. But as Panter-Brick would 
argue, a military regime that has assumed responsibility for correcting the deficiencies of 
its predecessor may act like a colonial government, exercising the power of tutelage, and 
reserving for itself the right to insist on certain constitutional provisions.
530
 In other 
words, it will always give itself a period of grace, ruling by decree until certain 
conditions are fulfilled, and it may pre-empt future decisions by its own unilateral 
action. Given this, the new regime removed all the governors who served under Gowon 
and disallowed the newly appointed governors from being part of the Supreme Military 
Council (SMC) in order to achieve discipline in the force.
531
 
         This study also posits that one of the major policies of the regime in the reform 
process was to restore democratic governance with a determined effort at establishing a 
functional and liberal democracy in Nigeria. Mohammed had in September 1975 
selected a 50-member (49 in active service) as Constitutional Drafting Committee’ 
(CDC) with specific instructions namely: “To eliminate cut-throat political competition 
and discourage electoral malpractices; discourage institutionalised opposition to 
government in power; firmly establish the principle of public accountability; eliminate 
over-centralisation of power in few hands; provide for genuine and truly national 
political parties”.532 But Malaysia did not encounter these disruptions as witnessed in 
Nigeria after its initial Alliance compromise that ushered in its consociational 
democracy. However, Nigeria was able to produce its first autonomous constitution by 
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1979 charter. It was put in place thus justifying the preamble “we the people of Nigeria 
[…] do hereby make, enact and give to ourselves the following constitution”.533  
         Fourth, the abolition of a parliamentary system in favour of a presidential system 
of government in 1979 demonstrated effort at correcting inherent systemic problems in 
Nigeria. True democratisation sustains effort at political integration while strengthening 
national cohesion under federalism. The adoption of American presidential system of 
government was meant to provide room for true federal structure and practice Nigeria’s 
diverse ethnic groups long desired. Given the fact that the military rule is an aberration, 
President Shagari’s administration was expected to restore enhanced economic welfare 
to Nigeria’s diverse population, but his regime failed in this sense.  It is fair to argue at 
this point that there was a policy change, and a genuine effort at repositioning the nation 
in the right constitutional track by developing democratic institutions. The argument had 
been to replace the Westminster model with American presidential system in view of 
past failures in governance. Nigerian leaders could no longer continue with the earlier 
experimented parliamentary system under the Westminster model of 1960 - 1966 which 
operated prior to the first military take-over of the government. 
          A presidential system similar to that of the US was adopted in 1979. The idea was 
to go for the full workings of federalism in Nigeria as seen in America.
534
 However, 
effort was made to end the military rule in 1979. Nigeria’s earlier parliamentary 
constitution was dropped and the newly provided presidential constitution was adopted. 
But it should be recalled that Malaysia went ahead uninterrupted with its own similar 
parliamentary system of government till this day. However, while the new constitution 
retained federalism, other ways to reduce ethnic tension, taking account of the “federal 
character” principle to mandate recognition of the diversity of Nigeria’s people in the 
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composition of any government body were retained.
535
  In spite of the latest reforms by 
the Obasanjo’s administration, the new civilian administration led by President Shehu 
Aliyu Shagari was still characterised by huge economic mismanagement and electoral 
fraud.
536
 The 1983 election which marked the transition that ushered in Shagari into 
power was characterised by large scale rigging by northern dominated ruling party.
537
  
          Fifith, President Shehu Shagari’s Administration was overthrown by Major 
General Buhari and Major Gen. Idiagbon in 1983. This was almost the same time in 
1981 when Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad was elected as Malaysia’s 4th prime 
minister since 1957. This time the take-over of government by coup was instigated by 
Shagari’s ineptitude resulting in regime’s squandering of national wealth with the 
attendant social decay in fraud and other forms of anti-social life in the country. 
Nigerian Armed Forces (NAF) constituted a Federal Military Government led by 
Buhari.
538
 The 1979 federal Constitution of Nigeria has been suspended. For Buari, 
there was a need for a new approach to the socioeconomic predicament to which 
Shagari regime exposed the country. Other challenges were in the area of illicit 
activities and moral decay in the Nigerian society. Shagari’s government was unable to 
be guided by the new Federal Constitution of 1979 for democratic rule in Nigeria. 
Rather Nigerian politicians were unrestrained to capture power at all costs.
539
   
          Rampant regime change is argued in this study as part of Nigeria’s continuity and 
discontinuity that negatively affected interethnic relations and the true workings of its 
federalism. From 1983 -1985, Buhari and Idiagbon were preoccupied with political 
education and public policy in Nigeria in view of the decay in the sphere of ethical 
values. This was exacerbated by people who were wired to setting government 
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buildings ablaze in an effort to cover large scale fraud.
540
 Apart from ethnic conflicts, 
there were also other anti-social behaviour issues that needed to be dealt with in 
Nigeria. While the people had started to respond to Buhari and Idiagbon’s new rule, the 
regime was immediately overthrown by Babangida –led coup. Yet, ethnic virus in the 
Nigerian military force was unrestrained from 1984-1999 era of military hegemony in 
their exchange of power in a system held hostage by ethnic army from the North.
541
  
           Sixth, General Ibrahim B. Babangida removed General M. Buhari from office 
through a palace coup. His eight-year transition to civil rule programe climaxed in the 
annulment of June 12
th
 1993 presidential election which was won by Chief M.K.O. 
Abiola –a southerner. As covered in chapter five, it led to serious ethnic tension mainly 
in the southwest that claimed numerous lives and properties. It showed the North’s 
unwillingness to share political power with other sections of the country. Babangida 
stepped aside, and handed over to Chief Ernest Shanekan from the southwest as the 
Head of Interim Government (ING), now seventh head of state of Nigeria. Yet, the 
interim government could not calm down ethnic tension against military action. 
          General Sani Abacha’s regime became Nigeria’s eighth administration when he 
removed Shonekan from office in a space of three months. He ruled with an iron hand 
which constrained any effort at unity of all the ethnic groups. His regime recorded 
political assassinations while he drove members of National Democratic Coalition 
(NADECO) into exile for being in opposition to his rule. Unlike such considerable 
ethnic harmony and political stabilityin Malaysia, Nigeria has remained a contrast in its 
perennial disruptions of governance.  As Julius Ihonvbere observes, most of the public 
reactions are shown through protests against “unfederal” development were met with 
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intimidation and repression. Many Nigerians have been killed under the military rule 
and through ethno-religious conflicts, and class-based riots which characterised the 
society under the military. Military regimes in Nigeria were largely insensitive, often 
used brute force against the demands of nationality groups, minority participation in 
governance as well as quest for true federalism. He also posits: 
       By “defederalisation” we refer to the process of making unitary what was once federal. In other 
words, defederalisation is a deliberate process of eroding or dismantling a federal system and 
replacing it with a unitary arrangement. The military not only concentrated power in itself and 
the center, but also ensured that the states were reduced to mere administrative units taking 
orders from the center. The excessive centralization of power, resources, and opportunities also 
encouraged the rise of authoritarianism and other forms of despotic rule, and the negation of 
democratic values. 
542
          
 
     Pini Jason shows Abacha’s administration’s level of sectional interests in the 
selection of officials who are almost all from one section of the country. This 
arrangement runs counter to the federal character of Nigeria.
543
 Nigeria’s nineth regime 
was headed by General Abdulsalami who took over power after Abacha’s sudden death 
in 1998 and eventually handed over to a democratically elected president in 1999. While 
Olusegun Obasanjo became Nigeria’s next Head of State in 1999, this period witnessed 
ethno-communal clashes all over the country. The long held grievances under the 
military were at this time unleashed on the polity by ethnic militia in demand of 
increased derivation paid on oil revenue or outright control of their resources in the 
Nigeria Delta region. Obasanjo was besieged by a host of problems. In his inaugural 
address on his ascension as Head of State, he noted: 
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       The incursion of the military into government has been a disaster for our country. The espirit de 
corps among military personnel has been destroyed. Professionalism has been lost. Most 
youths go into the military now not to pursue a noble career but with the sole intension of 
taking part in coups and to be appointed as military administrators of states and chairmen of 
task forces.  As a retired officer, my heart bleeds to see the degradation in the proficiency of 
the military. A great deal of re-orientation will has to be undertaken and a redefinition of role, 
retraining, and re-education will have to be done to ensure that the military submits to civil 
authority and regains its pride, professionalism, and tradition”.544 
 
 
      In his solemn address to the Joint National Assembly Session (JNAS) in 4 June 
1999, the president also stated “…our people have come to understand and appreciate 
the extent of historical links within the geographical area housing our nation... various 
groups and communities have been advocating their perception of “true federalism.” 
Some talk of restructuring of the federation with separate defense and law enforcement 
commands; others demand the application of a revenue allocation formula based only on 
the principle of derivation; there are those who want the country carved into six 
geopolitical zones”. He understood the system, the people and the nature of governance 
in Nigeria over the years hence he couldn’t hide his feelings when he also noted: 
      These demands are mostly borne out of deep frustration and despair over the persistent failure of 
central governments to meet the hopes and aspirations of the people. An inventory of our 
grievances would reveal that without exception all sections have felt marginalised in the last 
fifteen years. In a situation where groups complain of marginalisation the question is begged: 
who is doing the marginalisation? This whole nation has been traumatised by misrule. It is 
perhaps understandable that in the absence of a trustworthy, transparent and just central 
authority, each one feels a victim and suspects the other of being the oppressor.
545
 
 
 
        There was pressure, as this study discovers, leading to a suit filed by the federal 
government demanding Supreme Court’s interpretation of the offshore oil revenue in 
2001 where it argued that it was not compelled to pay revenue derived from offshore oil 
fields to coastal states. The ruling by the Supreme Court in favour of the federal 
government triggered further agitation due to a feeling by oil-producing states of their 
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derivation cut.
546
 Similarly such rulings in favour of the federal government have 
featured in almost all contested election cases brought before the courts in Nigeria. For 
example, Section 141 of 2006 Electoral Act states thus “an election petition shall be 
presented within 30 days from the result of the election is declared.” This gives the idea 
of a long period of hearing hence the tenure of the office in contention is almost 
completed at the time judgment is delivered. It is argued that the Electoral Act is silent 
on time frame within which Tribunal Court need to complete petitions brought before 
them. This differs markedly from Electoral Act of 1982 and 1977 which gave 30 days to 
complete hearing and pass judgment in respect of presidential elections and 60 days for 
others. The trend has been that all the presidential and some other major elections in 
Nigeria since 1999 have been contested and court judgments passed has been in favour 
of the federal government.
547
 While the courts have helped to sustain democracy in 
Nigeria in what is described as the proverbial Rock of Gibralter of Nigerian 
democracy,
548
individuals and organizations have attacked the Courts in Nigeria. 
According to Bolaji Akinyemi, some judicial interpretations have led to staggered 
elections as well as elongation of tenure of some public officers which is not good for 
democracy, and not found elsewhere in the world.
549
 Nigeria is known to be Africa’s 
most consistently federal polity.
550
 Yet, given its failings, federalism in Nigeria has been 
described derogatorily as “peculiar, bizarre, misleading, purely distributive or failed, 
and representing a hollow federation or a unitary state in federal guise”.551All these 
explain Nigeria’s decades of instability. 
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5.5.3 Ethnicised Federal Constitution and Consociational Democracy as Institutional       
         Architecture for Stability in Malaysia 
 
        Malaysia is a multiethnic country with unique features which are rarely found 
elsewhere in the world. The nation of Malaysia is populated by its indigenous Malays 
and other tribal or aboriginal groups who today live side by side with a host of earlier 
migrants from China and India who had settled in Malaysia for over a century. From its 
independence in 1957, Malaysia has demonstrated such commitment to realising and 
retaining a united and harmonious multiethnic society. Although Malaysia has 
maintained relative political stability for over four decades now, it has also exhibited 
direct and unrestrained discriminatory practices. This argument is premised on a federal 
feature of unity in diversity, but checks and balances against dominance of sections of 
the society by one group, as one of the cardinal features of federalism
552
 is ignored in 
Malaysia’s quest to retain the primacy of Malay rights and its institutions in its federal 
arrangement. Yet the system has been given credit for its effort at enhancing economic 
distribution and balancing interethnic relations. 
       This segment of the chapter is devoted to examining the mode of regime change in 
Malaysia and to view how and what has made its democracy uninterrupted, ethnic 
harmony improved and a considerable degree of its national development realised. All 
these point to the fact that Malaysia’s nation-building effort demonstrates effective 
federalism.  But the intent of this thesis is also to unveil salient features and such unique 
attributes that distinguish Malaysia’s federation from others, yet a high degree of 
interethnic harmony and federal and state cooperation have been maintained.  
         In all calculations, Malaysia harbours remote ethnic tension amid its level of 
political stability. But to understand Malaysia better, the focus of this study is now 
aligned to H. Singh who has noted “Rather, the more pertinent question that arises at 
this juncture is: why did the Malaysian political system come to be structured on a 
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differential, rather than on an equivalent, or even universalistic, mode of 
incorporation?” Equivalent incorporation as Singh explains has to do with social justice 
that is expressed in equal rights to citizens with regard to affiliation. He employs 
“universalistic incorporation” to explain the need for equal political rights to all 
individuals in Malaysia.
553
 The foregoing issues point to the ethnicised federal 
constitution and practices which have placed the control of political power and ‘rights’ 
in the hands of Malay ethnic majority in one authoritarian party rule in the country. This 
fact is profound in the general discussion. This thesis now highlights what contributed 
to the effectiveness of federalism in Malaysia.  
       First, the study done by Shafruddin has shown that ethnicity featured greatly in 
Malaysia’s 1957 and 1963 federation as demonstrated in chapter three of this study on 
federal design in accommodating pluralism.
554
 The earlier existing traditional 
institutions of the Malay Rulers were given recognition and protection by the Malaysian 
Constitution. The Rulers have constitutional functions as well as roles enshrined in the 
Federal Constitution and States Constitutions too. There are nine Malay Rulers who are 
Heads of State as well as Heads of the religion of Islam in their various states.
555
 
Notably, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the King is Malay Ruler elected by the 
Conference of Rulers as the Head of State for the federation (the Supreme head of the 
Federation) which gives a total of ten monarchies in Malaysia. “The existence of ten 
Malay monarchies or Malay sovereigns who have constitutional roles and prerogative 
powers in one country is a unique feature of Malaysia.”556 
         Given the position of Malay Rulers in the constitution, it is also discovered in this 
study in comparison with Nigeria that the constitutional framework as well as the 
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system of government in Malaysia was adjusted to accommodate the traditional 
institutions. Hence the Malay Rulers as well as federal system in Malaysia are knotted, 
showing that the institutions rely on the federal system and vis a vis.
557
 The Malay 
ethnic majority whose special rights and privileges are fully protected in the constitution 
have also been nurtured in a system that makes their loyalty mandatory to a cultural 
heritage and religiosity in the context of both Sovereign Monarchy and Sultanate 
assigned to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong.
558
 In view of this scenario, this study argues 
that the Malays are playing out as well as utilising the power of majority in all their 
protected rights and positions. For example, McGarry and O’Leary have reasoned that 
“A majoritarian federation concentrates power-resources at the federal level and 
facilitates executive and legislative dominance either by a popularly endorsed executive 
president or by a single party premier and cabinet.”559 The system truly retains the 
loyalty of all Malays in particular and other ethnic groups. It has enhanced political 
stability and sustained federalism in Malaysia in contrast to issues discussed on Nigeria. 
         Second, this thesis stresses that the event of Malaysian independence ushered in a 
new thinking in interethnic relations, pushed forward by the departing colonialists. This 
brought about the inter-racial bargain demonstrated by the Alliance. Having documented 
this in an earlier chapter, it shows how in a compromise between ethnic groups, political 
power and certain special rights were given to Malays in exchange for citizenship rights 
and economic power to the Chinese. In a nutshell, this study stresses that this power 
sharing and compromise arrangements by the Alliance at independence have led to 
consociational democracy in Malaysia. This argument is premised on the fact that 
political stability of any polity can hardly be based on predictions involving political 
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culture and the role of culture as two variables in which Lijphart considers the behaviour 
of the political elite as a third variable that provides consociational democracies as 
demonstrated by the Alliance.
560
 It describes uninterrupted one party seemingly 
majority-authoritarian democratic rule for fifty years.
561
 This is the political stability 
Malaysia commands over Nigeria in which Malaysia’s democratic transitions from one 
regime in power to another has been smooth.     
         Third, this study argues that durable democracy is the cornerstone of effective 
federalism which is the outcome of Malaysia’s consociational democracy discussed 
above. But this study sees post-independence leaders in Malaysia as truly determined to 
build a progressive society. The first phase Malaysian history provides a rich tapestry 
and insight of Tunku Abdul Rahman’s administration from 1957-1970, whose attention 
was deeply devoted to nurturing a plural society with emphasis on political stability.  For 
example, given his inclusive posture, Pramanik one of many scholars that have written 
about Malaysia’s success says that Tunku deserves credit for his leadership quality 
which brought about a unity at securing independence and also for laying a strong 
foundation for sharing economic opportunities and racial harmony in Malaysia.
562
 
According to Tunku, “without national unity, there would be no stability, without which 
there would be no opportunities and resources for national development”.563 Enloe, one 
of the earliest political scientists to study multi-ethnic politics in Malaysia observes that 
“A political community is a man-made artifact fraught with destructive tendencies, 
making its continued cohesion a major task of government.”564 Malaysia’s success in its 
consociationalism in contrast to Nigeria is explained in the work of McGarry and 
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O’Leary on the reasons for success and failure of federations. They have argued that 
“Nigeria and a future European federation will, ceteris paribus, be relatively unstable, as 
neither possesses a Staatsvolk. What must be considered in our ‘ceteris parbus’ clause?” 
They hypothesise the following: 
(a), Multi-national federations without a Staatsvolk, if they are to survive as democratic entities, 
must develop consociational practices that protect the interests of all the encompassed national 
and ethnic communities with the capacity to break-away (b), The existence of a Staatsvolk, or 
the existence of consociational practices, will not themselves assure the stabilisation of a multi-
national democratic federation, though they will separately or cojointly increase its survival 
prospects (c), Other conducive external and internal political, economic and social relationships 
may decide the fate of a multi-national federation. The character of multi-national power 
sharing, whether a national minority has backing from a powerful neighbouring state and 
whether its region is on the border of the federation will assuredly matter, as will the democratic 
and legal character of the federation, its mode of formation, and its prosperity.
565
 
 
       In addition to McGarry and O’Leary’s assertion, the significance of this section also 
makes a logical claim that genuine effort was made in laying a solid foundation for a 
united and peaceful Malaysia when compared to events in Nigeria. This assertion is 
made clearer by a scholar who observes that the period of 1957-63 was like an illusion. 
This is because the Alliance created a platform that put in place a foundation for 
Malaysia’s integrated society, ethnic harmony as well as constitutional democracy.566 
Tunku believed he would usher-in Malaysia’s developmental aspirations and unity. 
Despite his effort, this thesis reflects on how racial riots of May 13, 1969 set a defining 
moment in the history of Malaysia.  
        It led to fresh policies from 1970 under Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak that 
enhanced accommodation and welfare to Malaysia’s diverse racial groups to tackle the 
1969 challenges through NEP as an affirmative action. This section shows how Tun 
Abdul Razak’s administration of 1970-1976 used security measures and economic 
integration through affirmative action to support national unity while retaining Malay 
political dominance. The transition of power from Razak to Onn was smoothly 
democratic. Under Prime Minister Tun Hussein Onn in 1976-1981, the thesis examines 
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his administration that was centered on national unity with commitment to national 
security. The entire analysis here compares to rampant coup-related change of leadership 
in Nigeria. Remarkably, Onn’s relentless onslaught against Islamic resurgence helped 
Malaysia to move beyond early fragmentation with enhanced economic growth.  
          Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad’s rule from 1981-2003 redefined Malaysia in 
a new development discourse and focus while accommodating all ethnic groups. His 
regime’s response against Islamic insurgency as Onn did was remarkably swift and 
effective with sustained strong domestic economy which climaxed in his Vision 2020 for 
Malaysia.  Finally, Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi’s administration from 2003-2009 
gave attention to the continued unity of the country and the realisation of Mahathir’s 
Vision 2020 policy. He emphasised on the importance of human capital in view of 
Malaysia’s quest to join the league of developed nations by year 2020. Badawi’s strong 
emphasis on good race relations creates a window for Nigeria to view Malaysia’s 
treaded path. Unlike the presidential system of government in Nigeria, and especially 
what the military did in disrupting federalism in the country, government in Malaysia’s 
parliamentary democracy seems to function smoothly without disruption or 
disagreements with the states apart from earlier highlighted federal and state 
disagreements. Power transfer in Malaysia is smooth with ethnic harmony yielding 
political stability and effective federalism. 
         Fourth, there could be reasons why there was no military coup in Malaysia 
compared to the Nigerian situation. This study underlines four emerging arguments that 
support the considerable ethnic harmony and political stability in Malaysia in this sense: 
(i) the Chinese in particular are smaller in number and traditionally tend to gravitate to 
the business sector and few are in civil service. (ii) By the adoption of a federal 
constitution in Malaysia, the safeguards of the positions of the Malay Rulers, the 
Bumiputra rights, which also promoted quota system in the civil service in favour of 
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Malays by 4:1 non-Malay, may have reflected in the military being composed of largely 
Malays.
567
 (iii) This study looks at Malays as striving to protect all the rights and 
privileges they arrogate to themselves hence its military is made up of greater number of 
citizens of Malay extraction and this is the surest way of protecting the Sovereignty of 
the Constitution and the country. (iv) The compromise and shared interests by the 
members of the Alliance produced a democratic government born out of interethnic 
exchange of rights and privileges to the indigenous people and citizenship to other 
immigrant communities. Given this scenario, it has been said that one form or uniform 
federalism does not exist; hence Malaysia’s federalism accommodates elements of 
ethnic inequality in contrast to true federal tenets. This may have given room for Malay 
ethnic forces with fewer tendencies for coups unlike Nigeria’s experience which 
precipitated its ethnic driven civil war, the obliteration of its federal features which 
continues to rock its ethnic communities as seen in contrast to more peaceful ethnic 
communities in Malaysia.   The division of Nigeria into twelve states helped the military 
to neutralise the regional hegemony that encouraged the Igbo Biafrans in civil war. It is 
important to recognise that none of these power struggles were witnessed in Malaysia. 
         Fifth, Malaysia’s relative political stability is anchored on McGarry and O’Leary 
research. They argue that “The demographic composition of the federation matters: a 
federation with a dominant ethno-national community is likely to be more stable than 
one that does not”. They are also of the view that federalism does not provide all the 
answers to interethnic harmony, rather consociational practice at the federal level is vital 
for “success of multi-national federalism if there is no Staatsvolk”. 568 
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5.6 Reflections on Current Challenges in Nigeria and Malaysia 
 
 
         Attempt is made in this section to highlight in a concise manner some ongoing 
challenges in Nigeria and Malaysia. As earlier noted, it helps in support of ongoing 
arguments on both countries in the entire study as well as providing informed knowledge 
on current realities in the two countries as at the time of concluding this study. It is 
imperative to note that Nigeria continues to witness continuing ethno-religious violence 
in spite of some measures by the Nigeria Federal Government to keep the Africa’s most 
populous nation free from ethnic strife. For instance, President Goodluck Jonathan 
became the head of state of Nigeria after the death of President Yar’Adua in 2010. 
Before his death, Yar’Adua’s administration spent time and resources in addressing 
ethnic and regional problems in Nigeria. However, since 2011, President Goodluck 
Jonathan’s administration has also been challenged even more by unending ethnic 
conflict in the country. Amid growing insecurity in the country, the Nigerian Army says 
its operatives are on top of security challenges in Nigeria.
569
 Precisely, the study 
provides some highlights on President Jonathan’s current challenges. 
          First, President Jonathan’s victory in the April 2011 poll sparked revolts in a few 
parts of the North, which claimed many lives and property, while the opposition 
challenged his victory.
570
 Second, hundreds of Nigerians have been killed in the 2011 
ethno-religious violence in Jos and a few other states in the North.
571
 Third, Boko Haram 
a brutal terror outfit, have killed many Nigerians including United Nations (UN) staff at 
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the UN office in Abuja in the September 2011 bombing.
572
 History has a way of 
repeating itself, (as earlier acted by Obasanjo and Yar’dua), President Jonathan recently 
drafted the military to crack down on the Boko Haram sect in Maiduguri and other areas 
they could be traced.
573
  
          But the persistent reign of terror by the Boko Haram sect in Abuja, Sulija, Bauch 
and Borno and the communal crisis in Jos has further raised questions concerning 
President Jonathan’s capacity to address the rising wave of deadly conflicts in 
Nigeria.
574Also, “Movement for the emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)” 
including various ethnic militia remain threats to national security with attempts to stop 
Nigerian independence cerebrations on 1 October 2011.
575
 Nigeria’s complex security, 
economic and political problems led to fresh calls in 2011 by Nigerians and State 
Governors for a forum to address important national issues.
576
 There are insinuations as 
to whether Jonathan has all it takes to carry the nation over the threshold to greatness.
577
  
         Amid these tensions, President Jonathan has said he will disappoint those who 
expected him to act like a military general, or like a Pharaoh. He warned Nigerians not 
to make him into a Nebuchadnezzar.
578
 “I’m no Pharaoh or army general”, he 
declared. He also noted that he had not the character of a ruthless leader, but believes he 
can transform the country without exhibiting the traits of a lion king or of “a Goliath”.579 
He assured Nigerians in his 51
st
 independence address that the nation would overcome 
its challenges while urging citizens to keep faith in the country. Many southerners have 
fled Northern Nigeria due to ceaseless bombings by Boko Haram which currently holds 
over 200 girls as hostages. Other issues involving Jonathan’s second term bid, power 
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shift to other ethnic groups especially the presidency, and the North’s insistence that 
power must be returned back to the North in 2015 continues to hit the polity. President 
Jonathan’s Government has concluded a fresh National Dialogue in 2014 involving all 
the representatives of ethnic nationalities in Nigeria to find ways to cohere as a nation.
580
       
         There are few current issues that need mention on Malaysia. The current Prime 
Minister, Najib Tun Razak took over power on 3rd April, 2009. The1Malaysia concept 
became the key thrust of his administration which was to foster unity amongst the multi-
ethnic rakyat (people).  While 1Malaysia is gradually gaining acceptance, the country 
has witnessed religious tensions as highlighted above involving the word ‘Allah’ as 
exclusively for Islamic religion and not for Christians. While the court ruling was in 
favour of the Muslims, it aggrieved Christians in Sabah and Sarawak who have been 
using the word ‘Allah’ for over a century.  Yet the Malaysian Government says the word 
‘Allah’ can be used by Christians in Sabah and Sarawak and prohibited in Peninsular 
Malaysia only. This is a conflicting issue in the country.
581
 Also the state is about to 
invoke the Sedition Act 1948 against ceaseless racial and religious provocative remarks 
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by Malaysians through the media and other forms of social interaction.  Lastly, while 
Malaysia is discussed in this study as free from militant activities, fresh developments 
show that some Malaysians are said to have joined the Islamic State ‘IS’ jihadists in 
Syria. Some suspected militants were also arrested in the country.
582
  
 
5.7 Conclusion 
          This chapter has demonstrated institutional structures that promoted ethnic tension 
and harmony in Nigeria and Malaysia respectively. This study provided views on ethnic 
and regional conflict over exploration and distribution of resources in Nigeria. While it 
is peculiar to Nigeria, effort was made to highlight few instances of agitation especially 
by the opposition wing in Malaysia. The thesis also argues that ethnic tension in Nigeria 
is induced by structural and political context. This segment also highlighted factors that 
induce certain ethnic conflict in Nigeria as peculiar and localised, i.e problems of state 
creation and military penchant to power seizure which are not observed in Malaysia. 
          The chapter underlined the level of political stability, instances of what constitutes 
remote ethnic tension that still exists in Malaysia. However, this study has highlighted 
political and religious culture as intertwined in Malaysia. This has contributed 
tremendously to cultural and considerable ethnic harmony in Malaysia, when regular 
ethnic conflict and armed militia confronting the Nigerian armed forces is revisited. 
While armed confrontation is absent in Malaysia, the payment of oil royalty to its oil 
producing states is known to be peaceful. Credit is given to Malaysia in its effort to rid 
its system of violent ethnic conflict which makes the country more stable than Nigeria. 
         Finally, differences appear in political stability and regime change in Nigeria and 
Malaysia. From the first decade in 1966 to 1999, civilian administration in Nigeria 
operated for only four years, and the rest of the years were characterised by military 
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dictatorship. The nation of Nigeria was seemingly under siege due to ethnic army 
adventure in politics. While they appeared as if they were on a mission to unify the 
country, they were also seen exchanging power often violently among themselves 
through coups in their unhindered authoritarian rule that dismantled almost all the 
features of federalism in Nigeria. Not only was the Nigerian constitution suspended, 
there was no rule of law in terms of judicial interpretation and adjudication of justice. 
           All these are contrasted with democratic rule in Malaysia throughout the same 
period. One feature that has sustained federalism in Malaysia is the nation’s ethnicised 
federal system that gave protection to both traditional and religious institutions a place 
in governance with total loyalty from Malays who are given special rights in wealth 
distribution. This is an unfair practice that has lasted for several decades in favour of the 
Malay majority ethinc group that gives support to UMNO-led government. Given 
Malaysia’s consociational democracy, the system was able to sustain stability with 
smooth power transfer in a seemingly authoritarian one party rule for over half a 
century. This explains the dividing line between Nigeria’s ethnic chauvinism and its 
unstable polity, and Malaysia’s considerable ethnic harmony and political stability. 
     Finaly, reflections on the two countries has shown that Nigeria is still putting up 
measures to counter ethnic threats to its existence as a nation whereas new events 
continue to emerge within Malaysia’s relative ethnic harmony and political stability. 
However, the next chapter discusses various contested issues by ethnic groups in 
Nigeria and Malaysia. The chapter demonstrates various competitions and cleavages as 
well as physical clashes among ethnic groups as manifestations of ethnic conflict. 
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CHAPTER 6 
A Comparative Analysis of Ethnic Conflicts in Nigeria and Malaysia 
 
  6.1 Introduction   
 
        The preceding chapter explored the effectiveness of federalism in managing ethnic 
conflict in Nigeria and Malaysia. It provided the background knowledge of levels of 
political stability as shown in the patterns of regime change in both countries. This 
current chapter is focused on shaping the reader’s understanding about contested issues 
in Nigeria and Malaysia, and the degree and impact of such conflicts on both countries. 
The aim of this chapter is to compare and contrast various forms of ethnic conflict in 
Malaysia and Nigeria since their independence in 1957 and 1960 respectively till 2009. 
The idea is to show major arenas of ethnic conflict and how the chapter offers rich 
materials in the general evaluation of ethnic conflict in Nigeria and Malaysian 
federations of diverse ethnic communities as shown in figure 6.1 in the next page. 
        Nigeria is explored first in the chapter and then followed by Malaysia. The chapter 
discusses domains and dimensions of ethnic conflicts in Nigeria in the following 
arrangement: ethno-political conflict and coups; era of electoral violence; massacre of 
ethnic communities; ethno-religious conflict; contesting education; economic contests; 
contesting politicized state creation; contesting resource control; and contesting security. 
The chapter further discusses research findings, summarises findings and concludes. 
This chapter adopts a priori assumption that different manifestations of ethnicity as well 
as conflict are linked to political power.
583
 However, ethnic cleavage for sectional 
interest is akin to what Nzerimo describes as crisis of values.
584
 Figure 6.1 serves as a 
balance sheet of the study showing common and uncommon issues contested for in each 
of the two countries being studied which make conflict different and often severe. 
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Figure 6.1 Domains and Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria & Malaysia at a Glance 
 
      Federation of Nigeria and Malaysia  
                  *Domains of Conflict* 
 
Politics & Administration Religious Contests    Education  Economic & Business       Security 
 
                               Dimensions 
 
       Contested  Issues Common  to Nigeria 
                              Dimensions 
         Contested  Issues Common  to Malaysia 
                      
 
Resource Control –militancy& secession        
Contesting politicized state & local council creation 
Contesting ethnic security operatives  
Source: Designed by the author. 
 
 
6.2 Nigeria’s Unbalanced Federal Structure Generating Ethno-political Tension 
 
 
6.2.1   Introduction 
 
 
           This section discusses numerous ethno-political conflicts over contested issues in 
Nigeria since its independence in 1960. It has often been argued that the asymmetrical 
federal structure foisted on Nigeria by the departed colonialists in favour of the North 
with two-third of the country’s landmass tend to marginalize the two main ethnic groups 
in the south in an unfavourable political equation. Ethnic conflict in Nigeria crisscrosses 
many aspects of life. First, the study traces the 1959 election crisis at the threshold of 
independence which exposed ethnic groups in Nigeria to severe divisions especially 
between the North and South. Second, the 1962 census crisis and the 1964-1965 
elections generated ethno-political tensions in the Western Region which invoked 
federal power controlled by northern leaders.  This climaxed in the first military coup by 
Igbo officers, briefly discussed, and counter-coup carried out by northern ethnic army in 
1966 which complicated governance and threw the country into a three-year Civil War. 
Contesting Special Rights 
Contesting language 
Contesting cultural inequality 
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6.2.2 Ethno-regional Controversies over Elections, Census Figures and Adminisitration 
 
        Many troubled societies especially among recently decolonised countries are often 
beleaguered with question as to who is power. ‘Who’ in this sense is not about an 
individual but the ethnic group in control of power? Each ethnic group in Nigeria is 
unrelenting in the country’s complex multiethnic setting. This section explores 
controversies involving elections, National Census and the administration of Nigeria. 
This study emphasises that the genesis of Nigeria’s ethnic crisis is historically linked to 
the “amalgamation of Northern and Southern” Nigeria in 1914 as shown in chapter two 
of this thesis. This union of north and south gradually climaxed in the independence of 
the Nigerian state in 1960. Politics in Nigeria is characterised with severe ethnic 
divisions which has been identified as one of the leading causes of all forms of social 
conflicts and political instability in the country. Hence ethnicity is perceived as a 
hindrance to socio-politico and economic development of Nigeria.
585
 
        Given the fact that this section is conceptualized to address ethnic conflict in 
Nigeria, the problems that besiege the nation can only be diagnosed and understood 
through historical survey and analysis of contemporary events as they occurred for a 
better understanding of the nature and the degree such ethnic conflicts. The period 
between1960 and 1970 was a decade of ethno-political turmoil in the history of Nigeria. 
Its 1959 general election ushering in independence was won by the Northern People’s 
Congress (NPC), a party dominated by the Hause-Fulani of the north by 142 seats. The 
National Council of Nigerian and Cameroons (NCNC predominantly Igbo of Eastern 
Nigeria) while in an alliance with the Northern Element Peoples Union (NEPU) based in 
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the north, won 89 seats while Action Group (AG) of Western Nigeria and predominantly 
Yorubas won 73seats in the federal House,
586
 as shown in Table 3.1.
587
 
Table 6.1                     Results of Nigerian Federal Elections 1959                             
       Party                North              East                West             Lagos           Total               
N. P. C.                      142                 --                      --                 --                 142                 
NCNC/NEPU                8                58                     21                 2                   89 
A.G.                             24                14                     34                 1                   73          
Seats                           174                72                     63                3                 312                  
Source: Adapted from K. W. J. Post, The Nigerian Federal Election of 1959, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 373. 
 
       This development led to the formation of a coalition government by NPC and 
NCNC at the federal level. NPC with a higher winning figure produced the Prime 
Minister while NCNC produced the President of the Senate and later the Governor 
General of Nigeria in 1963 when Nigeria became a republic. In other words, Abubakar 
Tafawa Balewa, Nnamdi Azikiwe and Obafemi Awolowo became the Prime Minister, 
the first Nigerian Governor-General and the opposition leader respectively.
588
    
         Given various conflicts, the crop of politicians and leaders at Nigeria’s immediate 
post-independence period have been described as appointed stooges and incapable as 
they mismanaged the economy with abuse of power.
589
 Several crises precipitated the 
collapse of the first republic that laid the foundation for other crises that followed. This 
study also stresses that as early as 1962, Nigeria as a nation started to manifest negative 
tendencies especially among its composing ethnic groups, which led to mistrust, 
suspicion and violence. National census is known to have political connotation and 
equation in the electoral process in governance. In their political calculation, political 
leaders of Southern Nigeria had the option of using population census figures at this time 
to compete with the North by attempting to undermine the constitutional basis of 
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domination by the North. This self-seeking interest of all the groups resulted in the three 
regions of the country inflating their respective census figures. The result of this initial 
census gave 54 per cent to Northern Nigeria as its share of the entire population. The 
controversy led to the cancellation of the figure with a recount conducted in 1964.
590
 
            The North still maintained a dominant position with regard to population 
distribution. The premier of Southeastern Nigeria refused to accept the census results, 
while the premier of Midwestern region reluctantly accepted it for the sake of unity. 
However, premiers of both Northern and Western regions accepted the result as 
rendered. The acceptance of the census result officially led to Nigerian ethnic and 
regional conflict now transformed from its known broader North-South dichotomy to 
uncompromised positions between the North and the East. The census result would have 
been invalidated by the Supreme Court of Nigeria, but by not doing so it brought about 
the legitimisation of Northern domination, which seemed to have been left to stay. All 
shifted to federal elections in 1964-1965 where Southern Nigeria felt that if its parties 
could win the election and establish the government at the federal level, they could use 
constitutional power to amend the rules and counter Northern dominance. But such 
strategic plans depended on free and fair elections.
 591
 
        This study discovers that ahead of 1964-1965 elections, political alliances merged 
for the federal legislative elections which brought about two broad alliances for the 
elections. Unlike the 1959 election, the 1964-1965 election brought about two major 
alliances for the election which were the “Nigerian National Alliance” (NNA), which 
was comprised of the following: NPC, NNDP (party from the west) including smaller 
parties from the West and Midwest. “United People Grand Alliance” (UPGA) was 
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another alliance which was composed of the following: NCNC, the AG, NEPU and the 
United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC), as two broad alliance groups for the election.
592
  
           This study also takes into account the harassment and arrest of opponents and a 
haphazard NCNC boycott of the election that characterised the campaigns and pattern of 
conduct exhibited by groups which marked the campaigns as neither free nor fair. The 
end of the election showed NPC from NNA Alliance to have won 162 of the 167 seats in 
the Northern Nigerian, and by implication allowed it to form a government without 
getting involved in any form of alliance. A controversy arose when the president of the 
country under NCNC of a different coalition refused to call the leader of the majority 
party, the NPC to form a government. The president insisted that the prime minister 
should set aside the election results, but the prime minister refused. There was no 
government in the country within the four days of this disagreement, but it was the 
intervention of the chief justice of Nigeria and the chief justice of the Eastern region who 
negotiated a peace deal that brought about a compromise to the saga. It was 
recommended in the compromise that a broad-based government be formed while fresh 
election should be conducted at places of election boycott.
593
 Similar alliance was 
witnessed in Malaysia during the same era of the two countries formative years with a 
difference as shown in discussion on Malaysia ahead in this chapter. 
       What led to the collapse of Nigeria’s First Republic was the political instability in 
the country which featured fierce competition for supremacy between two Yoruba 
parties in the West. Problems occurred in the 1965 Western regional election when AG 
attempted to assert its influence in the West by trying to recapture power from NNDP, 
another Yoruba party that was formed as a splinter group from the AG, but had support 
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from the NPC led-federal government. The NPC-controlled federal government used its 
power of incumbency to guarantee the success recorded by NNDP.
594
   
       All these early tensions and internal disorder in Nigeria’s political arena culminated 
in breeding ethnic motivated mutiny and coup d'état of January 15, 1966 in Africa’s 
most populous country. It laid the foundation of Nigeria’s unstable polity as discussed 
previously in Chapter five. For Horowitz, ethnic conflict in Nigeria stems from ‘ancient 
hatred’ that characterised the Nigerian polity and has affected its military.595 Appendixes 
H. figure 6.1 shows how ethnic affiliation stimulates force of action on recorded coups 
in Nigeria. This study argues that federalism is not auto-mechanical in conflict reduction 
in view of the need for unity and coexistence in diverse societies. Rather, Moten 
reiterates on K. W. Robinson’s study cited earlier in chapter one of this thesis that 
“federation does not create unity out of diversity; rather, it enables the two to coexist.”596        
 
6.3. Fledging Federal Structure Exhibiting Ethno-religious Conflict in Nigeria 
        In this study, credit is given to the federal arrangement that has kept diverse ethnic 
groups in Nigeria together for over fifty years of the country’s existence. Yet, the same 
federal system is fraught with numerous abnormalities that have exposed the nation to 
ethnic tensions. While this argument is broad, it is pertinent to note for objective 
assessment that “Nigeria’s chronic instability is largely a consequence of its failing 
experiment in federalism. Federalism is often championed in ethnically diverse countries 
in the hope that it will foster greater political participation and reduce inequality among 
diverse populations.”597 This understanding could be seen from the fact that “federalism 
is not fixed; it is a process that is in perpetual negotiation” involving both soluble and 
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insoluble issues in the system.
598
 The argument is that many ethnic and religious groups 
do not induce or trigger conflict in their natural setting. It is only when these groups are 
mobilised within the context of identities or they are sometimes politicised that provides 
a ground for conflicts.
599
 Nigeria is a secular state of different beliefs, with UN (2010) 
population figure of 158.2 million people.
600
 Currently, both Christian and Muslim 
populations in the country are contested. Currently, Muslims who live in northern and 
southern Nigeria make up roughly 50 per cent of the Nigerian population.
601
  
         Nigeria as a nation accommodates “Africa’s oldest Islamic traditions, Christianity 
is much newer, but it has quickly grown to encompass 50 per cent of Nigeria’s 
population, with the greatest growth occurring during the past 30 years.”602 Recent 
statistics by a notable African Christian scholar maintained that Christians in Nigeria 
were 46 per cent by 2000 while 44 per cent Muslim. He argued that Christians have 
increased from 1per cent since 1900 to 50 per cent of the population in the same 
frame.
603
 Given Nigeria’s contested census figures, other scholars estimate the number 
of Christians and Muslims as approximately equal.
604
  
        Religious conflict in Nigeria could be seen through the lens of Ayoade’s study 
which stresses how religious bias often influences certain official decisions that demand 
equity and justice in the Nigerian Federation. The second republic (1979-1983), 
“countrywide, Muslims obtained about 70 per cent of all executive positions” in 
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Nigeria.
605
 This is similar to a scenario in Malaysia where Muslims occupy most of the 
country’s strategic positions, but federalism calls for unity in diversity as well as equity 
as this federal principle disallows disharmony among groups in a federation.  
        Religious differences tend to divide Nigeria along ethnic and regional lines. Major 
deadly conflicts in the country for decades have been associated with ethno-religious 
tensions. This thesis argues that Nigeria has since the 1970s exhibited religious violence 
and conflicts of unprecedented proportions that shaped its volatile political arena. A 
close study shows Nigeria as a major African theatre of religious violence and 
aggression, as have Sudan and Algeria in Africa.
606
 The problem in Nigeria is that 
religion strongly separates “Christians and Muslims”. The separation is due to religious 
crisis that has characterised their relationship. Due to the uneven distribution of 
population, the majority of Muslims live in the north and some in the Middle Belt, while 
the Southeast is predominantly Christians and Southwest having equal representation of 
both faiths.
607
 While Christians and Muslims in Western Nigeria have always lived 
peacefully together, the North is charactrised by endless hostility. This problem is 
triggered by struggle for religious space in socioeconomic and political arenas. 
Compromise is needed for Nigeria to move forward.
608
Arguably, strong security 
measures and tolerance among the people has significantly moved Malaysia away from 
the spot of brutal ethnic clashes to a considerable ethnic harmony.  
          This study stresses that at Nigeria’s independence, the most destabilising factor 
was ethnicity which prompted the idea of dividing Nigeria into states after the civil war 
to weaken the earlier regions and empowering the centre. Since then religious violence 
which is as disruptive as ethnicity took centre stage in Nigeria, within a short time over a 
                                                 
605
 J. A. A. Ayoade, “Federalism in Nigeria: The Worship of an unknown God,” Paper presented at a 
special seminar held at the Institute of African Studies on Wednesday, February 10, 1982. 
606
 Falola, Violence in Nigeria, p. 1. 
607
 For discussion above see Falola, Violence in Nigeria, p. xii -1. 
608
Two anonymous persons (Yoruba –Southwest), officers of EFCC. Similar email responses, March 10, 
2012 
 206 
dozen religious riots had claimed many lives. Religion is used by politicians to gain 
political legitimacy, hence politicians have since the mid-seventies asked their followers 
to vote along religious lines. The political parties have always operated along ethno-
religious lines too.
609
 It is religious intolerance that has become a big challenge to the 
country over the years. It is a problem that escalates from time to time with huge 
casualties. It is a problem yet unresolved in the country.
610
 
        However, transferring power from the military to civilians involved writing a new 
constitution which provided opportunity for groups to settle old scores and create 
hegemonies for their ethnic and religious groups. The adoption of the Constitution in 
1978 generated tension in the 1978 election as politicians campaigned by manipulating 
religious symbols and values, and rejection of the recitation of national anthem and 
pledge by the Jehova Witnesses. In 1980 the Maitatsine religious crisis in the North 
claimed many lives while properties worth millions of naira were destroyed.
611
  
         Given the development of Maitatsine violence which was on the rise, Hacket 
expressed shock over what seemed to be like millennialist Islamic or Islamic movement 
that has assumed metonymic status in the psyche of Africa’s most populous nation. 
Similar violence occurred in Kano and Sokoto in 1994. An Igbo man standing trial for 
defaming the Koran was taken out of a police station and beheaded. It spread in Igbo 
land and further intensified religious and ethnic tensions in the country.
612
 Also, in 
October 1982, eight churches were burned down in the city of Kano while intra-Islamic 
violence claimed two lives and injured hundreds of people. In the same manner a major 
riot in Kaduna claimed at least four hundred lives the same year, while in 1984, violence 
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intensified by Muslims in Yola and Jimeta consumed approximately seven hundred 
people which included policemen and left nearly six thousand people homeless. Gombe, 
a neighbouring town was also besieged and over one hundred people were killed.
613
  
        In 1990-91, the objection by the Igbo and other Nigerians concerning the 
introduction of Sharia in the country generated tension and bloodbath in which hundreds 
of Christians, mostly Igbo were killed thereby raising fresh ethnic tension.
614
 Certainly 
people are fervent about ethnic and religious space in Nigeria, Nwankwo cautioned: 
          Religious tolerance is almost at zero level mainly in the North, there will be no end to ethnic 
and religious killings in Nigeria so long we pretend about nation building and the sacrifice it 
entails. “We appear not to know what it takes to build a great nation”. It takes persistent 
sacrifice on the part of the leaders in all their ways and their doings, in both words and actions 
for a great nation to evolve”.615 
 
 
         In other words, rampant killings characterised Obasanjo’s Administration between 
1999 -2007 that claimed many lives in the event of Sharia contestation and conflict in 
the Muslim-populated Northern Nigeria. But President Obasanjo quickly noted that 
“Sharia law is unconstitutional and will die a natural death.”616 According to Malami, 
religious tolerance is at zero level while religious intolerance is high in the country.
617
 
This problem led to Anyanwu’s rhetorical question, “Is there an end in sight for religious 
killings and violence in the country? “Religious violence is born of lack of 
understanding. When people of different faiths are properly educated to understand that 
no one religion is superior to the other, then they could coexist peacefully.”618  
        Certainly, the level of ethno-religious mayhem in Nigeria is not witnessed in 
Malaysia. This assertion will be substantiated in the next segment of this chapter on 
Malaysia’s considerable religious tolerance. Religious intolerance is really on the high 
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side with Boko Haram insurgency heightening religious intolerance.
619
 The thesis argues 
that intolerance could be seen in mistrust emphasised by Edmund Ezegbobelu in the 
literature review above. For Ebirim, religious intolerance is enormously caused by 
Northern religious leaders who are conservative and intolerable. They still believe that 
they will convert Southerners to Muslim religion through Jihadist bloody movement.
620
  
Appendix I. Table 6.1 shows a list of more than fifty tragic cases of ethno-religious 
conflicts from 1960 to 2002, and as shown in the literature review. 
        However, the fight for Sharia law and various killings by the current Boko Haram 
insurgency is a fight against the secular state in the north for the institutionalisation of 
Islamic Caliphate. But it is seen differently by other people, for example, Douglas Patt 
sheds light on secularism in Nigeria and positively describes secularism as “an ideology 
of peaceful co-existence of freedom of choice in matters of belief and association, and 
freedom of expression in matters of speech, arts, publication and worship”.621 Given the 
significance and explanatory goal this study invokes, a secular state is therefore a 
conception of secularism, in which a nation-state is deemed to be formally unbiased on 
issues of religion by giving no support to religion or irreligion.
622
        
         A secular state is not inclined to declaring superiority of a particular religion and is 
never given to promoting religious doctrines nor does it have any formal interest to set 
up a particular religion within its territory. The state is not expected to detach itself 
completely from religious issues; rather the different religions should have permissible 
right given their status as secular organizations that can benefit from community 
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financed police as well as emergency services.
623
 This study argues that tolerance makes 
room for unity which is one of the underlying principles of federalism as explained in 
chapter one of this study which draws from Livingston’s insight on federalism. Different 
religious ideologies constitute a hindrance to unity in a federal polity.  
       One similarity of importance in this discourse is the push for Islamic law that has 
started to create tensions in Nigeria and Malaysian secular states. Unlike in Malaysia, 
religious bigotry in Nigeria has assumed impunity with the current Boko Haram 
insurgency to Islamise the country.
624
 For the sake of clarity, this study emphasises that 
Nigeria maintains its secular status, given the need to clarify institutional competences 
between the federal and northern states pressure in this matter. But the pressure is more 
from Islamic scholars, governors and Islamic religious groups in the North who regard 
secularism as a popular Western ideology. A similar view is held in Malaysia’s 
oppositions push for Islamic state whereas its Islamic religious centered government has 
directly or indirectly but incrementally been pushing towards this end as will be 
discussed on Malaysia. Okorie gives more explanation on religious bigotry in Nigeria:   
           In this our beloved nation, religion is an instrument of division among its people. This day, the 
elders and frustrated leaders now make use of the youth in trying to achieve some selfish purpose 
through religious bigotry. This religious vice has always created mutual suspicion, civil unrest, 
wanton destruction of lives and properties. In this orgy of religious violence, the youths are 
fronted by disgruntled politicians hiding in the mask of religion. The current dichotomy in Nigeria 
based on religious beliefs was stirred by these elders who want to cling to power by all means.
625
 
 
 
     The spate of ethno-religious killings in Nigeria has gradually assumed impunity 
status which explains the worsening ethno-religious conflict in the country. It owes a lot 
to inconsistency with federalist principles of dialogue, tolerance and accommodation.  
This is contrasted with events discussed under Malaysia ahead in this chapter. 
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6.4 Contesting Education 
           In Nigeria, education is noticeably contested. It is significant to point out here that 
the contestation in the sphere of education in Nigeria is not as serious as seen in 
Malaysia. Nigeria has evolved as a tripolar ethnic structure along with the minorities.  
Persisting educational gaps which is illustrated in historical foundations of inequality 
prevailed. For Graham “It was precisely in the sphere of education that regional 
differences were increasingly manifested under colonialism. And this then had a knock-
on effect on the regional formation of human capital and general economic development. 
Colonial educational policy in Northern Nigeria was driven by two intertwined policies: 
fear of the development of a class of educated Africans, as was the case in Southern 
Nigeria.”626 It is needful to emphasise that the British approach towards the north was to 
a great extent instigated by the north attitude towards western education in which there 
was an “attempt to create an alternative Anglo-Muslim aristocratic civilisation in 
Northern Nigeria”.627 Lord Lugard looked at how education had raised a good number of 
men in Southern Nigeria whom he described as dissatisfied, impatient of any control as 
well as passionate of their importance.
628
  
          This study looks at Lugard’s negative reaction against more literate southerners 
because they were averse to colonial rule. Both educational and economic inequalities 
cut across ethnicities and regions, a situation that manifests in the recruitment within the 
public establishments in Nigeria. Regional divisions of the country manifest all forms of 
inequalities, even among ethnic groups and in administrative units of the four regions of 
the federation up to 1966. Not too long ago, the current 36 states of the federation were 
informally grouped into six zones. However, wrong perception of educational agenda 
under the British colonial rule, and the North’s poor receptivity to western education 
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created north-south regional gap since the early 1900s.
629
 This variation in North-South 
zones remains a big problem in Nigeria, and is currently made worse by Boko Haram’s 
(Islamist sect) insistence that western education is evil. One similarity that once existed 
educationally in Nigeria and witnessed in Malaysia especially within their Muslim 
populations was their backwardness in Western education after their independence. 
Governments in the two countries rose up to tackle the problem through quota system. 
The educational gap among ethnic groups (zones) in Nigeria is shown in Appendix J. 
Table 6.2 where the North is seen trailing behind. 
       The introduction of quota system in Nigeria to bridge the gap among groups in 
Nigeria signifies that the federal principles of equality and fairness were upheld. But 
given the existing differences, this study argues that decades of gradual educational 
progression in Nigeria has ‘avoidably’ left behind a sectional ethnic variation of ‘far less 
literate citizenry to compete in the same commonwealth of Nigeria in this global age. 
This delicate situation in the north has also been emphasised by Adamu who argued that 
many years of educational differences have manifested in differences in manpower and 
human resources development throughout Nigeria. A report in 2003 attributed the 
northern zone which has 53 per cent of the population of producing “only 10 per cent of 
engineers, 15 per cent of professors, 10 per cent of architects, 25 per cent of lawyers, 8 
per cent of bank executives and less than 2 per cent of insurance practitioners”.630 
        There is no doubt that this gap in the level of elite formation has its implications in 
the inter-ethnic relations in Nigeria in which Jubril Aminu once posited that “Certain 
sections of this country will be highly disturbed about their future in a united Nigeria if 
they study the pattern of higher educational opportunities in the country. It is this kind of 
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disturbance which promotes among the people some actions and counteractions, mutual 
suspicion, nepotism and loss of confidence in the concept of fair play”.631 
          But this study raises arguments that counter Aminu’s apprehension because 
educational problems of the North are self-induced. For example, the demand for 
education is so huge in Southern Nigeria. The educational gap which has existed 
between the regions is historically linked to regions and their receptivity to Western 
education. For instance, Chikas Danfulani argues that Quranic education had been in 
place prior to colonial rule. Formal education introduced after the British occupation in 
1903 in Nigeria was rejected and resisted as linked to Christianity popularised by the 
missionaries. It was believed, if allowed, may lead to conversion of their children to 
Christianity.
632
Amid the North’s negative attitude towards Western education, the 
federal government introduced affirmative action to bridge the gap in education with the 
South by granting more scholarships and financial support to the northerners than the 
southerners. Conscious efforts were also made to build more schools in the north.
633
This 
approach was similarly adopted in1970s to support poor Malays who were educationally 
disadvantaged. Having been left behind educationally, they were given more attention.
634
 
        All things being equal, the levels of educational attainment in various sections of 
Nigeria obviously reflected the level of professional and manpower development in 
these areas. All efforts made in 1990s to abridge the widening gap through quota system 
amongst the regions could not yield the expected result rather the number of highly 
trained professionals in the South continued to increase. For example, in 1990 the total 
number of engineers that registered with the ‘Council of Registered Engineers’ 
(COREN), was 6,407, but only 129 which represents 2.0 were from the North. A similar 
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scenario was observed the same year in the law profession, whereby of the “1,344 
lawyers called to the Nigerian bar, only 196” or 14.6 per cent represented the North. In 
addition, of the 669 registered estate surveyors, only 5 or 0.7 per cent were from 
northern areas. The North produced only 160 (14.2 per cent) out of a total of 1125 
registered architects. People of northern origin managed only 14 registered accounting 
firms (2.7) out of 522 registered firms operating in Nigeria.
635
 While huge successes has 
been made by the South in education, the North has remained backward for many years 
and the only educated children were those that attended Koranic schools.
636
  
       The South which is made up of the Eastern and Western parts of Nigeria were 
largely Christians and had much higher education and better equipped with modern 
skills than the North. This state of affairs was to provide a fertile ground for endemic 
conflicts that would plague post independent Nigeria.
637
Briefly, this section of the study 
underlines two contrasting scenarios in Nigeria which differ from issues in Malaysia:  
(a) The federal government of Nigeria has always committed itself in providing 
education across the country, while being guided by the federal character principle 
through its quota system. This means that in Nigeria, there is no discrimination 
 and favouritism given to a particular ethnic group for access to education. This is 
contrary to what the Malaysian government has done over the years as discussed on 
Malaysia in the next segment.  Ironically, the North has failed to appropriate this 
benefit provided by the Federal Government of Nigeria whereas the number of 
students seeking for admission in the southern part of Nigeria continues to rise. 
(b) Currently, the North maintains a certain level in education but the situation has not 
altered much given its self-induced problem of not being amenable to Western 
education. Sadly, Islamic religious ideology has for decades discouraged Northern 
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Nigeria Muslims from opening up to Western education provided by the Federal 
Government of Nigeria through its quota system. In contrast, the Malays who are 
largely Muslims in Malaysia are more willing to be educated in modern or western 
sense of education whereas those of the Hausa/Fulani or the larger Muslim 
community in Northern Nigeria are not receptive to western education. 
Certainly, Aminu’s aforementioned fear is further constrained by the current Boko 
Haram insurgency in the North, as earlier highlighted which says “Western education is 
sinful” with continuing killings in the country. This thesis also stresses that ethnic 
groups in Nigeria maintain their respective cultures and traditions without any external 
imposition from the government or larger groups unlike Malay dominance in Malaysia. 
This shows how federalism in Nigeria has been successful in allowing diversity of 
traditions and cultures unchallenged, unlike what seems to be Malay dominance which 
often challenges the existence of other cultures. 
          Similarly, unlike what appears as Malay hegemony with regard to government’s 
influence on education and language in Malaysia, English as the official language in 
Nigeria is not contested. As a secular state no particular ethnic language is imposed on 
others. It is pertinent to emphasise that conflicts over education is a conflict between 
“backward” and “advanced” status of groups. Horowitz relates this to ethnic conflicts in 
many African, Asian and Caribbean countries where group advancement in education 
and representation in the civil service and independents professions place such ethnic 
groups ahead of others in social equation.
 638
 It is a contest of values which may take 
years for Northern Nigeria to overcome, but other groups in Malaysia may need to 
engage with the Malay-led government in what A.B. Shamsul describes as “stable 
tension in Malaysia.”639  
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       Given the quest for sharia law and Islamic schools in some Northern states of 
Nigeria, the distribution of power in the federalism guarantees federal and state 
governments independence but not outside their jurisdictions. While this idea obviously 
derives from the principle of unity in diversity, some assumed state rights in this 
discussion on Northern Nigeria in terms of their jurisdiction on certain educational 
matters is divisive, retrogressive and far from unifying the Nigerian federal state. 
 
6.5 Economic Contests 
          The economic contestation in Nigeria is as old as the country itself given the fact 
that the first three regions which were ethnically divided demanded to be autonomous 
even in the sphere of development so that each could grow at its own speed.
 640
 In this 
section of the thesis, effort is made to show in brief some form of Nigeria’s economic 
history and the interplay between political and economic upheavals in resource 
distribution. By every conceivable measure, Nigeria is one of the world’s richly 
endowed countries with natural resources. It is the most populous country in Africa and 
has one of the best human resource bases in the developing world.
641
  
          Competition exists in the sphere of economics and business in Nigeria. For 
instance, the Igbo people are known to be more aggressive in business within the 
Nigerian economy. During the colonial era, the Igbo had great men in business such as 
Sir Lous Philip Odumegwu Ojukwu, who was “one of Africa’s most successful 
entrepreneurs at a time when business environment was highly disciplined”. The 
economic smothering of Igbo began during the country’s First Republic at the time the 
Northern ruled federal government established all important development ventures 
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allotted for execution in the first National Development Plan (1962-1968) in northern 
Nigeria. These development schemes include, “the 150 millon BP Bornu Railway 
extension project, 50 million BP defence and administration factory and the 7million BP 
Kainji-Dam, Sokoto Road project”. The iron and steel industry which was meant to be 
sited in the Eastern Nigeria was denied on the bases of using raw material from the north 
to service another industry in the south.642  Yet, the oil produced in Eastern Nigeria and 
Niger regions regularly piped up the north to service the Kaduna oil refinery. 
            Igbo areas being denied federal projects and industries to be setup has attracted 
Achebe’s criticism that “Many have tried to ask but nobody has quite succeeded in 
explaining away the sitting of five steel mills worth 4.5 billion naira on final completion 
with estimated employment capacity of 100,000 by 1990, only in North and West of the 
country.”643 This study addresses Chinua Achebe’s complaints. For example, from 1986-
1990, 70 per cent of registered companies in Nigeria were found operating in the 
southwest whereas 16 per cent were located in the northern zone and 14 per cent was 
shared by two other northern zones.
644
 Yet the same north suffered infrastructural and 
macro-economic difficulties that led to 46 per cent of industries located in the zone to 
close down as at 2001. In other words, de-industrialisation as a result of economic 
liberalisation has excessively negative impact in the north.
645
 
         In furtherance to this argument, this thesis provides other instances of unfairness in 
the system. Obafemi Awolowo who was the Nigerian Finance Minister “put a ceiling of 
20 pounds on all bank accounts that had been operated in Biafra” for the duration of the 
civil war, was designed to neutralize the savings as well as economic capacity of the 
Igbo to recover from the setback caused by the civil war and to re-enter the Nigerian 
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economy. Others include exploitation of revenue allocation formula as well as negligible 
share of federally funded projects to the East.
646
  But these issues do not promote a 
cohesive federal state as seen in ill-treatment against the defeated Biafrans now being 
short-changed while rejoining the federation. Forsyth insists that in multi-national 
federalist, multi-national maintenance engineers the system. Multi-ethnic federalists 
conversely promote federation “to unite people who seek the advantages of membership 
of a common political unit, but differ markedly in descent, language and culture.”647   
         Furthermore, this study argues that the current agitation in the Niger Delta is truly 
based on the argument that both the Philipson “Commission report (1946) and the Dina 
Committee Report (1968)” provided the country with “the principle of derivation” which 
was generally accepted amongst the measures for allocating national revenue in Nigeria 
which benefited the North and West through their agricultural produce. The military 
changed the rules as soon as oil was discovered in Eastern Nigeria and largely within 
the/Niger Delta. It ceased to be the revenue distribution arrangement whereby the 
military in1970 amended the principle of derivation through Decree 3 of 1970 which 
recognised equal weighed principles-population and equality of states.
648
  
           Post-independence Malays were backward like the the situation in Northern 
Nigeria in terms of economic empowerment. This is attested within the index of 
economic inequality as shown in the predominance of Lagos in banking operations 
which maintained 48 per cent of general deposits as well as 69.96 per cent of loans 
issued in 2006. This starkly contrasts with the 10.75 per cent of deposits and 8.5 per cent 
of loans in the three northern zones combined.
649
  
                                                 
646
 N. Ikpeze, “Post Biafran Marginalization of the Igbo in Nigeria,” in Ifi Amadiume and Abdullahi An-
Na’im (eds.), The Politics of Memory: Truth, Healing and Social Justice, London: and New York: Zed 
Books, 2000: 90-109, p. 96. 
647
  M. Forsyth, Federaisim and Nationalism, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1989, p. 4. 
648
 Ikpe, “Post Biafran Marginalization”, p. 97. This speaks of the current conflict in the Niger Delta. 
649
 Charles Soludo, Preserving Stability and Accelerating Growth, Central Bank of Nigeria, Speech by the 
Governor, 2007. 
 218 
           It is significant to note in this study that macro-economic liberalisation could 
result in unwarranted polarisation consequences, so also are official discriminatory 
practices by the state and its officials. It can fuel inequality and tension when certain 
groups are given unfair access to economic resources which is commonly described in a 
local Nigeria parlance as “Na for them them” and literarily interpreted as (the system is 
for them and their people), nepotism at work whereby some officials give their ethnic 
group more preference. For example, many Igbo leaders expressed dissatisfaction over 
the quick indigisation of companies in Nigeria immediately the Civil War ended in 1970 
which they felt was done so that a devastated people will not be able to take their due 
place in the exercise. In the same manner Ken Saro-Wiwa, a Niger Delta activist 
complained resentfully that top northerners were lifting oil under the military 
dictatorship of Babangida and Abacha when they themselves in the oil producing Niger 
Delta never had access to the oil wealth deposited in their region.
650
  
            Sadly, Ken Saro-Wiwa was among the nine environmental and political activits 
of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) who were executed by 
Gen.Sani Abacha’s government.651 This thesis argues that it was a violation of the 
federal constitutional provision expressing the competences of the federal and the state 
in terms of revenue accrual and utilization. This remarkable violation of the right of the 
states or regions in their geoethnic setting is resisted to this day, especially the ethnic 
groups in the Niger Delta thereby causing ceaseless tensions in Nigeria. Yet, not too 
long ago, Northern Elders complained of “a systematic edging out of the region and 
northerners from positions in the economy in sectors like oil/gass, telecommunications, 
banking and energy.
652
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          Also ethnic politics is responsible for the lopsided location of industries and 
development projects which tend to disregard genuine feasibility studies or viability of 
the location. Politicised ethnicity remains detrimental to national unity and socio-
economic development and well-being of Nigeria.
653
 Unlike Malaysia, no ethnic 
preferential policy is practised in Nigeria rather politicians often use political fiat to 
favour their ethnic group. For example, an appointee of the Abacha administration, 
General M. Buhari (rtd) who is of northern extraction was said to have allowed the 
allocation of Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) lopsidedly in favour of the North whereas the 
South-south and South-east where the oil is produced received less.
654
 
             In this context, it raises certain questions as to the criteria used by Buhari’s 
office to distribute resources to different geopolitical zones in the country. The amounts 
allocated to South-south and Southeast where oil is produced as shown in Appendix K. 
Table 6.3 on patterns of PTF allocation demonstrate the grievances that followed 
military exit from power in 1999. This describes structural injustice as the table 
demonstrates. This is akin to Malaysia’s preferential treatment. Paradoxically, both 
North-west and North-east were allocated a total of 458 contracts as whereas South-
West, South-East and South-South where oil is produced were allocated with something 
around 250 contracts. This is one of such issues perceived as unfair treatment which 
directly or indirectly fuels ethnic hostility in the country. The thesis stresses that years of 
harsh military rule that were characterised by misguided policies and over centralisation 
of national resources at the center with the federal government has reduced the 
constitutional powers of states and regional autonomy to a seemingly unitary status 
thereby reinforcing ethnic demands for a true federal order in Nigeria. 
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6.6   Contesting Politicised State and Local Government Creation –ensuing Conflicts 
        Ethnicity is politicised when political coalitions or parties are organised along 
ethnic lines, and when access to political or economic good depends on ethnic 
affiliation. Two issues are crucial in this discussion. First, regular state creation produces 
dimensions of ethnic and communal conflict in Nigeria. Second, incessant state and local 
government creation tends to foster continuing and enduring instability in Nigeria. 
          In Nigeria, state creation and recreation of states and local governments provides a 
ground to view both power and revenue-sharing strategies and the numerous conflicts 
the country has created for itself. For example, state creation started in Nigeria in the 
1940s. This brought about the creation of a three-state system and later made four in 
number in 1963. Gowon’s administration recognised the need to divide the country into 
smaller units in order to overcome the problem of a strong state that would control the 
central government or opt for secession. Gowon however articulated five principles for 
new states to be created namely, “No state should be in the position to dominate or 
control the central government; Each state should form one compact geographical unit; 
Administrative convenience, the facts of history, and the wishes of the people concerned 
must be taken into account; Each state should be in a position to discharge effectively 
the functions of the existing regional government; It is essential that new states are 
created simultaneously”.655  
       This study points out that General Gowon’s announcement on May 12th 1967 of the 
new 12 structures of Nigeria coincided with Eastern-region declaration of its 
independence as Republic of Biafra. This development brought changes in the federal 
system and created a more centralised government that gained more power.
656
 The re-
organisation in 1967 intensified demands for new states,which confronted Brigadier 
                                                 
655
 Elaigwe, The Politics of Federalism in Nigeria, p. 115.  
656
 Rotimi  T. Suberu, Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria, Washington: United States Institutes of 
Peace, 2001, pp. 87-88. 
 221 
Murtala Mohamamed who quickly appointed the Irikefe panel with the mandate and 
possibility of creating additional states in Nigeria.
657
  
              Irikefe’s panel recommended that 7 states be created on the basis that Nigeria’s 
stability might not be assured without the government creating new states. The new 
seven raised the number of states in the country to 19, but failed to satisfy numerous 
demands, mainly the Igbo whose discontent was great in being allowed only two states. 
Politically speaking, a crucial point of note in this discource is that ethnic groups in 
Nigeria measure how many states each dominant group controls. This is important 
because it determines their respective power at the federal center as well as attracting 
higher revenue allotment from the Central Government. It should be noted that in 1985, 
General Ibrahim Babangida’s administration created two more states and later further 
agitation led his administration to create nine more states and based his arguments on 
“three mutually reinforcing principles, namely, principle of social justice, the principle 
of development and the principle of a balanced federation”. 658  A number of reasons 
which include realigning former boundaries of earlier colonial provinces, as well as to 
see the Third Republic experience smoother operation than earlier regimes were among 
his few reasons for new states.
659
  
           Further demands for new states never ceased, hence General Sani Abacha 
received more than seventy thousand requests for new state creation. He created six 
more states thereby bringing the total number to 36 states. He emphasised how state 
creation had become regular as well as an accepted aspect of politics in the country 
given the fact that it has gained the support of the National Constitutional Conference.
660
 
Appendix L Table 6.4 shows the years and number of states created in Nigeria 
since1914. Obviously, newly created states are not an end in themselves, rather they 
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induce splitting and recreating new local government areas in line with the 
administrative structures of the new states. This thesis argues that by splitting the 
country into several new states, the nation has not really shifted from the earlier regional 
centres of ethno-politics because newly created states are largely considered along these 
ethno-regional lines of remote power centres thus reinforcing ethnicity in the country. 
According to Otite, these incessant state creations in Nigeria induce communal conflict 
in local councils. He cites numberous communities involved in these conflicts. 
          First, land space and resources available constitutes a source of conflict. People of 
different backgrounds within and across LGAs most times claim ownership of land as 
“original settlers or aboriginals” who see this as a basic reason to fight off those they see 
as intruders. It has generated heightened tensions and clashes in some parts of Nigeria’s 
deltaic areas where claims and counter claims over territories oil companies operate for 
which royalty and other developmental benefits are expected.
661
      
         Second, the “disputed jurisdiction of some traditional rulers and Chiefs” is a factor 
in which a ruler lays claim to certain people as his subjects is resisted. For instance ‘Olu’ 
(King) of Itsekiri ethnic group who had been “Olu of the whole Warri” has in his 
possession Itsekiri, Ijaw and Urhobo groups living within his jurisdiction, but problem 
arose when the government appointed three new rulers in similar capacity for the whole 
area now split up. In “Ile-Ife in Osun State, the Modakekes” claims of “ownership” of 
the disputed settlement along with farmland was opposed by the Ooni (King) and his 
people of Ife, and this led to conflict resulting in numerous deaths among the warring 
factions.
662
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       Third, newly created LGAs as well as the locations meant for their headquarters are 
conflict-generating factors in Nigeria’s local communities exemplified in Ife and Warri 
cases. The federal government is responsible for the creation of the new local 
government councils but conflicts arise when a particular community feels its inclusion 
in the wrong council. Attempts to site local government council headquarters or market 
are sources of conflict in the case of Zangon Kataf and Tafawa Balewa town in Kaduna, 
with the opposition demanding relocation to another community and subsequent 
resistance exacerbating widespread conflicts.
663
  
       However, Appendix M. Table 6.5 contains the list of these communal clashes in 
Nigeria. It is these tragic images that intensified conflicts involving Yoruba communities 
of Ife and Modakeke who are neighbours but have been locked in a bitter and violent 
conflict over historical and legal claims to land ownership. In the southeastern region of 
Nigeria, the Ikun community of Cross River state had conflicts of their own with their 
neighbours the Okon-Ohafia community of Abia state. Violent clashes also occurred in 
the farming community of Udawa in Gombe State involving Fulani cattle rearers. 
Communal conflicts have always been widespread involving Umuleri/Aguleri, 
Ijaw/Itsekiri, Ilaje/Ijaw and many other communities in the country.
664
 Huge human and 
material losses were recorded at the threshold of Nigeria’s transition to civilian 
administration in 1999, in which over forty tragic ethnic clashes consumed about ten 
thousand lives. These occurred within the first four years of the administration of 
President Obansanjo.
665
 Communal clashes stem from individual and sectional 
competition over scarce resources. “Positions of state commissioners, local government” 
council chairmen as well as “councilors are limited” and opponents mobilise their tribe’s 
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men for victory through their votes at elections. Expectations are high because 
successful contestants are expected to bring political good home.
666
  
        Despite its associated conflict, state creation has some seemingly positive effects on 
the continual existence of the Nigerian federation. First, the numerous states created 
have given the minority groups in Nigeria a sense of identity and believe in the system. 
Multiple-state federal system has provided room for the role of ethnic minority states in 
Nigeria’s decentralised polity.667 Second, despite the insurgency being carried out by the 
southern ethnic minority communities in the Niger Delta, anti-secessionist sentiment as 
well as support for the continuity of Nigeria as a nation is moderately strong since the 
1967 state creation exercise in Nigeria.
668
  Third, it has localised conflicts within states 
but has not engulfed the entire country. However, the exercise has led to inter-religious 
hostility particularly in Kaduna.
669
 Suberu’s observation indicates that conflict in Nigeria 
is widespread.  Then does it make the federal centre an island of its own? Is the federal 
constitutional role effectively discharged as revealed in this discourse? It could rightly 
be said that the federal centre is meaningless if the component units are destroyed or are 
engaged in self-destruction and by extension does not portray federal accommodation. 
        This study also argues that most states in Nigeria seem to be unviable not for a lack 
of resource generating avenues. Rather monthly oil money disbursed at the center has 
made the federal and its component units dependent solely on the fluctuating petro-
dollar oil prices at the world market. This accounts for danger in the economy whenever 
oil prices fall. Hence these states have become cost centres, and as Nwankwo correctly 
noted, “We have indolent-nominal rent-collecting governments in Nigeria whose only 
role and duties as governments is to pay civil servant salaries, as well as maintain a few 
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administrative offices; with no form of real development to show for their existence.”670 
Unforfunately, overdependence by the states in Nigeria on the central government is 
antithesis of federal practice which has given room for much crisis in governance. 
        Conversely, these conflicts are peculiar to Nigeria. In Malaysia, no new states have 
been created outside the original 13 states existing from its independence as observed by 
former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad. He also explained, “All these states are the 
original Malay states. Each has its own ruler. So when we began, we did not create any 
new state, but we had those territories ruled by the colonial powers, like Pinang and 
Malacca, and for them we created governorship. Today they have government, the same 
thing with Sabah and Sarawak. They have their own governments and are loyal to their 
states.”671 The foregoing discussion demonstrates the fact that factors responsible for 
numerous ethnic conflicts in Nigeria are varied. Arguably, state and LG creation and 
recreation as a factor in communal tension has to do with the ‘politics of the belly’. It is 
part of such failure in Nigeria’s federal practice due to the nation’s inability to nurture 
peaceful coexistence among its large ethnic communities. 
 
6.7 Contesting Resource Control Inducing Militancy and Secession 
         To argue that Nigeria’s federal system is flawed is never meant to castigate the 
nation which has endured for over fifty years. Yet, the grounds for this argument is not 
abashed by mere existence, given the numerous contradictions in terms of misrule 
exacerbating ethnic upheavals that have characterised and constrained the social 
progress of the people, as well as the development of the federation. This section of the 
study establishes two salient facts about resource control and revenue sharing in Nigeria:  
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 (a),  Resource control in Nigeria is historically linked, its distortion by the military created 
tension,  
  (b), Federalism is less practiced in Malaysia’s close parliamentary government, unlike Nigeria’s 
style of American presidential system of democracy with its federalism reinforcing demands by 
federating units in Nigeria on their rights under the country’s federal constitution. 
   
 
         The difference between Nigeria and Malaysia as highlighted above should be kept 
in mind, while this study stresses that the need for true practice of fiscal federalism poses 
a great challenge to Nigeria. Differences exist among federations as could be seen in 
these two countries under investigation, and between adoption of federal system and full 
practice of federalism. For example, these variations are documented in chapter one as 
made clearer by Mcgarry and O’Leary who posit, “The federal principle of separation of 
competencies says nothing about how much power each level enjoys. Regions in some 
federations may enjoy less de facto power than those in decentralised unitary states. The 
constitutional division of power (even as interpreted by the courts) is not always an 
accurate guide to policy-making autonomy and discretion enjoyed by different tiers.”672                  
Given the foregoing issues, this study looks at how time and space created a dichotomy 
from what is known to what is imposed on revenue sharing in Nigeria. For example, the 
emphasis here is that the constitution (legal framework) covering resource control as 
well as revenue distribution gives the Federal Government of Nigeria the final power. 
When the British rule ended, the 1946 Mineral Act which granted colonial authorities 
the control as well as onwnership of all minerals in the country was maintained.
673
 In 
providing a concise analysis of the root of resource control problem in Nigeria, Octive 
Igbuzor in an interview with Allwell Okpi of SUNDAY PUNCH observed, 
   In the first republic (1963 to 1966), there was no oil. The revenue of the country was 
distributed based on derivation principle.  Fifty per cent of the revenue from mineral resources 
was given to the region from where the minerals were extracted. Then, 30 per cent was put into 
a distributable pool which was divided among all the regions including the producing regions 
while the remaining 20 per cent went to the Federal Government. But the formula changed 
when oil became Nigeria’s main source of revenue.674 
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          The challenge posed by resource control struggle in Nigeria has not only attracted 
scholars but civil societies alike. The perception is seen within what could be concieved 
as Federal Government absolutism on mineral resources involving oil and gass in 
Nigeria. For instance the ‘Citizens Forum for Constitutional Reform (CFCR)’ which is a 
coalition of more than ninety civil society groups in Nigeria was formed in July 1999. 
Its major concern as contained in its constitution is to press for constitutional reform in 
Nigeria’s fiscal federalism in which it noted, 
     It has been noted that the 1999 Constitution violates the principles of Federalism as applied to 
revenue allocation. In mature federal political systems, federating units have the right to control 
their resources.  For example in the USA, the state of Alaska owns all the lands in the State 
currently producing oil and collects over $1.1 billion annually in royalties on production in its 
public land.  In Canada, the provinces (states and regions) are entitled to extract a royalty 
payment in respect of each unit of production. In Australia, States collect royalties but not taxes. 
The past and present revenue sharing formula in Nigeria are bedevilled with problems. 
…Derivation principle, which has been used since the 70s to try to transfer some of the revenue 
from resource exploitation to the areas, have not satisfactorily addressed the problem.
 675
 
  
        Contrary to what is practiced in the older federations as shown in the foregoing 
analysis, the military created resource sharing problems in Nigeria. For example, while 
oil was discovered in Nigeria in 1956, unfortunately the generous derivation principle 
earlier practiced in the country was disrupted by the incursion of the military into 
governance. The secession by Biafra and threats to annex a large share of the oil-rich 
south quickly pressured the Nigerian Federal Authority to enact the ‘Petroleum Act of 
1969’ which conferred on the  Federal Government of Nigeria with ownership of oil and 
gas wherever they are located in the country, including those found in its territorial 
waters and continental shelf. But the turning point as this thesis discovers is that the 
1969 Petroleum Act was originally a war instrument against the secessionist Biafra, and 
was not reversed after the war. Yet, as commentators say, the government incongruously 
continues to fight the very oil-producing region it moved to ‘liberate’ at the period of 
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civil war in the country.
676
 However, “the 1979 Constitution Section 40(3) declared all 
mineral and hydrocarbons legal property of the federal government” whereas “land 
ownership rights”  were left in the hands of state military governors “in trust” for the 
people.
677
 By 1999, the Federal Government enshrined into the 1999 Constitution the 
ownership of all the natural resources in the country.
678
  
           Given all these constitutional changes, this study looks at a scenario in the Niger 
Delta region which shows the majority of communities occupying the oil-rich region as 
comprised of peasant farmers. Unfortunately, their incomes were based on food and cash 
crops as well as minimal compensation received from their land which fetched the 
Federal Government “billions of dollars from of oil and gas” exploration. This study also 
discovers resentment by Niger Deltans towards President Obasanjo over the oil revenue 
law instituted during his tenure as military head of state in 1979. In all the troubles 
associated with ethnic and regional conflict in the Niger Delta region, this study found 
that it has mainly been centered on derivation increase demanded by the oil-producing 
ethnic communities rather than resource control as the primary contention. The 
governamnt maintains a Federation Account on oil from which oil funds are shared by 
“federal government, states, and local governments” in line with the formula provided 
by the “Revenue Mobilisation, Allocation and Fiscal Commission” (RMAFC) a federal 
executive agency.
679
 All the tiers of government in Nigeria virtually depend on oil 
revenue they receive from a central pool through statutory allocation, a situation that can 
make them non-functioning if oil revenue is deleted. Fiscal structure in Nigerian 
federalism should be quickly addressed.680  
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           For Anynwu, “We are not really practicing true federalism because various states 
are at the mercy of the federal government, as the formula for revenue allocation is 
manipulated”.681 Contrary to the fundamentals of federalism, the politicians-in-uniform 
substituted surreptitiously, the true federal constitution of 1960 and 1963 with decrees 
that reduced the 50 -70 per cent derivation to a paltry percentage. Undoubtedly, the 
perpetuation of these “gross inequalities, unfairness and injustices in our polity” remains 
the major catalyst for the re-current national crises.
682
  As stated in Chapter five that the 
military whittled down 50 per cent derivation enjoyed by the rejoined three regions now 
down to 1.5 per cent in control of oil wealth.
683
 The pervasiveness of marginalisation 
and unfairness with natural resources has led to a resurgence of secessionist movements 
in the country with threats to dismember the political entity called Nigeria.
684
 The 
slashing of oil revenue paid to oil-producing region is shown in table 6.2. 
Table 6.2. Federal and producing states shares of oil rents proceeds 1960- present 
 
Years       Producing state share 
         (Derivation per cent) 
    Federal Government share  
(inclusive of Distributive Pool Account in per cent) 
1960-1969 50 50 
1969-1971 45 55 
1971-1975 45 minus offshore proceeds 55 plus offshore proceeds 
1975-1979 20 minus offshore proceeds 80 plus offshore proceeds 
1979-1981 Nill 100 
1982-1992 1.5 98.5 
1992-1999 3 97 
1999 till date 13 87 
Source: UNDP, Niger Delta Human Development Report. Abuja: United Nations Development 
Programme, 2006, p. 15. 
 
 
Nigerian leaders have had the delicate task of holding the country together, yet, it must 
be stated clearly that the very problems that caused these attempts to break up the 
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country have not been carefully addressed up till now.
685
 The Niger Delta Militant 
groups insist on the control of natural resources in their region, which the Nigerian 
nation-state denies them.
686
 Given the need for equity in federalism, the implementation 
of resource control as presently practiced in Nigeria appears to be limited to mineral 
resources, particularly oil. There should be a generalisation of resource control of all 
resources in all states of the federation and the criteria clear and accepted.
687
 
          Ethnic self-determination is born out of deep frustrations caused by unfulfilled 
promises where a group or groups feel alienated or marginalised in the scheme of things. 
Hence MASSOB and MEND ethnic secessionist groups in southern Nigeria have been 
challenging Nigeria on socio-economic disparity in its lopsided federal practice.688 But 
Yusuf was against the agitation for resource control. There was a time groundnut from 
the North was one of Nigeria’s main revenues. He posited, “They now want to separate 
because they have oil in their area, what about our abundant agricultural produce for all 
in pre-1960 and 1960s? Oil in Nigeria is for the development of the country”.689 
         Conversely, Malaysia’s federal state under parliamentary system of government 
shows demands on fiscal federalism by its federating units but with less tension. Reasons 
for this are discussed in the next segment of this chapter on Malaysia. This is mainly on 
an account of low poverty rate on the one hand, and authoritarian one-party rule of a 
unitary posture, that is shielded by Malay ethnic majority electoral support that are 
influenced by preferential policy of the government. A salient fact at this point in 
Nigeria in contrast to ethnic preference in Malaysia is obvious. For instance, while 
federalism remains an effective system of consociationalism given its conflict regulatory 
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mechanisms, ethno-regional domination, polarization and alienation in Nigeria provided 
a ground for ethno-military infighting which led to the collapse of the First Republic.
690
 
          It was marginalization and unfairness in the sharing of derivatives from with 
natural resources that led to the resurgence of secessionist movements and threats to 
dismember the political entity called Nigeria.
691
 It is obvious that Federal Character 
Commission was established to cater for the welfare of different ethnic groups in 
Nigeria. Agitation for resource control has led to militancy especially in the Niger Delta. 
Resource control as a problem today in the Nigeria is `a constitutional matter that should 
be resolved through constitutional means’.692 Ethnic clashes induced President 
Obasanjo’s regime between 1999- 2007 to organise a national conference in 2005 which 
among other issues increased the derivation on oil to 13per cent which the Niger Delta 
region says is still unjustified.
693
 Government should revert to the period before the civil 
war when regional governments had full control of their resources that were taxed by the 
federal government instead of the slashed percentages on the current derivation.
694
 Given 
the dependence and the centralisation of oil resources at the center, Nwankwo argued:  
I am in support of resource control as part of the Nigeria federation policy. As this is the only 
way various levels of the government in Nigeria from local, state and federal governments 
could look inwards and begin to make positive attempts at developing natural and human 
resources otherwise distributed all over the country by God Almighty Himself. Nigeria is a 
very rich resources blessed nation. Resource control in Nigeria is an idea, which time is ripe 
for implementation. Resource control will make our political leadership to sit-up from the 
president to the 36 state governors, down to the 774 local government chairmen who have 
collectively constituted themselves into a drain pipe of the country’s resources and revenue.695 
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         The lingering and often open gun battles with frustrated ethnic militia, results in 
the destruction of oil facilities which attracts brutal retaliatory measures by the Nigeria 
armed forces.  This reinforces further confrontations by such ethnic communities with 
the entire oil-rich region threatening secession from the entity called Nigeria. But 
Ibrahim suggested that ethnic separatism could be overcome in Nigeria through equal 
rights and justice, and true federalism. “Equal rights and justice must be exhibited in all 
spheres of our national life”.696 According to Crisis Group “The government has been 
quick to brand many of the symptoms, especially the rise of militancy, as simple 
criminality to be dealt with by more police and troops. But unless it engages with the 
underlying issues of resource control, equal rights, power sharing and accountability, 
Nigeria will face an internal crisis of increasing proportions.”697 Other views insist that 
ethnic separatist movements could be overcome by negotiations and compromise that 
will be strictly honoured by the stake holders and warring parties in the country.
698
  
          Yet, revenue formula has raised serious disagreement in the ongoing National 
Conference under the leadership of President Jonathan in 2014.
699
 The struggle for 
‘resource control’ in the Niger Delta region was enshrined over decade ago in various 
ethnic declarations such as, “(i)The Ogoni Bill of Rights (ii) The Kaiama Declaration, 
(iii) The Aklaka Declaration, (iv) The Bill of Rights of Oron People, (v) The Warri 
Accord (vi) Resolutions of the First Urhobo Economic Summit, (vii) Ikwere Rescue 
Chapter”.700 The foregoing analysis and list of social forces as well as reasons for 
continuing conflict in the Niger Delta region is summed up by Nwankwo: “The 
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generality of the people feel politically alienated and short changed in the scheme of 
things. People have generally lost faith in the way the country is governed politically and 
economically. The wealth of the nation is steadily being siphoned away to foreign bank 
accounts of the elites, leaving the majority of Nigerian people economically destitute in 
their own country.  Sadly, uemployed youths resort to violence, militancy, kidnapping 
which has become a way of life among this alienated segment of the population”.701 
       Many reasons given in this study collaborate with Nwankwo and Jinadu views who 
insist that the “effectiveness of federalism and consociationalism as conflict regulatory 
mechanisms has been limited in Nigeria”. The kind of competition and quest to control 
the “Nigerian state” revealed strong ethnic cleavages that truncated the First and Second 
Republics.
702
 These ethnic militants are forces common to Nigeria and may have been 
aggravated by the frustrating poverty which the Nigerian government has not fully 
addressed as seen in Malaysia.
703
  
            Given Nigeria’s wealth distribution challenges, the ICG proffered the following 
remedies to the Nigerian Government: “1, Work toward a new division of the country’s 
natural resource wealth by: (a) Increasing as an interim measure the oil revenue allocated 
to producing states (the derivation principle) to 25 per cent. (b) passing uniform resource 
control legislation that: invests 50 per cent ownership of natural resources in the states 
and 50 per cent in the federal government, and then divides a percentage of the federal 
share among the states and local government areas (LGAs) through the Federal Account; 
and it requires that state devolve two thirds of the revenue accrued from state ownership 
directly to local incorporated development trusts, splitting the remainder between the 
state government and (LGAs); and (c) abolishing the derivation principle entirely once 
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this new framework is in place. 2,- Encourage non-oil producing states to develop new 
revenue generating capacity in agriculture, tourism and solid minerals. 3, Conduct a 
review of laws that have deprived communities of their lands and birthrights, leading to 
reform of the 1978 Land Use Act and repeal of the 1946 Minerals Act and the 1969 
Petroleum Decree.”704 
 
6.8 Contesting National and Ethnic Dimensions of Security Operatives 
 
      In Nigeria, the task of sustaining effective national security in the country has largely 
constituted a national challenge. The issue of security of life and property in Nigeria has 
become crucial for the country’s survival and progress. This argument draws from 
Njoku’s view that “a sovereign state is marked by self-rule while maintaining all the 
trappings of sovereign status that grant it legitimacy over its geographical limits within 
which lives, property and the well-being of its citizens form prioritised goals of the 
government to protect and guide jealously for its own continuity.”705  This section is 
significant in the entire ethnic conflict discourse in this study. (a) It grants the reader a 
clearer view of physical force and brutality associated with ethnic conflict in Nigeria. (b) 
It serves as a benchmark for understanding the level of political instability and social 
disharmony in Nigeria. (c)To state the fact that Malaysia does not have parallel ethnic 
security movement competing with the national security outfit as seen in Nigeria. 
          This study is inclined to arguing that Nigeria’s need for adequate security is not a 
matter of huge numbers of soldiers within its army, because most of the problems the 
country has suffered from since its independence in 1960 down to year 2000 have been 
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associated with the actions and omissions of the same security forces of Nigeria.
706
 In 
other words, this study emphasises that security in Nigeria has been limited to the 
personal security maintained for the leader as well as those supporting him. The 
protection and safety measures in the country have collapsed due to the fact that the 
“national security” failed to “include vital aspects of social and national development in 
the area of basic amenities”, hence Nigeria has not been able to achieve economic, social 
and “military conditions” that serve as “national security”.707       
           For instance, security failures in Nigeria created a vacuum that gave rise to ethnic 
militia serving as auxiliary security operatives called vigilant groups, and militant civil 
society vanguards. It exposed the inadequacy of the Nigerian police force as well as its 
awful disappointment to uphold the rule of law and offer protection which was among 
the findings of the Annual Reports of the human situation in Nigeria. Many civilians 
were slain by these ethnic vigilant groups.
708
 While it is highly contested, these ethnic 
militia were not too long ago drawn into religious as well as ethnic conflicts, and by 
extension undermined “the fragile peace and stability of the country”.709 These armed 
militia represented by the Bakassy Boys of Southeastern Nigeria, the Oodua People’s 
Congress (OPC) of Southwest and the Egbesu Boys acted as security to their respective 
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ethnic groups. The worsening crime in Nigeria at this time which overwhelmed the 
police led to the need for the vigilantes.”710  
        For instance, the so-called “Godfathers” in politics largely recruit from certain 
vicious and sometimes violent struggles for local power or against other ethnic sectarian 
groups.They have at one time or the other aided the intimidation of political 
opponents.
711
 It is worthy to point out that Bakassi Boys, for instance have at various 
times been drafted and recognised as state vigilantes and sponsored by governors. They 
were legitimised as Anambra Vigilante Service (AVS) between 1999 and 2003 during 
the tenure of then governor, Chinwoke Mbadinuju. Given their suspected involvement in 
several political smuggings, abductions, assassination as well as being political thugs, no 
efforts were made to prosecute for engaging in extra-judicial killings.
712
Similarly, 
between 2004 and 2005, Governor Chris Ngige who succeeded Governor Mbadinuju 
used Bakssi Boys to guard himself and key officials at Government House in Awka, due 
to the federal government’s withdrawal of his police guards.  In Abia State, Governor 
Orji Kalu argued that the due to the scale of crime in his state, the ‘Abia State Vigilante 
Group Bill’, which gave assent to the operation of the state-based security outfit, was 
borne out of a crucial  societal need, and not connected to Bakassi Boys.
713
  
            The foregoing can be understood through a Lagos editorial publication which 
summed up the emergence of State Vigilante groups in Nigeria and their role in 
contemporary Nigeria. It expressed that the challenge that confronted the Federal 
Government especially on the need to reduce enormous crime in the society, was the 
police force’s inability to ensure effective protection of lives and property. This gap has 
led to some states to have parallel security and vigilante groups which have been more 
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effective in reducing crime in the country. Despite the inherent problems and risk 
associated with untrained security, such as vigilante groups who usually operate without 
defined structures, proper training or legal authority, these groups should be allowed to 
operate to assist in law enforcement, as in the case of the Bakassy Boys and others 
pending the creation of state police in the country.714 
         Also this thesis looks at the growing insecurity during Obasanjo democratic regime 
and how various regimes have allowed huge budgetary allocations to equip the police 
for their role. Crime rate has for several years led many state governments to give their 
state police patrol operation names such as ‘Operation Sweep’, ‘Operation Wipe Out’, 
‘Operation Gbale’ etc.715 Yet, crime rate in Nigeria has not been reduced to match with a 
more secure Malaysia. However, noticeable contradctions exist in the operation of 
federalism in both countries with different results in the context of a federal balance.  
           However, this study highlights the fact that the ban on Bakassi Boys some years 
ago has not really altered the situation. The Nigerian state has not achieved enough on 
security when compared with Malaysia’s stern measures on security matters. The 
argument in favour of Malaysia’s considerable ethnic harmony and political stability is 
shown in a contrasting scenario to Nigeria’s incessant political crisis that led to military 
dominance for roughly three decades. This study takes congnisance of the fact that 
military regimes in Nigeria exhibited unstable government that set negative legacies.
716
 
These legacies are seen as poor social conditions they left behind. For instance, 
protection and safety measures in Nigeria are lacking because the “national security” 
failed to “include vital aspects of social and national development in the area of basic 
amenities”, thus the nation’s failure to achieve economic, social and “military 
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conditions” that serve as “national security.”717 The thesis argues at this point that 
failings in socio-economic conditions of Nigerians reflect the social fragmentations in its 
polity accounting for ethnic militant movements that more or less operate in parallel 
with the Nigerian armed forces. This view point should be well understood when 
considering the dimensions of ethnic conflict in Nigeria. Ethnic movements in Nigeria 
include, Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC), Arewa Peoples 
Congress (APC), Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), Movement for the Actualization 
of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) whereas Malaysia has none of these ethnic 
forces. However, Afenifere, Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) and Ohanaeze Ndigbo 
are Socio-cultural organizations in Nigeria which are similar to UMNO, MCA and MIC 
ethno-cultural organizations in Malaysia. The formation of Ohanaeze and MASSOB 
were targeted at protecting as well as promoting the Igbo interests. Ohanaeze is non-
radical whereas MASSOB radical, but non-violent.
 718
   
        However, structural and institutional imbalances led to the establishment of these 
“ethnic social movements and ethnic socio-political organizations” in Nigeria. As social 
pressure groups, they pressure for the restructuring of power in Nigeria by fighting for 
the marginalised groups and the worsening material conditions, political and economic 
deprivations of some ethnic groups in the country.
719
 This study accentuates the fact that 
the existence of these ethnic movements in Nigeria is reinforced by the problem of 
ineffective political leadership, the challenges posed by the existing structure of power 
as well as economic relations in the country. It also involved some perceived hegemony 
by certain ethnic groups, the asymmetric centre-state relations which has been described 
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by Wole Soyinka as extremely unbalanced, exploitative and acquisitive.
720
 The Nigerian 
federation showcases conflicting social forces such as the forces for unification 
(centripetal forces) and the forces for preserving differences (centrifugal forces). This 
fact is obvious. For example, to understand the roots of ethnic conflict in Nigeria is to 
understand the thoughts of Ralph Uwazuruike, the founder and leader of MASSOB who 
once posited: “Biafra is a fight and symbol for inclusion, a project aimed at breaking the 
chain of Igbo exclusion from the scheme of things; a quest for a sense of belonging and 
identity; it is not an issue of secession but that of justice and fairness…”721  
             The foregoing collaborates with similar views by Ben Nwabueze who is of Igbo 
extraction, and a constitutional lawyer of repute. He said that ‘Ohanaeze Ndigbo’was 
formed “to lift ourselves from our present marginalised position and realise our group 
interests in the fierce competition and struggle among the antagonistic ethnic 
nationalities comprised in Nigeria imperatively, requires an effective, credible 
organisation and without which we will remain rudderless. In such organisation lies our 
only hope of salvaging ourselves from the abyss into which we have sunk.”722  
           The ‘abyss’ as a metaphor demonstrates the intensity of ethnic conflict in Nigeria 
and the support it has attracted.  Ihonvbere argues that The growing socio-economic 
injustice, political intimidation and alienation expressed in marginalised ethnic groups 
for many years in Nigeria has negatively affected both traditional values and institutions 
have become fresh challenges for the state and those in power.
723
  Ethnic organisations 
in Nigeria are ethnic movements and affiliations which show organisational cohesion 
and limitations on their ability to generalise support.
724
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Malaysia 
6.9 Ethno-Federal Constitutional Design and Ethnic Conflict in Malaysia 
6.9.1 Introduction 
     In this section of the study, attention is paid to domains and dimensions of ethnic 
conflict which are similar to issues treated on Nigeria. However, contests over special 
rights on education; language and culture provide a unique discussion on Malaysia. 
Unlike Nigeria, ethnicity featured in the calculations for the establishment of both the 
1957 and 1963 federation as shown in Chapter three. In effect, ethnicity infused 
Malaysia’s federal designs-in its earlier constitution of 1957, which preserved all aspects 
of Malay hegemony, legitimacy and their indigenous demographic dominance.
725
 These 
issues include; the position of Islam; the Malay Sultanate and monarchy; Special 
position of the Malays and indigenous people; position of Malay Language. These 
should be seen in a restricted sense while contested issues in Malaysia are explored. 
 
6.9.2 Contesting Ethnic Politics and Administration in Malaysia 
       Malaysia and Nigeria shared similar experience on ethnic politics and 
administration during their early formative years in 1960s. The origin of the country’s 
ethnicisation is located at the influence of the British who reinstated the authority of the 
Malay Monarchs that had been somewhat disregarded and created social stability by 
treating the Malays favourably to have influence in the politico-administrative domains 
due to reasons of being marginalised in business and industry.
726
 Similar special 
privileges have centrally influenced politics since 1946 when UMNO was formed as a 
major political party to advance the special rights of the Malays vis-a-vis other ethnic 
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groups in the country. As observed in the formation of early ethnic political parties in 
Nigeria such as NPC, NCNC and AD, such occurred in Malaysia too. The role of 
ethnicity in Malaysia has also been very profound in which the formation of the three 
major political parties, UMNO representing the Malays, MCA for the Chinese and MIC 
covering the interests of the Indian community define their segregated configuration in 
the Malaysian political, religious and socio-cultural map.
727
 The political history of 
Malaysia is in part shaped by the three main political parties that rose from the formation 
of a coalition to strengthening it with what is ordinarily known as the ‘Alliance’. The 
Alliance victoriously won Malaysia’s first federal election in 1955 that formed the 
government at independence in 1957. The coalition later welcomed other minor political 
parties to form an enlarged “Barisan National or the National Front.”728  
          However, the Alliance of UMNO, MCA and MIC leaders was a product of 
cooperation, agreement, and compromise among these leaders with regard to power 
sharing, allowing “political power to Malays and economic power to non-Malays”. 
Alliance was to serve the above purpose for interexchange of rights and benefits in 
which non-Malays were assured of citizenship and limited political role which was to be 
exchanged for accepting the special rights of the Malays in politics, education and 
language.
729
 In the Malaysian political equation, UMNO which represents the Malays 
can easily gain victory at elections but it entails MCA as well as MIC to gain two-third 
majority requisite to engage in any form of constitutional amendment. It is within this 
ethnicised structure of the governing coalition that the influence of Malay rulers is made 
evident in their political and religious roles in their states. Notably, from among them the 
king emerges as the constitutional monarch of the federation for every 5-year term.
730
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          It is also observed that the ethnicisation process in public service started during 
the imperial rule, which provided English education as well as teaching sons of Malay 
aristocrats in order for these young ones to occupy elevated ranks in the Malayan Civil 
Service (MCS).This then led to the creation of Malaya Administrative Service (MAS) 
which was for these Malay privileged class. In this scenario ordinary Malays were 
neglected while non-Malays were permitted to “professional and technical services”.731   
It was proclaimed by the colonial government in 1952 that non-Malays could be 
employed in the MCS on the ratio of 4:1 which specially was in favour of the Malays. 
This quota became well-entrenched in the system after independence, and based on 
Article 153 of the Constitution, the issue of ethnic ratio between the Malays and non-
Malays came into view in the MCS– 4:1 in all the government departments.732 
     According to Crouch “the ethnic preferential policy” brought about huge numbers of 
Malays occupying top “political and administrative positions” and this formed the 
archetype of Malay primacy “over institutions” like cabinet, legislature, bureaucracy, 
defense, judiciary, police etc.
733
  This shows how Malaysia operates what McGarry and 
O’Leary describe as majoritarian federation which allows power-resources at the federal 
level while facilitating “executive and legislative dominance either by a popularly 
endorsed executive president or by a single party premier and cabinet”.734  
          For the sake of a well-enlarged Malaysia, Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman 
had welcomed Singapore to be part of the federation. This decision formed the 
imperative of a greater Malaysia.
735
 The most significant consideration from Tunku’s 
approach was touching on the ethnic factor, reasoning that in an enlarged Malaysia, 
incorporating the Borneo territories would ensure that Malays would always outnumber 
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other ethnic groups like the Chinese, Indians, and secure integration of Borneo territories 
especially Brunei and Sarawak into the Malayan federation.
736
   Singapore being a part 
of Malaysia came to an end in 1965 through peaceful negotiations. Social conflict is 
known to be a fight over rank, authority, as well as limited ‘resources’ whereby the 
objectives of the contenders are not simply to achieve their preferred goal but at the 
same time aim to damage or get rid of competitors.
737
 Elections in Malaysia from 1970s-
1980 show mass support.
738
 Crouch describes UMNO as authoritarian whose elections 
are not intended to allow the voters to change the government.
739
          
       The compromise between UMNO, MCA and MIC has always given Barisan 
Nasional (BN) victory. But most noticed struggles within MIC and MCA especially 
urging their leaders to fight more for non-Malay rights in BN.
740
 In non-Malays there is 
seemingly a frustrating situation of exclusion within the domineering influence of 
UMNO-led Barsan Nasional. One observes poor federal practice given the fact that 
democracy aids federations to thrive in an open manner in power sharing arrangements. 
While there is strong ethnic competition in Nigeria, the conflict in Malaysia is 
exacerbated by ethnic hegemony between those deemed as owners of the land and those 
Malays Amibiga, a radical Malaysian Indian lawyer recently criticised for derogatorily 
using the Malay word ‘Pendatangs’ or  immigrants for other Malaysians.741 
 
 
 
                                                 
736
Kheng, Malaysia: The Making of a Nation, p. 93. 
737
 Lewis A. Coser, Sociological Theory: a Book of Sociological Reading, 2nd edition, London: McGraw 
Hill, 1966. 
738
 For more on UMNO’s level of mass support (Case 1993:187) cited in Zhang, Pacific Asia: The Politics 
of Development, p. 96. 
739
 Harold Crouch, Malaysia: Do Elections Make a Difference? in R. H. Taylor (ed.), Woodrow Wilson 
Center Series: The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 
p. 114-115. 
740
 Crouch, Do Elections Make a Difference? pp. 130-135. 
741
 Yiswaree Palansamy, “Stop rewriting history to justify racist policies, Ambiga tells Putrajaya,” 
Malaymail Online, October 2, 2014 available at http://m.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/stop-
rewriting-history-to-justify-racist-policies-ambiga-tells-putrajaya  (accessed January 7, 2015. 
 244 
6.9.3 Post-independence Religious Contests and Violent Conflicts 
         Religion is highly given primacy in the governance of Malaysia. Muslims in 
Malaysia are mostly Malays who constitute the largest number of the national 
population. Article 11 of the Federal Constitution gives freedom of worship for ethnic 
groups to practice their religions, while Article 3 stipulates that Islam is the state 
religion.
742
 In this section of the study, four major factors which underline ethno-
religious tension in Malaysia are explored. (a) First, Islamic religion dominates the 
governance of the Malaysian State to the extent that people of other faiths feel 
disadvantaged. (b) The authorities in Malaysia disallow conversion of Muslims (mainly 
Malays) to other religions but allow others to convert to Islam which is regarded as 
double standard. (c) There is ongoing attempt to Islamise Malaysia as against the secular 
status of the constitution of the country. (d) The use of the word ‘Allah’ is currently 
being contested.  All these largely shape explosive grounds of conflict in the Malaysian 
federal formation, yet Malaysia is seen as being more tolerant than Nigeria.         
        While the thesis explores all the aforementioned areas of concern, the literature 
section of this study demonstrates how Schottmann admires the influence of the former 
premier of Malaysia Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad while arguing that Islam could rise to 
the level of being a cultural pillar for democracy in Malaysia. This thesis looks at such 
perception which seems to dominate some people’s view about Malaysia and Islam. This 
is reinforced by the obvious fact that Muslims enjoy certain religious privileges when 
compared to devotees of other faiths. According to Hamid “First, in terms of legal 
repercussion, if Malay Muslims convert themselves to other religions, and if individuals 
preach Christianity among Muslims, they may have to face some consequences, 
although the conversion of non-Muslims to Islam is not discouraged”.743 This 
collaborates with Woon’s view that “Religious tolerance is relatively good where there 
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is freedom of worship despite the fact that there are so many religions in Malaysia. 
However, majority are Muslims as Malays born in Malaysia embrace Islam, and people 
of other faiths are not allowed to preach (apostasy) to the Muslim as it is against the 
law/constitution, which is actually religious intolerance.”744  
         For Kumar, all is not settled “Malaysia is predominantly an Islamic country. The 
constitution states freedom of religion very clearly but unfortunately freedom of religion 
is in reality not true. There is a restriction in Malaysia that Christians are not allowed to 
share their faith with Muslims. Muslims are not allowed to be found in Church building. 
There have been raids in churches and unfair intimidation so to speak. The right of 
Malay to choose his own faith is absolutely out of the question in Malaysia”.745 
However, such can be related to more tragic scenarios in Nigeria where the level of 
intolerance, not by the central government, but by angry intolerant mobs who torch 
churches and indulge in mass ethno-religious killings in the country. 
        On a wider context, this study discovers that there is a growing tendency in 
Kelantan State where the state applies Islamic law. Apart from restrictions, the 
government is accused by critics of its active role in pursuing the process of Islamisation 
of the country through many Islamic programmes. These include provisions and 
“establishment of Islamic institutions such as Islamic Banks, International Islamic 
University, expansion of Shariah courts and religious schools,” as well as allocating 
larger space for building Mosque unlike spaces allowed for other religions.
746
 Religious 
popularity seems to influence Malay Muslims in the coalition as well as the impulsive 
increase in the number of groups with political influence as exemplified in “Muslim 
Youth Movement of Malaysia, the Islamic Representative Council and the Jamaat 
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Tabilgh, and the Islamic Party of Malaysia”.747 In these state-led policies in favour of 
Muslims, people of other faiths might have a feeling of envy. For example, in Nigeria, 
the regional government’s policy of Northernisation led to the programme which was 
intended to free the North from depending on the Southern Nigerian civil servant and 
business by giving “preferences in employment, contracts, scholarships, land, and loans 
to Northerners”. This was as a result of apprehensions in Nigeria against the Southern 
domination of the Northern life.
748
 This is what Horowitz describes as ethnic groups 
maintaining their solidarity on material rewards they make available to “their members 
rather than on diffuse affection whose behavior is based on the interests of their 
members”.749 This creates divisions instead of unifying the country. 
           Similar to the era of ethno-religious tension in Nigeria in 1980s and 1990s, 
Malaysia’s religious tension also started with the activities of Darul Arqam which was a 
religious body established in 1968 by Ustaz Ashaari Mohammad, leader of the 
organization up till its end in October 1994.
750
 The clandestine activities of this religious 
body that operated for some years was halted my Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad’s 
vituperative assaults against the organisation that curbed its influence. This created room 
for a peaceful political environment for the Prime Minister’s vision to continue 
uninterrupted. However, there were outbreaks of Islamist violence in Southeast Asia 
around 1998 in Indonesia, southern Thailand and the Philippines which have long 
traditions of paramilitarist rebellion. Malaysians however have managed to keep the 
train of national politics on a largely constitutional track that remains undisrupted.
751
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          For a harmonious coexistence, Prime Minister Mahathir in 1996 criticised PAS on 
its intention to introduce “hukum hudud”, “God’s Punishment including amputations, 
lashes and stoning”752 and to enforce “Muslim dress codes”. Mahathir further tried to 
keep the Sharia Court significantly controlled by the Federal government in order to 
disallow interpretations of Sharia decisions by states ruled by PAS which could 
undermine the guiding principles of the Federal government.
753
 For enduring harmony, 
the Federal Government started to put in place “Islamic institutions” namely: “the 
Islamic Banking and finance Institute, the Institute of Islamic Understanding and the 
International Islamic University Malaysia”.754 
         Tension was again generated in 1998 when PAS stood firm in its bid to implement 
Sharia law in which it proposed a bill in the federal parliament that recommended 
punishment for any one converting from Islam to another religion with the death 
penalty.
755
 This tension created by PAS was worsened in 1999 election when it won in 
Terengganu state and twenty seven seats in Malaysia’s federal parliament, thus making 
itself a strong opposition party.
756
  
          PAS’s increasing power induced Mahathir’s government to declare “in 2001 that 
Malaysia fulfills the conditions for an Islamic state”.757 In spite of the appeasing 
changes, PAS further threatened to islamise a number of institutions of governance in 
PAS-controlled state of Terengganu having made it clear in 2002 of its plans to amend 
its constitution in order to introduce hokum hudud.
758
 Challenges posed by hard-pressing 
Islamic PAS led to the introduction of “dress codes for tourists, closed pubs, karaoke 
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centres, unisex hair salons and gaming outlets” in Teregganu, they also “enforced gender 
segregation aisles at supermarket counters”.759   This study emphasises that PAS-induced 
tension in the application of Islamic law in governance was climaxed in 2002 when the 
PAS controlled state of Kelantan fined 120 Muslim women for violating the stipulated 
Islamic attire.
760
  Abdullah Badawi brought about sweeping changes when he succeeded 
Prime Minister Mahathir in October 2003 by frustrating PAS’s agenda when he declared 
a fresh standpoint on Islam in the country. It is known as Islam Hadhari or ‘civilizational 
Islam,’ which is basically 10 axioms.761 
        The thesis submits that the state operation has been intertwined with religious 
issues by providing more incentives to Malay Muslims who are the majority in order to 
avoid wider conflict. But the Federal Government of Nigeria does not engage in this 
kind of practice. However, efforts of the Malaysian Federal Government has also been 
devoted to protecting the interests of people of other faiths in this secular state without 
which PAS moves would engulf the state in crisis given various perceptions and 
religious interpretations and the need for tolerance. According to Paul Chen, laws exist 
indicating a certain religion as state religion, and laws that project the state as secular. 
“What is important is the implementation. It doesn’t matter what the law says, it all 
depends on how each leader interprets the law. Majority of people in this country are 
tolerant. It is only a few key leaders in this country who created problem for political 
gains.
762
 Mahathir  looked at Malaysia rather in a historical context when he observed: 
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We have lived peacefully with other races right from the time we were feudal state and the time 
when we were under the British rule. We accepted that these other races have got their religions, 
and at that there should be justice. We have two laws, one Islamic law and British Common law. 
If we impose Islamic law on them, there is likely to be instability and Islam forbids that. Though 
we allow most of the time to be tried under the British Common law, and it applies to all and the 
sentence is the same, whether they are Muslims or non-Muslims. If you apply Muslim law to 
Muslims, to other they will be punished the way Muslims will be punished. So we have to be 
careful so that in administering law in this country you do not differentiate between Muslims 
and non-Muslims in terms of the sentence but in terms of justice they must be the same.
763
 
 
        For the benefit of argument in this study, Mahathir clarified what makes Malaysia 
more tolerant compared to Nigeria, in view of interpretation and implementation of 
Sharia law and what it has caused in Northern Nigeria. For Amanath, “I think the 
government has given a fair opportunity for all religions. No-body is deprived of his or 
her religion. We have literally done well there, that is why we are united. If we have not 
done well we would have created civil strife then”.764 In the same vein Musa Hitam was 
quite passionate about his country Malaysia. His expression was persuasively patriotic 
thus invoking a deep sense of national pride as seen in his remark, “As a Muslim country 
when compared to other Muslim countries in the world we are ahead of all of them. We 
are above. Concerning women and Muslim women in this country – Our women are in 
education, 70 percent of our Universities are filled by women even heads of 
departments. However, there are those who are error-minded, but generally speaking we 
are the best”.765 There is no doubt that the above views provide a ground to argue that 
Malaysia has maintained a peaceful federal structure in contrast to Nigeria. 
         This study also takes into account Rahim’s positive view on secularism in 
Malaysia given the constitutional provisions at Malaysia’s independence as observed in 
Article “11. (1) Every person has the right to profess and practice his religion, and 
subject to Clause (4), to propagate it”. He also observes that Article 11 which guarantees 
freedom of worship is similar to Article 25 of the secular Indian constitution. 
“Malaysia’s federal constitution has been aptly described as embodying the postcolonial 
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spirit of Merdeka (independence) rooted in the wasatiyyah (centrist, moderates, middle 
path) principles of accommodation, moderation, and tolerance”.766  
        In spite of this development, Saravanamuttu argues that Malaysia’s constitutional 
provisions since its self-rule in 1957 seemingly permitted a sort of Muslim 
exceptionalism which has turned to be the instrument that accelerated the infiltration of 
Islamic practices.
767
 Yet, the progressive push for Sharia in Malaysia has been 
incrementally dismantled by the comprehensive imposition of state-led Islamization. 
Since Malaysian independence in 1957, its secular constitution has been altered 600 
times through 45 amendments. All these amendments were driven by BN (Barisan 
Nasional National Front) coalition government supported by conservative Islamists who 
view the federal constitution as little more than a legacy of British colonialism.
768
 Given 
this religious push, extremists are springing up in Malaysia as recently reported.
769
  
 Apart from the era of religious tension in Malaysia, the state is known to have 
exhibited religious harmony. Given the issues raised by J. Hamid above, the thesis 
describes Malaysian government as playing double standard in forbidding Muslims to 
convert to other religions, whereas the state allows non-Muslims to convert to Islam. 
This collaborates with Woon and Kumar’s views on some aspects of religious 
intolerance in the country. This is against religious freedom of most Malays in not 
attaining their desired spiritual fulfillment in life, whereas people of other faiths are 
made to feel inferior and marginalized. There is no restriction on religious conversion in 
                                                 
766
 See, Lily Zubaidah Rahim, “The Crisis of State-led Islamisation and Communal Governance in 
Malaysia” in Lily Zubaidah Rahim (ed.), Muslim Secular Democracy: Voices from Within, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013, 166; see as cited from Faruqi 2006, p. 8. 
767
 John Saravanamuttu, “Malaysia: Multicultural Society, Islamic State, or What?” in State and 
Secularism: Perspectives from Asia. eds. Michael Heng Siam-Hend and Ten C. Liew, 
London: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., 2010, p. 289. 
768
 Sarwar (2006:11) cited in Lily Z. Rahim, p. 66, See Rahim, Lily Z. “The Crisis of State-led 
Islamization and Communal Governance in Malaysia,” in Lily Z. Rahim (ed.), Muslim Secular 
Democracy: Voices from Within, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013: 165-190, here pp.165-179. 
769
 Militants in Our Midst, The Star, June 24, 2014, p. 1. 
 251 
Nigeria. This is what Horowitz says power is, of course, often an instrument to secure 
other, tangible goods, and benefit for a particular group.
770
 
          It is important to note, although it is beyond the scope of this thesis, but for 
emphasis that the use of the word ‘Allah’ has caused serious controversy in Malaysia. It 
was a disagreement between Muslims in Malaysia who objected the use of the word 
‘Allah’ by its Christian Community for their God. Recently, a High Court in the country 
in an earlier ruling gave its nod on 31 December 2009 quashing a minister’s ban order 
and that Catholic weekly Herald could use the world ‘Allah’. It sparked an appeal by the 
minister and Government against the ruling in which the Court of Appeal later on 
October 14, 2013 ruled against the use of ‘Allah’ by the same Catholic weekly Herald. A 
4-3 majority decision of the Court of Appeal on June 23, 2014 rejected the bid by the 
Church to challenge the use of ‘Allah’ again.771  
         Also, Holy Bibles containing the word ‘Allah’ for the indigenous people in 
Malaysia were confiscated by the Islamic religious group on June 2014. Attorney 
General closed the case saying that Jais erred in seizing the Holy Books.
772
 Yet, such 
tension has not been diffused by the federal government. Nevertheless, the use of ‘Allah’ 
does not cause problem in Nigeria. Undoubtedly, Horowitz is correct when he posits that 
such things people elsewhere regard as regular issues become a political agenda of 
ethnically divided societies.
773
 This thesis argues that religious issues in Malaysia bear 
largely on the ethnicised federal constitution where Malay is intertwined with Islam, and 
where the federating units such as Sabah and Sarawak majority ethnic Christian states 
who have been using the word ‘Allah’ over a century witness its ban in the country. If 
the word “Allah” is not banned in East Malaysia of Sabah and Sarawak, why is it banned 
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in the Malaysia Peninsular of the same federation where Sabah and Sarawakians 
intermingle with their Holy Book containing the world ‘Allah’? Malaysia is truly an 
ethnicised federation as as Shafruddin has observed as shown earlier in this thesis.
774
 
          To understand Malaysia’s hidden tensions, a senior Sarawak Barisan Nasional 
minister accused the Malaysian government of the police not taking action against 
Perkasa’s Datuk Ibrahim Ali over his call to burn copies of the Bible containing the 
word “Allah” because he was merely defending Islam which has placed extremists 
above the law. He also noted, “So now it is acceptable to burn the Bibles, insult 
believers of other faiths and do disrespectful acts in denfense of the sanctity of Islam.”775 
 
6.9.4 Economic and Business Contests 
 
        Malaysia and Nigeria’s economic contests are embedded in their histories. We may 
not understand people’s frustrating tension in any given society unless their economic 
consciousness that impinges on their welfare is examined in view of contending groups’ 
interests within the available resources of the state and how the system allocates such 
resources. This segment focuses on two issues: (a) to highlight a few historical flash 
points that can enhance understanding of the past and contemporary economic cleavages 
and tension in Malaysia. (b) to affirm to the fact that preferential policy in Malaysia is a 
historical necessity that has saved the nation from more explosive ethnic tensions. 
          A close study of the state and nation-building in contemporary Malaysia remains 
crucial because the state has been fully involved in the transformation of the country. Its 
“intervention and political patronage” describe most significantly its influence in 
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Malaysia’s economic development since its independence in 1957.776  For example, the 
struggle for group interest by the Malays was induced by critical thoughts which 
routinely looked at what they have things they feel they deserved or even merited in the 
context of common wealth with other rival ethnic communities especially the Chinese.
777
 
          This study emphasises that economic and business competition and preferences 
have been part of Malaysian history and practices that provide a scene to see what this 
thesis describes as ‘winners and losers’ within the system. This study demonstrates this 
historical development and practice as observed in the area of land ownership, whereby 
the pre-colonial tradition to land which benefited only the Malays was changed by the 
British land tenure system based on Torrens Land Laws which created opportunity for 
both the “British and Chinese miners to purchase and own land as transferable private 
property.” This was done at the expense of peasants within the Malays.778  
           The growing resentment by the Malays led the British to put in place “Malay 
Reservation Act”. The Act provided for selected neighborhood as “the Malay 
Reservation Land” and similarly empowered the Malays to own, lease and mortgage 
land.
779
 Ethnic competition and preferences were intensified at the immediate post-1957 
independence of Malaysia whereby the 1957 Constitution empowered appropriate 
establishments to set aside specific allocation of business as well as licenses on trade for 
Malays.
780
 Malaysia’s First long term articulated Plan (1971-1990) was targeted at 
raising “Malay ownership and participation in industrial and commercial activities to 30 
per-cent by 1990”. Similarly, the agenda aimed at developing a class of Malays in 
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commerce as well as industry was encouraged, and was given a place in the Second and 
Third Perspective Plans.
781
          
             Mahathir has stressed on how ethnic tension brought about by economic 
imbalance in Malaysia induced the introduction of an affirmative action to reduce the 
disparities in the system.
782
 “The Industrial Coordination Act of 1975” which was 
introduced made it essential that non-Malay companies with capital as well as financial 
reserves of over M$250,000 and 25 employers should show not less than 30 per cent 
Bumiputra equity for the approval or renewal of its license.
783
 However, non-Malays 
could be denied of company license by the state if it failed to satisfy the requirements. 
Given these special rights, the Malays were favoured in business licenses, which 
encompass the following sectors: construction, mining, transport, timber industry, and so 
forth.
784
 These privileges have been designed by the government to position the Malays 
to be adequately in control of state machinery.
785
    
          Differences exist between Nigeria and Malaysia in this respect. First, there is no 
such thing as preferential policy to indigenous people because all the ethnic groups in 
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Nigeria are natives. Second, Nigeria’s failure in its post-civil war 2nd National Plan that 
was meant for reconciliation, integration, reconstruction and development is akin to 
Malaysia’s success story although it was highly ethnicised. For example, the affirmative 
action plan as this study explains expanded and laid a strong root for “Malay special 
rights” in various spheres. This was deepened by the Malaysian government as an 
agenda of such transformation right from 1970s involving measures, as an “ethnicized 
policy framework” to reposition the Malays over years of exclusion from Malaysia’s 
business sector. This was a move intended to assert an assumption of “Bumiputraism” 
thus justifying their indigenous status as more privileged in Malaysia.
786
  
         NEP ushered in radical Malay elites that took control of the Alliance who 
maintained that the root causes of Malays’ poverty and tragedy was due to unequal 
distribution of the fruits of modernisation. They advocated for the restructuring of the 
economy to correct economic imbalance.
787
 Yet, the state is largely peaceful in spite of 
Chinese, Indians and other people who feel a sense of deprivation in the system.   
            Briefly stated, this study provides other current issues (a little beyond its scope 
for emphasis). Recently, Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak looked at Bumiputra interest 
as an historical necessity when he noted: “Appreciating the interest and struggles of 
Bumiputra, I wish to quote seven wills by the Nine Malay Rulers when consenting to 
the independence agreement to set up a federation”. Truly: “We declare and we keep 
for you and we allow you to declare and keep for your children and grandchildren, 
other than the mountains, lakes and forest reserves, Malay Reserve land up to a ratio of 
50 per cent, the rest you, together with the other communities, may grab”.  Najib also 
noted that “this will is very clear. It has stated the equity and the ownership of the 
Malays and later expanded to Bumiputra, through the unification of Sabah and 
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Sarawak when Malaysia was set up 50 years ago.”788 Yet, it remains mostly contested 
by non-Malays as continued deprivation and marginalization whereas the government 
says it is not losing sight of the needs of all the ethnic groups.
789
 This thesis looks at 
Malaysia’s ethnicised federal structure as characterised by limiting other ethnic 
interests in the same social system which creates obvious ethnic boundaries as fault-
lines. Yet, its federation appears more peaceful than Nigeria. 
 
6.9.5 Contesting Special Rights, Education, Language and Cultural Inequality    
 
       There is need to note that many issues are contested for in Malaysia. Education, 
language, culture and other special rights are known to cause tensions in the country. In 
these areas of ethnic cleavages and tension, this study establishes three key areas of 
concern in relation to federalism. (a) The country projects Malay primacy through 
hegemony by UMNO-led Government, given the fact that UNMO unifies the Malays 
and thrives on the strength of its majority in the country. (b)This move allows little or no 
expression to states on certain debatable issues as federal units in Malaysia, rather than 
being almost mere appendages. (c) The Malaysian Federal Constitution is ethnically 
designed with less regard of federalism to regulate conflict in the system. 
            To begin the assessment of contested areas, this thesis emphasises that in the area 
of education, there have been several instances of communal tensions that rose to a 
dangerous dimension. Education is highly contested in Malaysia.
790
 For example, the 
Chinese community was outraged in 1973 over the mass-failure of Chinese students in 
their Malaysia Certificate of Examination (MCE, form 5) in a compulsory Malay 
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language paper.
791
 Some cultural issues in education caused tensions in 1982 in which 
Malay language was officially used in schools and the Chinese community felt alienated 
with grave danger on their children’s cultural upbringing. Some educational policies of 
the government intensified inflamed ethnic passion.
792
 However, Nigeria is known for its 
extreme linguistic diversity but English is the official of the nation without problems. 
          Ethnic conflict on education-related issues as this thesis emphasises could be 
observed in a situation where a non-Mandarin-educated teacher was appointed as senior 
administrator in a Chinese school. It was visited with instant reaction from the Chinese 
community. Chinese students at a time boycotted classes
793
 because of irregularities and 
quota system that never favoured them and has always been the reason for many Chinese 
sending their children abroad for studies.
794
This study points out that post-independent 
government in Malaysia employed unrestrained procedures to intensify the articulated 
“special rights of Malays in education by offering them generous scholarships, by 
expanding their quotas”. It started to lower the admission requirements along with 
building institutions to accommodate and train Malay professionals.
795
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         In view of these historical events, the Razak Report of 1986 emphasised for the 
establishment of a common education system that would accommodate all the racial 
groups which was premised on slow but sure rapport toward meeting the aspirations of 
the larger ethnic groups in the country. Contrary to this, Majid Ismail Report 
recommended university admissions to be based on racial quotas instead of merit.
796
 
Efforts were made to strengthen and protect special rights for the Malays in education in 
the Constitution in which Article 153 gives power to the king to give directives to 
appropriate bodies to set aside definite number of placements in universities and 
colleges, and other related establishments in the country for Malay students.
797
 This has 
helped to reduce the educational gap between the Malays and other ethnic groups, which 
has enhanced a measure of stability in the Malaysian federation. But this privileges are 
currently and largely for the Malays.  
          In related terms, this study broadens this discussion with emphasis on language 
policy which continues to be a crucial weapon in ensuring Malay dominance. In order to 
promote national integration through the development of language, Malay was selected 
but a strong stand was taken as the federation of Malaya was being formed on educating 
the whole of its people in Malay language. This nearly divided Malaya’s Alliance. 
Malay leaders who rejected the Reid (constitutional) Commission’s recommendation, 
that Chinese and Indian languages (Mandarin and Tamil) should be recognised along 
with Malay for use in the federation’s parliament.798  However, English was retained for 
official purpose only for ten years as a gesture to the peninsular non-Malay leaders.
799
 
The frontal attack on other languages was not allowed, but Malay became the official 
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language in 1967 for communication.
800
 According to Razak Report, “one of the 
fundamental requirements of an educational policy was to orientate all schools to a 
Malayan outlook through the teaching of Malay”.801 The 1956 Razak Report advocated 
the idea of unifying the nation’s system of education based on “Malay-English 
bilingualism and Education Ordinance of 1957” showing Razak Report which was 
targeted  at replacing Chinese with English in examinations  conducted in Chinese 
secondary schools.
802
The Rahman Talib Report of 1960 brought about the Education Act 
of 1961, with its recommendation to convert every Chinese secondary school “into 
English secondary schools”. This led to the conversion of 54 out of 71 whereas 17 
preferred to remain as “Independent schools.”803 The language policy further intensified 
leading to the “passage of the National Language Act” (1967). This constitutional 
amendment positioned “Malay as the national language” while Chinese and the use of 
English still remained as part of the educational scheme in the country.
804
 
         Similarly, it was demonstrated in the 1970s and 1980s when government and its 
agencies regularly seemed to disregard other cultures and treated Malay culture as if it 
were synonymous with Malaysian culture. Horowitz points out that “short of eliminating 
ethnic diversity in the physical sense, exclusionary groups seek to impose a 
homogeneous identity on the state and to compel acknowledgement of their preeminence 
in it.” While non-Malays were unnecessarily subjected to all sorts of pressures in 
Malaysia, it became difficult to maintain much of their culture.
805
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          A number of contested issues in Malaysia bear on culture. For instance, the 118-
foot-high statue of Kuan Yin which is ‘the goddess of mercy’ at Ayer Itam hill in 
Penang was forced to be reduced to eighty-three feet due to Malay protest in 1980.
806
 In 
1984, the Melaka government planned to level a large part of Bukit China (China Hill), 
which was reputed as the largest Chinese graveyard outside China, which contained 
around twelve thousand graves dating back to the time of Melaka sultanate in the 
fifteenth century.
807
 There were instances when appeals were made to the government by 
the Chinese group to have regard for non-Malay culture. But the government has been 
careful in this area.
808
 Discussions on “National Culture Policy” (NCP) instigated 
identity contestation in Malaysia between the 1970s and the 1980s and it has almost 
been forgotten due to changes in governance.
809
         
           This study now reiterates further on cultural inequality in Malaysia that often 
restrains cultural autonomy of other ethnicities contrary to its primacy in federalism. For 
instance, since the 1980s, the government and its agencies seemed to disregard other 
cultures and treated Malay culture using the media as well as displaying its Islamicised 
outlook in the public domain. Certain established rules by the government tend to restrict 
symbols of Chinese culture and practices.
810
 Given this cultural issue, Horowitz explains 
that “short of eliminating ethnic diversity in the physical sense, exclusionary groups seek 
to impose a homogeneous identity on the state and to compel acknowledgement of their 
preeminence in it.” While non-Malays were needlessly subjected to numerous pressures 
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in Malaysia, it became difficult to maintain much of their culture.
811
 Conversely, 
language is not contested in Nigeria but the complexity of ethnic languages complicates 
conflicts in the country. Pius Eze estimated that there are more than 300 languages (and 
dialects) in Nigeria.
812
 Such cultural differences had earlier prompted Awolowo to 
caution the British rulers in Nigeria to group together only people who could through 
affinity or general experience work together in harmony with regard to ethnic 
classification, cultural affinity and common problem.
813
 However, from a few hundred to 
well over five million, Coleman reduced the number of Nigerian languages to 248. No 
single satisfactory scheme for African languages has been agreed to by linguists, but it is 
generally accepted that Nigeria is one of the principal “linguistic crossroads” of 
Africa.
814
  This study argues that many languages in Nigeria may have directly or 
indirectly impacted negatively on national cohesion because languages create 
boundaries. For Horowitz “The key element in ethnic conflict is religion, or a common 
language is what “knits people together.” What is absent is what pulls them apart.815 
          To sum up, this study also perceives language controversy in Malaysia in the light 
of what Horowitz describes as Jayakan Bahasa kebangsaan – “Glorify the National 
language”-reads a neon sign in Kuala Lumpur. Horowitz emphasises that Malay 
language had often been denigrated. He insists that what was at stake was more than a 
language. This is because during the colonial rule, “the language of administration was 
the language of the ruler, the status of the language denotes the status of the group that 
speaks it.” 816 The overall clamor and demand by UMNO-led government since 1957 has 
been to maintain the primacy of Malay in the national outlook. This does not truly reflect 
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federal character in what projects a posture of ‘us and them marginalization” in what 
remains a centrally ethnicised-federation as earlier shown in Chapter three. 
 
6.9.6 Fiscal Federalism:  Contesting for Higher Royalty on Oil Resources 
        This section explores fiscal federalism in Malaysia with special attention to resource 
control and what instigates militancy and secession within a federal state. Three major 
themes emerge from this discussion on Malaysia: (a) Malaysia’s long ruling one-party 
majority parliamentary federal structure inhibits true federal autonomy, although Sabah 
and Sarawak are unique in their own sense of autonomy in the country. (b)Unlike 
Nigeria’s geoethnicity –where ethnic groups are geographically separated with their 
reinforcing regional (state) demands, Malaysia ethnic groups which live in clusters less 
provokes ethnic-state demands. (c) Less agitation for resource control in Malaysia is 
because federalism is not well studied and practiced in the country as compared to 
Nigeria. (d) A new development shows that the victory of opposition parties in the 
recent elections in Malaysia seems to have liberated some states from UMNO-led 
authoritarian government now demanding higher oil revenue as seen in East Malaysia. 
          To start with, federalism as a concept in governance provides room for spheres of 
autonomy between the regions and the central governing authority. It gives support to 
democracy through its balancing attributes. It endows central governments therein 
accommodating diverse groups and long-existing localities through consultative and 
pragmatic ways. While its terms are rooted in constitutionalism, it deepens the rule of 
law and raises the value of citizenship.
817
 Malaysia as a nation was founded under its 
Federal Constitution of 1957, which provides a federal system of government under an 
elected constitutional monarchy. Each of Malaysia’s 13 states has its constitution and a 
unicameral state assembly that shares legislative powers with the federal parliament. The 
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states in east Malaysia enjoy guarantees of autonomy.
818
  But the fact remains that 
“federalism has done less to promote democracy than to reinforce semi-democratic 
politics, a shifting amalgam of authoritarian controls and democratic space by which 
central government has efficiently- and interminably – extended its tenure”.819 
         Malaysian Federation is still credited to have innovative mechanisms to 
accommodate other irreconcilable diversities within a single system. One strong point 
remains that accommodation of ethno-cultural identities was almost ingrained in the 
very body of the post-Independence Malaysia federalism because of collective efforts 
and expansion in federalising efforts since the Federated Malay State in 1895, the 
Malayan Union of 1946 and the Federation of Malaya 1948 which led to independence 
in 1957.
820
 Rosely observes that “Federal Constitution of Malaysia assigns clear 
responsibilities to the federal, state, and local orders of government with much greater 
taxation power assigned to the federal government has led to fiscal centralization.” 821 
        According to Jaafar, as far as natural resource is concerned Malaysia has two main 
points. The first one is regarding petroleum resources. The question of exploration and 
of sharing is handled by the federal government in tandem with the state governments 
wherever the state has petroleum resources. Other than petroleum, other resources like 
iron ore, tin etc. are in the hands of state government, including water and sand. There 
was a debate between the state of Kelantan and the federal government as to how much 
royalty should be given to the state of Kelantan for its petroleum resources. Malaysia 
had earlier same question in the state of Terengganu, but these matters have been 
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resolved between the state and the federal government.
822
In view of what is happening 
elsewhere where states are meant to give the central government – “that is a new 
structure, the federal structure that has been imposed on old structure. It reinforces old 
structure. The new structure supersedes the old structure but nevertheless both work 
together – the federal and state are set up to operate.”823  
            Federal hand-outs (grants and loans) have enabled states to ignore the revenue 
potential of their own tax sources and their incentives for economy. Umikalsum Nor 
suggests that the states should generate their own revenue, and encourages the 
Government to manipulate federal grants given to states so that they should explore their 
potential.
824
 There have been instances of growing problems of vertical and horizontal 
imbalance in the system but federal transfers in the country should take into account 
interstate inequalities.
825
 There is no doubt that Malaysia is blessed with oil and other 
rich natural resources –oil palm and timber. But the problem with Malaysia is that it is 
divided into so many states like Sabah, Sarawak and Terengganu where there are rich 
deposits of oil and timber and therefore is economically prosperous. But the Federal 
government seems to have an overall control over this revenue and only a certain 
percentage of the oil money is ploughed back to the respective states”. Apparently, this 
has caused discontentment from time to time. A resource control could bring a pecuniary 
situation to most states in Malaysia. On the other hand, resource control could be 
achieved with a dynamic, progressive and visionary leadership.
826
 In Malaysia, both 
federal and state governments retain certain powers over resources. National finance and 
police (security) are under the federal government. Land which is one of the natural 
resources belongs to the states. If the federal government needs land it asks the state. In 
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the case of oil “It involves huge capital for the state, the federal government took over 
the management of oil resources but the state where the oil is found on-shore or off-
shore becomes entitled for 5 per cent of the total production – 5 per cent to the state 
involved, the rest goes to the federal government revenue. From there it becomes 
redistributed to states including states which have oil.”827   
         Apart from Holzhausen’s study on federal finance and state financing by Lai Ah 
Hoon,
828
 specific study on fiscal federalism in Malaysia appears negligible.
829
 The 
concentration of functions with the Federal Government has been so overwhelming in 
which one is bound to ask the essence of federation in the first place since states are not 
active in a real federal setting except the Borneo states with some additional powers but 
are still below the first level of government importance.
830
  However, the structure of 
federalism and the nature of federalism was already in Malaya before the British came. 
Negeris Sembilan – meaning nine states were in place in 1773 when America was 
involved in civil war. The indigenous concept of federalism has always been there.
831
 In 
the federation of Malaya (during independence) there were only two items the state has 
autonomy (1) Land (2) Religion and Malay culture. But Sabah and Sarawak have 
autonomy on immigration, education. He also noted:  
            I can take my passport to go to Sabah. This is the unique federation we have. In terms of fiscal 
policy we are different from many federalism all over the world, because it is not homogenised, 
but the only thing that is homogenised is when you agree in that federation you can only take 
5per cent of whatever resources in the country. Economically you have to manage because we 
emphasise on redistribution, we really don’t emphasise on good, we emphasise on redistribution 
and that is where Malaysia is very strong relative to other countries. We emphasise on 
redistribution and we are concerned about redistribution. We know a state as rich state or poor 
state. If you are a rich state, you cannot be rich alone. You must share, so income from oil in 
Terenganu, Sarawak must be shared by everybody. This is what we have in this country.
832
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       However, on oil resource distribution generally “if your contribution is 20 million, 
you can only have 5 percent that is the rule. This is based on consensus and negotiation - 
consensus is contingent upon many other things. I believe Malaysia is practicing what I 
call autonomous-oriented federalism”.833  Shamsul also argued that fiscal policy was not 
yet seen as important in the devolution of fiscal policy while stressing that fiscal policy 
has never been studied in Malaysia because people were so engrossed in politics and 
economic growth, they don’t study federalism and economic distribution. Affirmative 
policy is one and, there are many other things.
834
   
          According to Musa Hitam there were laws which cover the sea up to many miles 
is owned by Malaysia. “Each one of the states which conforms and complies with the 
petroleum Act, the National Petroleum Act gives power to the federal government to 
extract the natural resources but they must share the income with every one of the 
states”. He also noted that, “It was easy; we were all from the same party. When 
Terengganu became under Islamic party, the Federal Government said no, we won’t pay 
because we have not ripped, then politics comes in. I am an UMNO man but I said it 
open that it is their right. We gave them and called it sympathy fund. Basically it goes to 
the people, not to the pockets of leaders. But the quarrel with the states now is that they 
want the money for development. It is not individualised. But collective –that is a good 
thing about Malaysia and they are not following it in a violent manner”.835 
        The issue of resource control between the federal and state government is a recent 
phenomenon because until the last election, Barisan Nasional had full control of both the 
Parliament and the State Assemblies. Until recently, the issue of resource control was 
still not well tested. With recent events showing the swing of loyalty away from the 
Barisan coalition, “we may see this conflict of resource control becoming an issue 
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between federal and state governments depending on which party wins the Parliament 
seats and State seats. No experience to show how this problem can be overcome”.836 
         Recently, an appeal was made to the Malaysian government to increase oil 
royalties for the state of Sabah. Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak on July 2014 noted that 
“A formula is being worked out to address the call to increase oil royalties for 
Sabah…We have been concerned about the issue of oil royalties in Sabah and as an 
immediate solution, PETRONAS will increase its corporate social responsibility 
(CSR)…We will be announcing several other approaches which can help Sabahans in 
the oil royalty issue.”837 However, experience has shown how resource control elsewhere 
has led to serious negative impact on some nations, but there has not been such thing as 
militancy agitating for control of resources in Malaysia. Rather initially the indigenous 
people were the poorest among the groups in the country whereas the descendants of the 
immigrants who became nationals were richer and very much richer. This led to the 
conflict experienced in 1969. It was decided that the disparity should be reduced. It was 
followed with affirmative action which favoured the indigenous people. The indigenous 
people now have a share in the economy and they are less prone towards antagonism.
838
  
           There is also a general view that there is no militant group in Malaysia. “I don’t 
see such in Malaysia only but outside the country. Such thing can exist in agitation of 
Bumiputra, unfair policies or, privileges given to one race. I believe the government has 
been able to recognise other races and treat them much better”.839 The May 13, 1969 riot 
made the government become stricter on issues that could disrupt public peace and order 
in the country. There is no militancy in the country.
840
 A circle of inequity and 
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revolutionary response are provoked by ill-feeling of primordial type held by certain 
ethnic group members in a multiethnic nation which are historical legacies of 
deprivation and vengeful mentality. However, Malaysia is a multiracial democratic 
country, the people look up to their leaders to provide security.
841
 There has not been 
any form of secessionist groups or rival groups in Malaysia. Ethnic separatism has never 
been the issue facing Malaysia today. In the future, if there would be any division that 
may arise, it is more likely to be along religious lines.
842
 Such is always overcome by 
political leaders being fair in the policies of the government.
843
 
 
6.9.7 Contesting National Security for Political Stability 
         Managing national security is vital in the life of a nation. Briefly stated, this 
segment on Nigeria showed a precarious federation that suffers internal cohesion 
instigated by parallel militia and ethnic movements alongside with the nation’s armed 
forces. Malaysia does not have ethnic militia. This has helped in its political stability. 
          Ethnic and ideological differences as well as socioeconomic imbalance often 
expose a nation to volatility and security problems. The Malaysian State has not only 
gone through socioeconomic transformation but has also been challenged in its own 
internal security threats. For example, given Prime Minister Onn’s strict measures 
against extremism, a Far Eastern Economic Review report in 1979, just prior to his 
retirement, explained that his first two years in office saw the Communist Party of 
Malaya (CPM) launching a terror campaign. This meant that his regime “had to be 
intolerably harsh” and “Draconian laws [had] to be passed to bring the terror to a 
halt”.844 Indeed, Hussein’s leadership coincided with a heightened outpouring of 
religiosity on a scale never seen before. This fervor was the result of a widespread 
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movement seeking a ‘back to basics’ in Islamic practices, or fundamentalism’ that often 
advocated the use of violent militant activism to force acceptance of its objectives. This 
was Islamic fundamentalism that spread rapidly around the world in the wake of the Iran 
Revolution.
845
  Dakwah groups were united in one area and they were determined to see 
a more Islamic environment that stressed on Malay primacy. It needs to be stressed that 
such dakwah motives underline resentment against a government that in their view, was 
unwilling to subscribe to Islamic governance.
846
    
         This thesis also emphasises that Mahathir responded strictly to dealing with 
religious extremists, His Administration’s projection of the interpretation, form and 
ideas of Islam which it considers appropriate for Malaysia clearly possess a reverse 
image – “wrong” Islam. Broadly subsumed under the category of extremism, it has been 
identified as problematic to Malaysian socio-political development and largely assigned 
to the ruling party’s political opponents (including, increasingly, any religious 
movements expressing dissenting Islamic interpretation. 847   
        The period 1990s - 2000s witnessed extensive mass political mobilizations and 
public protests in Malaysia. This led the government to invoke the powers of Internal 
Security Act (ISA) 1971. Some students and members of Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) 
were arrested between 2000 and 2001. The authorities claimed that they have netted a 
group of Islamic militants allegedly belonging to the Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia 
(Malaysia Mujahidin Group) or KMM that was trained in Afghanistan by the Taliban 
was plotting terror activities in Malaysia. Public reaction against the existence of KMM 
demanded that those arrested be brought for trial in court.
848
  This thesis argues that ISA 
was seen in Malaysia as an obnoxious law because of arrest without trial. But the 
government used it as an instrument to counter threats to national security and social 
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harmony in Malaysia for many years. For example, aghast by the growing threats to 
national security, Mahathir exploited the September 11 2001 to address some political 
issues. He noted in 2002 that the “dilemma that the Malays and the people of Malaysia 
face is whether we should in the name of democracy, allow the country to be destroyed 
or we ensure that people are not subjected to the point where they will use democracy to 
destroy democracy”.849 He also insisted “We want political stability because it is good in 
itself. But we want it more because it can help prosper our country.”850  
           Security comprises domestic as well as external dimensions. The emphasis is on 
the internal peace, law, and order perceived as important in the regular business of 
administering as well as meeting the needs and demands of a plural society. Historically, 
security measures in Malaysia can be seen in its “constitutional, political and economic 
structures” produced by its governing elites to guard and support the diverse needs of 
Malaysia’s multiethnic social order.851 There is no doubt that security is vital to both 
Nigeria and Malaysia, but numerous deaths and casualties recorded in Nigeria provide a 
contrast to view Malaysia’s relative political stability as shown in its ethnic harmony. 
          According to Mahathir “When we talk about national security, the picture that 
usually comes to mind is that of armed soldiers manning border posts or fighting in the 
jungle… But security is not a matter of military capability. National security is 
inseparable from political stability, economic success and social harmony. Without these 
all the guns in the world cannot prevent a country from being overcome by its 
enemies…”852 Mahathir’s uncompromising posture against threats to national security 
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and peaceful environment has helped to define Malaysia’s developmental progress get 
noticed today.  Mahathir speaks passionately when he says, “I am not saying that we 
should abandon democracy. Autocracy can be worse as we need force to remove an 
autocrat. We need only to vote a democratic Government out of office. For the time 
being democracy offers us the best political system. But we need to know how to 
manage it, to use it in order to have good Governments and political stability. We want 
political stability because it is good in itself. But we want it more because it can help 
prosper our country”. 853 However, Mahathir has recently observed that Malaysia’s 
relative political stability and social progress were not tied to one factor: 
It is difficult to identify a single thing that helped the country. But, it is a combination of 
people being well educated, also very restrained. They are not given to violence. They 
understand the limit they can go to, they don’t exceed that limit even in demonstration. 
Generally Malaysians are law abiding, and because of that as you can see, I can walk 
through the street in the town everywhere. There is nobody coming to beat me up or 
something like that. It is basically culture.
854
 
 
         There is no doubt that there was a total commitment towards security issues in 
Malaysia. The argument is not as if Nigeria does not fight against insurgency, but how 
is such effort sustained? To demonstrate the confidence of the government in the police  
force in providing security, an auxillary security unit set up by the Penang government 
was shut down. Secondly, even with the repeal of the ISA by the Najib government, the 
police are still effective in containing threats to the country caused by militant groups 
and extremists.
 855
 One significant difference Malaysia has displayed in its decades of 
democratic rule is its effectiveness and success in facing security threats to the nation. 
Malaysia was firm in dealing with religious extremism in 1980 and 1990s which was 
the same period of intense religious bloodbath as well as coups and counter coups in 
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Nigeria. The prevalence of ethnic security in Nigeria shows deep ethnic divisions, and 
ethnic conflicts led to security failures which exposed Nigeria to deeper challenges. 
 
6.10. Discussion of Research Findings  
This study deals with ethnic conflicts in Nigeria and Malaysian plural societies which 
are explored through the lens of federalism. A detailed explanation of the empirical 
report of this study is provided in this section for understanding of the phenomenon and 
the outcome. As Denzin’s study explains, “Interpretation clarifies and untangles the 
meanings that are produced by a set of experiences. It does so within an interpretive 
framework that is meaningful to those who have experienced the event in question – that 
is, interpretation utilizes experience - near concepts and interpretations”.856 Interpretation 
illuminates the meanings and conceptual structures that organise a subject’s 
experience.
857
 Most of the underlying challenges posed by ethnic conflicts in both 
countries owe a lot to the neglect of principles of federalism as a guide.  
        Notably, ethnic conflicts in Nigeria and Malaysia crisscross different spheres of life 
such as politics, religion, culture, education, language, security, economic sphere and all 
forms of rights exclusively claimed by certain ethnic groups. For instance, the struggle 
for ‘resource control’ is found to be one of the ethnic conflicts in Nigeria which is tied to 
unequal treatment in Nigeria’s socio-political and economic equation. The empirical 
evidence from respondents interviewed collaborates with views of scholars documented 
in the literature review of this study. The lists of Respondents from Nigeria and Malaysia are 
shown in Apendix N. Table 6.6, and Appendix O. Table 6.7 respectively.
858
   
          To understand issues in the literature review in relation to neglect of true federal 
practice is to consider Ogbodo’s comments against military economic mismanagement 
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in Nigeria in the late 20
th
 century and its consequences to the reconfiguration of the 
Niger Delta identity and intense conflict in recent times.
859
 In addition Najibo and 
Umukoro emphasised on support from local and state officials to paramilitary groups 
they believe would enforce their own political agenda in Nigeria shows how divided the 
society has become. It shows a lack of trust in the Federal Government given the way 
people seek solutions to their problems through any possible means.
860
 Najibo and 
Umukoro’s emphasis is on ethnic militia who fight to secure certain ethnic interests. 
This shows the ineffectiveness of federalism in Nigeria which demands Nigeria to 
address issues on equity (equality) as one of the principles of federalism. Fair resource 
distribution and recognition of jurisdictions and merit will help in resolving some of the 
nation’s lingering resource-related problems. Ordinarily, there should not have been any 
ethnic militia such as the Oodua Peoples Congress to defend Yoruba interests, and 
MASSOB for the Igbo, if there were no socio-economic disparities, power domination 
and if adequate security was provided by the police in a fair manner in Nigeria. 
         This study stresses that resource control issues which came up immediately after 
the military relinquished power to the Obasanjo-led civilian regime in 1999, was a 
reaction against years of unfair federal practices by the Nigerian military regimes 
especially in manipulating revenue sharing formula in the country. Horowitz describes 
them as ethnic army, “The military is both a resource and an object of ethnic conflict.”861 
The military plays many roles in ethnic conflict. One of the three roles is that “The army 
may be an integrating institution as has sometimes been claimed though in divided 
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society, it is doubtful that a single institution can reverse cumulative effects of others.” 
Experience has shown that the armed forces frequently generate ethnic resentments.
862
  
            Most recorded conflicts in Nigeria are the outcome of unequal distribution of 
wealth or a direct consequence of social exclusion.
863
 Horowitz insists that economic 
interest plays a leading role in ethnic conflict. Such economic contestation underpins 
ethnic hostility which persistently defines most recent ethnic conflicts.
864
 This means 
that asymmetrical social structures compel ethnic nationalism to organise themselves 
according to their ethnicity so that they fit into the new ethno-federal system.
865
 This 
study emphasises that militancy in Nigeria has some consequences because some states 
tend to prove to be enduring; while others are in the true sense ephemeral. Some old 
states are known to have fallen apart while new ones emerged.
866
  
          The position of this thesis is that the accommodation of territorial cleavages is 
facilitated by federalism, an institutional setting, whereby a broad range of scholars has 
identified as a useful device in divided societies. By combining the advantages of shared 
rule with that of self- rule, federalism offers a range of solutions and opportunities that 
make it preferable to unitarism.
867
 Understanding of ethno-regional struggle for resource 
control in both onshore and off-shore situations which is a source of tension with the 
Federal Government of Nigeria is clarified by Sagay, who looks at the same issue in 
advanced federations like the US. For example, while supporting resource control in 
both continental shelf and land mass, President Truman of America stated: 
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          (i)the continental shelf is an “extension of the land mass of the coastal nation” and that (ii) the 
resources in the continental shelf “form a seaward extension of a pool or deposit lying within 
the coastal state territory”. President Truman had a third reason for resource control 
declaration. This is the control for the purpose of conservation of the resources and 
conservation in this context includes environmental considerations.
868
 
 
 
        Sagay is also of the view that the aggressive move for resource control has to do 
with “the right of the states and communities” who are honestly anxious to be part of 
decision-making with regard to the “exploration for, the exploitation and disposal of 
including sales of the harvested resources” in their area. The control of resources and 
management is better handled by those who live with the impact and devastating effects 
of oil production. He also noted that, “Mere increase in revenue without control and 
management is short sighted, and deadly, and it condemns the peoples of the Niger Delta 
to a present without a future”.869 These give support to the plight of oil producing areas. 
It is significant to note that there is no record of state or ethnic struggle for resource 
control in Malaysia. Rather, sometimes there are calls for the increase of oil royalties to 
oil-producing states in Malaysia. The difference between Nigeria and Malaysia on 
‘resource control’ issues lies in the original derivative arrangement in Nigeria which the 
ruling military changed and the level of violence it has unleashed on the Nigerian polity.      
        The thesis argues that ethnic struggle is a demand for the restoration of the original 
50 per cent, or an outright control of resources by Nigeria’s Niger Delta. Conversely, 
while 5 per cent is paid to oil-producing areas in Malaysia, 50 per cent originally paid to 
oil-producing regions in Nigeria was reduced by the military to1.5 per cent. It was 
recently increased to 13per cent after the military disengaged. Worse still, as this study 
discovered, no meaningful development was recorded in the Niger Delta almost 
throughout decades of military rule and exploitation of oil in the region. Instead the 
ethnic communities suffered environmental degradation to their fisheries, which affected 
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their incomes, health problems caused by air and water pollution and social upheaval, as 
many had to translocate to areas within or outside of the delta region to escape violence 
clashes between the military and ethnic forces. From 1999 onwards, serious effort has 
been made by the Federal Government of Nigeria under various civilian administrations 
to develop the region and also to reduce the adverse impacts of oil extraction in the area. 
           This study points out that given the aforementioned initiative as a federal measure 
to resolve the problem, programmes are implemented through the Oil Mineral Producing 
Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC), and Niger Delta Development 
Commission (NDDC). These are bodies established by the federal government to 
ameliorate the situation in the Niger Delta Region after many years of neglect which 
exposed the oil-rich region to poverty. Yet, these establishments have their constraints in 
developing the area while militancy inevitably remains a threat to national security 
which differs from the moderate approach adopted by states in Malaysia.
870
 Chapter six 
of this thesis demonstrates the intensification of ethnic separatism in Nigeria. This 
tension revolves around demands for power sharing, equitable distribution of wealth and 
the general empowerment of the citizens which is consistent with federal practice. Yet, 
in fairness to all as a federal principle given huge natural resources at the disposal of the 
central governing authority, it has been a challenge for the nation’s struggle with ethnic 
militia. Serious disscussions need to take place to establish balance and fairnessin the 
practice of federalism in Nigeria in view of years MASSOB
871
 and MEND which have 
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engaged in self-determination struggle in the country.  Most related issues on federalism 
as highlighted by the respondents are linked to unfairness and marginalization in the 
polity. The same fear of domination and deprivation by other powerful groups has 
helped to fuel separatist movements, hence each group needed to assert itself within the 
Nigerian political and economic arenas.
872
 This is the crux of militancy against the 
federal government. This however fits into words penned down by Wallenstein during 
Katanga’s move to secede some decades ago that “Some regions will be richer (less 
poor) than others, and if the ethnic claim to power combines with relative wealth, the 
case for secession is strong. … Every African nation, large or small, federal or unitary, 
has its Katanga”.873  
         While separatism could be better understood in the context of self-determination, 
Horowitz observes that after decolonization in the developing world, the context and the 
issues changed. It was no more a fight against external powers. Colonial domination was 
no longer the problem; rather self-determination was seen only to the level of preexisting 
colonial boundaries. “Within these boundaries, the question was to whom the new states 
belonged…”This was the cause of the Biafran war in post-independence Nigeria.874  
           Yet, it was due to social injustice and unfairness to groups from which separatist 
movements emerge. The situation in Nigeria indicates that social imbalance persists, 
which explains why the Igbo of Biafra and MEND see themselves territorially trapped in 
Nigeria.
875
 Malaysia achieved success in reducing ethnic tension in its polity due to its 
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bold step in implementing its Affirmative Action on NEP.  Malaysia has no record of 
separatist groups and hence enjoys relative peace with political stability as shown in 
field reports and literature. This point is validated by Hitam who insisted that the large 
comfortable middle class that Malaysia has produced will not give room for militancy 
while others share similar notion because the rate of poverty has been reduced in the 
country.  Hitam’s view by extension relates to most new Bumiputras who have benefited 
from the government’s preferential policy which aims at enhancing special rights of the 
Malays and other natives in Malaysia. As unfair federal practice, policy implementation 
over decades has led to good wealth distribution among the Malays; the chances of 
tensions rising in the community have receded. 
           The study has also shown the prevalence of religious bigotry in Nigeria, mainly in 
the north. The interview report demonstrates that ethno-religious tension plays a fair 
share in the conflict that has engulfed Nigeria in recent years. Religious extremism not 
only plays a divisive role in Nigeria but has impacted negatively on the development and 
wellbeing of Nigerian citizens which works against a cohesive federal structure. Unlike 
earlier religious tension in Malaysia that was brought under control by different 
administrations, sadly, thousands of Nigerian citizens have lost their lives at the hands of 
religious extremists in Northern Nigeria. There are efforts by Muslim extremists to 
islamise the country through forced Islamic laws and terror attacks.  Given the persistent 
killings of the Igbo in the North, it has caused MASSOB in the Southeast to retaliate and 
has also reinforced its bid to secede from the entity called Nigeria which accounts as part 
of the failings of federalism in Nigeria. 
           Arguably, religious violence in Nigeria may have been triggered by economic 
frustrations unlike in Malaysia’s case.  In spite of Malaysian government’s compulsion 
on issues of faith on Muslims as some respondents observed, economic consideration 
has largely influenced the government’s attitude towards Muslims in the country. This is 
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seen in special rights as highlighted earlier which have both ethnic and religious 
connotations in Malaysia’s ethnicised federal constitution. This point is crucial about 
Malaysia’s relative peace, as could be seen in numerous Islamic institutions springing up 
in the country presently. This thesis clarifies economic issues and religious harmony in 
Malaysia. For example, P.R. Bhuyan reflects on Swami Vivekananda’s work in India in 
which Vivekananda writes “religion is meaningless to a starving man. Man’s mind is 
guided by his stomach”. The stomach of such a person matters, without which all 
preaching and philosophy will have no effect on him. “Religion will stand supreme if it 
has an economic background … Whenever any religion succeeds, it must have economic 
value. Thousands of similar sects will be struggling for power, but only those who meet 
the real economic problem will have it.”876 This shows that even in a federal system, 
ethno-religious group’s inclination for survival is a common challenge to federalism. 
          The study has also shown that there is no separatist group in Malaysia as 
confirmed by the entire respondents interviewed. However, despite sporadic violence, 
ethnic groups in Malaysia have been living moderately in harmony for decades. In 
addition, due to Malay dominance, the relative political stability in Malaysia as shown in 
chapter five of this thesis is premised on the demographic composition of the Malaysian 
federation. This view is factual and consistent with McGarry and O’Leary insight on 
successful federal states. This study considers it a major factor for Malaysia’s 
considerable interethnic harmony given the fact that the country which is dominated by 
the over 60 per cent population of Malays is likely to be more stable than a country of 
almost shared equal population of its main ethnic groups whereby each ethnic groups 
struggles for ascendancy in what makes ethnic conflict in Nigeria more explosive.
 877
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6.11 Research Findings     
      Findings in this research largely draw from research questions (RQs) of the study. 
Findings from RQ “a” unveiled (i) ethnic /regional agitation for resource control, (ii) 
ethnic separatism (iii) religious tolerance and intolerance (iv) federal practices in the 
two countries as challenging. For instance, findings show how ethnic/regional agitation 
for resource control has intensified militancy due to deprivation. Similarly, ethnic 
separatism has also been induced by alienation, deprivation and marginalization and 
fear of domination by stronger ethnic group/s in Nigeria. It shows that federalism as a 
mechanism that mitigates conflict is not yet effective in the governance of Nigeria.           
There is no doubt that both Nigeria and Malaysia have different levels of religious 
tolerance and intolerance. However, federalism as a system that mitigates ethnic and 
regional conflicts has not been effective especially in Nigeria. This is because 
kleptocracy and failure to be guided by federal institutional framework have 
exacerbated poor governance which in turn intensified ethic and regigional tensions in 
Nigeria. The findings in this study are given detailed explanations below:  
        (i) A few factors account for agitation for resource control in Nigeria as 
highlighted in the study and by the respondents.  First, pre-1966 derivation formula of 
50 per cent paid to resource-producing regions was ‘stopped on oil produce’ by the 
nothern ethnic military in power, which denied the Niger Delta region’s right. Second, 
decades of oil exploration under the military failed to develop the Niger Delta oil 
region, which has suffered neglect arising from environmental pollution affecting their 
agricultural lands, water as well as air pollution. Third, in spite of decades of oil 
exploration, no meaningful infrastructures were provided by the military, hence the 
region was deprived of life’s essentials coupled with its youths’ unemployment 
reinforcing poverty which breeds frustration and militancy. Ethnic and Regional 
demands for increase in oil derivation led the Federal Government to increase its 
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derivation under the Obasanjo democratic regime from 1.5 to 13 per cent which was 
seen as small and has intensified demands  for further increase or alternative control of 
resources by the region. From the respondents’ perspective, militancy in Nigeria is 
induced by a struggle for social justice due to deprivation and alienation. It is also 
shown in the study that militancy is now adopted directly or indirectly by the major 
ethnic groups to advance their claim from the Federal Government and to counter 
domination by other rival groups in Nigeria.  
       (ii) Given the problem in Nigeria, the study also reveals that there is no resource 
control conflict in Malaysia. For instance, 5 per cent which is paid to the oil producing 
areas in Malaysia does not attract confrontation even during a review of such oil 
royalties as shown in this chapter.
878
  Conscious effort in fair distribution of wealth in 
Malaysia has helped to reduce conflict in this respect. However, other findings show 
that less agitation and conflict over resources could be as a result of Barisan National 
ruling for many years in Malaysia’s parliamentary system of government. It shows how 
almost all the states have been under the control of the Federal Government hence 
everything appears peaceful compared to agitation by the opposition states.
879
 Second, 
Malaysia operates quasi federalism under a parliamentary system as some scholars 
observe, unlike Nigeria which operates American presidential system. This is consistent 
with Shamsul’s claim during the interview that fiscal federalism is not yet well studied 
in Malaysia. Third, there was no ethnic militancy in Malaysia within the period covered 
in this study. Atempted insurgency in the past was dealt with the use of ISA.                   
        (iii) Separatist movements in the country which aim to form parallel sovereign 
states from Nigeria’s lopsided federal structure represent resistance against inequality. 
They are reactionary forces against the anti-federal character of the state such as social 
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exclusion, denial, marginalisation and corruption. The state has become an instrument in 
the hands of politicians for furthering of sectional interests. There was no consensus as 
seen in early Alliance in Malaysia. The state maintains limited space for power sharing 
arrangement as shown in Nigeria’s early electoral and census tensions within its federal 
structure. Moreover, socioeconomic disparity tends to alienate some ethnic groups 
contrary to the federal principles of equity, accommodation and balance.  This is a lens 
through which separatist movements in Nigeria can be viewed as interview results have 
also shown.  Nigeria’s geoethnic politics is disruptive, divisive and prone to violence. 
      However, empirical evidence has shown that Malaysia has no secessionist 
movements. There are several reasons that account for this variation in both countries.       
First, good redistribution of national wealth was instituted in post 1969 racial riot via 
affirmative action. Second, Malaysia maintains strong laws and exercise of state power. 
For example, the ISA was dreaded by many due to arrest and detention without trial 
those whose activities are threats to national security. Nigeria has been careful and has 
avoided obnoxious laws but it has been seemingly complacent with its relevant laws in 
dealing with extremists. Third, Malaysia’s federal constitutional arrangement is well 
ethnicised that favours the native Malay Muslim majority and the preservation of Malay 
traditional and religious institutions in the governance of the Malaysian State. Respect 
for traditional institutions is high, which allows for moderation in politics. Fourth, unlike 
the case of Nigeria, UMNO, MCA and MIC alliance gave birth to Malaysia’s 
consociational democracy as a beacon of its federal arrangement, which by extension has 
made the polity considerably stable since its independence. This has been achieved 
through the sharing of political power by Barisan Nasional, with the dominant UMNO 
taking the lead role since independence in 1957. 
       (iv) Religion is a factor in the analysis of ethnic conflicts in Nigeria and Malaysia. 
One of the challenges in the Nigeria federal arrangement is that religious violence 
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especially in the North is perpetrated along ethnic lines. Both literature and views of 
respondents show that religious conflict has consumed thousands of lives in Nigeria 
gven the fact that religion is imported into politics in the country. It is also revealed that 
attempts at implementing sharia law in Northern Nigeria have exposed the nation to 
ethno-religious bloodbath which rather denigrates the true workings of federalism in 
Nigeria. Due to its destabilizing impact on the federal arrangement, President Obasanjo 
descibed it as political sharia which he said will die a natural death. This is due the fact 
that it is inconsistent with the secular status of Nigeria as enshrined in its Federal 
Constitution. Documented evidence in the study and views given by respondents show 
that religious intolerance is high in Northern Nigeria as could be seen in the current 
Boko Haram insurgency. This is not seen in Malaysia which is relatively more peaceful. 
       In Malaysia result also shows that the primacy of Islamic religion as the religion of 
the state is enshrined in its constitution. The line between Islamic religion and 
governance of Malaysia is blurred because the two are intertwined. This is observed in 
Malays Rulers who are also spiritual heads of their state, with the status of the King who 
is also the Sultan. It is found that Malaysia has had religious conflict especially during 
Mahathir’s regime which was at the instigation of the opposition in government trying to 
implement full Islamic law in the country, in an apparent push for the establishement of 
an Islamic State in the country as seen in Nigeria. While its related tension in Nigeria 
has consumed thousands of lives and property, Malaysia seems to be stable amid threats 
of implementation of hukum hudud by Islamist PAS in states of Terengganu and 
Kelantan.  Religious conflicts in the two countries are reinforced by strong ideological 
views and wrong interpretations as commented by some respondents. The literature 
section shows how ethnic groups and religions are intertwined thus exacerbating 
rivalries in more reinforcing ways. While the level of tolerance is low in Nothern 
Nigeria, Malaysia is considerably moderate with less violence as seen in Nigeria.  
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        Yet, scholars and empirical evidence show that the Malaysian government seriously 
segregates and shows intolerance in practice in its commitment to protecting Islam and 
Malays under the state religion. While the state allows people of other faiths to convert 
to Islam, it strictly refuses any attempt for Malays (Muslims) to convert to other regions. 
This has been described in the study as intolerance and double standard. Such state 
compulsion and restriction is not practiced by the Nigerian government, as the 
constitution disallowes such practices. Malaysia’s religious authority raids in churches 
amount to intimidation which tends to deviate from the moderate posture that Malaysian 
demonstracy projects.  It is apt to state that both Nigeria and Malaysia are secular states, 
despite killings in Northern Nigeria, Nigeria demonstrates more openness and fairness to 
all as enshrined in its federal constitution. This is unlike issues raised against Malaysia’s 
protection of Islamic faith in the country, yet it infiltrates into individual freedom and 
human right of choice of faith of the Malays. In all, Malaysia is more tolerant, less 
violent without mass religious killings as observed in Nigeria. 
       (v) The federal system and politics in Nigeria are deeply flawed providing the 
perfect setting for fostering political violence and divisive tendencies that always 
threaten to destabilise the country. First, the lopsided structure of Nigeria whereby two-
thirds of the country is located to the North has led to the northeners trying to dominate 
politics, the economy and finance to the exclusion of other areas of the country such as 
the Easten and Western regions. The stakes are high for ethnic groups in their states or 
regional formations to capture power at the centre which shows the lopsidedness in 
centre-state relations. Chapter six of this study demonstrates early internal crises in 
Nigeria over census figures and elections result rivalries. North’s dominance of political 
space is also shown in three decades of its ethnic army in power in Nigeria. Since the 
Civil War ended, the Igbo who were known for their prominent role in securing Nigerian 
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independence as well as in the political engineering of the new nation have been 
sidelined from occupying presidential position.
880
      
           Federalism is the appropriate system designed to manage conflicting ethnic and 
regional interests in both countries, yet due to ethnic chauvinism Nigeria has not been 
able to utilise the system to prosper its diverse ethnic groups. Repeated complaints by 
southern Nigeria has been that the Britsh left an unbalanced federal structure which is 
inimical to the country’s federation given its political implication. The military disrupted 
federal practice for three decades with less consultation to Nigeria’s federating units in 
its governance of Nigeria unlike democratic practice in Malaysia. 
          However, federalism in Malaysia has been successful as shown in chapter five. 
This is observed in its enhanced welfare although discriminatory in nature, yet a 
considerable ethnic cohesion has been achieved. This is not by the workings of federal 
principles as such; rather Malaysia’s ethnicised federal structure places the primacy of 
Islamic religion and its institutions in all the states ruled by kings who are also religious 
heads in their various states as earlier highlighted. It embraces the position of the Sultan 
as the spiritual head of the religion and Sovereign King and Head of the Malaysian 
Fedaration. This is reinforced by the privileges granted to the Malays who are natives 
and Muslim majority whose loyalty to Malay Rulers and the King is absolute. Given this 
scenario, ethnic conflict in Malaysia is partly and strategically managed through these 
traditional and religious structure infused in the governance of the state. It has always 
been used by the long ruling UMNO-led Barisan Nasional Government to pacify and 
assuage possible threat by the Malay majority even in electoral support. This is profound 
in the governance of ethnicity in Malaysia. Yet the state also provides for the rest of 
other ethnic groups in Malaysia which have chosen a moderate approach in their 
demands unlike regular escalation of conflict in Nigeria’s lopsided federal structure. 
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          However, Research question (RQ) ‘b’ provides institutional working of federalism 
with four features of federalism which are used in the study to analyse and providing 
ways of resolving problems arising from division of power in a federal system. It 
provided insight into ethnic and state (regional) problems in Nigeria and Malaysia. This 
is provided within the lens of the role of federal design in accommodating pluralism 
which is treated in chapter three. The chapter demonstrates the role of federalism and 
how federal constitutional design in both countries is meant to accommodate diversity. 
Chapter four under ethnic conflict and federalism shows how features of federalism ‘a’ 
and ‘b’ are used to analyse governance of the two federations. In Malaysia, features -‘a’ 
and ‘b’ exist, but the line is blurred in ‘a’ due to the influence of the centre in a 
parliamentary system of government. In the case of ‘a’ and ‘b’, unlike in Malaysia, 
institutional framework of federalism was distorted for many years by the military rule 
in Nigeria which convoluted in the military suppression of the powers of the federating 
units. The constitution was severally suspended by all the military regimes that ruled by 
decree, which gave the courts little or no room to operate. All these constrained the 
operational functions of federalism in Nigeria similar to ethnicised type in Malaysia.   
         However, RQ ‘c’ is explored and explained in chapter four also, which looks at 
elite behaviour and different policy roles in Nigeria and Malaysia. Findings also show 
how the role of political leaders and policy execution differ in the post-1969 race riots 
and post-1967-1970 civil war in Malaysia and Nigeria respectively. Unlike Malaysia, the 
poor leadership role in Nigeria, continuity and discontinuity in policy programmes as 
well as unresolved economic disparity in the system have continued to bedevil Nigeria. 
        Finally, RQ‘d’ on how Malaysia is more successful in dealing with ethnic conflict 
is answered in chapter five. The chapter measures the effectiveness of federalism in the 
two countries. Findings show that federalism has been more effective in Malaysia than 
in Nigeria. This owes a lot to years of consociational democracy providing room for 
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political stability in Malaysia and further enhanced by strong traditional and religious 
institutions unlike three decades of military incursion and destabilsation of federal order 
to the chagrin of ethnic groups in Nigeria. It is also found in the study that the 
demographic composition of federation matters which suggests that dominant ethno-
national community as seen in Malaysia is likely to be more stable than Nigeria. The 
foregoing shows that the whole research questions have been answered. 
 
6.12 Conclusion    
          Many contested issues have been discussed in this chapter and a number of facts 
can be discerned. First, ethnic politics is observed right from party formation to other 
socio-political and economic competitions that are common to both countries. While the 
Alliance is characterised by the UMNO-led Malay dominance, Malaysia also displayed 
quality leadership that cared for the interests of its wider community, but its plight for 
the Malays is profound. Conversely, Nigeria’s political problem was exacerbated by a 
lopsided federal structure that makes electoral and census figures more in favour of the 
North.  This has led to struggles for political power and economic control in Nigeria. 
      Second, religious influence is huge. In Malaysia’s wide range of influence and 
incentives to Muslims and in Islamic projects with state resources places people of other 
faiths in disadvantaged position. Also, slow Islamisation process in Malaysia makes its 
remote tension obvious, although more religious tolerance than Nigeria. But Nigeria 
holds strongly to its secular federal constitution despite its challenges.  
        Third, economic and business competition feature in both countries. Except for 
Nigeria under the First Republic and the northern military hegemony, no particular 
ethnic group is allowed domineering influence on other ethnic communities. The 1954 
federal constitution in Nigeria led to decentralization and healthy competition among the 
regions. Federalism in Nigeria was distorted by the military, so also were economic and 
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business interests against the marginalized. Most ethnic tensions in Nigeria owe a lot to 
struggles against inequality in its federation which is against the principle of federalism. 
The affirmative action in Malaysia was a federal intervention to favour earlier 
disadvantaged Malays. Yet, such preferential treatment to Malay Bumiputra is 
continuously expanded by the government which makes other ethnic groups survival 
conditioned by their own push and grumblings in ‘a nation in the state of stable tension’. 
        Fourth, low level of education was a problem within the Malay circle apart from 
economic inadequacy, but affirmative action was used to correct the imbalance with 
other ethnic groups.  Interview with Tun Musa Hitam (Former DPM) elucidated facts 
surrounding government preferential treatment to Malay education. Other ethnic groups 
perceive continuing denial of similar opportunity as unfair in view of numerous 
scholarships to Malays. Also, cleavages over language, culture and religious matters 
largely raise disagreements and tension. Given the primacy of Islam in the Constitution 
of Malaysia as the State religion, its influence on governance is profound in view of a 
number of Islamic public institutions being established by the government which are 
denied other ethnic groups.  However, questioning Malay special rights or comments on 
Islam can spark off tension among the Malay Muslim majority in the country. Generally, 
there is considerable harmony in the country because other ethnic groups do not use 
violence to secure what they believe they merit. This speaks of moderation on the part of 
other ethnic groups (non-Bumiputra), in contrast to ethnic militia in Nigeria. 
       However, the backwardness of Northern Nigeria like the Malays of old was a 
problem inherited from the divide and rule policy of the British. Moreover, strong 
religious doctrine among the Muslims in Northern Nigeria never allowed them to 
embrace Western education early on and even now. Many are in the camp of Boko 
Haram sect which says “Western education is evil”.881  While the number of the 
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 See, chapter 7, on the activities of Boko Haram and the new challenges facing current Nigerian Head of 
State - President Goodluck Jonathan.  
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Southerners is high in educational intake, it is also observed that many students from the 
south cannot gain access to universities because of limited space due to the Quota 
System. This also shows that the Nigerian Federal Government under civilian rule holds 
more strongly to the principle of equity in federalism. Unlike Malaysia which made 
Malay its official language with a certain level of discrimination against other cultures. 
     Fifth, both countries have flaws in their fiscal federal practices as seen in most 
centralised issues with the federal government in Malaysia. The constitutional structure 
involving the role of monarchy and Islam, and Malay special rights as well as its 
parliamentary system of government make the practice of federalism sustained in an 
operation that resembles a unitary system, because power is highly centralised at the 
federal level. However, Nigeria started on a sound federal practice but this was later 
distorted by the military when it took over power. Most of the policies lacking 
transparency initiated by the military pose problems to Nigeria’s federal structure now.  
          Sixth, Malaysia does not have problem of state creation. This is a burden created 
by the military in Nigeria. The effect of state creation and recreation tend to localise 
conflict within various states instead of disrupting governance at the center. Deadly 
ethnic clashes and boundary adjustments showcase Nigeria as a troubled federation.    
Seventh, similarity between Nigeria and Malaysia in terms of ethnic political dominance 
is observed in almost thirty years of northern ethnic dominance of Nigeria’s political 
space which is akin to UMNO-led Barisan Nationale authoritarian rule spanning over 50 
years. Yet, despite strong opposition, Malaysia has experienced decades of smooth 
transfers of power which makes its electoral and political process more stable than 
Nigeria. Obviously, one ethnic majority (party) rule in a federal state for over fifty years 
as seen in Malaysia does not project federalism in good light. This is in contrast to 
Nigeria which is to some extent open to power shift to other ethnic groups, but 
fragmented by strong ethnic strife. 
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CONCLUSION 
         This study has examined the ethnic conflict in Nigeria and Malaysia through the 
lens of federalism. The study is pursued with the intent to unveil reasons as to the 
continuing ethnic tensions and years of ethno-political as well as ethno-religious 
conflicts especially in Nigeria. Given the fact that this study is pursued for the cause of 
good governance in Nigeria in view of the aforementioned tensions that have 
characterised the nation since its independence, it became necessary to compare issues in 
Nigeria with Malaysia which is relatively a peaceful country that shares most features in 
common with Nigeria. Federalism as conflict mitigating mechanism has helped to 
narrow down the missing link between both countries in conflict management. 
         Major findings in this study show levels and dimensions of conflict that 
characterise Nigeria and Malaysia as two former British colonies. Findings show more 
destructive and even open brutal communal clashes exacerbated by ethno-religious 
inclination by groups in Nigeria which regularly accounts for numerous violent deaths 
recorded in the country. Findings also show that Malaysia is more successful in 
achieving ethnic harmony which manifests in its considerable political stability and 
sustainability in contrast to Nigeria. These findings were obtained through the 
institutional mechanism of federalism as a tool that mitigates conflicts in plural societies. 
         From the foregoing discussion, three key issues that touch on the objectives of this 
study have been highlighted as treated in the study.  First, the entire study has been 
devoted at exploring the challenges posed by ethnic groups in both countries which are 
well highlighted in the introductory section of the study. This is precisely demonstrated 
in the statement of the problem that describes the nature and levels of conflict in both 
countries being compared. The second objective of the study looks at a framework that 
interprets as well as addresses problems in multiethnic societies. The adoption of 
federalism as the framework is covered in chapter one which provides explanatory 
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insights in the management and conflict analysis in plural societies. For instance, Eme 
Awa’s view as a renowned scholar in federalism is shared by other scholars as 
documented in chapter one. He describes Federalism as a mechanism that provides the 
existence of a primary centre in a political system while accommodating units which are 
subordinated to this centre. A federal system of government shows the existence of a 
primary centre which is the central government that possesses intrinsic authority, while 
devolving some powers on the units in running the administration of the country. 
         This study is further guided by Wheare’s emphasis on the principles of federalism. 
Notably, institutional requirements such as constitutionalism, especial four features of 
federalism which are also rendered by Moten are adopted in the analysis of center-
periphery relations in both Nigeria and Malaysian federations. The third object of the 
study provides a comparative overview of contested issues in Nigeria and Malaysia. The 
workings of federalism, especially its four features are explored in the analysis of 
federal practices in the two countries as treated in chapters three, four and five. Given 
the fact that this study seeks to compare and contrast ethnic conflicts in Nigeria and 
Malaysia as part of the third objective, chapter six of this thesis serves as a lens to view 
the domains and dimensions of the ethnic conflicts in both countries explored.      
       However, the strength of the thesis draws from the research questions that were 
articulated to unveil areas and factors that have induced ethnic conflicts in Nigeria and 
Malaysia. The first research question (RQ) ‘a’ generated four empirical answers as 
problem areas in the conflict analysis and resolution in the study. These four research 
findings from the first research question are as follows: (i) ‘Resource Control’ is a 
problem, and one of the challenges in Nigeria that has driven some ethnic groups in the 
country into militancy. (ii)Socioeconomic disparity, social exclusion, alienation and less 
effort in power sharing are jointly inherent with explosive violence and separatism in 
Nigeria in particular. All these which are anti-federal have featured in the Nigerian 
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federal state. Malaysia is also analysed in the entire context. (iii) Overzealous pursuit of 
religious ideology and space has brought about ethno-religious bigotry and bloodbaths. 
(iv)Unguided, or neglect of principles of federalism in governance of the state. RQs ‘b’ 
‘c’ and‘d’ are well discussed in the research findings. Findings show that all the research 
questions have been answered. The researcher at this point demonstrates to the reader 
that the empirical findings are also supported by salient facts revealed in the study:      
(a) First, Malaysia paraded leaders who were strategists with commitment to national 
aspirations. The Alliance of the three main ethnic groups engineered by the First 
Malaysian PM. Tunku Abdul Rahman led to a coalition that has ruled the country 
democratically for over fifty years of relative peaceful ethnic co-existence.  
Although with emphasis on Malay primacy, Tunku (lawyer) demonstrated 
leadership with intellectual wealth, vision, innovation and an accommodating heart. 
This truly amplifies the fact that development thinking calls for intellectual vision 
as well as honesty needed to transform society. This study submits that Tunku and 
other past Malaysian prime ministers truly showed how institutions of governance 
required men who are knowledge-driven with political will, maturity and trust 
which correctly explains human factor engineering that transforms society.
882
 
(b) Going a little beyond the scope of this study helps to clarify certain issues in this 
study better. For example, Prime Minister Najib in his recent defense of the 
Bumiputra special rights covered in chapter three of this thesis is evident. It is 
really discriminatory, yet the system is stable because other racial groups while 
unhappy are not violent. Malay privileges which are subsumed in Bumiputra 
interest as a historical necessityhas been elevated in governance in Malaysia. 
(c) Horowitz asserts that the colonialists recognized the legitimacy and the “special 
positions” of indigenous people in Malaysia, in the face of migrant population 
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 See S. B-S. K. Adjibolosoo, “Human Factor Engineering: The Primary Mission of Education and 
Training,” in Senyo B-S.K Adjibolosoo (ed.), Human Factor Engineering and the Political Economy of 
African Development, Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996, p. 30. 
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whose real home is elsewhere and cannot claim parity of status with those who 
were inhabitants of the land before they came.
883
 This is the origin of special rights 
of the Malays which later became part of Malaysia’s ethnicised federal constitution 
that also retained Malay traditional and religious institutions in the governance of 
the state which has enhanced its political stability. This study commends the 
Chinese and Indian communities in Malaysia for their tolerance and moderation. 
(d) The study also revealed that Malaysia has had smooth democratic transition of 
government right from 1957 to date. This is contrasted with Nigeria’s deadly coups, 
and rampant disruptions of democratic process. It is important to point out that 
military coups instigated by ethnic rivalries and inclination to power is absent in 
Malaysia for two obvious reasons:(a) It could be argued that political stability in 
Malaysia is in part rested on its armed forces which are highly dominated by ethnic 
Malays, and Malay traditional and religious institutions. Undoubtedly, the ratio of 
recruited military officers’ falls within the ratio of 4 Malay to 1 non-Malay as 
earlier discussed on federal service which is contrary to the principle of equity in 
federalism. Hence it is obviously correct in line with Horowitz’s assertion that 
ethnic army ensures protection of its ethnic group in control of power.
884
 
(e) The study has truly shown that good policy choice, implementation and 
accountability has been the hallmark of Malaysia’s success. Speaking in federal 
terms, this thesis argues that N.E.P was meant to reduce income disparities among 
ethnic groups, equitable provisions of life essentials for all groups, while 
emphasising on social harmony, moral reorientation and development engineering.  
Malaysia is primarily known for its stability. This is a country where leaders who 
are also Muslims never gave room for any form of Islamic insurgency. The power 
of ISA, although obnoxious in nature was invoked to deal with any acts disrupting 
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  For military politics as well as numerous sectional struggles in Nigeria, see, Horowitz, Ethnic Groups 
in Conflict, p. 443  
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Malaysia’s peace. This is one of the essential factors that have contributed to a 
peaceful Malaysia, as well as issues covered in the literature review of this study. 
        In fairness to Nigeria, in spite of numerous ethnic conflicts in the country, Nigerian 
authorities have been able to hold the country together within the framework of 
federalism unlike failed federations. Some salient facts are also raised on Nigeria: 
(i)The country never had true nationalists who were committed as seen in Malaysia. 
There was no spirit of comradeship that would have molded into real coalition as in 
Malaysia.  Both countries have similar history but there came a point of divergence. 
Unlike the UMNO, MCA and MIC Coalition, both NPC and NCNC and A.G were too 
parochial about ethnic and regional gains from the federal stand point of politics. They 
missed a unifying strategy Nigeria needed to overcome most of its challenges. They 
never let go of what Horowitz describes as ancient hostility in their post-colonial rule.
885
 
(ii)  Post-civil war Nigeria did not provide new ideas to change the pattern of 
governance. Unlike Malaysia’s post-1969 NEP, a war-torn Nigeria failed to follow its 
policy outline for implementation. The Igbo were not truly reintegrated into Nigeria after 
the war in which millions were in poverty. Instead, they were shortchanged of their 
money left in the bank prior to the civil war. Their houses were declared as abandoned 
properties. It was reconciliation without full integration. This is one of the policy choices 
and implementation issues in which Nigeria missed Malaysia’s treaded path. 
(iii) Nigeria has had its bad experience in changes of leadership. Nigeria as a nation was 
caught in a web of coups and counter-coups that polarised its military for almost thirty 
years. Decades of military rule by ethnic army distorted federal order with the use of 
force which is contrary to federal balance.  This created resentment among other ethnic 
groups in what Horowitz refers to as “ethnic army.” It explains escalated ethnic and 
regional conflicts when President Obasanjo came to power in 1999 democratic system. 
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(iv)Furthermore, the military used state creation as a development policy to legitimatise 
their regime by creating unviable states which today solely depend on the central 
government for its resources to function in such a federal state. Apart from inducing 
conflicts through state creation and recreation affecting boundaries, agitation for state 
creation continues. Paradoxically, these new states have now become cost-centres. For 
instance, Gowon has recently advised the National Assembly not to accede to various 
interests for the creation of new states emphasising that it will increase the burden of 
governance in the country.
886
 This is consistent with Nwankwo’s interview remarks in 
describing the thirty six states as over-bloated government without development. 
(vi)Political instability is highly prevalent in Nigeria’s internal crisis exacerbating 
security challenges.
 
These are direct results of denial, marginalization, and exclusion 
accounting for ethnic restiveness in Nigeria. Assassination and arson, militancy against 
the federal government, including destruction of oil facilities in the South, killings by 
religious extremists in the North, rampant kidnapping, daily armed robbery and 
secessionist movements are challenges confronting the Nigerian nation. Communal 
clashes arising from claims to land, boundary disputes due to new states as well as local 
government creation intensify the need to adjust boundaries to suit current reality are 
problems that have bedeviled Nigeria lately. Assertion made by Malaysia’s former 
Prime Minister Mahathir presents a contrast with Nigeria and many troubled plural 
societies, when he remarked, “You know I can walk freely in the street here in Malaysia 
without being afraid of who is after me, and this is the Malaysia we have”.887       
 (vi)Finally, having explored ethnic conflicts in Nigeria and Malaysia, it is evident that 
Nigeria has a lot to learn from Malaysia. This study has indeed demonstrated how 
Malaysia provides a mirror to view Nigeria’s missing link in interethnic harmony, 
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considerable religious tolerance, redistribution of national wealth and social progress. 
Former Malaysian Prime Minister Badawi’s insightful comment validates the argument 
on more ethnic violence and conflict in Nigeria in contrast to Malaysia’s considerable 
ethnic harmony and political stability, when he, Badawi posited: 
My country does not enjoy peace and harmony today by accident. Our founding fathers and 
mothers did not leave it to chance that Malaysia would become a calm oasis of many cultures and 
religions. What we enjoy today is not something that was created overnights. Malaysians have 
worked hard for our peace, harmony and prosperity. We have had to sacrifice and we have had to 
give-and-take. We have fought terrorism and extremism in all its forms. We have protected our 
many languages and religions so that our people are free to speak their mother tongues and 
profess the religion of their choice. Achieving all this was not easy…The-so-called burden of not 
having a homogenous country did not destroy us, it brought the best out of all us.
888
 
 
 
      The resolution of ethnic conflict in Nigeria calls for effective federalism with its 
institutional architecture that provides a fair and balanced approach in dealing with the 
existing differences, and socioeconomic disparity which induce rivalries among ethnic 
communities in Nigeria. However, the study does not assume to have an overall solution 
to Nigeria and Malaysia’s ethnic problems, but to proffer some solutions that could be 
helpful to policy makers concerning Nigeria largely, and Malaysia where necessary. 
Given unbiased assessments of both countries, Malaysia has hidden tensions, yet Nigeria 
is considered far behind Malaysia in a number of issues that demand focus and 
determined national leadership on ethnic harmony and social cohesion. However, the 
following issues need to be addressed in Malaysia as it harbours remote tensions. 
           First, the study has shown that in Malaysia, Malay ‘special rights’ has been a 
source of grievance to non-Malays. As a constitutional matter, it is advised that 
Bumiputra special rights be narrowed to a particular item for the Malays since the 
country has reduced poverty to 5 per cent.  Second, the state should continue to sustain 
its political stability and good race relations along with social development by allowing 
more and fair federal principle of equity and well decentralised powers. Third, the state 
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should continue its people-oriented progrmmes while creating space to listen to minority 
ethnic groups in the spirit of one Malaysia and federal balance.  
        Fourth, the government of Malaysia is commended for its commitment to religious 
tolerance and peaceful co-existence. However, policy issues on religion should be 
balanced and fair to individuals and people of various faiths in the country as it touches 
on their freedom, psychology and perception. The study has revealed a form of 
intolerance that Malays do not have freedom of personal choice of their faith due to 
restrictions placed on them not to convert to other religions whereas others can convert 
to Islam. This does not promote good interaction needed in a federal system. It does not 
allow for human freedom and self-fulfilling spiritual life of most Malays. It is double 
standard as perceived by people of other faiths who see such official notion as 
reinforcing the primacy of Islam and in being superior to other religions in the country.  
     Five, Apart from complaints about Bumiputra privileges, Malaysia harbours remote 
tension which is managed by the state. This tension is caused by the opposition group in 
Malaysia forcing the government to enforce Islamic laws even now. This has in the past 
led Mahathir’s Administration to put up Islamic institutions in the country as well as 
saying that Malaysia was ripe for Islamic state. Yet, these appeasing moves have not 
deterred PAS pressure on hudud and other issues that project Islam in the governance of 
Malaysia. This should be checked because the Federal Constitution of Malaysia does not 
prescribe Islamic state, or it may slide this country of diverse cultures into real tension. 
Malaysia’s known religious moderation is gradually drifting towards a uni-polar primacy 
of Islam in the making of an Islamic state while its original secular constitution is also 
contested by other stakeholders. The current push by its opposition group for Islamic law 
in Malaysia tends to revive religious militancy which Mahathir and other past leaders 
had earlier dealt with head-on. While Malaysia fights militant threats, it may exceed its 
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current stable tension if Islamisation which is outside its constitution is attempted within 
its ethnic and religious divide.
889
 
        On the other hand, it must be mentioned as earlier emphasised that in the midst of 
its internal troubles, Nigerian leaders have been able to keep the country intact under its 
federal structure. This is gallantry. The effort of the government in maintaining 
democratic governance after fifteen years of military disengagement is also 
commendable. The Obasanjo civilian administration (1999-2007) was able to pay-off 
Nigeria’s foreign debt which has been a burden to the nation. This is also commendably 
a rare achievement and first of its kind in Africa. But it is supposed to improve beyond 
that in view of its huge resources, which is unfortunately described as ‘resource curse’. 
           Nigeria’s ineffective and lopsided federal structure, as shown in its flaws in 
governing the nation’s diverse ethnic groups have manifested in different ways which 
makes the nation to be seen as unstable. The thesis offers some recommendations that 
would enhance interethnic harmony, political stability, and growth in line with 
Malaysia’s treaded path for Nigeria to evolve a better future for its people. 
     (a)Nigerian leadership should explore with vigor the need for a prioritised goal at 
improving economic welfare and development. This is because poverty induces ethnic 
and regional tensions in most divided societies which Nigeria counts. This explains the 
World Bank’s view that the challenge of development in many countries “is to improve 
the quality of life, which generally calls for higher incomes” for citizens for a more 
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progressive life.
890
 As commented by ‘United Nations Development Programme’ 
(UNDP), “People cannot be reduced to a single dimension as economic creatures”.891  In 
other words, unity eludes a nation when people are hungry and less-catered for, yet 
many political leaders in Nigeria live affluently. There is need to reduce income 
disparity which induces a sense of exclusion, frustration, denial and social tension.
 892
   
       (b) Ethnic conflict in Nigeria is also exacerbated by misappropriation of resources 
by corrupt leaders who treat development and human welfare issues as unimportant. 
When national wealth benefits all, no one talks of marginalisation and exclusion. EFCC 
Report of over $380b lost to corruption since independence partly explains bad 
leadership exacerbating poor development, frustrating poverty of some ethnic groups 
and tension. Corruption is a symptom of fundamental failure of governance which 
indicates that the higher the incidence of corruption, the more sustainable development 
becomes elusive. Politicians of certain ethnic extraction manipulate the system to the 
disadvantage of others in the same federation. 
       (c) Policies and their implementations should find expression within the basic sense 
and definition of economic development that bring positive benefits to citizens.  Certain 
sections of the country can be frustrated and feel excluded when thebenefits accruing 
from programmes implemented by the government does not reach them. It becomes a 
problem when true communication is lacking. There should be a genuine sense of equity 
and fairness in the discharge of federal character principles in the Nigeria. 
       (d) It is important for Nigerian leaders to go back to the drawing board and make 
moral education more compelling and well understood among Nigerian children, youths 
and adults. Reform in this area has become crucial in view of the eroded moral life 
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prevalent in Nigerian society today. Good moral behaviour has become the cornerstone 
of enabling state building in most of the advanced countries of Europe, Japan and 
Singapore. It is part of Malaysia’s success as a harmonious society.893  
        (e)There is a need to resolve the problem of resource control in the country. The 
study has shown supporting views for resource control by ethnic groups/state/regions or 
improved derivation to cool tensions in the Niger Delta region. The apex Court decision 
on off-shore and on-shore exploration of oil in Nigeria has not solved this matter that 
requires true dialogue. If the Supreme Court which is an arm in a federal constitutional 
structure could rule in the “on-shore and off-shore exploration, the same court is 
supposed to void the undemocratic derivation cut by the departed military. This has not 
been done. Yet, most of the military authoritarian decrees that form part of the 1999 
Nigerian Constitution with institutional restrictions especially on the derivation principle 
have not been fully addressed. Rebellion is obviously associated with a political system 
that restricts the independence of the judiciary which in part explains the limited role of 
the court during years of military role in Nigeria. In view of this, the Nigerian 
government should tackle Nigeria’s overarching resource control problem and other 
unfair practices inducing secession, militancy and brutal killings in Nigeria through 
commitment to inclusive government with unbiased power sharing arrangement.  
        (f) Notably, state institutions need to be strengthened with leaders who are truly 
elected by the people without ethnic biases in order to achieve constitutional roles of 
meeting Nigeria’s diverse needs. It follows that laws and other instruments of coercion 
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should be appropriately used when it is necessary to deter or punish extremists and other 
social misfits while the police should be more proactive and friendly with the masses.
894
  
        (g) Reforms in Nigeria should also look into educational integrity on the part of its 
students and leaders alike for national development. The country needs men of integrity 
to move forward. It rewards individuals and the society at large by imbibing patriotic 
behaviour.
895
  For example, Chinua Achebe’s recent refusal of the “National Award” 
twice from the Nigerian Federal Government was due to poor governance of the country. 
Achebe addresses part of the issues covered in this study while rejecting National 
Honour Award by the government of his country Nigeria in reaction to its problems.896   
           (h)Maintaining independent Courts with impartial judges of high integrity is 
important as a federal institution that could truly enhance checks and balances between 
the Central and State Governments. It is envisaged that this initiative would bring about 
true justice in addressing ethnic, regional and religious tensions as well as social 
injustice that aggravate tensions in Nigeria. Nigeria must experience exceeding 
transformation when good leaders emerge with genuine dialogue, compromise on power 
shift, fair wealth distribution, and eliminating the so called godfathers who largely 
takeover the institutional role of the state. 
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         It is needful to emphasise at this point that federalism does not provide a panacea 
for all the ills of a multicultural society but it does offer a greater capacity for solving 
problems. However, a federal model in one state cannot be transferred wholesale into 
another. The success of any federal solution depends on how a given state copes with the 
group rights and cultural rights of its diverse people, and how it creates a feeling of 
security among them.  A crucial point to note is that any power sharing arrangement 
must empower the minorities and reduce their fear in the face of the natural power of the 
majorities. This is especially when a country has suffered from violent conflict as largely 
observed in Nigeria which Malaysia addressed considerably in its formative years. 
Tremendous and sustained efforts are needed by all ethnic groups to work for what is 
needed most: reconciliation and reconstruction of the country while rebuilding trust. 
This is important given the fact that ethnic conflict is more disruptive in Nigeria where 
the state totters in the face of tension due to pulls by its fragmented ethnic groups that 
feel territorially trapped in a country many regard as a colonial ideology. 
             It is also important to reiterate as noted in chapter two that ethnic groups in 
Malaysia live in clusters, which does not give room for intense conflict among them. 
This salient fact is also important in the analysis and arguments about Malaysia’s level 
of ethnic cohesion. Coversely, ethnic conflict in Nigeria is reinforced by its geoethnicity 
and unmet social demands aggravating fragmentations and conflict along ethnic and 
regional lines in which some ethnic groups feel terrirorially trapped in Nigeria. This 
assertion is premised on the fact that previous national conferences aimed at addressing 
ethnic and social conditions in Nigeria did not yield the expected results. Similar to past 
experiences, ethnic contestations, antagonism and secession also confronted President 
Jonathan’s Administration that prompted the convocation of the 2014 National 
Constitutional Conference to address ethnic demands in Nigeria. Yet, Nigeria’s most 
critical challenge is its fragmented ethnic groups which have transformed into parallel 
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remote centers of power built on suspicion as shown in chapter six. They have over the 
years developed less trust in a seemingly less-mediating central governing authority in 
its inability to resolve lingering socioeconomic disparities and power sharing problem in 
the system. This dividing line explains more struggle and ceaseless ethnic conflicts that 
have characterised Nigeria as more unstable and underdeveloped in comparison with 
Malaysia which explains the impairment to which Nigeria has been exposed. 
         But it a major fact in this study is that Malaysia’s ethnicised Federal Constitution 
makes room for Malay traditional and religious institutions at the apex of governance, 
and special rights of the Malays who are Malaysia’s ethnic majority. All of these 
uncommon practices have combined to influence Malay loyalty, morality, and 
moderation in politics resulted in inherent institutionalised discriminatory policies in 
favour of Malay ethnic majority as a solace against tension. This fact is profound in this 
study which shows how Malaysia has managed its ethnic conflict better than Nigeria.  
        Finally, this thesis suggests the need for a responsive mediating central governing 
authority with men of educational integrity at ‘resource centres and power’ in line with 
true federal principles to mitigate ethnic conflict in Nigeria. This study argues that no 
multiethnic nation-state makes substantial social progress or survives outside the axis of 
its interethnic balance. This is the critical challenge of the Nigerian government in 
nation-building! In effect, when the state serves its citizens well, ethnic conflict is 
reduced and none of its ethnic groups will feel entrapped in an invented nation-state, 
rather it becomes a nation for all with less contention. Truly, the ember of ethnic conflict 
is largely fanned and maintained by elite of perverse mind. For Nigeria to emerge united, 
free of ethnic antagonism, and become more progressive, the nation needs true practice 
of federalism and a change of the existing orthodoxy of its leadership and reminiscence 
of ethnic hegemony for a true national rebirth. 
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                                                      APPENDICES 
Appendix A,  Map 1.1  Map of Map of Nigeria 1954  
 Map of Nigeria 1954 Showing Three Federal Regions Created by British Colonial Rule (1954 
 
 
Source: Wilberforce Conference on Nigeria Federalism, New York, 1997 
 
 
Appendix B, Table 1.1                       NIGERIA,  POPULATION AND AREA, 1953 
                          AREA:                              373, 250 Square Miles. 
                          POPULATION:         31, 500, 000                                                                               
Northern Nigeria                                                                                             16, 840,000   
Eastern Nigeria                                                                                                  7, 218,000 
Western Nigeria                                                                                                 6, 087,000 
Southern Cameroons                                                                                             753,000 
Lagos                                                                                                                     272 ,000   
                      NON-AFRICAN POPULATION 
Northern Nigeria                                                                                                      4, 897 
Lagos                                                                                                                        4, 393 
Western Nigeria                                                                                                        2, 852 
Eastern Nigeria                                                                                                          2,578 
Southern Cameroons                                                                                                    634 
            Total                                                                                                            15,354   
                      PRINCIPAL TRIBES 
Hausa                                                                                                                 5, 540,000 
Igbo                                                                                                                    5, 426,000 
Yoruba                                                                                                               4, 849,000 
Fulani                                                                                                                 3,  030,000 
Kanuri                                                                                                                1, 301,000 
Tiv                                                                                                                          780,000 
Ibibio                                                                                                                      755,000 
Edo                                                                                                                         462,000 
Nupe                                                                                                                      358 ,000 
                        RELIGIONS 
Moslems                                                                                                          13, 655,000 
Christians                                                                                                           6, 371,000 
Other Religions                                                                                                 10,109,000 
Source: Nigerin Yearbook 1960, p. 13. Adapted from the 1952-53 Census. 
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       Appendix C Table 2.1   SOUTHERN NIGERIAN CENSUS, 1911 
ETHNIC GOUP      &     POPULATION ETHNIC GROUP    &     POPULTION 
Ibibios                                           210,000                                                                                                                                                                                           Ngbos     50,000
Sobos(Urhobos)                            209,000 Jekris(Itsekiris)                               35,000 
Ezzas                                             180,000 Nsokpongs                                      33,000 
Ezzis                                              140,000 Ekpaffias                                        33,000 
Anangs                                          119,000 Okobos                                           32,000 
Ishans                                            114,000 Ogbsayons(Ogbeyans)                     31,000 
Munchis(Tiv)                                  97,000  Bokis                                              31,000 
Kwales                                            97,000 Ikwes                                              30,000 
Ijaws(Ijo)                                        93,000 Igaras                                              29,000 
Kwas(Qua)                                     90,000 Abuas                                             26,000 
Ogonis                                            78,000 Yalas                                              26,000 
Bini                                                 75,000 Etchis(Etches)                                25,000 
Ikas                                                 74,000 Orons                                             25,000 
Efiks                                               62,000 Ekois                                              24,000 
Okpotos(Akpotos)                         60,000  Akoris(Akunakunas)                     22,000 
Ekets                                              60,000 Yakoras(Yakos)                             22,000 
Ikonors(Ikonos)                             50,000 Abos(Abohs)                                 21,000 
Kukurukus(Afenmai)                    50,000 New calabar(kalabari)                   20,000 
  Total:                                         1,858,000                                                         515,000 
Source:
 
 T. N. Tamuno,  The Evolution of the Nigerian State , The  Southern Phase ,  1898  -- 1914.  London: Longman 
group Ltd, 1972, p. 223. 
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Appendix D: Map 2.1   Map of Nigeria with Major Ethnic Groups   
 
 
Major Peoples: Yoruba, Igbo, Fulani, Hausa1 
 
 
 
 
Appendix E Table 2.2 Early Population of Malaysian Ethnic Groups 
Area                                                                   Population    % of Population  
Federation of Malay                      Malay:            3,125, 474                49.8%                   
(Malay Peninsula)                       Chinese:            2,333, 756               37.1% 
                                                   Indian:               696, 186               11.1% 
                                                     Total:            6,278, 578               98.0% 
Singapore                                     Malay:               197, 059               13.6% 
                                                 Chinese:            1,090, 596               75.4% 
                                                   Indian:               124, 084                8.6% 
                                                     Total:            1,445, 929              97.6% 
Sarawak                                       Malay:                129, 300               17.4% 
                                                 Chinese:                229, 154              30.8% 
                                                   Indian:                   2, 355                0.3% 
                                             Indigenous:               375, 154              50.9% 
                                                      Total:              744, 529              99.4% 
Sabah                                           Malay:                 26, 429                5.8% 
                                                  Chinese:               104, 542              23.8% 
                                                    Indian:                  3, 180               0.7% 
                                             Indigenous:              3 00, 941              66.2% 
                                                      Total:              454, 421              95.7% 
Federation of Malaysia                    Malay:           3,478, 262              38.8% 
(Grand Total)                               Chinese:           3,758, 048              42.1% 
                                                     Indian:             825, 805                9.2% 
                                               Indigenous:             676, 095               7.7%            
                                                                          8,923, 673              97.8% 
Europeans and Eurasians are included in the figures of total population of each category, but have not 
been listed separately since they do not constitute significant group within the unit that formed the 
federation of Malaya:Source: DemographicYearbook,  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Source: Net. Http://www.uiowa.edu/~africa/toc/countries/nigeria.html 
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Appendix F: Map 2.2 States in West Malaysia   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
                 West Malaysia is also referred to as Peninsular Malaysia       
 
 
Appendix G: Map 2.3   Map 2:  States in East Malaysia) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
East Malaysia also referred to as Borneo 
Source: http://www.mymalaysiabooks.com/malaysia/Malaysia_states.htm Sabah  & Sarawak 
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Appendix H Figure 6.1 
The Congregation of Ethnic Army and the 1966 Revolution in Nigeria                   
                                            
(1)       PRINCIPAL ACTORS AND VICTIMS IN THE JANUARY 15, 1966 REVOLUTION  
          Actors  Victims  
          Majors  Brigadiers  
1 Chukwuma K. Nzegwu Igbo Sam A. Ademulegun non-Igbo 
2 The EarlThe    Emmanuel Ifeajuna Igbo Z. Miamalari non-Igbo 
3 D. Okkafor Igbo Colonels  
4 C.I.Anuforo Igbo K. Mohamed non-Igbo 
5 I.H.Chukuka Igbo Ralf A. Sodeinde non-Igbo 
6 T.Onwuatuegwu Igbo Lt.Cols   
7 Adegbyega Non-igbo Y.Paur non-Igbo 
 Captains  A.C.Unegbu non-Igbo 
8 G.O.Oji Igbo Major Sam Adegoke non-Igbo 
19 Gbulie Igbo   
10 E.N.Nwobosi Igbo   
11 Lt.B.O.Oyewole non-igbo   
 2
nd
 LTs    
12 N.S.Nwokocha Igbo   
13 Ojukwu Igbo   
14 Azubuogu Igbo   
     
(2) PRINCIPAL ACTORS AND VICTIMS IN THE COUNTER-COUP OF JULY 29, 1966  
 Victims    
 Lt. Colonels  The counter-coup was masterminded   
1 I.C. Okoro Igbo and executed entirely by Northern   
2 G. Okonweze Igbo Officers in the army.  
 Majors    
3 T. E. Nzeogwu Igbo   
4 B. Nnamani Igbo   
5 C.C. Emelifeonwu Igbo   
6 J.I. Obienu Igbo   
7 P.C. Obi Igbo   
8 Ibanga Ekanem non-Igbo   
9 O.U.Isong non-Igbo   
10 A.Drummond non-Igbo   
 
Source: adopted from, Ema I. Orji, Issues on Ethnicity and Governance in Nigeria: A Universal Human 
Rights Perspective, Fordham International Law Journal, Volume 25 No.4 (2001):431-482, here p. 447. 
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Appendix I. Table 6.1 List of Ethnic and religious Clashes in Nigeria 1754-1817 &1960-2002 
Date Regime Description of Conflict 
1754-1817       Pre-Independence      Usmandan Fodio Jihad which led to the conquering of the Hausa  States in 
Northern Nigeria 
1960-1966   First Republic                External mutual respect but internal spite and Disaffection 
1967-1970       Civil war period            Although not a religious war, Biafran propaganda argued that they were fighting 
and resisting Muslim expansion.       
1970-1975        Gowon regime             Religious cold war. Christian Mission schools in the South were taken over by 
Govt. but Koranic schools in  the North were funded and preserved by Government 
1976 Murtala/Obasanjo Regime Sharia controversy during the drafting of the 1979 Constitution: To have provisions 
of the Sharia written into the laws providing for the supreme Court of          Nigeria. 
The compromise reached was the establishment of Sharia Courts and Customary 
Courts  of Appeal at the State level for those States that deserve them. 
18-  29/12/1980 Shagari Regime Kano Matatsine Riot when a Muslim sect attacked all those they considered pagans 
and infidels including Muslims that did not belong to their sect, approximately 
4,179people lost their lives. 
10/1982        Shagari Regime -            Burning of Churches in Kano. This has been described  as the first open and  
violent religious conflict between  Christians and Muslims allegedly caused by the 
laying of the foundation of a Christian Churh near a Mosque 
26/10/1982   Shagari Regime Two years after the Maitatsine riot, some members of the group escaped to 
Maiduguri and a violent episode   occurred when police tried to arrest  them for 
allegedly threatening the lives of the people of Bulumkutu area of Maiduguri. 
27/2/1984 Buhari Regime - The Jimeta uprising by members of Matatsine Movement who survived the 
Bulumkutu Riot 
29/5/1985 Buhari Regime With the crushing of the Jimeta riot, Musa Makanaki, who was in charge of defence 
in the Jimeta uprising  moved  to his home town Gombe and settled with other 
surviving Maitatsines. After a few months, another riot broke out. 
1/1986 Babangida Regime Nigeria applied for membership of Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) 
3/1986 Babangida Regime The Ilorin disturbances. A Christian procession during Palm Sunday angered the 
Muslims and they attacked the Christians. Eight persons were injured and two 
churches were damaged. 
3/5/1986 Babangida Regime The Students Union of the Usman dan Fodio University  organized a gala night to 
commemorate the   achievements of Nana Asaman, the daughter of Usmandan 
Fodio.  Among the events scheduled for the     night was a Miss Nana Beauty 
contest. This angered the Muslim students Society who thought that it was absolute 
abomination to associate the name of Nana, a   virtous woman with the parade of 
nude girls in the name of beauty contest. They stormed the scene of the programme 
which led to a fight. 
5/1986 Babangida Regime Clashes between Bassa and Gbagyi against Ebira in Nasarawa State 
5/5/1986 Babangida Regime On 5 May 1986, the University of Ibadan Statue of the risen Christ was burnt by 
unknown persons. 
18/7/1986 Babangida Regime Muslim Students Society of the University of Ibadan demonstrated on campus 
destroying offices and halls of residence with inscriptions “cross must give way to 
the mosque” 
6/3/1987 Babangida Regime During the Federation of Christian Students Annual    Fellowship in Kaduna, a 
preacher and convert from Islam, Bello Abubakar from Kano State was attacked by 
Muslims mainly of the Izala group. The crisis spread to Zaria and Kafanchan. The 
Christian Association of Nigeria recorded that 153 churches were burnt. 
3/1978 Babangida Regime In Zaria, the land that has been housing St. Michaels’ Church for 50 years belonged 
to Muslims and they demanded the land back. The Christians refused and it led to 
fighting 
5/1988 Babangida Regime A clash occurred between Izala Muslim movement and Darika Muslim group over 
disagreement on the  conduct of Ramadan Koranic reading 
6/1988 Babangida Regime Violence broke out at the Ahmadu Bello University    when it became clear that a 
Christian student would win the Students union election. Earlier, the Student (Mr. 
Stephen) had earlier campaigned on the slogan of “a vote for Steve is a vote for 
Christ” 
20-22/4/1991 Babangida Regime A ten year old Muslim boy bought Suya meat from a Christian. Another young boy 
challenged the boy that the Suya bought from the Christian could have been pork or 
dog meat. This led to fight. 
11/10/1991 Babangida Regime A group of Muslim Youth attacked people in Sabongari and Fagge area of Kano 
metropolis as a protest against the religious crusade organized by the State Chapter 
of Christian Association of Nigeria with a renown German  Preacher Reinhard 
Bonke. 
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10/1991 Babangida Regime A Story in Fun Times, a Daily Times of Nigeria Publication tried to 
show that a prostitute who repents can lead a decent life. He gave examples with the 
Bible & Koran. He mentioned that “Prophet Mohammed had an affair with a 
woman of easy virtue and later married her” . An Islamic preacher used this to 
mobilize against the Governor of the State who is a Christian and they destroyed 
the offices of Daily times. 
4/1992 Babangida Regime On 2 April 1992 there was an uprising in Bauchi which led to the destruction of 
many Churches and Mosque. The clash was over the use of abattoir in Tafawa 
Balewa town. The abattoir had three sections: one for the Izala Muslims, one for the 
other Muslims and the other for the Christians. The Muslims protested the 
“Desecration” of the abattoir and this led to the clash.  
5/1992 Babangida Regime In Zangon –Kataf, the Local Govt Chairman Mr. Ayoke, a Kataf Christian, ordered 
the relocation of a market. The order was opposed by Alhaji Mato, the Uncle of 
Dabo Lere the then Governor of Kaduna State. This led to a fight. 
12/4/1994   Abacha Regime Clashes as a result of protest over the appointment of an Hausa man as the 
Chairaman of the Caretaker Management Committee of Jos North Loca 
Government 
15/5/1999   Obasanjo Civilian Regime Struggle for Local Government Headquarter in Niger Delta. 200 people died. 
18/7/1999   Obasanjo Civilian Regime Clashes between Hausa and Yoruba over traditional rites in Shagamu. 60 people 
were killed. 
22/7/1999   Obasanjo Civilian Regime Clashes between Hausa and Yoruba, retaliation to Shagamu’s conflict in Kano. 70 
people were killed. 
5/8/1999 Obasanjo Civilian Regime Clashes between Ijaw & Ilaje over oil rich land in Niger Delta. 
11/8/1999  Obasanjo Civilian Regime Conflicts between Kutebs and Chambas (causes unknown) in Taraba state. 200 
people were killed. 
9/9/1999 Obasanjo Civilian Regime Conflict between the Yoruba separatist and the Oduas People Congress in Lagos. 
16 people were killed. 
4/10/1999   Obasanjo Civilian Regime Fight over the control of land near Nigeria’s biggest oil Refinery at Port Harcourt 
between Okrikas & Elemes 30 people were killed. 
21/11/1999 Obasanjo Civilian Regime Ijaw Youth were accused to have killed12 Policemen in Niger Delta. The retaliation 
of the Federal government to the above accusation by the Military led to the death 
of 60 civilians. 
25/11/1999 Obasanjo Civilian Regime Riot between Yoruba and Hausa over the control of a market in Lagos. 100 people 
died. 
21/2/2000 Obasanjo Civilian Fight between Muslim and Christian in Kaduna.100 people died. 
27/5/2000   Obasanjo Civilian  Crisis between the Urhobo and Itsekiri near the oilrich town of Warri in Niger 
Delta. 
 21/6/2000  Obasanjo Civilian Proclamation of Sharia law in Kano. 
25/6/2000   Obasanjo Civilian Fight between Tiv and Hausa speaking ethnic group in Nasarawa. 
15/10/2000 Obasanjo Civilian Four days fight between OPC and Hausa Fulaniin Lagos. 100 people died. 
18/10/2000 Obasanjo Civilian Three days fight between OPC and Muslim Hausa Fulani in Lagos. 100 people died 
26/11/2000 Obasanjo Civilian Implementation of Sharia Laws in Kano. 
7/8/2001     Obasanjo Civilian Conflicts between Muslims and Christians in Jos 165 died while 900 were injured. 
12-23/10/2001 Obasanjo Civilian Regime    Communal fights between the Tiv and Jukun. The Military intervention led to the 
death of 19 Soldiers and 200 Civilians. 
25/10/2001 Obasanjo Civilian Clash between Itsekiri and Uhrobo in Niger Delta. 5 people were killed Regime. 
11/2001 Obasanjo Civilian Regime Relocation of Sanga Local Government Headquarter in Kaduna State. 10 people 
were killed. 
4/5/2002 Obasanjo    Political parties crisis in Jos ( PDP) 
13/10/2001 Obasanjo Civilian Regime Violent riots in Kano against USA led air strikes on Afghanistan 8 People were 
killed and 5 Churches burnt.  
11/2001 Obasanjo Civilian Regime Another Ethnic crisis between Junkun/Chamba Settlement in Taraba State. 50 
people were killed. 
4/2002 Obasanjo Civilian Conflict between Olusola Saraki’s faction versus Governor Lawal’s faction at Ilorin 
the Headquarters of Kwara state. One killed and property worth  millions of Naira 
were destroyed. 
2/2002   Obasanjo Civilian  Ethnic Conflicts btw Hausa and Yoruba in Lagos. 
15/10/2002 Obasanjo Civilian Ethnic crisis in Jos, the headquarter of Plateau State 16  people killed.  
Sources, (Adopted from Udoidem), 1997:154-181, Ikubaje, 2002 and CFCR, 2002 http://www.encburma.net/index.php/feature/54-
feature/166-nigerias-experience-in-managing-the-challenges-of-ethnic-a-religious-diversity-through-constitutional-provisions.html 
Retrieved 23/4/2012 
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Appendix J. Table 6.2  Admissions to Nigerian Universities by zone of origin, 2000 -2001  
 
Zone,  Population in millions & 
(%) in National 
Population.  
Number of all post-
primary institutions in 
1989 & (%) of total.  
Number of admitted 
candidates to 
universities.  
Percentage of total 
university admissions  
Northwest 22.9 (25.8)  567 (9.7%)  2341  4.7  
Northeast  11.9 (13.4)  343 (5.9%)  1979  3.9  
Northcentral 12.1 (13.6)  1022 (17.5%)  5597  11.1  
Southwest  17.4 (19.6)  1575 (27.0%)  8763   17.4  
Southeast  10.8 (12.1)  1208 (20.7%)  19820  39.4  
Southsouth 13.3 (15.1)  1114 (19.1%)  11734  23.3  
Source: adapted from www.jambng.com; Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN), 2001; Tell, November 14
th
1994, p. 15.  
 
Appendix K. Table 6.3 Pattern of Project Allocation by the PTF, 1994-1998 
 
Source: Adapted from TELL Magazine1999: 24-27 - as cited by Ibaba S. Ibaba, Alienation and Militancy in Niger 
Delta, p. 17. 
 
Appendix L, Table 6.4    The Search for a Viable Federation in Nigeria. 
         Year Number of Regions or States Extent of Regional or State authority Regime Type 
1914                      2                                    Very high                                      Colonial                     
1954                      3                                    Very high                                      Colonial                   
1963                      4                                     High                                             Democratic                 
1967                    12                                     Low                                              Military                   
1976                    19                                     Low                                              Military                
1979                    19                                     Medium                                        Democratic               
1991                    30                                     Low                                              Military              
1996                    36                                     Very Low                                      Military          
1999                    36                                    Medium & rising                           Democratic            
        Source: World Bank. (see, as cited by Paden)
 2
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 John N. Paden, Unity with Diversity toward Democratic Federalism, in Robert I. Rothberg (ed), Crafting 
the New Nigeria: Confronting the Challenges, Lynne Rienne, Colorado: Publishers, Inc. 2004, p. 19. 
                                          Projects 
 
Geo-political Zones and component 
                         states 
Road rehabilitation       
programme: Total distance in 
km 
 
      Health rehabilitation      
Programme: Total 
number of contracts 
Education rehabilitation     
programme: Total 
number of contracts 
        No         %        No        %        No       % 
South-West: Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, 
Osun, Oyo. 
1,984.50  10.84        -        -        51    5.29 
South-East: Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, 
Imo 
977.9   5.34 31    6.53         
South-South (Niger Delta): Akwa-Ibom, 
Bayelsa, Cros River, Deta, Edo and Rivers 
 
1,478.03 
 
8.07 
 
31 
 
   6.53 
 
 188 
 
19.48 
North-West: Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Kebbi, 
Sokoto and Zamfara 
 
5,020.00 
 
27.42 
 
263 
 
 55.37 
 
336 
 
 34.82 
North-East:Adamawa, Bauchi, Bornu, 
Gombe, Taraba and Yobe 
 
4, 299.44 
 
23.48 
 
 2 
 
 0.42 
 
212 
 
 21.97 
Total 18310.9  475   965  
North 13,870.47 76 381  80  687  71 
South   4,440.43 24 94  20  278   29 
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Appendix M. Table 6.5 
  Some Nigerian Communities and their Reactions to the New Local Governments  
State LGA Community Nature of Dissatisfaction Community Reaction 
Anambara Oguta        Awgbu Wanted to be excised from 
Aguata    in order to be merged 
with Anaocha  
Protest to state govt.   
 Oyi Awkuzu Dissatisfaction over sitting of L.G 
Headquarter at Umnya 
Protest and petition to State 
Government 
 Awka Amawbia Dispute over control of old  Local 
Government Station 
Petition to state government. 
Dissatisfaction between 
Amawbia and Awka communities  
Bendel Enuani Ubuluku Dislike sitting of new Enuani L.G 
Headquarters at Nzukwa. 
Suspicion that a member of the 
state house who hails from 
Nzikwa worked agaist the interest 
of Ubuluku 
Protest march and demonstration 
at the premises of the Bendel 
State House of Assembly 
 Isemeyin Ibrede Wanted new L.G Headquaters 
sited in Ibrede not in Aboh. 
Feared its minority status among 
Ukwanu speaking people, wanted 
its own local government or 
merger with another Isoko-
speaking L.G.A 
Threat to expel all Aboh people 
in Ibrede and to recall Ibrede 
people from Aboh. 
 Etit-Ukwani  Otagb Ogbe Regard removal of Kwale as 
Headquarters of Etiti Ukwani as 
robbery. Kwale had been L.G 
Headquarters since 1930s 
Demonstration at  the State 
Assembly chanting war songs. 
Cross River Afi Nde Edor Edor is unhappy with sitting of 
L.G Headquarters outside Mgbaka 
Threat of court action against 
state government 
 Boki Okondi Not happy with sitting of L. G. 
Headquarters at Nwup 
Violent clash between Okomdi 
and Boki communities 
Imo Njaba Amucham These communities are opposed 
to having Umuaka as 
Headquarters of Njaba L.G.A 
Physical violence; Attack on 
chair and supervisory councilor 
of new L.G.A 
 Akaokwa 
Arondizogu 
Akokwa Dislike sitting of Headquarters  
of L.G.A at Ndiawa and 
inclusion of 3 Aro communities 
to another Senatorial district 
Protests, petitions, 
demonstrations, threats to go 
back to Ideato L.G.A. 
  Arondizogu Dissatisfaction over legislative 
decision to site L.G. 
Headquarters at Ikpachara 
Petition to the legislative and 
executive press release 
Ondo  Owo Irekari area 
(comprising 
Ido-Ani, 
Idogun, Afo, 
Sekere and 
Kajola) 
Dislike merger with Ekamaru Protest letters to State Governor 
and to speaker of Ondo House 
of Assembly. Threat court 
action against state government. 
  Ifedore 
Igbara-Oke 
Not happy with sitting of L.G. 
Headquarters at Ijara. Wanted 
L.G Headquarters sited at 
Mariwo 
Press conference threat to go to 
“war”. 
  Oke-Igbo Rejected merger with any other 
communities. Wanted its own 
L.G. 
Threat to declare a “peoples 
Republic of Ok-Igbo”. 
Rivers Bori Babbe Dislike over merger with Kenkhan 
district. Wanted its own district 
Petition State Governor 
Source: National Concord June 15, 1982; Daily Times May 28, 1982 
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Apendix  N Table 6.6                                                                           
                                                       LIST OF (25) PERSONALITIES INERVIEWED IN NIGERIA  
Name Title Profession Affiliation Rank     Age 
 
 Date Place/T  Origin 
Anyanwu, O. Dr. Lecturing University og 
kentucky 
Ass. Professor  42 7/8/2010 Email 
 
Eastern Nigeria 
(Igbo) 
Anyaehie,  E. O Dr. Lecturing Abia State 
University 
Professor 65 20/5/2012 Abia Eastern Nigeria 
(Igbo) 
Arisukwu, J. C. Mr. Civil Servant Civil service 
Owerri 
Deputy Director 52 20/3/2012  
Owerri 
Eastern Nigeria 
(Igbo) 
Anonimous 1 Mr. Crime 
Investigation 
EFCC Top Rank 55 10/3/2012 Email Middle Belt Jos 
(Hausa/Fulani) 
Anonymous 2 Mr. Crime Invest EFCC Top Rank 50 10/3/2012 2.10pm- 
2.45pm 
Western 
NigeriaYoruba) 
Anonymous 3  Mrs. Crime 
Investigation 
EFCC  Top Rank 55 11/3/2012 2.0pm – 
2.40pm 
 Niger –North 
(Hausa/Fulani) 
Anonymous 4 Mr. Crime 
Investigation 
EFCC Deputy Detective 48 11/3/2012 10.00am- 
10.30am 
North 
Maiduguri(Hausa/F) 
Anonymous 5 Mr. Crime Unit N.F.I.U  Deputy  Detective 53 11/3/2012 Email Western Nigeria 
(Yoruba) 
Ebirim, D. C Dr. Retired Alvan Ikoku 
Coll.of Edu. 
Associate Professor 70 17/3/2012 Email Eastern Nigeria 
(Igbo) 
Ezeji, E. Rev. 
Canon 
Clergy Anglican 
Communion 
Vicar 40 30/7/2010 Ehime 
9.ooam-
9.45am 
Eastern Nigeria 
(Igbo) 
Etiuzalle, E. L. Lawyer.  Aw Practice Law chamber 
Ikoyi-Lagos 
            ___ 50 12/7/2010 Abuja 
11.45am-
12.15pm 
Eastern Nigeria 
(Igbo) 
Hamaadama, S. Alh. Civil Servant 
(Retired) 
Fed.Urban 
Mass Transp. 
Deputy Director 70 28/6/2010 Abuja 2-
2.45pm 
North – Niger 
(Hausa/Fulani) 
Ibrahim. H. Mr. Crime Unit   Nigeria Fin. 
Int. Unit 
Deputy Detective __ 10/3/2012 Email Kaduna North 
(Hausa/Fulani) 
Madu, E. M. Dr. Consultant Owerri CEO 57 30/6/2010 Ehime 9-
945pm 
Eastern Nigeria 
(Igbo) 
Malami, H. U. Dr. Lecturer Usmandan F, 
Uni. Sokoto 
Senior Lecturer  - 15/3/2012 Email North – Sokoto 
(Hausa/Fulani) 
Musa, U.  Mr.  Public 
Servant 
CAC Abuja DM (Customer 
Service 
45 11/7/2010 Abuja 
12-
12.30pm 
Middle Belt 
Nonso, p. Mr. Crime 
Investigation 
     ___ Deputy Detective 
Superintendent 
 13/3/2012 Email Eastern Nigeria 
(Igbo) 
Nwankwo, F. O. Mr. Corporate 
Business 
Estate 
Management 
CEO 53 15/9/2010 Email  Eastern Nigeria 
(Igbo) 
Obe, A. A.  Mr. Media  
Service 
National 
Press center 
Head 52 29/6/2010 Abuja 9-
10am 
Western Nigeria 
(Yoruba) 
Okwun, C. Dr. Lecturer University of 
Malaya 
Senior Lecturer 54 15/9/2010 UM12.1-
1.10pm 
Eastern Nigeria 
(Igbo) 
Ofor,  N. Lawyer Law 
prractice 
Chamber 
Ikoyi, Lagos 
             __ 56 13/7/2010 Abuja 2-
230pm 
Eastern Nigeria 
(Igbo) 
Onyemechalu, N Lawyer Law practice Madona 
Chamber 
             __ ___ 13/7/2010 Abuja 1-
145pm 
Eastern Nigeria 
(Igbo) 
Oragba, T Pastor Gospel 
Minister 
Ambassey of 
Refuge 
Head 53 13/8/2010 5.25-
600pm 
Eastern Nigeria 
(Igbo) 
Sowe, M. A. Mr.  Civil 
Servant 
ICPC Abuja Head Public 
Enlightenement 
57 25/6/2010 Abuja 
12-
12.45pm 
Western Nigeria 
(Yoruba) 
Uchenna, O. A. Mr. Magistrate Judiciary Senior Magistrate 
Grade II 
- 15/3/2012 Email Eastern Nigeria 
(Igbo) 
Yusuf, A. H. Alh. Civil Servant Fed. Min. of 
Justice 
Deputy Director 65 28/6/2010 Abuja 3-
3.30pm 
Northern Nigeria 
(Hausa/Fulani) 
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Appendix O. Table 6.7 
                                         LIST OF  (25) PERSONALITIES INTERVIEWED IN MALAYSIA  
Name Title Profession Affiliation Rank Ag
e 
Date Place & Time Origin 
Abubakar, M. Professor 
 
Lecturing University of 
Malaya 
Academic 
Professor 
7o 31/1/2012 UM 
11.30-12pm 
Malay 
Amanath Dr. Academics Gemiland 
College 
Rector 6o 18/10/2010 KL office 12-
12.45pm 
Indian 
Amin, M. Mr. Civil Servant Min. of 
Information 
Senior Ex. Officer 60 21/10/2010 11.10-am 
11.45amKL 
Malay 
Asmi Dr. Researcher Asia Europe 
Institute UM 
Deputy CEO 60 19/10/2010 AEI 2.30-
3.20pm 
Malaya 
Anonymous Mr.  Civil servant    ___       ___ 83 26/5/2012 2-2.55pm Chinese 
Anonymous Mr. Retired     ____ 80 23/3/2012 11.20-11.40am Indian 
Chen, p. Dr. Clergy/ River of Life Head Pastor 70 16/2/2012 11.15-11.45 Chinese 
George, B. Dr. Surgeon George Specialist CEO 85 18/10/2010 KL office 2-
2.45pm 
Indian 
Hok, L.Y. Mr.      Estate 
Management 
 Rector 60 18/10/2010 KL 9.930am Chinese 
Hitam, M. Tun Deputy PM 
Malaysia (former) 
WIEF Chairman 78. 12/3/2012 KL office 2-
3.10pm 
Malay 
Inck, J. P Mr. Property Investment 
Adviser 
      ___ General Manager 66 11/5/2012 2-2.40pm Chinese 
 
Jaafar, M. A. Dato Former Envoy Asia Europe 
Institue UM 
Senior Research 
Fellow 
67 11/10/2010 AEI office 4-
4.45 pm 
Malay 
Jedidiah, J. D Pastor Clergy/Businee TAIC Pastor/CEO 60 10/10/2010 2-245pm Indian 
 Judah, A. Puan Civil Service Min. of Info/cult. Chief Ass. Sec 53 21/10/2010 Office 
10.15am-
10.50am 
Malay                 
Kim, K. K. Professor 
Emeritus 
Profesor (Retired) Human Rights 
Comm Malaysia 
Commissioner 78 11/10/2010 UM 1-1.45pm Chinese 
Kumar, J. Dr. Retired Pharmacist      _____        ____ 75 24/5/2012 Email Indian 
Leong, T. C. Mr. Retired Banker  MayBank Manager 70 25/5/2012 9.30-10am Chinese  
Selangor 
Mahathir, M. Tun Dr. Medical Doctor/ 
PM 
 Malaysia 4th Prime Minister 
Malaysia 
86 14/2/2012 Twin Tower 
3.30-4.15pm 
Malay 
Shafeje, M. A. B. Mr. Civil Servant Min of Info. Senier Ex. Officer 59 21/10/2010 11-11.45am Malay 
Shamsul A. B  Professor Senior Lecturer UKM.Founder, 
Institute of 
Ethnic Studies 
Malaysia’s 
Distinguished 
Professor 
68 23/3/2012 UKM office 9-
10am 
Malay 
Sivanathan, S. Engineer Mechanical   Stemtech      ____ 60 27/5/2012 11-11.45am  
Indian 
Tan, K.  Mr. Businessman Prince of Peace CEO 55 30/5/2012 OUG office 
5.5.45pm 
Chinese  
Theoh, L.  Mr. Banking     ___ Member, Board of 
Directors 
66 19/10/2012 9-9.45am PJ Chinese 
Wong, J. Mr. Training Master Weld 
Academy 
CEO 75 22/5/2012 Email Chinese 
Woon, E. Engineer Manufacturing 
 
   Auto CEO 60 28/5/2012 Email Chinese 
Sel’gor 
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Appendix P. Sample of Letter to Some of the Personalities Interviewed  
                                                                                                          
                                                                          Dept. of International Relations and Strategic Studies    
                                                                          Faculty of Arts and Social Science, University of Malaya  
                                                                         30/12/2011 
His Excellency,  
YABhg Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad 
Hon.President, Perdana L. Foundation, Putrajaya 
 
Your Excellency, 
               Request For 30 Minutes Academic Research Interview on Malaysia 
                                           Chukwunenye Clifford Njoku  Ph.D Candidate  AHA080051 UM. 
 
Subject refers; I am delighted to approach Your Excellency on this timely and important segment of my 
academic work at the University of Malaya that requires your comments. I am from Nigeria - a Ph.D 
student of International Relations at the University of Malaya. I am under the supervision of Assoc. Prof. 
Dr. Hamidin Abd, Hamid, and Dr Trevor Williams Parfitt as my second supervisor. The title of my thesis  
 
   The Challenges of  Ethnic Conflict  in a Plural Society, and Federalism in Mitigating Conflict: Nigeria and Malaysia in  
    Comparative Perspective 
 
Your Excellency, my arrival in Malaysia for my Master’s degree in 2005 opened my eyes to see a 
peaceful and progressive country, and I developed passion about Malaysian society which led to this fresh 
study, with the intent to compare and give suggestions for changes in Nigeria. The background of this 
study stems from misrule as the root of continued ethno-religious and political tensions in Nigeria since 
its birth as an independent nation. Although the core reason and the genesis of the country’s retarded 
growth and development in part stems from its pre-independence rivalries orchestrated by hatred and 
strong cleavages among its competing main ethnic groups that seems to portray 1960 independence as a 
mere conjecture. Of course, this was intensified by the British colonial rule.  
 
Today tension looms in Nigeria due to fierce contestations by groups, expressed in regular ethno-religious 
blood bath, communal conflicts, guerilla warfare etc. In a nutshell, Economic stagnation, mass poverty, 
endemic corruption, political instability, inept leadership, weak institutions, and ethno-religious conflicts 
are found elsewhere but Nigerian experience is fiercely dangerous. However, this thesis reconciles these 
differences and prevailing situation in Nigeria within the embrace of Malaysia – a harmonious, 
progressive and federated state whose similar society has peacefully endured for over half a century.  As a 
multiethnic, racial and religious society, (apart from May 1969 Riot), Malaysia presents a sharp contrast 
to Nigeria in terms of its political stability since its independence in 1957. Malaysia’s religious tolerance 
is enhanced by good moral orientation which has helped to forge good inter-ethnic relations, thus 
bringing about stability in governance.  In other words, Malaysia has been free from any form of conflict 
and military coups since its independence while corruption rate is minimal. Its fast growth and 
development has put the country ahead of most developing countries with the current target of attaining a 
fully-developed country by year 2020. 
 
Your Excellence, I decided to brief you on the background of this study for you to understand where I’m 
coming from. Given this, I intend to engage in this study to uncover the underlying factors that have for 
so long permitted poor governance in Nigeria. Sir, I did my “Candidature Defence” in November 2011, 
and the University Defence Evaluating Team was impressed about this research work. Sir, among others, 
your administration and positive impact on Malaysia feature greatly in this study. They suggested that 
apart from my previous interviews, that I should try and incorporate oral interview comments from Your 
Excellency to enhance the quality and authenticity of this scholarly work, hence this request. Please Your 
Excellence, I would be highly delighted if you could invite me within January 2012 for few minutes 
interview. My first supervisor, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hamidin Abd. Hamid (CEO Razak School of 
Government) is aware of this request. Your Excellency, I thank you immensely for this privilege and 
consideration. 
 
Yours faithfully,  
Chukwunenye Clifford Njoku 
Ph.D Candidate AHA080051  UM 
 
 
 
